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Stories retold 
Someone will rewrite our life 
And interpret the bare huts 
We built to shelter our bones. 
Someone will pin together 
Our suffering telling 
Clever narratives about 
Why we bore and brought up 
These children giving them 
The stories of our survival. 
Someone will chant about 
Why our homesteads were 
Round like craters, 
Why we were knit 
Together like the blankets 
Which keep our blood from 
Congealing. 
This life we have lived in earnest 
Will be twisted into gothic tales. 
These children we share 
Will be numbered and separated. 
Strangers will strive to understand 
These souls melted into each other, 
And my sister, 
Our life will stop meaning 
What it has meant to us 
Who have fought for sanity 
Who have combed for roots 
To charm hunger 
Who have hidden in jungles 
To evade the crash of boots. 
Our breath will become 
Someone else's story 
And it will never be restored to us, 
It will scamper away 
To create other lives 
In distant places. 
Susan Nalugwa Kiguli 
tussen jou en my 
hoe verskriklik 
hoe wanhopig 
hoe vernietig breek dit tussen jou en my 
soveel verwonding vir waarheid 
soveel verwoesting 
so min het oorgebly vir oorlewing 
waar gaan ans heen van hier? 
jou stem slinger 
in woede 
langs die kil snerpende sweep van my 
verlede 
hoe lank duur dit? 
hoe lank vir 'n stem 
om 'n ander te bereik 
in die land so bloeiende tussen ons 
die liggaam beroof 
die blind gefolterde keel 
die prys van die land van verskrikking 
is die grootte van 'n hart 
verdriet draal so alleen 
as die stemme van die angstiges verdrink 
op die wind 
jy gee nie op nie 
jy trap 'n voetpad oop met seer versigtige 
stappe 
jy sny my las 
in lig in - liefliker, ligter en kraniger as 
lied 
mag ek jou vashou my suster 
in die brose oopvou van 'n nuwe, 
enkele medewoord 
hoar! hoar die opwel van medemesnlike 
ta al 
in haar sagte weerlose skedel 
en hoar die stemme 
die talige stemme van die land 
alma! gedoop in die lettergreep van 
bloed en hoort 
be-hoort die land uiteindelik aan die 
stemme wat daarin woon 
le die land aan die voete van verhale 
Vanwee die verhale van verwondes 
le die land nie meer tussen ans nie 
maar binne-in 
sy haal asem 
gekalmeer na die litteken 
aan haar wonderbaarlike keel 
in die wieg van my skedel sing dit 
my tong my binneste oor 
die gaping van my hart 
sidder vorentoe na die buitelyn 
van 'n woordeskat nuut in sag, intieme 
keelklanke 
Antjie Krog* 
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Preface 
'Muthu ndi muthu nga munwe' 
Sevenda saying1 
'Die ungelosten Antagonismen der Realitiit 
kehren wieder in den Kunstwerken 
a/s die immanenten Probleme ihrer Form' 
Th. Adorno2 
This dissertation continues an ongoing interest in the significance of critical theory to South African 
studies, particularly in the contribution of the aesthetic to the utopian ideal of social justice. It grapples 
with divergent concerns that intersect in sometimes surprising ways. On the one hand, the practice of 
collaborative auto/biography in South Africa in which an oral narrator tells her life to a writing author who 
then publishes a book circulating in the public sphere. On the other hand, issues which are debated in 
contemporary critical theory by German, North- and Central-American philosophers. Combining these 
diverse concerns may stretch the patience of many readers. Those primarily interested in literature and in 
collaborative auto/biography in particular, may find the philosophical theory tedious. Those primarily 
interested in philosophy may find the application to collaborative auto/biography frivolous. I myself have 
often questioned the sense of this undertaking. Still, I hope that my attempt to shorten the distance 
between what is sometimes described as high theory and popular culture and to develop the contact 
points between ideas circulating in the southern and northern halves of the globe, is worth the frustration. 
The aim of this study is to shed light on two colla_ggrnti'le Cil.J~O/t:>iographies, namely Eunice N.3 and Elsa 
....------------- . - . - '· '"" ,_ 
Joubert's Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena4 and ~!l~fv1akanya and M~-~~~_r:~t McCord's The Calling of 
K,pti~ Me11<anya: a Memoir of So.uth Africcr as exemplars of the genre of collaborative auto/biography. It 
does so by proposing that collaborative auto/biography be approached within an intersubjectivist paradigm 
as outlined in contemporary critical theory. This includes second-generation critical theory represented by 
Jurgen Habermas and third generation feminist critical theory as espoused by Seyla Benhabib, Nancy 
Fraser, Maria Pia Lara, and Iris Young. The primary thesis is that truth and identity ci.re interi:;ubie£tively 
------~----'"'-- _, ·-- -- ~--"' 
generated and that this view, which is theoretically developed in contemporary critical theory, finds 
concrete expression in collaborative auto/biography. Consequently, the intersubjectivist approach 
promises to offer a theory that is more appropriate to the understanding of collaborative auto/biography as 
a genre in its own right than those theories arising from typically modem monological notions of truth and 
identity as expounded in Cartesian philosophy and classic autobiographies such as Rousseau's 
Confessions. Collaborative auto/biography, it is argued, constitutes a concrete case in which the claims of 
critical theory can be both explicated and tested for their validity. On the one hand this will reveal some of 
the deficits of the collaborative auto/biographies under discussion. At the same time, through such an 
Preface 
application of critical theory to collaborative auto/biography, some of the shortcomings in contemporary 
critical theory become evident, and possible ways in which these shortcomings may be addressed are 
identified. 
Inevitably a study like this will run up against various objections, the most important of which is that it 
constitutes multiple acts of appropriation, namely of African life narratives by occidental theory, and of 
women's writing by a masculinist theoretical framework applied by a white man. From the perspective of 
Afrocentricists it may be argued that placing the grid of occidental philosophy on the narratives of two 
African women constitutes an appropriation6; that an indigenous theory arising from within their practice 
would be more suitable to the texts7; and that one needs to work amongst one's 'own people' to create the 
conditions for the destruction of oppression.8 From the perspective of feminists it may be argued that the 
use of feminist critical theory and collaborative auto/biographies by women to prop up a failing critical 
theory and to salvage the position of white males within the academy also constitutes an act of 
appropriation (Lockett, 1996:7 and 8; and Ryan, 1996:33). 
These objections warrant more extensive consideration than I can devote to them here.9 A necessarily 
unsatisfactory, because truncated, reply is that this study springs from the belief that the imperative on 
white feminists to Sit Down and Listen10 also applies to white men. Listening to the collaborative life 
narratives of black women from South Africa alongside feminist critiques of Habermas's thought produced 
the idea that there is a decisive congeniality between collaborative auto/biography and views on 
intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory, suggesting that an encounter between the two could be of 
mutual benefit. When a white man goes beyond the initial stage of listening and enters the conversation 
as a speaker, he risks repeating acts of appropriation and depriving these writings of their specific feminist 
oppositional force (Lockett, 1996: 15).11 Participating in the conversation as both listener and speaker 
means opening up one's views to the critique of others. Refusing to do so would constitute a declaration 
of authoritarian autarchy and an act of self-imposed immaturity. Furthermore, in the words of Gyatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, the imperative on persons in hegemonic positions engaging in such exchanges is to 
examine 'the ways in which [they] are complicit with what [they] are so carefully and cleanly opposing' 
(Spivak, 1990:121, 122). This is a difficult task to which I do not believe I am equal. However, concurring 
with Jenny de Reuck, I believe that, instead of accepting 'a regime of silence', the 'engagement by white 
South African academics [must] be predicated upon a commitment to problematise the terms of that 
engagement. In a sense the demand is to resist silence, and to interrogate the hegemonic discourse that 
otherwise would inscribe us as its utterers' (1996:39). Seen from the 'opposite' side of the potential 
benefit to feminist theory, this exchange is informed by the assumption expressed on the dustcover of 
Joanna Meehan's (1995) Feminists Read Habermas, that the 'masters tools are worth pilfering.' Whilst it 
would be audacious to describe this dissertation as a piece of feminist scholarship, failing to acknowledge 
that it would not have been possible without the work of women and feminist scholars would constitute an 
even grosser act of intellectual dishonesty. 
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The study commences with a short contextualisation in chapter I. To begin with, I stake out some of the 
key theoretical choices I make regarding the philosophical theory with which I approach collaborative 
auto/biography. I then provide a synopsis of a selection of problems that pertain to collaborative 
auto/biography in South Africa and which will be dealt with in terms of the theory opted for. As far as the 
theoretical choices are concerned, two philosophical views on human interaction, knowledge, and identity 
are distinguished. According to the first philosophic view, human interaction, truth, and identity are 
primarily expressions of power. According to the second view, the principles of communicative action 
inform human interaction, the production of truth, and identity. It is this latter paradigm which I use as the 
basis for a theory of collaborative auto/biography. After identifying the choice of theoretical framework, I 
provide a brief overview of a few collaborative auto/biographies in South African writing. The purpose of 
this is to identify select moments in the genealogy of collaborative auto/biography and to compile a small 
catalogue of problems that characterise the genre and that will be dealt with in greater detail in the 
analyses of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. Finally, it is suggested 
that collaborative auto/biography constitutes an alternative tradition in South African writing - a tradition 
informed by the assumption of the possibility of understanding and recognition across differences rather 
than one informed by struggles for domination. 
In chapter II I outline the intersubjectivist approach to understanding, truth, and identity in contemporary 
critical theory. I begin with a sketch of, and objections to, modern monologistic subject philosophy. These 
Cartesian notions serve as a source of classic autobiography and which is still often used as the basis for 
the critique of collaborative auto/biography. The sketch of Cartesian monologism is followed by a 
synopsis of Habermas's speech act theory, with special attention paid to his consensus theory of truth. 
This paves the way for a discussion of the four validity claims raised in every speech act and the 
intersubjective generation of truth, identity, justice, and the speech system. 
In chapters Ill, IV, and V Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya are 
analysed as sites of the intersubjective generation of truth and identity in the medium of speech. This 
allows for the identificatio~~f deficits in the two collaborative auto/biographies analysed; for the explication 
of the theoretical insights derived from contemporary critical theory in two extensive examples; for the 
identification of deficits in the theory; and for suggestions of possible improvements drawing on the 
feminist critical theory of Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Maria Pia Lara and Iris Young. 12 Chapter Ill 
focuses on the consensus theory of validity, according to which the validity of an utterance depends on 
whether rational consensus can be established between speakers and addressees. It is shown that the 
collaborators on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya understood their 
utterances at least in part to be aimed at establishing such rational consensus. Although this search for 
consensus may be informed by the ideal of seeking rational agreement, as real dialogue it can be 
expected that some non-rational forces impinge on this process. Consequently the potentially distorting 
influences on the production of consensus, namely the steering mechanisms money and power are 
discussed. It is concluded that the consensus theory of validity be extended to include an account of the 
3 
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relationship between rational consensus and non-rational forces (like emotions and the effects of the 
steering mechanisms money and power) which impact on consensus-seeking interaction in cases of non-
ideal communication. 
Chapter IV focuses on the intersubjective generation of the truth about an oral narrator's life. It identifies a 
deficit in Habermas's consensus theory of truth, which fails to distinguish sufficiently between truth claims 
in the natural sciences and validity claims about past truths that constitute the largest part of collaborative 
auto/biographies. Since collaborative auto/biographies are written transformations of original oral 
narrative self-representations, the transformation of the oral narrator's claims into its final form is explored. 
Here specific attention is paid to the rhetorical techniques used in the novelization of the oral narrative, 
concentrating on the ways in which these techniques of novelization affect the truth-value of the 
utterances. An analysis of some of these techniques leads to the conclusion that the distinction between 
novelization and fictionalization makes it possible to distinguish merely novelized utterances, in which 
truth-value is sustained, from fictionalized ones, in which truth-value is suspended. 
Chapter V deals with the intersubjective generation of identity. It picks up on Habermas's assertion that 
autobiographies are appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public for the choices and values 
(notions of the good life) that inform an author's identity. It starts with an outline of the notions of 
recognition held by the collaborators on The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena. Then it looks at the rhetorical techniques used by the writing authors to elicit recognition for the 
oral narrators from the reading public. Distinguishing between the formal public sphere of state 
institutions and the informal public sphere of civil society and, within the informal public sphere, between 
alternative-, counter-, and hegemonic publics it is suggested that collaborative auto/biographies constitute 
an interface between various public spheres. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the nature of the 
appeals for recognition and the responses to these appeals by the reading public. It is suggested that 
collaborative auto/biographies constitute two types of appeals for recognition: one which prioritises 
similarity, and one which prioritises difference. The appeal for recognition which prioritises similarity is an 
appeal for the recognition of the oral narrator as an equal interlocutor in the communicative community. 
The appeal for recognition which prioritises difference is an appeal for recognition addressed to the 
reading public for the oral narrator's distinct values based on the assumption that only those values which 
find universal acceptance are legitimate. 
The study concludes with chapter VI in which the limits of this inquiry and some of the questions it leaves 
open are identified. It is argued that collaborative auto/biography is an incompletely evolved genre. 
Slowly outgrowing its origins in colonial administration and the sciences of man, it is poised on the brink of 
new potentials. Whilst inequalities in writing and rhetorical skills and access to the publishing industry and 
the public sphere will remain in some cases (for example with the differently abled), the aim of 
collaborative auto/biography is to abolish those very conditions of inequality which still make collaborative 
auto/biography necessary. Thus the success of collaborative auto/biographies like Die Swerfjare van 
4 
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Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya lies in introducing a new generation of collaborative 
texts in which equals collaborate, thus giving concrete form to the dictum that in the process of 
enlightenment there are only participants. 
Given the nature of some of the material, referencing is not always as complete or systematic as 
convention demands. In the case of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena I have drawn on Elsa Joubert's 
papers. These are classified as the Elsa Joubert Collection nr. 256, held in the Manuscripts Division of 
the J. S. Gericke Library, University of Stellenbosch. Complete cataloguing has not yet been undertaken 
but the following broad preliminary categories apply. The transcripts of the interviews with Eunice N., 
along with drafts of the book are in box 15. The notes Joubert made while writing the book and after, 
along with speeches and notes for speeches are in boxes 14 - 15. Correspondence between Joubert and 
·various publishers and letters from readers are in boxes 12 - 13. Reviews and newspaper clippings are in 
boxes 20 - 23. Whilst I have attempted to be as precise as possible when referring to these documents, 
some references are incomplete. This pertains especially to reviews and other clippings taken from the 
press that do not always contain page numbers or other bibliographic details. It also pertains to the 
transcript of the interviews between Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, which took place in 1977. The original 
tape recordings could not be traced. At the time of the publication of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, 
Joubert's husband, fearing state repression, had sealed them along with the transcripts and drafts, and 
took these to a location unknown to Joubert, where they remained for several years. The transcripts and 
drafts are extant. The page numbers of the transcripts are erratic and inconsistent. Where there are 
page numbers I refer to them. Where these are lacking I try to identify the sources as closely as possible. 
Two interviews on her collaboration with Eunice N. were conducted with Joubert, one in January, and one 
in August 2000. References to these are cited as Interview. Extracts from these interviews are to be 
published in Judith LOtge Coullie, Thengani Ngwenya and Stephan Meyer (eds). These are referred to as 
Joubert interviewed by Stephan Meyer (forthcoming). 
McCord recorded and re-recorded the interviews with Katie Makanya in Durban in 1954 on three tapes, 
which are no longer extant. McCord has kindly made the transcript of the interviews available to me. 
These can now also be consulted in the Killie Campbell Library in Durban. Here too page numbers are 
erratic and inconsistent. Again, I refer to original references as far and as closely as possible. I 
conducted an interview with McCord in Boston in 1998 and have corresponded with her since. Parts of 
the interview have been published. References to these are given in the standard manner. References to 
unpublished parts of the interview are cited as Interview. 
Quotes are largely in the original language. Where published translations of German or Afrikaans texts 
are available I quote these. Page numbers in () refer to the original editions. Page numbers in [] refer to 
the translated publications. Where the published English translation could not be consulted, where there 
is no such translation available, or where I have seen need to adapt it, I give my own translation and 
indicate it as such. Quotes from the transcripts are rendered uncorrected as they are without the 
conventional markings (sic. or[!]) to indicate typographic, grammatical, or idiomatic errors. 
5 
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I largely use the pronoun she to refer to persons whose sex is not identified. Where it aids clarity, for 
example where several persons are referred to, I sometimes distinguish these with he and she. 
A study like this may bear the name of one person, a convention which clashes with the very thesis it 
explores, namely that truth and identity are intersubjectively generated. Yet, as with all other texts bearing 
the name of a single author, this study too could not have come about without the contributions of many 
people. Many of these remain unnamed participants in a communicative community in which the original 
sources of ideas can no longer be pinned down. Amongst these many interlocutors I would like to single 
out and thank the writing authors Margaret McCord and Elsa Joubert for making valuable materials 
available to me, for their time and the various exchanges which enabled me to formulate the original idea. 
Materials, links, and clues that made it possible to pursue and develop the idea were provided by Dawie 
Malan of the University of South Africa Library and Hannah Botha of the Gericke Library. Comments on 
papers held at the auto/biography conference at Peking University in 1998 and at the International 
Comparative Literature Association Conference in Pretoria in 2000 helped me to refine it. 
Ploughing through innumerable unintelligible formulations in various drafts, Pamela Ryan tirelessly 
challenged me to be more precise and clear. She patiently picked away at the weak points in the structure 
and argument. When both of us were facing the pressure of rapidly advancing deadlines, she gently 
motivated me to persevere. Anita Moore and Thomas Olver's expeditious and professional editing and 
comments contributed immensely to the readability of the text. Without Elma Meyer's invaluable 
assistance with the intricacies of the layout, the text would not have reached its final form. This 
dissertation is dedicated to my mother, who encouraged me from the start, and whose crucial telephone 
call ensured that I saw it through to the end. Needless to say, I am responsible for the many remaining 
shortcomings. 
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Collaborative auto/biography 
and the emergence of an alternative tradition in South African writing 
'Eunice en ek praat. Sy se: madam, ek het nie meer woorde nie'1 
Elsa Joubert, 3September1976. 
'When I was in England 
a very silly white man came to me and said he would not mind being married with me. 
And I said to him you are talking nonsense. 
It is not right for a white and a black to mix. 
God made the white people here and he made the black people in Africa all together 
and he divided their countries by a very wide river that the people could not cross 12 
Katie Makanya, 1954. 
Truth and identity are intersubjectively generated. This philosophic claim is explicated, explored, and 
scrutinised for its validity in an analysis of two South African collaborative auto/biographies, namely Eunice 
N. and Elsa Joubert's Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord's The 
Calling of Katie Makanya. Although it draws heavily on philosophy, the direction of focus is mainly from 
the philosophical theory to collaborative auto/biography. The philosophical argument is not evaluated in 
purely philosophical terms. However modest the benefit of such an encounter to philosophy, it is 
undertaken in the belief that philosophical theses have to withstand the test of interdisciplinary scrutiny 
and empirical application. 
Collaborative autobiography is an impure genre fraught with many problems.3 Traversing the spaces 
between autobiography and biography; orature and literature; coloniser and colonised; speakers and 
addressees; private self-reflection and public circulation it confounds the neat categories which literary 
scholars are often trained to uphold. It is this ambiguity that necessitates an exploration of the genre as 
such (Wicomb, 1996:51). But it is also in this messiness that the value of collaborative auto/biography 
resides. This study implies that the purported clarity that results from a narrow focus on each of the tidy 
categories traditionally treated in isolation can only be had at the cost of losing sight of the complex and 
sometimes confounding relationships between them. Often collaborative auto/biographies have been 
forced into these neat categories and consequently mistakenly premised on ideas gleaned from traditional 
autobiography, that is monological notions of the subject and the production of truth about his life.4 This 
misunderstanding is exacerbated by theoretical approaches, drawing on modern occidental philosophy, 
which interpret these texts as if they were a deficient attempt at emulating traditional autobiography. In 
I Collaborative auto/biography and the emergence of an alternative tradition in South African writing 
taking collaborative auto/biography as a genre in its own right, and developing an intersubjectivist theory 
appropriate to its production, the text itself, and its reception, the present study hopes to counter this 
widespread category mistake. 5 
The impurity of this genre is also a reason for some of the acrimonious debates that surround it.6 Often 
situated in the colonial contact zone, collaborative auto/biography ignites discussions about intercultural 
understanding, exploitation, and relationships of emancipation and oppression within the context of 
modernity. The scepticism with which collaborative auto/biography is regarded as implicated in various 
projects of domination is of course particularly valid in South Africa with its long tradition of institutionalised 
and informal discrimination. Suggesting that collaborative auto/biographies be read with the aid of an 
intersubjectivist theory informed by the emancipatory interest inherent in speech, implies that such texts 
should meet certain normative requirements if they are to contribute to a just society in which subjects can 
authentically interpret themselves in a democratic public sphere.7 
Any larger inquiry has unreflected assumptions and latent implications. One of the many implicit choices 
of this study is to side against the widespread view of human interaction, knowledge and identity as effects 
of the will to power.8 According to such a view, which has its modern European proponents in Niccolo 
Machiavelli9 and Thomas Hobbes10, and contemporary advocates in Nietzsche11 and Foucault12, 
knowledge and power are mutually constitutive and social interaction is essentially a struggle for 
domination over the other. Freedom, according to this monological view, consists primarily in freedom 
from others. Hobbes' social atomism and anthropological pessimism expressed in his dictum that homo 
homini lupus (1983:3) often combines in contemporary thought with a view which prioritises difference and 
concludes from this that religious, cultural, ethnic, racial, gender, class and other differences constitute 
unbridgeable divides amongst individuals as well as collectives. Furthermore, so the argument runs, all 
acts of understanding, especially those across difference, are acts of misunderstanding.13 Someone who 
shares these pessimistic views will naturally agree with the position that South African culture in general, 
and its literature in particular, is a culture of struggles for appropriation, resistance and re-appropriation. 14 
In his influential master - bondsman chapter, Hegel (1986, vol 3: 145-154) develops this modern notion 
epitomised by Machiavelli and Hobbes, that social relations are characterised by battles for survival and 
domination. These are understood as battles against domination by the other, which can only be achieved 
if the other is dominated and instrumentalised. According to Hegel, this battle to death is suspended in 
relations of mastery and slavery. Recent interpretations have made the point that the account Hegel 
develops in The Phenomenology of Mind is incongruous. Jessica Benjamin (1990:51-84) and Axel 
Honneth (1992:11-105) have questioned the quality of the recognition which the master effects from the 
slave, noting that if 'I completely control the other, then the other ceases to exist' and cannot grant me the 
recognition I need, namely that bestowed by an equal, 'and if the other completely controls me, then I 
cease to exist' and cannot grant her the recognition she needs. Given that a 'condition of our own 
8 
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independent existence is recognizing the other,' Benjamin concludes that, 'true independence means 
sustaining the essential tension of these contradictory impulses; that is, both asserting the self and 
recognizing the other. Domination is the consequence of refusing this condition' (Benjamin; 1990:53, See 
also Inwood, 1992:246).15 This study intimates that the general view of human interaction as purely or 
primarily a struggle for domination, and its transference to South African literature in particular, pays 
insufficient attention to detail and fails to notice instances of emerging understanding and recognition 
where these do exist. 
It is also suggested that the vulgar deconstructionist assertion that all understanding is misunderstanding 16 
and the thesis that understanding across difference is impossible, constitute performative contradictions.17 
Furthermore, even if we do take the assertion that all understanding is misunderstanding as our starting 
point, a one-sided concern with misunderstanding does not do justice to the full dictum. Therefore 
attention also needs to be paid to the first term in the equation. This focus does not flow from a na"ive 
belief in the possibilities of understanding across differences pegged to power, but arises from the 
(deconstructionist) assertion that if misunderstanding is internal to understanding then (even on 
deconstructionist terms) we need to give an account of both the possibility of misunderstanding and 
understanding, and their relationship to each other. 18 To a certain extent it is immaterial whether one 
starts with understanding or misunderstanding as the first term if one explains both of them in relation to 
each other. Such an account of 'the possibility of communication across wide differences of culture and 
social position,' is necessary if we want to make sense of the phenomenon of language and translatability 
and, according to Iris Young, essential for a 'theory of democratic discussion useful to the contemporary 
world' ( 1996: 132). 
In turning attention to the first term, this study suggests that it is of value to seek traces of another tradition 
in South African writing, one premised on the assumption of the possibility of successful communication 
and recognition across difference, which has been overshadowed by struggles for domination. Informing 
such an interest in this other tradition of communicative action is the view which runs counter to 
Machiavelli and Hobbes' positions and is given a specific African inflection in Afropessimist positions. This 
alternative regards communication and recognition across difference as immanent to all speech and 
central to the possibility of human survival. It is a basic idea that is present in the writings of 
Mediterranean authors predating the common era, like Plato and Aristotle, modern North Europeans like 
Hegel and Marx, and contemporaries like the Frankfurt philosopher Jurgen Habermas, the Jewish-Turkish 
Yale philosopher Seyla Benhabib, North Americans like Nancy Fraser and Iris Young, and the Mexican 
philosopher and literary theorist Maria Pia Lara. It also has an established tradition in the languages of 
Southern Africa and has gained currency within the public sphere through its use in the negotiated 
settlement of the early nineties, which culminated in a co-authored constitution and in the proceedings of 
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Tutu, 1999:34-36). According to this view, human beings are 
social and political animals19, or in the proverbs from six Southern African languages cited by Ellen 
Kuzwayo (1990:122) "'Motho ke motho ka motho yo mangwe"'.20 
This study selects one space of social interaction, namely collaborative auto/biography, and explores the 
extent to which it constitutes a site of such communicative action.21 This encounter between theories of 
intersubjectivity and collaborative auto/biography enables us to bring to light the tradition of understanding 
and recognition which has been eclipsed by that of domination and appropriation. It also allows us to see 
the contribution of posVcolonial writing to a transformation of the monological notion of the subject typical 
of occidental modernity and classic autobiography into an intersubjectivist notion of truth and identity. In 
South Africa, writing the lives of others on the basis of their oral self-representation has a long history, a 
varied application, and is found in a range of genres. These practices range from administrative and 
government reports, to journalistic pieces, auto-ethnography, resistance and commemorative writing, 
researches into the science of man, and literary endeavours. If we focus on writing in Afrikaans and 
English, the genealogy of collaborative auto/biography has its roots in the dubious origins of colonial 
writing stretching back to Jan Van Riebeeck (1619 -1677) and Thomas Pringle (1789 - 1834). 
Amongst other things Van Riebeeck's Daghverhaal (1651 - 1662), kept for the benefit of his employer the 
Dutch East India Company, includes dealings with the indigenous peoples.22 Besides the many accounts 
with faceless groupings, are the recurring vignettes of three individuals, Harry (Herry), Doman and Krotoa, 
the 'Hottentot girl' who 'had lived with us and had been given the name Eva' (Van Riebeeck; 1952, vol I: 
208).23 The treatment of Krotoa Eva shows how the imbrication of the colonial project with narrative 
accounts of the administering self, often results in the colonising subject occupying the autobiographical 
centre, with the indigenous peoples featuring as objects in biographical cameos. Mention of Krotoa Eva, 
for example is only marginal in the first volume of Van Riebeeck's journal. Gradually, as her position as 
interpreter, informant, mediator (1954, vol II: 170, 183), advisor (ibid.:287, 289), and strategist (ibid.:329, 
331) becomes more important she features more regularly, but also in less favourable light. Van 
Riebeeck depicts her as increasingly unruly, straining to convince his Dutch readers that he is in control. 
Paradoxically, this control consists largely of manipulating conflicts between her, Harry and Doman as a 
means of tapping information from them that can be used to establish his power over the local population. 
Many of these biographical vignettes served the early colonial project and its successors as sources of 
anthropological knowledge believed to be useful for controlling the indigene, construed as the other 
(Am pie Coetzee; 1989:41).24 This mixture of textual self-orientation, travel writing, and administrative 
report in which the writing of the othered is constitutive initiates the false start to a tradition out of which 
various versions of more fully fledged collaborative auto/biographical practice would evolve. 
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One hundred and seventy years later, with the arrival of the 1820 settlers, similar struggles can be found 
in South African writing in English albeit within different parameters. Thomas Pringle25 who is considered 
a founder of South African writing in English, was a journalist who had gained extensive experience in 
publishing, poetic composition, and the editing of life-writing in Edinburgh. Unlike Van Riebeeck's, 
Pringle's writing was not embedded in the early economic enterprise of merchant colonialism but in the 
booming colonial empire. As a journalist, his writing was not addressed to the governing body of a 
company who employed him, but to a critical reading public, both in Britain and in South Africa. Set in the 
colonial context in which frontier wars, slavery26 , and exploitation were rife, Pringle's writings constitute 
attempts at crossing divides of power caught in the dialectic struggle between master and slave. Although 
a champion of the abolitionist cause, which wanted to bring such relationships to an end, Pringle's writings 
cannot escape this Hegelian dialectic between a master and slave who remain pitted against each other in 
a struggle towards, but always stopping short of death.27 On the one hand, he subscribes to the principles 
of communicative action in calling for a 'system of just and honourable dealing, upon terms of fair 
reciprocity' mediated by the word of scripture and the law (Pringle, 1834:474, 468 and 475-476. e.a). On 
the other, the overriding relations in his poems are those described by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hegel of 
oppressors and oppressed locked in insoluble struggles for domination with no hope of reciprocal 
understanding and recognition. 
His canonised 'Afar in the Desert' is a case in point. The narrator of the poem perceives himself as 
inscrutable to his African companion ('With sadness of heart which no stranger can scan, I I fly to the 
Desert afar from man!' (Pringle, 1912:244-247. e.a.)). And his companion too is pre-emptively silenced 
by the narrator's description of him ('Afar in the Desert I love to ride, I With the silent "Bush-boy" alone by 
my side' (e.a.)). Communication between people is ultimately blotted out by the deafening silence of the 
empty land {'the barren earth and burning sky I and the blank28 horizon, round and round, I Spread - void 
of living sight or sound'), or by the capitalised voice of god ("'A still small voice' comes through the wild [ ... ] 
I Saying - MAN IS DISTANT, BUT GOD IS NEAR!). Where people cannot relate to each other 
communicatively in the medium of actual speech, the only communication that remains is the penetration 
of the heart by god. Ultimately the speaker's optimistic claim in 'The Cape of Storms', that in South Africa, 
'dwell kind hearts which time nor place can chill - I Loved Kindred and congenial Friends sincere', 
(Pringle, 1912:167), remains overshadowed by his own pessimism regarding the possibility of 
understanding and recognition across differences of race. 
This struggle for domination is further developed in his dramatic monologue 'Makanna's Gathering' in 
which the chief addresses his fellow Xhosa warriors, 'To sweep the White Men from the earth' who 'Did 
through our land like locusts range!', 'And drive them to the sea' (Pringle; 1912:215-216).29 Whereas Van 
Riebeeck's account of Eva's life is problematic in its objectification and subsumption of her subjectivity 
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under his, Pringle's advocatory calls for violent resistance to domination are contradictory. As imagined 
calls to resistance they question the possibility of understanding and recognition across the master - slave 
divide in the medium of language. These speech acts however assume the possibility of reciprocal 
understanding and recognition of interlocutors. There is thus a conflict between the implicit scepticism 
regarding communication and recognition across the master - slave divide on the one hand, and Pringle's 
assumption that the masters can understand the (potential) slaves' desire for freedom. 
In contrast to the poem on Makanna, the poem 'Bechuana Boy' constitutes early poetic evidence, from 
Pringle's own life, of the belief in the possibility of understanding and recognition across the divide of 
difference. The poem is a miniature collaborative auto/biography in which Pringle's voice frames that of a 
Bechuana boy Pringle and his wife Mary had adopted and taken with them to England. The poem 
alternates between a first person narrator, who situates the relationship between the boy and his adoptive 
family (Pringle and his wife- see Pringle's editorial note in Pringle, 1912:255-256), and the Bechuana boy 
who speaks of his life before meeting Pringle. 'Bechuana Boy' is a transition piece between advocatory 
discourse, in which Pringle speaks on behalf of another subject (like Makanna), and facilitating discourse 
in which Pringle mediates the speaking of another subject, as he would do in 1831 with The History of 
Mary Prince.30 
It is not surprising that this type of instrumentalisation, objectification, and oppression evident in South 
African society and writing should call forth resistance as it is extensively spelled out in Natoo Babenia and 
Ian Edwards' Memoirs of a Saboteur (1995). However, as long as the empire strikes back on the terms 
set by empire, as advocated by Pringle (in 'Makanna's Gathering'), Fanon (1986:216-222), and Winnie 
Mandela ('you have to use the language they understand: to have peace, you must be violent' (1985:89 
and 126-127)), and Lewis Nkosi (1983:108), it is still caught in the law of empire which is the will to power, 
and in the binary alternative between dominating or being dominated. But when empire starts talking 
back31 , or when it resists colonial violence and oppression with non-violence in the ways that emerged in 
South Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century (Gandhi, 1972:95-107), it introduces a shift to a 
different paradigm in which subjects engage with each other communicatively, seeking reciprocal 
understanding and recognition between equals in the medium of speech and action, refusing the false 
option between either dominating or being dominated (Arendt, 1981:34). The emergence of an empire 
which talks back, means a double paradigm shift: from unilateral speech about the othered, to 
communicative action, and from battles for domination to struggles for recognition. 32 An empire which 
talks back thereby asserts that the colonial space is not the assumed void onto which the coloniser can 
project his fears and I or desires in order to silence or subject them, as, for example, Pringle does in 'Afar 
in the desert', or Conrad does in Heart of Darkness. An empire which talks back breaks the colonial 
monologue, in which the othered could only be heard at the price of speaking in the master's voice. 
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In the twentieth century there is both an intensification and diversification of this talking back in the writings 
of black authors from South Africa (see Nkosi, 1983:107-117 and Watts, 1989:107-126). Furthermore, 
the originally mixed genres in which the lives of indigenous peoples receive punctual attention from 
Europeans undergo greater differentiation. On the level of genre, literary and scientific33 texts become 
more distinguishable from journalistic and administrative ones. And the lives of indigenous people receive 
more attention in themselves, so that they no longer just serve as the periphery held together by the 
narratives of the self-centring lives of the authors. In the sciences of man, the writing of other's lives 
increases exponentially in the twentieth century34 as ethnology and anthropology gain in scientific status in 
the occidental academy, as scientific writing replaces the lay writing35 of travellers as the authoritative 
mode for writing on indigenous people; and as fieldwork becomes more prevalent (Tadlock, 1991:70). 
The intensification is accompanied by greater internal diversification as distinctions emerge between the 
ethnologically, the psychologically, the sociologically, and the historically oriented texts, all of which grow 
more academic in the manner in which research is conducted and the narrative conveyed in print. Within 
this paradigm a number of book-length auto/biographies emerge36 which no longer shrink the lives of oral 
narrators into vignettes sandwiched into the travel writings of Europeans. Although the perspective in 
these books may remain the writing authors', the focus is no longer their lives but the oral narrators'. 
The relative naivety with which Van Riebeeck and Pringle write the lives of their interlocutors becomes 
increasingly troubled in the twentieth century as authors and critics reflect on the conditions of the 
possibility of writing the truth about another's life and recognising her across differences pegged to power 
and on the ways in which the relations of production impact on the truths produced about others.37 From 
the ethnographic portraits of Ten Africans38; via the fully fledged ethnological study of Nisa39; the 
ethnopsychology of Zulu Woman40 and Black Hamlet41; the auto-ethnography of Noni Jabavu's The Ochre 
People42, Mark Mathabane's African Women43 and the eye-witness 'diaries' of Maria Tholo44; the literacy 
and creative writing projects of Mirriam Moleleki's This is My Life45 and Jonathan Morgan's Finding Mr 
Madini46; the resistance writing of Winnie Mandala's Part of My Soul Went with Him47, the workerist Vukani 
Makhosikazi48 and John Mile's commemorative Kroniek uit die Doofpot49 ; to Charles van Onselen's oral 
history of Kas Maine50 a range of views on the conditions of the possibility of understanding and 
recognition across difference and the impact of the relations of production upon the truth that is produced 
can be discerned. I foreground a few of the issues that crystallise over time and that will be discussed 
with reference to The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. 
One of the most prominent recurring issues is the problem of understanding across difference. This 
question goes back for modem Europeans to the German Romantic tradition of hermeneutics.51 
Confronted with texts from the past, from various cultures, and in various languages, from Europe, Asia, 
and the New World, early hermeneutics inquired into the possibility and conditions under which they could 
understand these texts. Authors like Herder (1993:104-112) and Humboldt considered diverse cultures, 
languages, and literatures as expressions of particular life- and world-views, which constitute particular 
collective identities (Humboldt, 1963:44-46).52 One explanation for the possibility of understanding across 
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these differences is by recourse to a universal semantic deep-structure common to all languages (Herder, 
1993:117-118). By the end of the twentieth century, it became virtually a commonplace to question the 
possibility of understanding and recognition across difference and to renounce advocatory and facilitating 
discourses like those practiced by Pringle (davenport in Moraga et al, 1983:87; Larde, 1984:66-71); and 
Gardner, 1991:186 ff.). In the wake of existentialist philosophy and postmodern theories of difference, the 
assumption of essential human nature, of universal similarities amongst humans (or within a gender or 
race group )53 and of universal similarities in the semantic deep-structure of language was found to be 
unwarranted. The conclusion was that assumed differences also establish the lines across which 
understanding cannot take place. Difference as such, but especially in combination with the power of the 
white bourgeois male, became an insurmountable obstacle to knowledge of the othered, so that telling the 
life of the othered is seen as an inevitable act of domination. From such a largely Foucauldian 
perspective, collaborative auto/biographies are incongruous. While they advocate resistance to political 
and economic exploitation, and demand equality on the assumption that the writing author can understand 
an essentially similar oral narrator and her appeal for recognition, they in fact subject the oral narrator to 
the writing author's appropriating epistemological power.54 Whilst existentialist and difference theorists are 
right in their rejection of the assumption of an essentialist universal human nature and a universal 
semantic deep-structure shared by all languages they are wrong to conclude that understanding across 
different languages is impossible and that languages are totally incommensurable. By nature languages 
have to be open to appropriation otherwise they cannot be learnt (Schalkwyk, 1996:58). If one develops a 
theory of translation, which draws on Wittgenstein's argument against private language, then one need not 
share the nativist conclusion that linguistically constituted differences pose an insurmountable obstacle to 
common understandings (Spivak, 1988:253-254; Appiah; 1992:47-72; and Miles, 1992:244).55 
Autobiography is particularly well placed to examine this problem. On the one hand it is a genre of 
difference. It is preceded and necessitated by an awareness of historicity and the uniqueness this implies 
for the individual. 'The man who takes the trouble to tell himself,' Gusdorf asserts, 'knows that the present 
differs from the past and that it will not be repeated in the future; he has become more aware of 
differences than of similarities' (1980:30). But, in order for this difference to 'endure in men's memory' 
(ibid.:31), this specificity has to be communicated in a way that it can be understood by a general reading 
public. In other words, the difference has to be shared with others in the medium of speech. Once 
understanding becomes located in speech, rather than speechless penetration of the other's mind or 
heart56, essential similarities are no longer necessary to guarantee mutual understanding. Rather, in the 
words of anthropologist Barbara Tedlock, '[s]ince we can only enter into another person's world through 
communication, we depend upon[ ... ] dialogue to create a world of shared intersubjectivity and to reach an 
understanding of the differences between two worlds' (1991 :70).57 
Whilst their very activity attests to their belief that understanding and recognition across difference are 
possible, writing authors of the twentieth century are generally more aware of the fact that differences 
between collaborators constitute difficulties in understanding that need to be dealt with through conscious 
strategies. Many of them thus seek to create relations of production which take these difficulties into 
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consideration and are conducive to the production of truth. Often writing authors therefore foreground the 
neutralising effect of similarities58 , equality59 , and intimacy60 between themselves and oral narrators. Auto-
ethnographical texts61 at first sight seem to sidestep these epistemological and political problems raised 
by collaborative auto/biographies. Noni Jabavu's Drawn in Colour and The Ochre People; Mark 
Mathabane's African Women and Miriam's Song; and the various contributions to Finding Mr Madini 
originate in gender, racial, or ethnic similarity embedded in personal or family relationships between oral 
narrators and writing authors. Poised between auto-ethnography, autobiography, biography and travel 
writing, Noni Jabavu's two-volume account of her visits to East Africa, and her home in South Africa, might 
at first glance be welcomed by that side in the debate which insists that the insider is best suited to writing 
collaborative auto/biography. Situating herself as belonging 'to two worlds with two loyalties; South Africa 
where I was born and England where I was educated' (author's note), Drawn in Colour actually reveals 
itself as an inquiry into the deep-running differences between herself as a Southern African (married to a 
Briton), and other Africans. The same applies to Mark Mathabane's collaborative auto/biography of his 
grandmother, mother, and sister, African Women in which the women couch their discourse in terms 
which sound more apt to the North American audience the book was aimed at than the South African 
context from which it comes.62 Thus we are reminded of the warning that the sexual and I or racial 
similarity amongst collaborators should not lead us to conclude that all women and black South Africans 
are alike and that women writing about women and black persons writing about other black persons are 
not automatically immune to the pitfalls besetting European men writing on African women (Lazreg, 1988; 
Mohanty, 1991; and Goldman, 1993). This does not make auto-ethnographic texts less interesting or 
worthwhile. On the contrary, they make an important contribution to a theory of collaborative 
auto/biography, firstly because they force us to examine simplistic notions of similarity and insidership and 
the priority afforded to ethnic, racial, and gender similarity between interlocutors as a precondition to 
collaborative life-writing in South Africa. Secondly, they alert us to the significance of differences which 
may be less visible (such as class, gee-political location, life- and world-view), but not less influential than 
the superficial stereotypical ones. 
Another aspect of the production of knowledge about the oral narrator's life to which Jabavu alerts us is 
that truth claims about a life are not produced in Cartesian seclusion, but in interaction with addressees. 
This is most strikingly illustrated in her rendering of a young woman's narrative self-representation during 
a bus-ride63 from East London to Umtata. During the trip, passengers are encouraged to explain 
themselves to fellow passengers, both in the sense of their genealogies and their current life projects, 
suggesting that narrative self-representation is addressed to a public on the assumption that the 
addressees can understand each other, can evaluate the truth of what is said, and judge the acceptability 
of the values informing the life project described. Jabavu recounts the narrative of a young mother, 'a 
species of "New Woman", partly broken away from the society that bred her; independent, fierce, 
unabashed,' who proudly declares to the passengers that she has once again given birth to an illegitimate 
daughter, which she is now bringing to her family. Although they are startled by this, the audience 
nevertheless 'looked at her expressionlessly, following the custom of "hearing the speaker out"'. She is 
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encouraged to elaborate by an active audience of fellow passengers' cluck sounds and pertinent 
questions. The narrating mother responds by 'play[ing) on our sympathies', and the audience 'at once felt 
for them'. Often 'groans of assent are uttered', but when the audience interpret the situation differently 
from her, or a matronly woman and an older man respond disapprovingly, the young woman retorts with 
her own interpretation of the situation, substantiating these interpretations with grounds. Her explanation 
of her life's plan leads to a general discussion of 'not so much the personal case but its wide implications' 
(Jabavu, 1982:123-139). As the interaction between the interlocutors Jabavu describes shows, self-
representation is based on tacit assumptions that understanding and consensus are only possible if 
certain conditions are fulfilled. The most important ones are that participation in the conversation is open 
and equal. Everyone may participate as equal interlocutor. They are encouraged through rhetorical 
devices like groans of assent to explain themselves. But they are also challenged to justify their self-
interpretations. 
The collective reflection on an oral narrator's claims so clearly presented in Jabavu's description of the 
relations of production of the young woman's narrative of herself is echoed in collaborative auto/biography 
in the relationships between oral narrators and writing authors. Wary of the potentially distorting effects of 
representing others in the double sense of talking on their behalf and depicting them (see Bourdieu, 
1992:163-228) and keen to emulate the monological model of classic autobiography, writing authors 
follow various editorial strategies to deal with their role in producing the truth on the oral narrator's life. In 
Mpho Nthunya's Singing Away the Hunger, the writing author K.L. Kendall makes a concerted effort to 
spell out her involvement, but to withdraw into the background. Rather than declare her contribution in a 
foreword as is common, she explains her role in an afterword. Even if they are ostensibly exiled to the 
paratext of prefaces, footnotes, or glosses as they are in The Diary of Maria Tho/o, the difficulties and 
contradictions in attempts to both account for editorial presence and erase traces of potentially distorting 
intervention is a definitive feature of the genre. 
The effect of power and money on the relations of truth production as well as the responsibilities writing 
authors have towards oral narrators is another concern that informs many twentieth-century collaborative 
auto/biographies. One aspect of power is the agency of the oral narrator in forming the interaction during 
the interviews. Rejecting the thesis that writing authors by definition abuse oral narrators by patronizing or 
exploiting them, Shostak contrasts the image of oral narrators as instruments of writing authors with a 
sketch of the oral narrator Nisa as someone who often took the initiative in the interviews, had a personal 
interest, and benefited from preserving her narrative and disseminating it to a reading public even though 
she had no previous experience with print (1998:40~08). 
Another aspect of power centres on the priority afforded to the voice of the oral narrator in the publication. 
In The Diary of Maria Tholo, which distinguishes itself from Nisa primarily by the fact that the self-portrayal 
is the 'diary' of a literate woman belonging to an 'emerging black middle class' and living in an urban area 
(Hermer, 1980:x) there is a strong sense of the oral narrator's own voice and agency. This may well be 
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explained by the fact that Tholo's anecdotes arise from her self-confessed curiosity (ibid.: 152) rather than 
the interviewer's probes. Maria Tholo is also explicit about a further aspect of power impinging on 
collaborative auto/biographies, namely what can be said and by who, and how this is determined by the 
specific historical context such as the volatile situation of 1976. According to Maria, relations of 
dependence can have an effect on what black employees reveal to their white employers. Thus the youth 
call their parents 'cowards, only concerned for our own positions and unable to say "no" to whites. That's 
why they won't tell their mothers anything. As someone said, 'If Madam asks you what is going to happen 
you will say, "The children are going to march," because you must tell Madam everything' (ibid.:56). Also, 
the fear of informers or being suspected of being one, results in many speakers saying what they expect 
the addressees will want to hear. In fact, Maria Tholo herself constitutes such an example: 'There is a 
policeman's wife living next door. When I talk with her about the riots, of course, I am all against the 
children. You've got to take sides with the right people. When you talk to the children you are with them. 
When you meet somebody who is opposing them you also oppose because really you don't know where 
you stand' (ibid.:108). 
The potentially distorting effect of money on the truth produced about the oral narrator's life is another 
widespread concern. The idea that money corrupts the truth or cultural value of collaborative 
auto/biographies is widespread. It is evident in Wulf Sachs' decision not to let any money pass between 
him and the oral narrator John Chavafambira for work on Black Hamlet (Sachs 1996:74). It is also behind 
the initial romanticising of her !Kung informants by Marjorie Shostak (2000:63-76).64 Comparing the 
distribution of work, monetary, and cultural benefit accrued from the collaboration, Shostak remarks that 
Nisa 'offered weeks of her time [ .... ] For me [ ... ] it involved many years of my life. The ultimate gain for 
either of us can hardly be considered to be financial' (1998:408). In contrast Kendall (Afterword to 
Nthunya, 1996:167) has no scruples about mentioning money and announcing to the reader that all 
proceeds of the text will go to the oral narrator. 
Collaborative auto/biographies inevitably face the question of truth, especially truth claims about the oral 
narrator's past (LOtge Coullie, 1991:15. See also Coetzee, 1992:17-19). The nature and status of oral 
truth claims and their relationship to other sources is reflected in Van Onselen's view that truth claims 
about the past need to be corroborated on various levels. Even though the emphasis is on the 
protagonist's oral self-representation, according to Van Onselen, it needs to be squared with written 
sources for two reasons. The first has to do with his notion of truth. Implicitly subscribing to elements of a 
consensus theory of truth, Van Onselen insists that 'oral testimony, even when churned out on a scale that 
allows for a great deal of cross-checking for accuracy and internal consistency, counts for little unless it 
can be made to square with such documentary evidence as does exist and no matter how novel or under-
researched the topic, there are always public documents that can assist in the processes of 
contextualisation and verification' (Van Onselen, 1993:505). The second has to do with the understanding 
of the mechanics of power. Given the institutional power attached to writing, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relations of power treated in the oral narrative requires detailed attention to written 
sources (Van Onselen, 1993:499). In contrast to those writing authors who seek to create a sense of first 
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person face-to-face oral immediacy, Van Onselen's remarks raise an awareness of the various points of 
intersection between the oral and the written feeding into the production of the truth about the oral 
narrator's life, thereby rebuffing a na"ive desire for collaborative auto/biographies based on oral evidence 
to reproduce the pristine voice of the narrator. 
Even though they originate from oral narratives, collaborative auto/biographies are disseminated in the 
public sphere as printed texts. The various problems raised by the transformation of the oral narrative into 
a published text are thus a further persistent concern. These transformations range from the simple act of 
ordering, to novelization and even fictionalization. Sachs, for example is aware of the ordering imperative 
necessitated by the 'disconnected manner in which I encouraged him [Chavafambira] to talk to me' 
(1996:91) so that the order in which the narrative is retold diverges from the order in which it was originally 
told. Ordering or giving structure is necessary because '[p]eople's stories are not in final form, shape, and 
content, waiting patiently for a glorified mechanic (i.e. biographer, anthropologist, or the like) to open their 
''verbal tap", allowing the performed story to escape' (Shostak, 1998:404 ). 
But readerly expectations, according to Shostak, may exceed the simple requirement for a clear order. 
Readerly expectations demand editing and 'an overriding structure to be created, a "literary'' one that 
would grab the attention and maintain the interest of American readers' (ibid.:409). Turning the oral 
narrative into one which grabs and maintains the attention of a wider reading public means making a more 
or less conscious selection in favour of a certain genre. And the choice of genre with its particular form, 
means building an interpretative structure into the narrative (Lutge Coullie, 1991: 18), thereby creating 
'patterns by which readers and writers make the past intelligible' (Nussbaum, 1991:24). This choice of 
interpretative structure could range from the 'diary' format, to the collection of discrete stories, the novel, 
or the romance. Even academic texts like Van Onselen's, which adhere strictly to conventions of 
footnoting and referencing, making an explicit effort to distinguish fact and fiction, may show signs of 
novelization (1996: 15). In striving to present a readerly text, many writing authors thus follow Van Onselen 
who embellishes the historical facts with imagery and elements of novelistic style.65 As the author 
character in John Miles' Kroniek uit die Doofpot notes, this raises the question about where . the 
novelization of the oral narrative runs into the blurring of the distinction between fact and fiction (Miles, 
1992:272).66 
The significance of the addressee evident in Jabavu's description of the young woman's narrative on the 
bus, raises the issue of the relationship between self-reflection and the public sphere. The sensitivity 
Maria Thole shows for who can say what even in relatively private exchanges, is also extended to the 
ways in which access to the public sphere is regulated. As her reflection on an anecdote reveals, Thole, is 
highly aware of who can step into the public sphere and make which assertions: 'In town outside Garlicks 
there was a very old white lady. She was wearing posters in front and on her back. About the Transkei 
and how the constitution had been forced on people. There were Africans in a crowd around her so I 
couldn't read them properly. One African passing said, "Quite right. She can do it. She is old. They can't 
just pick her up and throw her into jail." At least someone is doing it for us because this is what we think 
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but we can't say it' (ibid.:109). Under a state of emergency, Maria Tholo reminds us, access to the public 
sphere is policed on all sides of various boundaries. And as she adds, being held to ransom for one's 
words is an added danger attached to writing (We are living in a state of absolute terror. You are always 
worried about what you are doing. I don't want to leave anything written lying about or appear too 
inquisitive' (ibid.:137)). This, as Tholo reminds us, is one reason why radical social movements operating 
in alternative public spheres often rely on oral communication. 
The co-existence of the counter-, alternative- and hegemonic public spheres and the extent to which 
collaborative auto/biographies constitute interfaces between these different public spheres is starkly 
evident in the structure of Tholo's 'diary'. Maria's own words are glossed, enhanced, and contextualised 
by footnotes in which the official view of events as described by government officials on the one hand and 
critical journalists on the other is provided. This juxtaposition of written texts from the official public sphere 
of the state, the critical public sphere of the predominantly English press, and the black oral public sphere 
of the diaries, which also attest to the significance of the invigorated informal black public sphere, (ibid.:54) 
are an indication of the extent to which collaborative auto/biographies serve as interface between 
alternative-, counter-, and hegemonic public spheres. 
Although they may prioritise the life of a single person, collaborative auto/biographies are often tied to 
social movements engaged in struggles for recognition (Gugelberger, 1996:5). This is most evident in 
texts by political leaders such as Part of My Soul Went with Him in which Winnie Mandela is given iconic 
status, representative of a people rather than just herself.67 Appeals for recognition include demands for 
equal inclusion as interlocutors in the communicative community as well as for recognition of the specific 
values expressed in their life choices, which constitute their distinctive identity. But since they are often 
addressed to a potentially hostile reading public, another concern regarding collaborative auto/biographies 
centres on the various rhetorical techniques used to elicit recognition from readers. These concerns 
range from the limits and potentials of foregrounding the similarities between the oral narrator and the 
reader68 ; to the limits and potentials of simulating a first person face-to-face interaction between the oral 
narrator and the addressee, as in Nthunya's and Mathabane's cases. 
This range of intricately related issues, namely the conditions of the possibility of understanding and 
recognition across differences pegged to power; the intersubjective nature of the production of the truth 
about the oral narrator's life and her appeals for recognition; the possible distorting effects of money and 
power on the truth produced; the nature and reliability of truth claims about the past; the need for the 
ordering of the oral narrative into an autobiographical discourse; the effect of the use of novelistic 
techniques in this transformation; the connection between private self-reflection and the addressee; the 
place of collaborative auto/biography in the various public spheres; the specific rhetorical techniques used 
to elicit recognition from the reading public; and the relationship between collaborative auto/biography and 
social movements are dealt with in detail in the analysis of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena and The 
Calling of Katie Makanya. 
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I focus on these two books for a variety of reasons. To begin with, their devotion to the historical life of 
Poppie and Katie take elaborate proportions, rather than being mere cameos, either in the colonial project 
or in the autobiography of another writer as is the case with Krotoa Eva. They are presented as fully-
fledged individuals, whose lives have a particularity which is narrated in terms of their specific historical 
development, rather than in terms of anthropological categories, as is the case with Christina Sibiya, John 
Chavafambira, or Nisa. The also differ from those early forms of collaborative auto/biography, such as 
Pringle's poem on Makanna, in that they constitute examples of facilitating rather than advocatory 
collaborative auto/biography. Even though they are detailed accounts of the lives of individuals, they do 
not adhere to the monological notion of identity informing much of occidental thought since Descartes. 
This distinguishes them from classic autobiography, in which the author and the protagonist are the same 
person, and in which he portrays himself as the prototypical autonomous individual externalising his 
interior world.69 Because they are not attempts at simulating classic monological autobiography (as ghost-
written texts usually are), but are openly collaborative products, these two texts convey a notion of the 
narrative construction of the subject as the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective. As such, they are 
examples of the struggle towards freedom with others, rather than from others70, thus offering a site for 
the development of a specific normative conception of the self and society. 
As texts produced by female oral narrators in collaboration with female writing authors they share the 
feminist scepticism towards the dominant tradition of separating the private and the public that informs 
classic narrative self-representation. Instead of an exclusionary focus on the public, they seek to explore 
the relations between the private and the public. At the same time they allow an inquiry into the conditions 
of access to the public sphere and the ways in which this access is gendered. Furthermore, as a genre 
necessitated by the exclusion of the oral narrators from the public world of letters, both texts are guided by 
an emancipatory interest. Along with the reconceptualisation of the distinction between the private and the 
public, they indicate the need for an internal reorganisation of a political republic and a public world of 
letters.71 Also, although they are factually-based accounts, both texts display a highly developed aesthetic 
sensibility. Thus they encourage an exploration of the connections between the aesthetic and social 
justice. On a more global scale, texts like these - which the enlightenment centre relegated to colonial 
outskirts - necessitate a confrontation of the project of modernity with its own strategies of exclusion. As 
such they offer an opportunity to revise the European focus in critical theory by transforming it to take 
posUcolonial conditions into consideration and to question its partiality to the Enlightenment, which was not 
innocent of the horrors of colonisation (Shilpi Sinha, 1998; Gilroy, 1993:42-49; and Nussbaum, 1995:192 
ff.). 
At the same time, the two texts also display relevant differences, which make mutual illumination possible. 
To begin with, the two texts are embedded in very different historical contexts, which impinge on their 
production, content, structure, and reception. Katie lived from the late nineteenth till the mid twentieth 
century. The recordings on which The Calling of Katie Makanya is based, were conducted in 1954, when 
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Katie was eighty-one. The book was published in 1995 during the Mandela Republic, long after her death. 
Eunice N. lived from the first half to the last decade of the 201h century. The oral narrative for Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (published in 1978) took place in what could be described as the 
watershed period of 1976 - 1977. Furthermore, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena was originally 
published in Afrikaans, which means that it was clearly marked for a local Afrikaans audience. In contrast, 
The Calling of Katie Makanya was originally published in English, and written for a US American 
readership. Thus it also belongs with other texts constitutive of a black Atlantic.72 Finally, there are 
important differences in the relations of production between the oral narrator and the writing author. 
These differences are reflected in the different ways in which the texts deal with issues relating to 
collaboration. 
This brief introduction has sought to sketch the double background against which the study of The Calling 
of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena takes place. The first is the rejection of modem 
and contemporary philosophical theories that prioritise the will to power and adhere to atomistic notions of 
the subject in favour of accounts which take the possibility of understanding and recognition across 
difference as their starting points and adhere to intersubjectivist notions of truth and the subject. The 
second is a reference to the roots of collaborative life-writing in the colonial project and a synopsis of the 
practice in the twentieth century. This serves as the basis for cataloguing a range of issues that will be 
discussed with reference to The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. In 
addition to the conceptual relations between a philosophical theory of communicative action which takes 
an intersubjectivist approach to the production of truth and identity and the genre of collaborative 
auto/biography that will be developed in the remaining chapters of this study, it has been suggested that a 
paradigm shift in the theory will also allow us to see emerging traces of an alternative tradition in South 
African society, culture, and writing. This alternative tradition is based on the assumption that 
understanding and recognition across a variety of differences is possible. Still in its infancy, riddled with 
imperfection, but with powerful potential, this is an unfinished tradition which, if we step 'back onto a 
trajectory already begun' (Nuttall and Michael, 2000:301) will give us an indication of the seeds that need 
to be nursed for our common future survival. 
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Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory 
'Mt dem ersten Satz 
ist die Intention eines allgemeinen und ungezwungenen Konsensus 
unmi{3verstiindlich ausgesprochen' 
Jurgen Habermas1 
'Een van die opwindendste aspekte van ons samelewing is dat taal oor ras streka 
Elsa Joubert, at CNA award ceremony. 9 May 1979. 
In this chapter I provide a sketch of recent theories of intersubjectivity advocated within contemporary 
critical theory. This includes the thought of Jurgen Habermas and feminist critics who are to a certain 
extent sympathetic to his theory of communicative rationality such as Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, 
Maria Pia Lara, and Iris Young. Although some continuities exist, roughly three generations of critical 
theory can be distinguished, each in critical relation to its forebears. 
The founding fathers and early representatives of critical theory Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich 
Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and Walter Benjamin had their institutional home or were in some way 
associated with the Institute of Social Research, founded in 1924 and attached to the University of 
Frankfurt.3 What distinguishes critical from traditional theory, according to Horkheimer, is its emphasis on 
radical self-reflection and its interest in emancipation, which is also evident in the aspirations of the 
underclasses. With self-reflection he means that reflection on the social and economic conditions of the 
production of knowledge should be intrinsic to the theory of knowledge (Horkheimer, 1988: 162-225). 
Branded by their experience of Nazism, Stalinism, and rampant capitalism, in which they detected the 
common denominator of identity thinking and the liquidation of the individual, Horkheimer and Adorno 
(1986) developed an extremely pessimistic notion of modernity as a process of escalating domination 
destined to end in Auschwitz. They countered this pessimism with its flip side, namely a utopian 
philosophy of negation according to which truth and justice consisted in the full-scale negation of the 
existing, which is the untrue. As the negation of the existing untruth, the utopian is subject to a 
Bilderverbot, meaning that it could not be spelled out. According to Adorno (1973:461-462) and Marcuse 
(1972:79-128), traces of this utopian wholly other could be found in what they described as autonomous 
art. By this they meant works of art which were neither products of the culture industry, nor ostensibly 
politically engaged, like agit-prop. Prime examples of such autonomous art, according to Adorno, are the 
twentieth-century avant-garde works of Kafka, Beckett, and Schoenberg. 
II Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory 
Habermas (1929 - ) represents the second generation of critical theorists, who came of age intellectually 
during post-World War II German reconstruction. He distinguishes himself from his predecessors by his 
comparatively optimistic philosophy of history; his defence of rationality; and his integration of Anglo-
American philosophy of language into twentieth-century Marxist theory. Habermas rejects Horkheimer 
and Adorne's undifferentiated critique of the Enlightenment and their concomitant pessimistic view of 
history. Instead, he holds that it is not reason as such, but its one-sided development, which led to the 
disasters of the twentieth century (TKH, vol I :489-534). Thus he defends the basic commitment of the 
Enlightenment to reason, but insists on its differentiation into instrumental and communicative rationality 
and its appropriate application in an emancipatory project. Because he does not subscribe to the notion 
that the existing is wholly untrue, he also does not .share the Frankfurt School's negative utopianism. 
Instead, he is concerned with spelling out the conditions of possibility of a just society. For this Habermas 
draws on the philosophy of language, especially Anglo-American speech act theory.4 From a 
reconstruction of the universal conditions of the possibility of understanding he concludes that the 
emancipatory interest is not class bound, as orthodox Marxists believe, nor are traces of a negationary 
utopia exiled to a few pieces of avant-garde art, as Adorno and Marcuse held. The interest in 
emancipation and the possibility of justice are manifest, according to Habermas, in ordinary language 
(TWI :159). 
In contrast to the early Frankfurt School, Habermas's thought is thoroughly steeped in what Rorty (1967) 
has called the linguistic turn, or what his colleague, Karl-Otto Apel, terms the intersubjectivist paradigm in 
occidental philosophy. Apel (1976:9-77) identifies three stages in the history of Western philosophy, 
namely the ontological-metaphysical paradigm represented by Plato and Aristotle; the paradigm of subject 
philosophy, or philosophy of consciousness, represented by Descartes and Kant; and the paradigm of 
intersubjectivity, initiated by Heidegger and Wittgenstein and espoused by contemporary critical theory. In 
the ontological-metaphysical paradigm the guiding question is 'What is X?' It is answered with reference 
to essences. In the paradigm of subject philosophy, or philosophy of consciousness, the guiding question 
becomes 'How do I know X?' It is answered with reference to the subjective capacities which produce 
reliable knowledge. In the intersubjectivist paradigm the guiding question is 'How do we speak about X?'. 
It is answered with reference to symbolic systems of communication and given various inflections in 
structuralism, hermeneutics, logical positivism, and speech act theory. The combination of the linguistic 
tum; the defence of an intersubjective reformulation of rationality; and the endorsement of the 
emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment combined constitute the main features of Habermas's version of 
second generation critical theory. 
The third generation of critical theorists consists largely of authors who attained their intellectual training in 
the sixties and seventies, in which the writings of Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno served as the basis 
for various social movements in Germany and the USA. While its feminist proponents like Benjamin, 
Benhabib, Fraser, Young, and Lara are sympathetic to some of Habermas's main arguments, they also 
contribute to its further transformation. Habermas's emphasis on relations of communication means that 
he finds a sympathetic ear amongst those feminists who question monological notions of the self, which 
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they associate with a male posture going back to Descartes. Jessica Benjamin (1990 and 1995), for 
example, has drawn on Habermas's notion of the co-constitution of intra- and intersubjectivity for a 
reformulation of psychoanalysis. Habermas's account of communicative rationality means that he finds a 
sympathetic audience amongst those feminists who distance themselves from what they see as a 
sweeping postmodern rejection of reason. In this regard Benhabib's and Fraser's debates with Jane Flax 
and Judith Butler are representative (in Nicholson, 1995). Benhabib shares Habermas's belief that the 
disasters of the twentieth century, which include the ongoing subjection of women, are not owing to 
excessive rationality. Instead they arise from the confusion of instrumental rationality (that is forms of 
rationality that are appropriate to relations between subjects and objects) and communicative rationality 
(that is forms of rationality that are appropriate to the relations between subjects and subjects) and the 
misapplication of instrumental rationality to the domain of communicative rationality. What is required in 
relations between subjects is not the departure from reason, but more communicative reason, which is 
based on relations of reciprocal recognition between persons (Benhabib, 1986:147-353, and 1992:203-
241 ). In relating these theoretical issues to concrete social problems like the position of women in the 
welfare state, Nancy Fraser (1989:144-160) and Iris Young (1997:75-164) have rekindled a form of 
applied research reminiscent of some of the articles in the Institute of Social Research's journal, Zeitschrlft 
fur Sozialforschung. In an account of the transformative influence of women's autobiography on the public 
sphere, Lara (1998) too has reconnected Habermas's insights to an earlier strand in critical theory, namely 
the emancipatory potentials of art spelled out by Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin. While drawing on first 
and second generation critical theory, each of these feminist writers has suggested ways in which 
Habermas's thought needs to be reformulated. As will become evident, these reformulations are pertinent 
to a theory of collaborative auto/biography. 
In this chapter I sketch Habermas's main thesis that truth, identity, justice, and speech are 
intersubjectively generated. At the same time I introduce criticisms of Habermas's position voiced by 
feminists who are generally sympathetic to his views. I also point out some of the required additions and 
reformulations to contemporary critical theory these feminists have proposed. The thesis that truth, 
identity, justice, and speech are intersubjectively generated (1) is given profile by outlining objections in 
contemporary critical theory to modem monologistic subject philosophy, which serves as a source of 
classic autobiography and is still often used as a the basis for the critique of collaborative auto/biography. 
After that, (2) Habermas's general consensus theory of validity is explained. This leads the way to (3) a 
discussion of the four validity claims raised in every speech act and the intersubjective generation of truth, 
identity, justice, and the speech system. 
1. The intersubjectivist transformation of the philosophical discourse of modernity 
In the introduction, mention was made of the predominance of the modern monological notion of the 
subject in classic autobiography and which often inappropriately serves as the basis for critiques of 
collaborative auto/biography. The modem characterisation of the subject and knowledge is usually traced 
to Descartes' Discourse and his Meditations which occupy canonical positions in what Apel and Derrida 
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respectively call the paradigm of subject philosophy or philosophy of consciousness.6 The 
autobiographical nature of Descartes' texts (Discourse :112 [4]), combined with the tremendous weight he 
affords to the self-reflecting subject in his epistemology, has also made it an influential source for thinking 
about autobiographical writing.7 Put simply, the paradigm of subject philosophy characterises knowledge 
and the subject as monological, foundationalist, and reduced to rational consciousness. This is evident 
from the way Descartes arrives at the cogito; its foundationalist role in grounding knowledge; and his view 
of the subject extrapolated from this discovery. Descartes presents his road to knowledge as a rite of 
purification from the errors induced in him by the community of scholars and the 'customs of other men' 
(Discourse :115 [10]). Thus he 'resolved one day to undertake studies within myself,' and 'finding no 
conversation to divert me, [ ... ] I stayed all day shut up alone in a stove-heated room, where I was 
completely free to converse with myself about my own thoughts' and 'scrutinize myself more deeply' 
(Discourse :116 [11], Meditations :24 [34]}. This meditative stripping away leads to an essence, which is at 
the same time an absolute foundation. Self-reliance and self-reflection, which are initially taken as critical 
instruments against the commonly held delusions of custom and tradition, become the source and 
foundation of knowledge. Turning the screw of self-reflective doubt as far as it could possibly go, that is, 
to the point of doubting his own existence, he generates an Archimedean foundation for knowledge 
(Meditations :16 [24]), Discourse :127 [32]). After establishing the existence of the I, which is also the 
foundation of knowledge, Descartes proceeds to describe it as follows: 'I am, then, in the strict sense only 
a thing that thinks; that is I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason' (Meditations :18 [27]). 
This characterisation of knowledge and the subject has been the object of severe criticism. Descartes' 
monological self-reflection on an apparently prediscursive consciousness has been criticised because it 
disregards the social relations within which knowledge and the self are produced, and because it is 
impervious to the discursive nature of the production of knowledge and the self. Philosophers and 
sociologists of science, like Peirce (see Habermas TK :9-33), Kuhn (1962), and Lakatos (1970:91 ff.), 
have pointed to the role of scientific communities in the production of knowledge. In fact, Descartes' own 
circulation of the Meditations amongst his contemporaries, requesting their comments and criticism8, pays 
witness to the fact that the generation of knowledge contains two dimensions: the meditative monological, 
and the intersubjective, and that both public and private conjectures and refutations are needed for the 
production of knowledge. The role language plays in the generation of knowledge and the self has been a 
central theme in twentieth-century thought. Giving the linguistic tum a further twist, Derrida has added the 
significance of writing (in contrast to oral speech), arguing that in its equation of consciousness and oral 
speech, Cartesian philosophy of consciousness fails to see to what extent the production of knowledge 
and the self are indebted to features of language evident in what he calls archewriting (Derrida, 1990:196 
ff.). Descartes' foundationalism has been criticised because of its equation of the indubitable to truth. This 
confuses immunisation against falsification9 with truth, a move contested as much by Popper as Rorty 
(Rorty, 1989:52). Finally his rationalism has been criticised because of its blindness to the influence of the 
non-rational (the body, the subconscious, and the economy) in the production of knowledge and the life of 
the subject, and because rationality has increasingly been blamed as a medium of domination rather than 
a medium of emancipation (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1986:7-41; Lloyd, 1993:103 ff.; Foucault, 1980:78-
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133). These shortcomings have resulted in many philosophers taking their leave of modern and 
Enlightenment thought. While some merely believe that modernity has not delivered the promised goods, 
others go even further, asserting that modernity is the root of the main pathologies of the last four 
centuries, to wit the oppression and extermination of the Jews and African slaves, and the exploitation of 
women, the underclasses, and nature (Nussbaum, 1995:192 ff.). 
In contrast, Habermas's The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity constitutes a sustained argument in 
favour of the intersubjective transformation and completion of the unfinished project of modernity.10 Some 
of the main tenets of this intersubjective transformation and completion of modernity include: a focus on 
language as medium of communication and the influence of this on the nature of knowledge; a sensitivity 
to the ways in which knowledge is produced within a scientific community; the rejection of foundationalism, 
resulting in a commitment to fallibilism; and the defence of an extension of a differentiated notion of 
rationality. Continuing in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, Habermas has consistently favoured a view 
of the production of knowledge and identity which integrates the social and the individual, and which 
allows for radical reflection. In the paradigmatic Cartesian philosophy of consciousness, the truth of a 
judgement is tied to the certainty held by the subject that his representation corresponds to the object. In 
the intersubjectivist paradigm, the arguments within a community of researchers who seek understanding 
with each other about the world, are decisive for the generation of truth. Identity, too, does not spring from 
introspection, but from the mediation of the introspective (intrasubjective) and the performance of this self-
reflection in intersubjective (speech) acts. Like Rorty, Habermas believes that foundationalism of the 
Cartesian type, 'has become as transparent a device as the postulation of deities,' which nowadays simply 
does not work (Rorty, 1991a:33). Instead Habermas takes his cue from Popper and Pragmatism, 
asserting that knowledge is produced in a double relation of potential falsification: by exposing validity 
claims to critique by interlocutors who seek to establish common ground in arguments, and by exposing 
action based on knowledge claims to failure in action. Thus, both truth and identity are not closed in within 
consciousness but are constituted in speech acts circulating in communicative communities and subject to 
public scrutiny. Finally, while paying heed to Horkheimer and Adamo's critique of reason, Habermas 
objects to their reduction of reason to instrumental rationality. Instead, he defends a differentiated notion 
of rationality. According to him, we need to distinguish between the rationality appropriate to subject-
object relations, which he terms instrumental rationality, and the rationality appropriate to subject-subject 
relations, which he terms communicative rationality. When the type of rationality appropriate to the former 
is misapplied to the latter domain (that is when instrumental rationality is applied to the domain of subject-
subject relations), we have strategic rationality (TWI :60-65 [TRS :90-94]). This results in the colonisation 
of the discursively reproduced lifeworld, and, in its extreme cases, in social pathologies like Fascism, 
Stalinism, and rampant capitalism. When Habermas advocates the completion of the intersubjectively 
transformed ideals of modernity, he thus has in mind the extension of relations of communicative action in 
the domain where subjects interact with each other (PDM :403--433; TKH, vol I :13-71). In order to clarify 
what Habermas means by the completion of the intersubjectively transformed project of modernity, I turn 
now to his speech act theory in which he develops the thesis that truth, identity, justice, and the speech 
system are all intersubjectively generated in speech. 
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2. Speech act theory: universal pragmatics and the general consensus theory of validity 
According to Habermas all knowledge is thoroughly discursive ('Der Erkenntnisprozer.. ist auf allen Stufen 
diskursiv' (El :124)). Thus, in order to give an account of the possibility of knowledge one has to give an 
account of how it is produced in speech. Habermas does this in his speech act theory, which he calls 
universal pragmatics. 11 The aim of universal pragmatics is to reconstruct the universal conditions of the 
possibility of mutual understanding-agreement (Verstandigung12) (VS :353 [PC :21]). This universalism 
has several dimensions.13 To begin with, Habermas seeks to reconstruct a competence he believes is 
universal to all who can speak. In addition, speech acts have universalist implications in that they raise 
validity claims which reach beyond the immediate context in which they are produced. Finally, the 
conditions of understanding ·are universalist in that they are not restricted to institutionally bound speech 
acts. This insistence that the ability to speak entails a universal competence to establish understanding-
agreements distinguishes his position from an analysis of the rules of specific language games a la 
Wittgenstein or conceptual systems constituted by specific languages. Locating this universal 
competence in the communicative interaction of the give and take of speech acts also distinguishes his 
position from Herder and others, who maintain that all languages share a universal semantic deep-
structure. Instead he holds that with each speech act a speaker raises validity claims which reach beyond 
their context of origin, in unavoidably supposing that these claims will find the reasoned consent of an 
unlimited community of interpreters (an 'entgrenzten lnterpretationsgemeinschaft' (FG :31 )). 14 Habermas's 
reconstruction of the conditions of understanding is universalist in a final sense in that it gives an account 
of the possibility of the felicity of institutionally unbound speech acts that constitute the largest part of 
everyday communication (VS :429 [PC :83]). This distinguishes him from his predecessor speech act 
theorists such as Austin, who focuses his analyses on institutionally bound speech acts (such as naming, 
and marriages). Yet, Habermas uncritically follows his predecessors Austin (1975:122), Searle 
(1969:144), and Toulmin (1958:11) in distinguishing between standard and non-standard speech acts 
such as writing poems and telling jokes (VS :396 [PC :56]). Standard speech acts, according to 
Habermas, are directed at solving problems in the world, while literary speech acts have a world-
disclosing function. By this he means that literary speech acts reveal the world to us in specific, hitherto 
unfamiliar ways (PDM :241-246 [PDME :204-210]). 
A central distinction to Habermas's speech act theory is the difference between speech and discourse. 
When interlocutors are in the speech mode the validity of their claims is not challenged, and 
communication runs, so to speak, smoothly without problems. Communication runs smoothly as long as 
speech acts derive their convincing force and motivating power from the unproblematised background 
reservoir of the lifeworld, which interlocutors presume to share. When the validity of a claim goes 
unquestioned, that is when there is a common background which backs the claim, interlocutors remain on 
the foreground level of speech. However, when the validity claims raised in speech are questioned, 
interlocutors who wish to act communicatively (rather than strategically) have to thematise the relevant 
background section of the lifeworld about which there is disagreement and which is needed to support the 
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challenged validity claims. In doing so, they change from speech to discourse. The difference between 
speech and discourse is expressed in the difference between 'p' and 'p is true'. In the latter there is a 
reflective relationship in which interlocutors debate whether grounds can be given to back p. Discourses 
are arguments aimed at the redemption or rejection of problematised validity claims. They constitute co-
operative processes in which validity is intersubjectively generated. In contrast to speech, discourses are 
set free of action and experience - they are 'handlungsentlastet und erfahrungsfrei' (El :386-387; VS 
:130). 
In every standard speech act a speaker seeks to say something to someone about something. In other 
words, she seeks to establish a double relationship: firstly an illocutive relationship with her interlocutors; 
secondly, a relationship between the utterance and the object of discussion (VS :79-80, WR :9). Put 
differently, the speaker claims that (a) she can convince her interlocutors that (b) a certain relationship 
holds between the proposition and the natural, inner, or social worlds she is talking about: 
The vertical perspective on the objective world is interrelated with the horizontal relationship 
to the members of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld. Objectivity of the world and 
intersubjectivity of understanding refer reciprocally to each other (WR :25. Own translation). 
Learning about the natural, inner, or social worlds is not a monological relationship between a lone 
observer and a reality to which she has unmediated access. On the contrary, 'we learn about the world by 
learning from each other' (WR :75. Own translation.). As claims about something addressed to someone, 
knowledge is embedded in a double relation of fallibility. As claims about the world, knowledge is subject 
to potential falsification in the pragmatic sense. That is, action based on the knowledge expressed in 
utterances can fail. As claims addressed to others, knowledge is subject to the potentially falsifying 
critique of addressees. The long-term effect of this last relation is an increased decentring of the particular 
perspectives of each member of the communicative community, resulting in an expansion and increased 
overlapping of horizons of meaning (Sinnhorizonte) (WR :73-75). 
This double relation of potential falsification is mirrored in the double structure of speech acts, which can 
be correlated to two parts of an utterance. In the utterance: 
The earth is round 
there is, according to Habermas, an implicitly illocutive part (which in turn also has two parts) that can be 
made explicit with the additions, 
it is true that ... 
and, 
I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that ... 
The complete utterance then is, 
I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that it is true that the earth is round 
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Which can be broken down as follows: 
I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that lntersubjective (I -you) 
c: 
0 
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u 
~ it is true that 
§ 
:;; 
·u; 
g_ the earth is round. e 
Q. 
Classification of speech act as 
claim about truth, identity, justice, 
or the speech system 
In this case the illocutive part is expressed in I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that it 
is true that, and the propositional part in the earth is round. The first part of the illocutive aspect of the 
speech act aims at establishing an intersubjective relationship - das Miteinander - evident in the 
reference to an I (I claim that I can) addressing others (provide you with convincing reasons). The second 
part classifies the way in which the proposition is meant, for example as a statement of fact about the 
natural world (rather than a moral injunction) - it is true that. The propositional aspect asserts that a 
specific relationship applies between this first intersubjectively shared proposition and states of affairs. 
A speech act consists of the speaker's utterance together with the listeners' response. Every time 
someone engages in a standard speech act she implies that she subscribes to the normative claim that 
she can provide convincing reasons to all potential interlocutors that her claims are valid. In other words, 
she implies that she can guarantee consensus about the validity of her claims by using only what 
Habermas calls the unforced force of argument in an ideal speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, 
interlocutors are equal, which means that they have equal chances to raise claims and objections, and all 
non-communicative restraints like money and power are barred. Habermas identifies four validity claims, 
which are non-reducible to each other, or to any other more fundamental claims (VS :156). These are 
truth (the claim that the external world is the way it is claimed to be); truthfulness (the claim that the 
speaker really means what she says); rightness (the claim that a norm is legitimate), and intelligibility (the 
claim that the utterance can be understood, and that the speech system in which it is couched is 
appropriate) (VS :354; 390 [PC :22-23, 50]). 
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When the background consensus collapses, then different discourses are opened according to the type of 
validity claim that is disputed. Each of these is redeemed in a logic of discourse particular to it. Typical 
questions, which arise when the background consensus regarding the different validity claims collapses, 
are: 
• Pertaining to truth: Is it as you say? Why is it like that and not different? To which we respond with 
claims and explanations. 
• Pertaining to truthfulness: Does he deceive me? Does he deceive himself? To which we respond with 
therapeutic analyses. 
• Pertaining to rightness: Why did you do that? Why didn't you behave differently? May you do that? 
Shouldn't you behave differently? To these we respond with justifications. 
• Pertaining to intelligibility. How do you mean that? How should I understand that? What does that 
mean? To which we respond with interpretations. 
shall return to each of these particular validity claims in the sections below dealing with the 
intersubjective generation of truth, identity, justice and the speech system, after looking at Habermas's 
general consensus theory of validity. 
According to Habermas's consensus theory of validity, the condition for the validity of utterances is the 
potential agreement of all others. Habermas takes a radically immanent postmetaphysical position, 
according to which there is no higher instance (like the Platonic ideas or Humean sense data) for the 
validity of an utterance than a consensus based on rationally motivated argument amongst interlocutors 
(TK :24). In order to distinguish a valid from an invalid utterance, one refers to the judgements of all others 
with whom one could enter into discussion. This implies the counterfactual supposition that potential 
interlocutors would include everyone whom one could find if one's life were coextensive with the history of 
humanity. Everyone else must be able to convince themselves that the speaker is justified in ascribing the 
predicate to the subject, and must be able to agree with her on this ascription. The claim that a 
proposition is valid is a promise to provide reasons which will lead to consensus about what has been said 
(VS :136-137).15 The illocutionary goal of the speaker is to establish common ground with the listener, 
based on the latter's acceptance of the validity of the claim raised in the speech act. In this sense the 
illocutionary force is cognitively secured (WR :10). The illocutionary success of a speech act is measured 
by the intersubjective acceptance found by the validity claim which is raised in the speech act (WR :113). 16 
A standard criticism of consensus theories of truth is that actual agreements may be the outcome of the 
exercise of power or tradition rather than reason. Thus, according to Habermas, all speakers implicitly 
distinguish between a rational consensus and Chomskyan manufactured consent with reference to 
assumptions for which he gives the name ideal speech (VS :179). The ideal speech situation is the 
counterfactual yet unavoidable and effective supposition that interlocutors find themselves in a situation in 
which communicative relations are ideal, in other words that they are not distorted by any external or 
internal constraints (VS :416-417 [PC :71-72]). It is part of the preconditions of discourse, Habermas 
argues, that we counterfactually utter speech acts as if the ideal speech situation is not just a fictitious 
supposition, but really operative. Without this assumption we cannot make sense of the distinction 
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between the validity of an utterance (Ge/tung) and its mere factual acceptance (Faktizitat) by a concrete 
community of speakers. The normative foundation of linguistic understanding is at the same time both: 
anticipated, but as anticipated foundation at the same time effective. 11 By this Habermas means that the 
existence of an ideal speech community is anticipated in every standard speech act, and that this 
anticipation already has a real effect. The idealisations pertaining to the ideal speech situation can be 
specified as follows: 
1. It is a situation which only allows the non-coercive force of the better argument 
2. It is public and open to all competent and affected parties 
3. The rights to communication are distributed equally 
4. Participants' utterances are sincere, that is they deceive neither themselves nor their interlocutors 
5. Any topic may be broached (WR :49; VS :177-178). 18 
While these communicative relations remain identical, irrespective of the type of validity claim at hand, the 
logic of discourse is particular to each of the four validity claims. 
3. The four validity claims and the intersubjective generation of truth, identity,justice, 
and the speech system 
According to Habermas, although every speech act raises all four types of validity claim, any one of them 
may be prioritised by a specific utterance and be thematised in discourse. In his own treatment of the 
validity claims he devotes almost exclusive attention to regulative validity claims about the rightness of 
norms. As the much discussed validity claim rightness draws on the analogy to the validity claim to truth, 
he also pays some attention to constatives, which are truth claims about the external world. Expressive-
aesthetic validity claims, which thematise the inner world of the speaker, get scant attention, while virtually 
no attention is devoted to communicatives, that is those validity claims which thematise the intelligibility of 
utterances and the appropriateness of the speech system. 19 
i. The intersubjective generation of truth in the experimental sciences 
Truth, according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated in speech acts which prioritise validity claims 
about the natural world and are called constatives.20 A communicatively acting speaker cannot but raise 
the claim that her utterance is true. Constatives (what Habermas also calls theoretical-scientific speech 
acts) foreground claims to truth typical of the practices of science and technology. They prioritise that 
aspect of the propositional content thematising external nature (VS :427 and 440 [PC :81 and 92]). They 
make claims regarding the applicability of a predicate to an identifiably existing object (VS :413 [PC :69-
70]). Examples of constatives are descriptions, reports, narratives, representations, explanations, and 
predictions (VS :147). 
Habermas's theory that speech acts establish a double relation of potential falsification is in fact only really 
applicable to truth claims raised in the logic of scientific research practised by the scientific community. 
Drawing on Peirce, Habermas holds that the claim, for example, that the earth is flat, is subject to the 
critique of a scientific community, as well as potential pragmatic falsification in action (El :116-143). In 
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what can be termed a realist turn in his writing, Habermas pays special attention to the significance of the 
role of potential failures of action as a sign of the incorrectness of the validity claims to truth on which they 
are based (WR : 20-21; 230-270). Thus, even where consensus exists amongst a scientific community, 
as it did at some stage, that the earth is flat, the second relationship of falsification which arose when Dias 
failed to fall off the edge of the planet but actually succeeded in circling it, poses a potential source of 
correction on the first. Whereas this double relationship seems obvious in scientific discourse about the 
world, which can be tested in action, the priority Habermas affords to claims about the external world 
typical to the experimental sciences in his explanation of the validity claim to truth, raises questions as to 
its applicability to other domains in which truth claims are typically raised. I will return to the most obvious 
of these, and the one that is most relevant to a theory of collaborative auto/biography, namely truth claims 
about the past. 
ii. The intersubjective generation of identity and appeals for recognition 
Identity, according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated in speech acts which prioritise validity 
claims about the inner world of subjects and are called expressives. A communicatively acting speaker 
cannot but raise the claim that she is truthful about her descriptions and interpretations of herself. Owing 
to a shift in Habermas's terminology, his theory is bugged with inconsistencies in pinpointing what it is that 
this validity claim thematises. In his early writing on speech act theory, Habermas speaks largely of 
expressive validity claims, which thematise the speaker's inner nature. Inner nature is a rather vague term, 
only somewhat clarified by the examples: intentions, thoughts, feelings, and needs. Paradigmatic 
examples of expressives like concealing, pretending, suppression of evidence, and denying (VS :147) are 
expressed in sentences like /long for ... or I wish ... (VS :426 [PC: 80]). The claim to truthfulness is the 
claim that the speaker means the uttered intentions, thoughts, needs and feelings exactly as she states 
them and that she deceives neither herself nor others ('Ein Sprecher ist wahrhaftig, wenn er mit seinen 
AuBerungen weder sich noch andere tauscht' (VS :156-167)). Taken in its weakest sense, the claim to 
truthfulness is the claim that the speaker is not consciously lying to others. Whether a speaker is truthful 
about her inner world, can, according to Habermas, not be determined within discourse. It becomes 
evident through the extent to which a subject acts in accordance with her selfdescriptions or not. In a 
more interesting and stronger sense, the claim to truthfulness is a claim that the speaker has developed 
an authentic identity, that she interprets herself and her needs appropriately (PC :403-433). These 
authentic interpretations of her needs and herself constitute a subject's values, which add up to her notion 
of the good life. According to Habermas values, or notions of the good life, are a personal matter in the 
sense that they are not subject to the same universalisation required that applies to laws. 
Going beyond his speech act theory, Habermas, in his later writings, gives an account of the 
intersubjective generation of identity that draws on the social interactionism of Mead and the theories of 
Dilthey, Piaget and Kohlberg, amongst others. From Mead (1967 :144-152; 245-260), Habermas takes 
the view that individuation and socialisation are tied to each other via the medium of speech (TKH, Bd. II 
:11-68). In most general terms, Habermas holds that, 'the identity of socialised individuals is constituted 
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simultaneously in the medium of establishing linguistic understanding with others, and in the medium of 
the intrasubjective understanding of the history of one's life. Individuality is constituted in relations of 
intersubjective recognition and intersubjectively mediated selfunderstanding' (NMD :191. Own translation). 
According to Habermas, individuation is not the self-realisation of a subject in seclusion and freedom from 
others, as early contract theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau believe, but a linguistically mediated process 
of socialisation, and the concurrent conscious constitution of a life story.21 Benjamin concludes from this 
that recognition serves as a core concept for intersubjective theories of the self (1990:21 ). 
In narrative selfrepresentation the subject creates a reflective whole, which is both the source of identity 
and meaning (Dilthey, 1970:242-251; Gusdorf, 1980:38; Benhabib, 1992:198; Appiah, 1996:97-99). Like 
the Socratic injunction, this view asserts that the conscious examination of experience and the life lived is 
superior (in terms of knowledge) to its pure living. But, because narrative self-reflection takes place in 
speech, it can never be just private as Cartesian monologism assumes. Speech is the medium of both 
communication and individuation. It is the basis of intersubjectivity in which a subject has to find its way 
before it can even utter its first narrative reconstruction of itself. This common language makes both 
identification and the assertion of non-identity possible (Benjamin, 1995:202). In Lara's words, dialogue is 
both 'a means of showing what makes one different' and also of 'showing that those differences are an 
important part of what should be regarded as worthy' (Lara, 1998:157). The success of autobiographical 
narrative depends on the extent to which it achieves a double integration. In order to generate meaning in 
reflection, the subject has to integrate the parts of her life with each other, and also integrate the parts of 
her life with those of other people's in narrative. Self-consciousness is constituted both vertically in the 
experiences of an individual, and horizontally on the level of the intersubjectivity of a shared 
communication between subjects (El :199).22 In addition, '[b]y means of narratives expressed in public 
with others differently situated who also tell their stories, speakers and listeners can develop the "enlarged 
thought" that transforms their thinking about issues from being narrowly self-interested or self-regarding 
about an issue, to thinking about an issue in a way that takes account of the perspectives of others' 
(Young, 2000:76). The identity of the I is constituted in the mediation of narrative self-understanding and a 
dialogical relationship of reciprocal recognition. Because our narratives are articulated in language (which 
has the same obligations for all its users), understanding the self in its own narrative construction requires 
also understanding the other in her narrative construction (El :190-203). To the extent that both the 
individual and social systems are discursively produced, Habermas holds that ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic development are internally tied to each other. That is, the development of social structures 
and the relations of communication they allow and the individual identities that can be generated under 
them are co-determinants. The consequence he draws from this is that authentic identities can only be 
formed in postconventional societies which allow for uncoerced intersubjective reflection on the self and 
the interpretation of the self and her needs (RHM :63-267). 
Habermas himself sees a clear expression of this mediation of individuation and socialisation in Dilthey's 
theory of autobiography and in Rousseau's Confessions, where meditative intrasubjective reflection in the 
Cartesian tradition is integrated with the performance of an intersubjective appeal for recognition 
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addressed to a reading public. Seyla Benhabib has succinctly stated this connection between narrative 
self-representation and the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective in a way which also suggests the 
special value of collaborative autobiography: 
From the time of our birth we are immersed in a 'web of narratives,' of which we are both the 
author and the object. The self is both the teller of tales and that about whom tales are told. 
The individual with a coherent sense of self-identity is the one who succeeds in integrating 
these tales and perspectives into a meaningful life story. When the story of a life can only be 
told from the perspective of others, then the self is a victim and sufferer who has lost control 
over her existence. When the story of a life can only be told from the standpoint of the 
individual, then such a self is a narcissist and a loner who may have attained autonomy 
without solidarity. A coherent sense of self is attained with the successful integration of 
autonomy and solidarity (1992:198; and Benhabio, 2002:15-16).23 
This double axis also illustrates to what extent the modern developed ego is decentred, rather than 
centred, as Descartes' selfdescription suggests. 
By way of a comparison of Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies Habermas illustrates the shift 
from ontological-metaphysical autobiography to an intersubjectivist autobiography. The shift from 
Augustine's to Rousseau's autobiography exemplifies a shift from the confession (if only ostensibly) 
addressed to god, to a profane appeal for recognition addressed to the reading public. Whereas both 
truth and identity are guaranteed in Augustine's case by god, the addressee, Rousseau, appeals to, and 
depends on the response of, the reading public (which stands for the potentially unlimited communication 
community) to accept the validity of the truth claims he raises, and to confirm his identity by recognising 
the authenticity and validity of his individual life choices, which express his individual notion of the good 
life.24 According to Benhabib (1992:169), values (or notions of the good life) too are public in the sense 
that in autobiographical acts of self-representation the subject appeals to the communicative community to 
recognise the validity of these values, which are concretised in her actions and choices and are expressed 
in her narrative of herself.25 
With Rousseau, according to Habermas, self-consciousness is transformed from an epistemological 
relationship of the reflecting subject to himself, (definitive of the paradigm of subject philosophy 
epitomised by Descartes (NMD :196)) to the moral self-confirmation of an accountable person. The 
representation of the self is not only a description of past events and actions. This narrative account of 
past events, such as the life choices she has made and the interpretations of them, is also an account of 
the values which inform a person's identity (EdA :104).26 Augustine's Confessions consists largely of the 
externalisation of the inner world and thus requires an all-knowing god to back its truth.27 But in a 
postmetaphysical age, where autobiography is transformed into a claim about the validity of specific 
values, the author relies on the response of his interlocutors to assert their acceptability. Once the 'vertical 
axis of prayer has turned to the horizontal interpersonal communication, the individual can no longer 
secure the emphatic claim to individuality only through the reconstructing appropriation of his life history; 
whether this reconstruction succeeds is now decided by the position taken by the others' (NMD :206-209. 
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Here 206. Own translation.). Habermas sees Rousseau as trying to achieve a kind of recognition which 
links two different dimensions of a moral goal that Lara would later ascribe to women's autobiography: 'the 
right to be considered a unique human being, and the moral worthiness inherent in the struggle to become 
a moral person occupying a place in the symbolic and cultural order as a result of her acceptance by 
public opinion' (Lara, 1998:83). From this perspective recognition is not just 'a claim for respect' or 'an 
anthropological need immanently linked to moral development' as Jessica Benjamin would hold. Rather, it 
is 'an important struggle within the dynamics of civil societies' (ibid.:70) as Axel Honneth (2002:39-61) 
would agree. 
I would now like to suggest that collaborative auto/biography serves as an ideal example for contemporary 
critical theorists like Habermas and feminist critical theorists like Benhabib and Lara, who have paid 
attention to autobiography, to explicate and substantiate their views regarding the mediation of the intra-
and intersubjective generation of identity in narrative self-representation.28 Then Augustine would be 
classified as representative of the metaphysical paradigm, Rousseau of the philosophy of the subject, and 
collaborative auto/biographies as the anticipatory forerunners to a truly intersubjectivist practice in life-
writing. 29 What makes collaborative auto/biographies more explicit exponents of the intersubjective 
paradigm than Rousseau's Confessions, is that they draw those intersubjective relations which are 
normally established between the text and the interpreting reader into their genealogy, leaving their mark 
in the text more visibly than in classic monological autobiography. 
iii. The intersubjective generation of justice in the public sphere 
Justice, according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated through speech acts which prioritise validity 
claims about the social world and are called regulatives. A communicatively acting speaker cannot but 
raise the claim that the norms she (implicitly or explicitly) voices in her utterances are just. The 
intersubjectivist generation of justice in regulative speech acts which prioritise the validity claim to 
rightness takes centre stage in Habermas's oeuvre and is well developed in his theory of discourse ethics 
(MbKH and ED). By analogy to constative claims about the external world, he holds that, regulatives 
(utterances which thematise the norms regulating social behaviour), also raise intersubjectively 
redeemable validity claims, making them subject to rational scrutiny (VS :427 and 440 [PC :81 and 92)). 
Examples of regulatives may be ordering, commanding, requesting, warning, recommending etc. (VS 
:147). Habermas's claim that justice is intersubjectively generated has two sources, one going back to the 
universal pragmatics, the other to his theory of the modern occidental bourgeois public sphere. The 
universal pragmatics is the source of the formal aspects of his discourse ethics. It gives an account of the 
formal conditions of universalisability which postconventional norms (norms which derive their acceptance, 
not from specific conventions but from rational justification) need to meet in a cosmopolitan world. The 
theory of the public sphere is a conceptual-social history with normative intent. It identifies concrete 
historical examples, and their evolution in European modernity, of the public sphere in which a 
proceduralist postconventional ethics can evolve. 
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In line with his defence of a differentiated notion of rationality, Habermas develops a theory of justice, 
which holds that only those norms are legitimate which can be justified in rational intersubjective discourse 
{MbkH :73-76). Applying the general consensus theory of truth to normative claims in his ethics, 
Habermas holds that a norm is legitimate if all interlocutors affected by it can agree to its general 
application, that is if it is universalisable in the sense that no one objects to it.30 In contrast to the double 
falsifying relationship characteristic of truth claims (namely potential objection by interlocutors and 
potential failure of action based on truth claims) Habermas holds that in the case of justice, the objections 
of interlocutors, rather than the resistance of the world of action, has prerogative. Progress in the 
normative domain of rightness consists in the universalising orientation of an ever greater inclusion of the 
unfamiliar demands of outsiders (WR :56). 
A distinctive feature of modernity, and one which Habermas initially insisted on, is its separation of norms 
from values, that is its separation of questions of justice from those of the good life.31 An ethics of justice 
is usually associated with a formalist proceduralist ethics in the Kantian tradition, and theories of the good 
life with substantive ethics of the Aristotelian kind. Habermas insists that a postmetaphysical ethics in a 
multicultural world requires assigning values (concrete notions of the good) to the personal sphere and 
norms to the political. The function of norms is to co-ordinate interaction between different agents who 
have different notions of the good life, rather than to suggest substantive values. Norms thus have to be 
universalisable, whereas values need not. The way in which Habermas introduces his theory of discourse 
ethics in his philosophy of law suggests that when he refers to norms he actually has those legal norms 
{laws) in mind which are legitimated through deliberation in formal public spheres like parliaments. This 
distinction between norms (public) and values (private) and the requirement that the former be 
universalisable whereas the latter is a matter of personal concern and thus not subject to interpersonal 
rational consensus has been criticised by feminist critical theorists (Benhabib, 1992:170 and Fraser32). 
According to them, values may not be subject to state legislation, but are nevertheless subject to 
intersubjective rational scrutiny. If values did not have to meet the requirement of universalisability, then 
there would be no basis of critique of discriminatory values exercised in the private sphere, such as 
sexism, racism, homophobia and so on. Habermas has recently conceded to the objection by Benhabib 
that this distinction between norms and values cannot be as knife-sharp as he initially contended. He now 
grants that different values have to be considered when the legitimacy of norms is at stake, and that 
notions of the good life are indirectly subject to public scrutiny in that those values which cannot be 
reconciled with universalisable norms are by implication also unacceptable (EdA :73). And, as seen 
above, he affords a special role to autobiography as a medium in which these values are offered to the 
public for scrutiny. 
Benhabib (1992:148 ff.) has used the universalisation principle of Habermas's discourse ethics to 
distinguish between two forms of relations between self and other. Put simply, the Kantian, whose ethics 
is based on the generalised other, assumes the existence of a universal human nature so that he can 
work out which norms are universalisable without leaving the seclusion of his study in Konigsberg. His 
monologically applied reason suffices to develop norms that would find universal acceptance because it 
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regards differences between subjects as morally irrelevant. In the second model, which is based on the 
consideration of the concrete other and where differences are morally relevant, dialogue is necessary in 
order to become clear about the specific needs of the other: 'Neither the concreteness nor the otherness 
of the "concrete other" can be known in the absence of the voice of the other. The viewpoint of the 
concrete other emerges as a distinct one only as a result of self-definition. It is the other who makes us 
aware both of her concreteness and her otherness' (Benhabib, 1992:168). Drawing our attention to 
difference as a resource rather than a complication to democratic deliberation, Young has asserted that 
different viewpoints can serve as a critical corrective on our own fallible views as well as provide us with 
alternative values for dealing with the situations we face. In addition, to the extent that actions of certain 
subjects affect others, there is an imperative to engage in concrete dialogue: 'Norms of communicative 
democracy assume that differently situated individuals understand that they are nevertheless related in a 
world of interaction and internal effects that affects them all, but differently. If they aim to solve their, 
collective problems, they must listen across their differences to understand how proposals and policies 
affect others differently situated. They learn what takes place in different social locations and how social 
processes appear to connect and conflict from different points of view' (2000: 117-118 and 1997:59). 
In his history-with-normative-intent of the rise of the modem European public sphere, Habermas argues 
that one of the features of modernity is the emergence of a public sphere, which is separate from and 
even in opposition to the state. He affords a central place to the salons, coffeehouses, and 
Tischgesellschaften as literary precursors to the political public sphere. These were early attempts at 
concretising relations of communication reminiscent of the ideal speech situation. As the towns and the 
bourgeoisie gained their independence from the court, "'opinion" became emancipated from the bonds of 
economic dependence' (STPS: 33-34 ). Conversation evolved into criticism, 'bon mots into arguments' 
(STPS :31 ). Gradually a parity of the educated developed between aristocratic society and bourgeois 
intellectuals. To the extent that it was a threat to domination, 'social equality was initially only possible as 
equality outside the state. The coming together of private people into a public was therefore anticipated in 
secret, as a public sphere still existing largely behind closed doors' {STPS :35). In Benhabib's words 
(1996:16), the 'salons were social experiments of a period of transition from the old to the new'. As initial 
space through which texts passed on their way into the world of print, the salons were gatherings, 'in 
which the written and the spoken word often flowed into each other'. As such they constituted both a 
testing ground and an anticipatory public in which 'written texts were often first presented, improvised, and 
altered in the process' (STPS :34). 
We have seen that Habermas holds that all communication is premised on the counterfactual, yet 
effective, assumption that an ideal speech situation actually exists. In the salons, coffeehouses, and 
Tischgesellschaften he sees early attempts at concretising these ideal communication relations.33 He 
identifies three basic principles informing these early precursors to the political public sphere, to wit parity, 
openness regarding what can be thematised, and openness in terms of participation (compare the 
second, third, and fifth requirements of the ideal speech situation on p 30 above.) Parity was necessary 
so that 'the authority of the better argument could assert itself.' It was achieved through the bracketing of 
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status (rather than the assumption of equality). In her study of Hannah Arendt's writing on Rahel 
Vamhagen (the German Jewess who conducted a salon in Berlin at the end of the eighteenth century), 
Benhabib has added that for Jewish women these social activities made emancipation from traditional 
patriarchal families possible in that they brought the Enlightenment idea of the human being as such to life 
(Benhabib, 1996a:15-17). The lifting of taboos on what can be spoken about meant that intellectual 
problems which had remained beyond the pale of public debate became topics of discussion. 
Pontification on literary and philosophical works was no longer left to the church or aristocracy, but, as 
these texts became commodities, their consumers entered debates from which they had previously been 
excluded, and profaning them, evaluated these texts in the light of their own lives. Concomitant to the 
extension of the issues which could be thematised was the opening of the discourse to a more general 
public. Despite the actual exclusivity of the salons, coffeehouses, and Tischgesellschaften, their 
participants perceived themselves, not as members of a clique, but were conscious of themselves as 
being part of, or even the mouthpiece of, a more inclusive public (STPS :36-37). Although the salons were 
topographically confined and structured spaces, they exemplified and helped to foster forms of sociability 
and social intercourse that were not topographically confined: 'As modem civil society spreads, the forms 
of sociability and intimacy prefigured by the salons became in part social reality; in part they remain the 
ideals defining the utopian self-understanding of early bourgeois society' (Benhabib, 1996a:17). 
According to Habermas, the modern European bourgeois public sphere originated with its counterpart, the 
private sphere.34 With the rise of an urban bourgeoisie, which set itself apart from the court as the centre 
of power and government, a new consciousness of privacy arose. This is evident in changes in 
architecture (dwellings gaining more separated and private rooms than previously, while retaining a salon 
where the family met each other and other persons from outside) and literature. Yet men and women 
related differently to the evolving literary public. On the one hand the press developed out of 
businessmen's need to be informed about events in the world, which would affect their trade. On the 
other hand, women and dependent classes increased the extent of self-reflection in the medium of 
intimate writing. Men, who had an active part in the economy, but were excluded from the political public, 
gradually started articulating their concerns regarding political affairs in the moral weeklies. Women and 
the dependent classes retained the principal position, if not as producers, then as organisers, and 
consumers, in the self-reflecting public world of letters from which the novel arose (Benhabib, 1996a:19). 
Self-reflection, in the medium of culture (rather than politics) was the centre of discussion. Early reflection 
in the literary public concentrated on reflection on the self and its newly found privacy expressed in 
intimate writing. Initially the 'public that read and debated [ ... ] read and debated about itself (STPS :43, 
29). In this literary public of rational-critical debate, 'the subjectivity originating in the interiority of the 
conjugal family, by communicating with itself, attained clarity about itself (STPS :51 ). For both bourgeois 
men and women their various entrances to the various public spheres were connected to the private 
sphere, albeit to two different aspects of it, namely the economic and the personal. Only as long as it was 
possible for them to set themselves apart from the public dominated by the monarch could they reflect on 
their own particular needs and selves. But this self-reflection was always directed to the outside: in the 
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case of the traders there was a link between their private economic interest and their interest in a politics 
which would support this; in the case of women and the dependent classes, intimate self-reflection was 
also intended for public consumption (STPS :43-56). 
The bourgeois literary public, according to Habermas, was informed by the typical modern emphasis on 
the interconnectedness of authenticity and universalisability. Narratives of the self, in which a specific 
notion of the good life is conveyed, acquired 'normative legitimacy because they are filtered through the 
public sphere, where actors create fragile and falsifiable agreements about what needs to be done in the 
social world' (Lara, 1998:6). In intimate writing like the letter; the epistolary novel (Pamela); and the 
'autobiographical charade' (Robinson Crusoe) (Coetzee, 1999:vi), 'the first-person narrative became a 
conversation with one's self addressed to another person.' Such 'self-observation entered a union partly 
curious, partly sympathetic with the emotional stirrings of the other I' (STPS :49). The literary public 
constituted an emotional and a social community, which Lara describes as follows: 'When one reads 
about the hearts and troubles of others, one forms a community with them in the very act of reading. 
Reciprocal understanding and recognition thus become the basis of the community in a much more 
powerful way' (Lara, 1998:79). The social community was constituted by readers coming together in book 
clubs and reading circles, which constituted the centre of self-understanding in which 'public deliberations 
lead to moral learning. They provide[d] the contrast one needs in order to clarify one's views reflexively' 
(ibid.:109, 110). Projects of authenticity thus have two conditions: the 'first is that one must possess 
sufficient autonomy to decide one's own life' as was increasingly the case for the urban bourgeoisie. The 
'second is that self-determination and self-realization must be brought together into a public claim for 
recognition in a disclosive fashion' as in narrative self-reflection (STPS :88).35 In this way 'reflections on 
life histories and cultural traditions have fostered "individualism" in personal life projects, and "pluralism" in · 
collective forms of life' (Lara, 1998:85). This connection between autobiographical self-reflection and 
participation in the public sphere is clearly stated by Mcclintock, 'The entry into autobiography, particularly, 
is seen to be the entry into the political authority of self-representation' (1991 :198). 
Initially women, who were excluded from the economic and political publics their husbands had begun to 
enter, played a prominent role in circles where publicly oriented self-reflection was practised. For women, 
intimate writing, real or simulated, or in the guise of the autobiographical novel, would remain a channel of 
entry into the public of letters in the English language for a long time. Works of art constituted a viable 
entry for them, because they did not have to contend 'with the impediments of liberal theories that 
excluded women from the public sphere' (Lara, 1998:59). Women increasingly 'used fiction as a cultural 
strategy for performing identity claims, once they became aware of the huge impact that literary works can 
have on public opinion' (Lara, 1998:92).36 Such performances of identity claims may initially be an appeal 
for recognition for specific women's life choices (their distinctive values), but they are, at the same time, 
also appeals for recognition of themselves as persons with an equal right to participate in the political 
republic. These two aspects are internally connected, thus showing the porousness of notions of the 
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good life and justice. In the very act of portraying themselves as responsible persons who can reflect on 
and justify their distinctive values (notions of the good) these authors assert their right to participate in a 
political republic informed by requirements of universalisability {Lara, 1998:32). 
Habermas's theory of the rise of the political public from the literary public of early modernity is largely an 
historical study with practical intent. In his recent philosophy of law, he has again turned to theorising the 
public sphere, this time with his eye on the contemporary situation in Germany and the USA. While 
affirming his earlier position on the necessity of the complementary relationship between the private and 
the public spheres, he has distinguished more clearly between two different domains in the political public. 
The first is the informal public sphere associated with civil society (churches, parties, associations). The 
second is the formal public sphere associated with state institutions like parliaments, in which legitimising 
debates about norms that become encoded in law take place (FG :399-467. See also Benhabib, 2002 
:21 ). Like Maria Pia Lara, I would like to suggest that, to the extent that they forge links between the 
domestic space of their production, publicly oriented self-reflection, and social movements seeking entry 
to the formal public sphere in order to participate in the legitimation of just norms, a study of collaborative 
auto/biography can assist in throwing some light on the culturally mediated relations between the informal 
and the formal public spheres. 
Lara has argued that Habermas's emphasis on society (the formal and informal political public) has left 
him blind to the role of culture in the struggle for justice. Pointing out that 'biographies have become the 
vehicle for identity projects linking the moral and the aesthetic spheres,' Lara insists on foregrounding the 
porousness of the cultural and political, the good life and justice, and values, norms and aesthetic-
expressive discourses (1998:49 and 6). Narratives (of the self) constitute a medium in which women 
achieve knowledge which has 'transformed our notions of justice and democracy' (ibid.:71 ). Once women 
considered 'themselves as subjects of interest and their lives as worth living and writing about' 
contemporary feminist discourse could discover 'that the possibility of recognition is in the public's interest' 
(ibid.:75). Lara thus argues that an account of emancipation and justice which connects social 
movements (the informal political publics of civil society) with the domain of letters (the cultural public) is 
both necessary, and throws light on the role of women's autobiography in the public sphere in general, and 
the political public in particular (ibid.:170). Combining Habermas's views on autobiography with Arendt's 
concept of storytelling, she points to the specific potential of women's narrative self-representations to 
simultaneously create and reconfigure the symbolic order and to 'expand and transform democratic 
institutions by challenging previous collective meanings and self-representations' (ibid.:170, 23, 108). 
Lara adds though that the success of (women's) appeals to recognition, however, depends on the extent 
to which they can show 'that theirs is a new project of universalism.' In other words, they have to convince 
their audience that, by accepting their point of view, other members of society can simultaneously enlarge 
their own notions of who they are (ibid.:121, 122). 'Women's claims for justice can succeed,' according to 
Lara 'only through a responsive acceptance that reframes their claim, taking it not only as a new 
understanding of a particular issue, but as a newly broadened collective self-understanding of the daily life 
40 
II Jntersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory 
of civil society' (ibid.:110). She insists though that the expansion of the we to include those others who are 
different, goes beyond mere tolerance and respect (ibid.:119). Like Habermas in his preface to Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen37, she notes that the 'value of differences must be asserted in front of others, 
not only others who are like oneself but others who, precisely because of their difference, matter to one' 
(ibid.:156). In fact, 'postconventional identities are formed through the acceptance of differences within a 
larger "we"', from whom one can also learn. As 'various groups and people submit life projects to 
discussion in the public domain, one exercises the capacity to learn and be transformed through these 
differences.' In this sense, 'recognition, thus, has become a social and individual need' (ibid.:119).38 
Habermas's theory of the public sphere has been both influential and received much critique. 39 It has 
been objected that the focus on the arguments in the press (and later the electronic media) fails to take 
into consideration non-argumentative modes and media of communicative interaction in the public sphere. 
His focus on the bourgeois public sphere has been criticised because it downplays the significance of 
alternative and counter-publics of the underclasses and women. His focus on a predominantly uniracial 
society in Europe fails to consider the specificities of a racist colonial context.40 (I shall return to these 
criticisms in specific relation to collaborative auto/biographies in chapter V below). 
iv. The intersubjective generation of the speech system and the appropriateness of 
the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication 
The speech system (language in the broadest possible sense), according to Habermas, is 
intersubjectively generated in speech acts which prioritise validity claims about the language in which 
utterances are couched. A communicatively acting speaker cannot but raise the claim that the speech 
system in which she couches her utterances is intelligible and appropriate. Habermas's claim that truth, 
identity, and justice are generated in the medium of critical intersubjective discourse goes some way in 
illuminating the significance of language. However, as with the claim to truthfulness thematised in 
expressive speech acts, Habermas has shifting and unclear ideas about validity claims pertaining to the 
speech system in which utterances are couched. What is clear however is that a specific speech system 
provides the cognitive schemata and the constitutive rules of a lifeform, and discloses the world in a 
specific way.41 On the basic level of observation statements the speech system selects and orders the 
phenomena which need to be explained or justified. On a further level, it sets the conditions of possible 
interaction with other subjects, which includes the conditions of the possibility of utterances and 
arguments (VS :169, 75, El :237, WR :76). 
At least two different claims which prioritise the validity of the speech system can be distinguished. The 
first is the simple claim that an utterance is intelligible (VS :81 ). According to Habermas, this claim has a 
certain temporal and logical primacy to the other validity claims because an utterance first of all has to be 
intelligible before it can serve as a basis for intersubjective dis/agreement at all (VS :139). The second is 
the claim that the speech system in which utterances are couched is appropriate. Like the other validity 
claims, this one too is subject to intersubjective evaluation and critique. At the level of a substantial 
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critique of the speech system, interlocutors explicitly debate the appropriateness of the speech system in 
the light of which experience is selected and ordered, and failed expectations accounted for. Such 
debates about the modification of the speech system or a weighing up of alternative speech systems 
constitute metatheoretical or metaethical discourse (VS :174-175). Here the question is debated which 
speech system should be used for the description of phenomena, for bringing a problem into focus or to 
express a knowledge-guiding interest (VS : 115). The foregrounding in his speech act theory of the 
universal conditions of the possibility of understanding over the appropriateness of specific speech 
systems means that Haberrnas neglects theorising the ways in which these particular speech systems 
themselves shape what can be said and what can be done within them, and the extent to which they are 
subject to reflection, intersubjective critique, and rationally based consensus. 
According to Habermas, progress in knowledge takes place in the form of a substantial critique of 
language (VS :171), which he construes as steps in an ontogenetic and phylogenetic learning process. 
There is an immanent connection between innovation in the speech system and innovation in research, 
leading to scientific revolutions. In extreme cases, we run up against the limits of our understanding and 
are unable to solve persistent problems. Then, when we see the same facts differently with a new 
vocabulary, perspectives are opened again (TK :28. See also LS :75).42 Linguistic innovations provide 
alternative truth-conditions, that is they create the frameworks within which utterances can become truth 
candidates, and in which claims about truth, justice, and identity can be raised which were not possible 
heretofore (TKH, Bd. I :91-93 [TCA, vol I :58-59]). Like all other validity claims, speech acts that prioritise 
the claims that the speech system is appropriate 'can only legitimate themselves through the filter of public 
opinion' (Lara, 1998 :113). 
Described in this manner, innovation in the speech system is the result of critical reflection and cognitive 
learning processes rather than relativistic successions.43 Whether a specific innovation is a good one, and 
whether the speech system is appropriate is then not arbitrary but subject to intersubjective scrutiny in 
discourses which require backing by reasons. Innovative disclosures are not immune to critical reflection 
and evaluation as Heidegger postulated about art (Bohman, 1996:201). They are thematised in discursive 
reflection on the speech system, which means that there is an internal connection 'between world-
disclosing language and learning processes in the world' (PDME :319). Some of the criteria which are 
applied in such critical reflection could be whether such disclosures: provide an appropriate description of 
the natural world {which makes it possible for us to solve certain problems in our interaction with material 
reality through technology); make an authentic interpretation of the self and its interests possible (thus 
opening the way to happiness); and provide a language of legitimation (which allows for the formulation of 
just norms). Habermas's evolutionary model marries historical materialism and formalism in an account 
of ever freer relations of communication. According to Habermas, the highest level of evolution occurs 
when norms are legitimised in accordance with the discourse ethical universalisation principle, when 
identities are de-centred, and when communication relations are devoid of external and internal restraint 
(RHM :144-199; MbKH :127). 
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Fraser's analysis of the discursive resources available to women in the welfare state for the interpretation 
of their needs has shown how matters of recognition and distribution are closely tied to the speech system 
or what she calls more broadly the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication (1989:144-
160, and 1997:11-41). In order to achieve recognition and a more just distribution of material and social 
goods, it may not be enough to demand them in the medium of hegemonic speech systems. Instead, 
social transformation is often only possible in conjunction with revisions to hegemonic speech systems. In 
Lara's words (1989:126), 'The creation of new vocabularies of needs, the new understanding of values 
that are presupposed in these new needs, and the wider and deeper interpretations of life and respect for 
it - these are the really critical elements to be discussed in any model of recognition'. In 'creating a new 
vocabulary social groups provide for new descriptions' that 'illuminate once repressed truths' and 'create 
possibilities for relationships that were never envisioned before' (Lara, 1998: 171 ). Recognising the effect 
of the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication (that is the 'historically and culturally 
specific ensemble of discursive resources available to members of a given social collectivity in pressing 
claims against one another') on questions of justice and identity understood as the authentic interpretation 
of needs, has led Fraser to draw up a suggestive catalogue of questions, which can be used in debates on 
the appropriateness of speech systems (Fraser, 1989:164). As the catalogue provides a valuable starting 
point for the evaluation of speech systems I quote her in full. According to Fraser, in evaluating the 
sociocultural means of interpretation and communication we should pay attention to: 
1. The officially recognized idioms in which one can press claims; for example, needs talk, 
rights talk, interests talk 
2. The vocabularies available for instantiating claims in these recognized idioms; thus, with 
respect to needs talk, What are the vocabularies available for interpreting and 
communicating one's needs? For example, therapeutic vocabularies, administrative 
vocabularies, religious vocabularies, feminist vocabularies, socialist vocabularies 
3. The paradigms of argumentation accepted as authoritative in adjudicating conflicting 
claims; thus, with respect to needs talk. How are conflicts over the interpretation of 
needs resolved? By appeals to scientific experts? By brokered compromise? By voting 
according to majority rule? By privileging the interpretation of those whose needs are in 
question? 
4. The narrative conventions available for constructing the individual and collective stories 
that are constitutive of people's social identities 
5. Modes of subjectification; the ways in which various discourses position the people to 
whom they are addressed as specific sorts of subjects endowed with specific sorts of 
capacities for action; for example, as "normal" or "deviant," as causally conditioned or 
freely self-determining, as victims or as potential activists, as unique individuals or as 
members of social groups (Fraser; 1989:164-165). 
Having asserted both that the speech system discloses the world, and that progress in knowledge is tied 
to the critique of the speech system, we are confronted with an ambiguity in Habermas's position as to 
where innovations in the disclosive capacity of language have their locus. In the eighties he distinguished 
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sharply between the problem-solving and disclosing capacities of language, aligning the former with 
standard speech acts, which carry on the business of the world, and the latter with works of art, which are 
parasitical on the former."" Drawing on Roman Jakobson and Richard Ohmann, Habermas holds that 
artworks are impaired speech acts. Because they are self-referential they relieve interlocutors from 
backing their understanding of something in the world with reasons that are intersubjectively binding and 
that co-ordinate interaction. Quoting Ohmann (1971 :17), he holds: 
"Since the quasi-speech acts of literature are not carrying on the world's business -
describing, urging, contracting, etc. - the reader may well attend to them in a non-pragmatic 
way." Neutralizing their binding force releases the disempowered illocutionary acts from the 
pressure to decide proper to everyday communicative practice, removes them from the 
sphere of usual discourse, and thereby empowers them for the playful creation of new worlds 
- or, rather, for the pure demonstration of the world-disclosing force of innovative linguistic 
expressions (PDME :201 [PDM :236)). 
What marks poetic use of language is not the deviation between fiction and a documentary report of 
reality, but the way in which a chosen excerpt of reality is used as an occasion for 'an innovative, world-
disclosive, and eye-opening representation in which the rhetorical means of representation depart from 
communicative routines and take on a life of their own' (PDME :203 [PDM :238)), with the result that the 
work of art is immunised against the demands of the communicative function of everyday speech and 
activities. 45 
Pace Habermas, I would contend that the relevant distinction is not between standard (scientific and 
moral) and non-standard (aesthetic) speech acts, with works of art specialising in innovations in the 
speech system. Fraser's argument against Rorty (Rorty, 1989:73-137), that world-disclosing innovations 
in the speech system are the prerogative of the artist, holds equally against Habermas (Fraser, 1989:93-
109) and his recent writings on world-disclosure (WR : 66-101) suggest a shift in this direction.46 The 
relevant distinction is rather between types of validity claims. Whereas truth, rightness, and truthfulness 
carry on the world's business in the sense of not reflecting on the medium of communication itself, claims 
about the appropriateness of a speech system focus on the medium itself. Whether we find ourselves in a 
discourse on truth, rightness, or truthfulness, we can always debate the appropriateness of the speech 
system. For example, whether it is more appropriate to speak of light in terms of waves or particles; 
whether it is more appropriate to use the terms justice or care in dealing with ethical dilemmas; and 
whether it is more appropriate to speak of the interpretation of the self and its needs in terms of identity or 
difference. Innovations in the speech system are not the exclusive domain of art, and like all other validity 
claims, uttering a claim about the appropriateness of the speech system commits the speaker to providing 
intersubjectively convincing reasons as to its validity. 
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4. Towards a theory ofintersubjectivity and collaborative auto/biography 
The above sketch of a theory of intersubjectivity, as it is advocated in contemporary critical theory, 
provides the groundwork for a theory of collaborative auto/biography which will be explicated by means of 
an application to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. I propose five 
sets of questions that could provide such a research programme for a theory of collaborative 
auto/biography: 
• Intersubjectivity and the general consensus theory of validity 
To what extent are the interlocutors of collaborative auto/biography guided by a search for common 
ground? Is this consensus established through reason, or are there also other ways of reaching 
understanding-agreement? Are the relations of production and consumption conducive to the 
establishment of a non-coercive (rational} consensus, and to what extent is the discourse distorted by the 
steering mechanisms of money and power? 
• The intersubjective generation of truth 
What makes validity claims about the past true? Where the pragmatic aspect of potentially falsifying 
action falls away, does consensus between interlocutors suffice as a criterion for truth claims about the 
past? What are the rhetorical devices that are used to convey truth claims? How is the truth value of 
utterances affected by these rhetorical devices? 
• The intersubjective generation of identity 
To what extent is the relation between the oral narrator and the writing author based on mutual 
recognition? To what extent does the narrative achieve the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective in 
the text? To what extent does the oral narrator succeed in eliciting an affirmative public response to her 
appeals for recognition? 
• The intersubjective generation of justice 
To what extent does the narrative contribute to the pursuit of the intersubjectively transformed unfinished 
project of modernity and the institutionalisation of those conditions of communication under which it would 
be possible for the subaltern to speak and be heard, as a first step towards the abolition of subalternity? 
• The intersubjective generation of the speech system 
What does the narrative contribute to the development of an appropriate speech system for the authentic 
interpretation of needs and the self, and their legitimation in the public sphere? 
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In line with the general idea informing critical theory, namely that it has to be in continual exchange with 
applied disciplines, an idea reiterated in Habermas's depiction of the universal pragmatics as quasi-
transcendental, the next chapters pursue these questions as they arise within the concrete practice of 
collaborative auto/biography. Mapping the intersubjectivist theory sketched in chapter II onto the practice 
of collaborative auto/biography will serve as an opportunity to elucidate the theory. It will also serve as the 
basis for developing a theory of collaborative auto/biography which is not premised on Cartesian subject 
philosophy and monological autobiographies belonging to a similar modern paradigm. Finally, it will reveal 
those shortcomings in Habermas's theory of intersubjectivity that have not been mentioned so far, 
showing where reformulations are needed and to what extent these can be sought from feminist critical 
theory. In chapters Ill, IV, and V the focus will be on the first, second, and third sets of questions 
respectively. Constraints of space will not allow me to devote full chapters to the last two sets of questions 
{although allusions to these issues will of necessity feature in the other chapters} and to the relationships 
between the five sets - a requirement that would have to be fulfilled by a more comprehensive theory of 
collaborative auto/biography based on contemporary critical theory.47 
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Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity in 
'Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena' and 'The calling of Katie Makanya' 
'The white people do not understand the natives. 
This is not because most of them do not speak the language, 
only kitchen kaffir, but because they do not care' 
Katie Makanya 1 
'Ons het waarskynlik nau die punt bereik waar ek nie nader wil gaan 
en .ry nie meer wil antbloat nie. 
Daar is 'n muur, nie van onbegrip nie, maar van valslae onbegeerte am te begryp. 
Vir my is daar iets afstaotliks in wat .ry aan my maet blootle, 
vir haar in die ajbreek van die mure wat daar tussen ons maet bestaan. 
Wil ek die kennis he? My hele psige verwerp dit.' 
Elsa Jauberf 
In the following three chapters I draw on the philosophical theories of intersubjectivity proposed by second 
and third generation critical theorists sketched in chapter II to suggest the outlines of a theory of 
collaborative autobiography taken as a genre in its own right. Rather than spell out a theory in the 
abstract, I develop it in application to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie 
Makanya. At the end of chapter II, five domains of study of collaborative auto/biography based on 
contemporary critical theory were identified. The present chapter deals with the first domain, namely the 
general consensus theory of validity or truth. Chapter IV deals with the intersubjective generation of truth 
about the past, and chapter V with the generation of identity within relations of reciprocal recognition. 
Comments on the role of collaborative auto/biography in the intersubjective generation of just norms and 
an appropriate speech system (or in Fraser's wider term, the media of interpretation and communication) 
are interspersed throughout. Translated into the specific context of collaborative auto/biography, the 
investigation into the relevance of Habermas's general consensus theory of validity can be broken down 
into two questions, namely ( 1) to what extent were the relations of production conducive to the 
establishment of a non-coercive rational consensus; and, the flip-side of that question, (2) to what extent 
did the steering mechanisms of money and power distort the relations of the production of knowledge, 
thereby also distorting the knowledge produced by the collaborators? 
III Jntersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity 
1. The relations of production understood as the search for rational consensus in an ideal speech 
situation 
To what extent then were the relations of production3 and consumption in Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya conducive to the co-operative production of knowledge 
understood as the establishment of a non-coercive rational consensus in an ideal speech situation 
described in chapter II? I will attempt an answer to this question by breaking it down into three more 
specific ones: To what extent were the interlocutors motivated by a co-operative search for truth? To what 
extent was truth based on consensus? To what extent was consensus established through the unforced 
force of reason? Paying attention to the relations of production should be understood as a continuation of 
Horkheimer's thesis (seep 22 above) that an adequate understanding of knowledge includes reflection on 
the conditions of the production of knowledge. 
i. To what extent were the interlocutors motivated solely by a search for truth? 
Bracketing the debate on the reservations about authors' motives4 I proceed directly to the question 
whether Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, and Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord were at all motivated by a 
search for the truth and whether this was their only motivation in producing Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. As is so often the case with collaborative auto/biography, 
there are no extant records in which the oral narrators Eunice N. and Katie Makanya express their motives 
and their views on the collaboration, except for those sources that are mediated by the writing authors 
Joubert and McCord.5 Elsa Joubert traces part of her and Eunice N.'s motive to the context preceding the 
collaboration on the narrative. According to Joubert, Eunice N. had been in her service as a domestic 
servant in a house in Belvedere Avenue, Oranjezicht in Cape Town, for about four or five years by January 
1977, when they started working on interviews for the book.6 Over the years Joubert had developed a 
certain compassion for her. During that period they often chatted - always in Afrikaans. In the course of 
time, Joubert got to know about Eunice's family, her Tant Lenie, Tant Hetta, and Tant Hanna. The origin 
of these Afrikaans names ('Boerename') in a Xhosa family intrigued Joubert, prompting her to find out 
more about Eunice and her relatives. By getting involved with the story of this one woman and her family, 
Joubert hoped to get the answers to questions about South Africa that had been plaguing her for some 
time (Interview).' 
In the decades prior to the work on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, Joubert had travelled extensively 
in Africa and had published several travel accounts. Two novels and a travel account dealing with 
conflicts in the Portuguese colonies followed this: Ons Wag op die Kaptein (1963) (translated as To Die at 
Sunset), Bonga (1971), and Die Nuwe Afrikaan (1973). With a travel narrative on South Africa in mind, 
Joubert conducted research in various parts of the country, visiting rural and urban areas, schools, clinics, 
pass offices, and traditional healers.8 Some of these experiences went into the collection of short stories 
Melk.9 Then, on Boxing Day 1976, while Joubert and her family were preparing to go on their annual 
seaside holiday, Eunice arrived a totally devastated. Joubert made tea, they sat down at the table10, and 
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Eunice told her about violence of the preceding two days in Nyanga, in which her grandson had been 
killed. After that they each went on their respective holidays, Eunice to Herschel where her son and 
daughters were staying with her in-laws 11 • and the Joubert's to their holiday home in Onrustrivier. During 
this time Joubert pondered Eunice's situation, discussed it with her husband, the publisher and author, 
Klaas Steytler, and decided to drop her earlier research and to work on Eunice's story instead. As Eunice 
needed money to buy a house, and Joubert anticipated that Eunice's life story would provide answers to 
many of the questions about South Africa she herself had been mulling on, she suggested to Eunice that 
she (Eunice) tell her (Joubert) her story, and that they would then share equally the profits from its 
publication (Joubert, 1987:253 - 256; Interview). Summarising their narrative relationship, Joubert notes, 
'she had a need to speak. I had a great need to listen' (Rough note for acceptance speech to the Royal 
Society of Literature. Joubert papers12}. Joubert adds that she and Eunice often said that they were 
writing the book for the sake of their children, who 'share a common heritage, a common land, and will 
share a common future,' and that the book 'was an attempt to combat barriers of ignorance and prejudice 
that exist between our peoples' (Final version of Royal Society speech. Joubert papers ). 13 
Joubert's sketch of the origins and nature of the collaboration allows us to draw a few general conclusions. 
The declared motives for the collaboration include the desire to make known and to know. This includes 
Joubert's particular desire to know more about Eunice's Afrikaans Xhosa family; to know about the events 
of her more recent life; and to find some answers to the more general pressing questions about (black) life 
in South Africa. But there were other motives too: Eunice's psychological need to speak the 
unspeakable, and Joubert's need to hear it; Eunice's need to be heard as a person, and Joubert's need to 
cross her 'bridge to the unknown', as the narrator of the story 'Backyard' from the collection Melk puts it. 
In other words, superimposed on the facts, there was also Eunice's need to be known and understood as 
a person (to be recognised) and Joubert's need to know and understand Eunice as a person (to recognise 
her). Then there were issues of money and power at stake. Eunice needed money to buy a house. As a 
professional writer, Joubert's writing constituted an income although she did not depend on it for survival 
in the way Eunice did. But Joubert's career as a writer did depend on her ability to manage the cultural 
capital she accrued through her books up till then. 14 
Less is known directly about the motives of the collaborators on The Calling of Katie Makanya. One 
reason for this is that, in contrast to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, it was the long deceased oral 
narrator, Katie Makanya, rather than the writing author Margaret McCord, who initiated the project. 
Because Katie had died by the time of publication, and records from the time from which her motives 
could be reconstructed are non-existent, we once again have to rely on the writing author, Margaret 
McCord' in an account provided in the prelude to the actual narrative (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3-
4).15 Makanya herself is reported to have wanted her story told in order to fill in the gaps in the 
autobiography of her employer, Dr James McCord. 16 Margaret McCord adds to this that Katie's sister 
Charlotte Maxeke (founder of the Bantu Woman's League, the forerunner to the African National 
Congress Women's League) had written her own autobiography by that time 17, which might have added to 
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Katie's reasons for having her own life published (Interview). Margaret McCord makes a point of using the 
opening pages of the book to express her initial doubt about the wisdom of Katie's request to her to write 
Katie's life: 
"You are very much educated so you know about these things. That's why you must write my 
story." 
"But Auntie, I can't do that, "I gasp. 
"Why not?" 
"Because - "(I search for the right words) "-we live in different worlds." 
She shakes her head impatiently. "Now you talk foolish. God only created one world." 
"I mean we lead such different lives. " 
"What does that matter? When you were little you slept in my bed, ate my food, played with 
my children. [ ... ] You were like a daughter to me."[ .. .] 
"But things changed between us after I started school, "I say. 
Katie shakes her head. "They didn't change. You still came to me for comfort when you 
were hurt or frightened. You still came to show off your treasures or pester me for stories. 
Even when you were in high school you would come into the supply room when I was having 
my afternoon tea and ask, "What was it like when - ?"(The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3). 
These opening lines also reveal some clues as to Margaret's motives for collaboration. Her intimate and 
longstanding relationship with Katie established a personal connection and probably a sense of 
responsibility, which also weakened her resistance to Katie's coaxing. Furthermore, we are told that 
McCord's interest in Katie's oral accounts of aspects of South African history which were barred from 
school textbooks had been kindled from an early age (See also Interview). Writing a book on Katie's life 
would thus allow McCord to further pursue this interest, and also to rekindle and relive an already 
established narrative relationship of her youth, which might have offered some nostalgic attraction. 
In the case of The Calling of Katie Makanya a further complication regarding the motives comes into play, 
namely that Katie's request to have her life written, and the recordings on which it is based, took place in 
1954, whereas the book was only published forty years later, in 1995. Motives may have been added or 
they might have changed over time, so that what had motivated McCord at the time of the recording, over 
the years of writing, and at the time of publication may well differ. 18 In a long process like writing, cause 
and effect may also flow into each other. McCord has noted that one of the effects of the book has been 
to take leave of her father, which may in fact have been an unconscious motivation. At the time of 
publication, McCord herself was at the age that Katie had been when the recordings were made. 
Revisiting that time may have also been a way in which she reflected on her own ageing, working through 
her own life story, as she wrote Katie's. 19 Finally, McCord has added that she wanted to counter the 
cliches about African women circulated by tourist agencies in the USA with a more accurate image based 
on the life of a real person (Interview). 
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Once again, in addition to the co-operative search for truth aimed at making a broader spectrum of facts 
known, psychological motives existed on both sides: Katie's desire to have her specific story told; 
Margaret McCord's revisiting of her childhood relations with Katie and her leave-taking from her own 
father. In contrast to the collaboration between Joubert and Eunice', money and cultural capital did not 
seem to play a prominent role for either Katie or Margaret McCord. There is no evidence that Katie hoped 
to become either famous or rich through the book. 
Thus, whilst the co-operative search for truth was indeed one of the motives guiding these two sets of 
collaboration, it was not the only one. Other motives include psychological ones, such as the need for 
self-reflection {of both the oral narrator and the writing author), the need to be known and the need to 
know the other person, and the need for recognition; financial motives; and the necessity to manage 
cultural capital. Although Habermas makes room for the psychological needs related to self-reflection and 
recognition, {see chapter V below), he clearly censors what he calls the distorting influence of the steering 
mechanisms money and power. As we have seen, he argues that the 'dumb' forces of money and power 
hinder the unfettered flow of discourse, which is necessary for the production of knowledge. I would 
concur with Habermas that, where the search for truth is steered by financial interests or by the exercise 
of power, research results might be warped.20 Yet, to the extent that collaborative auto/biographies and 
the search for knowledge are inevitably embedded in social relations they are also embedded in relations 
of money and power, thus questioning the neat distinction between communicative and strategic action 
underlying Habermas's thought.21 While admitting that communicative and strategic action do at times 
flow into each other, Habermas would insist though that the theory of communicative action and the 
production of knowledge assume that the influence of money and power can be bracketed from discourse 
or that their influence can at least be postponed, and that it is possible to distinguish those discursive 
interactions which suffer a greater deal of colonisation from others which do not. Before dealing with the 
extent to which such bracketing is possible, I will pay attention to the following question: 
ii. To what extent was truth conceived of as a search for consensus? 
Given that the search for truth was at least one of the many motives informing the collaboration, the next 
question is to what extent this search for truth can be construed as a search for consensus. To what 
extent did the interlocutors seek to establish common ground? Did they succeed in this? And how did 
they respond where they failed to establish consensus? 
As with most people, both Joubert and McCord display inconsistent notions of truth. They waver between 
a confessed adherence to either a monological objectivist notion of truth {whose achievability they also 
doubt) and relativism {Interviews). In actual practice, however, they seem to follow a consensus theory of 
truth such as that developed by Habermas. That Eunice and Joubert actually sought to establish common 
ground is substantiated by the method they followed. Joubert and Eunice would withdraw into a quiet 
room in the house where Joubert herself spent her days writing full-time and in which Eunice was 
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employed as a domestic servant. Joubert would then ask Eunice N. general questions (like 'Tell me about 
your train trip', What made them turn against the liquor?') to which she would respond (Compare 
appendix). These interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed 'to retain the exact nuance of her 
speech' (Introduction written for Italian translation. Joubert papers). Afterwards Joubert would write up the 
scenes. When she felt uncertain about her rendering she would read these back to Eunice. Joubert 
notes that Eunice was not interested in reading the manuscript, as she only read her Bible. When Eunice 
disagreed with the rendering, Joubert made changes, but did not check these back with Eunice.22 
Anxious about her reputation as a non-fiction writer, and given the contentiousness of the material at that 
time, Joubert was resolute not to be faulted on anything she published. Because memory plays tricks on 
one, Joubert felt that she, 'could not only rely on her [Eunice's] reminiscences.' Joubert thus 'checked and 
filled in every event she described' (Introduction written for Italian translation. Joubert papers; Interview). 
Where she was uncertain about claims that Eunice had made, she compared these to her own experience 
(for example ongoing visits to the pass offices and courts; attendance at the Cilliers Commission hearings 
on the uprising in the townships; visits to Eunice's family in Nyanga) and to print media (for example 
council reports on forced removals; and the daily press23). Where there were disparities, Joubert asked 
Eunice about these. Asserting that she was on the same side as Eunice, Joubert remembers no situation 
in which disagreements about the facts could not be cleared (Interview). 
Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena distinguishes itself from many other collaborative auto/biographies 
where the oral narrator is the only or dominant source of information, in that it also includes the voices of 
several other persons.~4 In addition to interviewing Eunice, Joubert also interviewed some of Eunice's 
family members, as individuals and in groups. These voices too go into the text, often identified as such, 
but sometimes subsumed under the voice of another character or the third person narrator. Some of the 
identified contributors are Eunice's brother Mosie, her mother, her half-brother Jakkie, and Johnny 
Slapoog. When Eunice and her relatives were gathered around Joubert's dining-room table, everyone 
joined in the banter, sometimes also contradicting each other (Interview). Joubert included some of these 
differences in the text (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 138, 337; The Long Journey of Poppie 
Nongena: 101, 263). 
The inclusion of additional speakers in the interviews and the text has several advantages. It extends the 
scope of reference so that events beyond Eunice's experiences can be included (Marquard, 1985:140). It 
also gives an idea of how Poppie's identity is a function of her relations to other members of her family. 
Furthermore, these different voices work against the notion of a unified individual consciousness typical of 
the monological author of conventional autobiography. And finally, it opens the possibility to correctives on 
truth claims raised by one of the speakers. Mosie and Jakkie's voices in particular allow for a stronger 
critique of politics than Poppie's own reserved utterances, thus providing a more diversified picture of the 
South African situation (Schalkwyk, 1989:269).25 Thus, whilst there was an attempt to establish 
consensus between Eunice and herself, Joubert's inclusion of other voices and her reference to other 
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sources works against what lsemhagen calls anthropological normalisation (1990:40). Joubert's use of 
multiple sources to corroborate the consensus was not aimed at sweeping divergences amongst them 
under the carpet of a single monological narrative voice. Instead, differences are often declared as such. 
In short then, the conclusion that the search for consensus about the validity of the oral narrators' claims 
was one of the goals of Eunice and Joubert's collaboration is substantiated by their practice, even if this is 
not the way in which Joubert formulates her understanding of truth. And where such consensus could not 
be established, this is acknowledged in the text. Where consensus was established, it did not spring from 
a "'natural", spontaneous empathy' between sisters (as one may interpret Lenta (1984:157 - 158) to be 
saying). On the contrary, as Schalkwyk points out, it 'is produced, acquired through a strenuous process 
of assimilation of the "other'' in Poppie and a critical reflection on her [Joubert's] own ideological 
circumstances' (1989:257. e.a.).26 
The interviews with Katie Makanya were conducted in 1954, while Margaret McCord accompanied her 
husband (an Africanist at UCLA), who was on a research grant, to Durban. They were recorded on a 
personal recorder, which was new technology at that time, and which McCord's husband had probably 
acquired for professional purposes.27 Margaret McCord could only afford three tapes, which she used and 
reused. For the six weeks during which they were recording, McCord put Katie up at the Salvation Army 
Hostel in the Sydenham area. She would pick her up at the hostel at eight o'clock in the morning, and 
take her to her and her husband's flat where they would have a cup of coffee. During this time McCord 
would 'try and get her organised to the kind of material that we would talk about.' McCord, who 
transcribed the notes at night, 'would have to sort of raise questions the next morning as to what happens 
in the middle of this story to get the end of these various stories that she had started telling me bits and 
pieces of.' She would say, "'Look Katie you started to tell me about when you and Dad went off to visit 
chief so-and-so and Dad had trouble with the motorcycle, but you didn't tell me what happened after that."' 
About the success of organising Katie's ideas in this way, McCord notes, 'It didn't work ever.' Katie 'didn't 
have her thoughts organised. It was all spontaneous, and she'd be in the middle of telling me one story 
and something reminded her of another story, which reminded her of another story. So it was a very 
confused story.' Warmed up by these initial 'two or three questions' over morning coffee, Katie 'would 
start talking and I [McCord] would say, "Hey, wait a minute, we have to turn on the recorder! But there's 
something else I want to know." Once the recorder was on I would remind her of the first question and 
she would talk about that. Sometimes she would complete the story and sometimes she would go off on 
still another tangent and I'd have to pull her back. The first couple of hours was really a matter of trying to 
get her to finish things that she had told me the day before, and then after lunch I just didn't interrupt her, I 
just let her talk. But sometimes in the first part I would give up because she would get onto some incident 
in her life that was very important and then she would just keep talking' (Interview). 
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The recordings took place regularly from Monday to Friday, with lunch breaks between eleven thirty and 
twelve thirty, finishing when McCord's son Johnny arrived home from school.~8 It seems as if Katie did 
some of the recordings without McCord's presence. 29 Unfortunately McCord had from the outset already 
edited out her questions during transcription, as if to simulate a monological externalisation of an interiority 
reminiscent of Cartesian philosophy of consciousness and classic autobiography. Very few questions in 
the sessions where both McCord and Makanya were present are retained.Jo Consequently the nature of 
their interaction is difficult to establish (for example, where McCord led Makanya on; where she required 
clarification; where she questioned Makanya's accounts or her interpretations of events). Breaks in the 
topic serve as some indication of where McCord probably asked questions, but what exactly they were 
has to be reconstructed from Makanya's replies.J 1 When Katie was describing events that had emotional 
significance she would unconsciously break into Zulu, 'Yesterday, when she had recalled Mbambo's final 
journey to Umgeni, her eyes had filled with tears and she had lapsed into Zulu as though she had 
forgotten my presence.' Then McCord would have nurses from the hospital translate (The Calling of Katie 
Makanya: 142). However, McCord found many of these translations stilted and rephrased them 
afterwards to suit, what she terms Katie's idiom (Interview). 
Like Joubert, McCord also relied on three sources to check the validity of Katie's claims, namely her own 
experience; the oral evidence brought by others; and the evidence provided by written sources. Her own 
experience served as a first test of the validity of Katie's utterances.32 McCord had grown up in Durban, 
but was familiar with rural Zulu life. After making the recordings she visited some of the sites of Katie's 
youth, for example Makanya's father's homeplace in Soekmekaar. Furthermore, McCord also interviewed 
other persons during the period of the recordings. One of these was George Champion of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers Union, with whom Katie had been on a bad footing at some stage. According to 
the interlude dealing with that interview, Champion rejected Katie's claims that they were enemies. 
Confronted with this evidence, Katie adjusted her earlier assertion, explaining that she and Champion had 
patched up afterwards (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 226-227). This inclusion of a dissenting voice 
differs from those in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena in ways determined by the difference in the 
structures of the two texts. In Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena Joubert's voice is concealed. In The 
Calling of Katie Makanya, by contrast, the recording context and McCord's voice are made explicit in the 
pre- and interludes, as well as in the afterword. This provides a site from which McCord could indicate 
dissent and establish resolution, which she could not do in the body of the main text without making her 
presence explicit. Finally, McCord consulted written records in order to test the validity of Katie's claims 
and to extend the base of consensus. These included press reviews of the Jubilee Choir's performances 
in London during 1891 (See her note of thanks preceding the contents page). In consulting written 
records, she was also assisted by the editor of the book at David Philip, Russell Martin, who was able to 
correct McCord's information on the Height family by tracing them in the records of the City of 
Johannesburg (Interview). 
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Although Katie pressed Margaret to complete the book (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 253), publication 
followed only well after her death. This means that it was not possible for McCord to check with Katie 
whether she agreed with the way the written text rendered the original narrative. In this regard McCord 
notes, 'How much Katie would have changed, I don't know. I mean that's impossible for me to say. I tried 
to tell the story as honestly as I could, but there were a lot of incidents, where I added descriptions which 
might not have been accurate. But they were as accurate as I could make them. [ ... ] She might have 
changed that. As far as the incidents are concerned, I think they were accurate' (Interview). Compared to 
Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, The Calling of Katie Makanya is thus less of an authorised text. The 
crucial point however is that even where consensus was not ratified afterwards, the writing of The Calling 
of Katie Makanya remains informed by a notion of validity based on consensus between the writing author 
and the oral narrator. 
Besides the oral narrators who function as sources because they are directly acquainted with the events, 
yet another set of interlocutors who constituted a source of potential dissent, correction, and an extension 
of the basis of consensus in collaborative auto/biographies is hinted at in the already-mentioned 
contribution by Russell Martin, McCord's editor at David Philip. These professionals range from in-house 
readers, to editors, and other persons related to the book industry. Following Laird and Ede (2001 :348), I 
propose that a theory of collaborative authorship should include the interventions of editors. Taking into 
consideration their role as interlocutors and contributors to the final text gives us even more of a picture 
reminiscent of the pre-Modern Medieval and Renaissance notions of collaborative authorship referred to 
by Woodmansee (see fn 4 on p 162) and the consensus theory of validity proposed by Habermas. 
Both Joubert and McCord requested and relied on reader's comments on their drafts. Such screenings, 
and even changes to what is said and how it is said, are not uncommon to editorial practice.33 In Joubert's 
case, she mentions her husband's ongoing advice (Interview, the dedication of her novel Bonga34 , and Die 
Burger, 10 October 1998:16). She also requested advice from her friend the author Jan Rabie who made 
a few suggestions, including the important one to keep herself out of the text (Letter to Rabie and reply. 
n.d. Joubert papers). The final manuscript was given to an anthropologist for checking. A reader's report 
(probably prepared for Tafelberg but not bearing any name) includes a list of suggested changes (Joubert 
papers). For the English translation there was close collaboration with the Managing Editor of Hodder and 
Stoughton, Margaret Body, in consultation with Danie van Niekerk the managing director of Tafelberg (see 
fn 36, p 136 below). Gerrit Olivier's comments on inconsistencies in the distribution of voices motivated 
Joubert to tidy these up in the English translation (Joubert, 1982:96). McCord too has thanked various 
readers for their suggestions. These include Tim Couzens of the University of the Witwatersrand, from 
whom the title of the book stems, and the already mentioned Russell Martin, who worked with her on 
reducing earlier versions of the manuscript to a publishable length. All of this confirms that collaborative 
auto/biography is indeed collaborative, with the collaboration between the oral narrator and the writing 
author anticipating a consensus with a larger audience consisting of several circles of interlocutors, in 
which the professionals of the book industry constitute the first circle.35 
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The importance of consensus and the scope of the collaboration evident in these projects raise questions 
regarding the claim often preceding collaborative auto/biographies, namely that nothing has been added 
or changed (see Vooraf in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena) and that the text is a true rendering of the 
oral narrator's narrative. (This claim is omitted in the English edition of Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena).36 What lurks behind this assertion is the attempt by the writing author to simulate an 
autobiography ensuing from a monological author like Descartes or Rousseau rather than consensus 
amongst collaborators, in the belief that the pretended purity of the oral narrator's voice guarantees both 
the authenticity and the truth of the text.37 While Joubert sought to establish as broad as possible a 
consensus between Eunice, other informants, written texts, editors, and herself in the process of 
producing the book, she was adamant that her own part in this consensus be concealed. This confirms 
Marquard's assertion that 'perhaps the major problem for the author of Poppie is that of locating herself in · 
the text' (1985:138). Abandoning earlier drafts which alternated between the first person voice of Poppie 
and the first person voice of her employer, Joubert made a decision: '[e]k sal haar self laat praat' [I'll let 
her speak herself] (Notes while writing. Joubert papers.). Commenting on the attempted excision of the 
writing author from the published text, Joubert asserts that a way of telling had to be found which would 
make the white woman of Oranjezicht as invisible as possible so that the black woman from Nyanga could 
speak.38 One way in which Joubert sought to mask her own contribution to the consensus was by opting 
for a perspective throughout Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena which is that of various first person 
narrators or of a third person who clearly aligns herself with these first person narrators. This proximity of 
the first and third persons is evident from the fact that the similarity of perspective, the common register, 
syntax, and the shared diction at times makes it impossible to identify the transitions between Poppie, the 
other first person narrators, and the third person narrator. Interpretations are predominantly those of the 
first person with the third person refraining from critique.39 
While Joubert's ideal is laudable in its countering of the apartheid laws which kept black women in the 
status of minors, and the ideology of apartheid which held that a black woman cannot speak for herself, it 
is nevertheless problematic on several other grounds. To begin with, it fails to acknowledge the extent to 
which Eunice's voice is in fact mediated and the final text the product of consensus between Eunice N. 
and Joubert amongst others, rather than just Eunice's monological outpourings on herself. This is not to 
say that Joubert was acting in bad faith and wanted to conceal her intervention because she had 
manipulated Eunice's words. But from the intersubjectivist paradigm sketched in chapter II above, there 
are nevertheless two different reasons why Joubert's concealment of her presence in the text may be 
unnecessary. 
To begin with, if identity is indeed also intersubjectively generated, then the consensus-seeking interaction 
with the writing author in the text is actually part of, and not merely a supplement to, Eunice's identity. By 
seeking to exclude herself from the way in which Eunice reflected on her identity in intersubjective relation 
to her (Joubert), Joubert masks a constitutive relationship in Eunice's narrative construction of her identity 
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(see chapter V). But more importantly, when the writing author is not an interlocutor but merely a 
mechanistic and unthinking scribe40, then the validity of the oral narrator's claims remains untested. 
Where dissent is impossible there can be no rational consensus. Where falsifiability is impossible, so is 
truth. For collaborative autobiography to constitute a site of understanding, dissent between the 
collaborators has to be possible. In other words the writing author has to be more than a scribe.41 That 
Joubert was to a certain extent clear about these issues and their implication, is evident from her remark 
that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is a novel which portrays the human being within a social I 
political ideology: 
It has its disadvantages: it can't portray the whole socio-political situation, but only as lived 
through the people. It has its advantages: the writer from the outside sees conflicts, streams, 
which the participant cannot see, and can interpret them, on condition that he interprets 
truthfully. Also: that's why it becomes a novel.42 Of necessity the content touches on the 
author's own unconscious, identify with your character. Also the danger that you emphasise 
that with which you identify (Notes after publication. Joubert papers. Slightly adapted for 
translation). 
As we shall have opportunity to see below, Joubert's declaration of unquestioned loyalty to Eunice thus 
constitutes as much a precondition to collaboration as an obstacle to establishing consensus. 
In contrast to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena in which the writing author's contribution to consensus 
remains masked, it is made explicit in The Calling of Katie Makanya. McCord thus follows Tedlock's 
(1983:321 ff.) advice that the circumstances of the discourse are not hidden, but made transparent in the 
text. This allows McCord to hint at the types of questions she posed to Katie, and the nature of her and 
Katie's interaction (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 31 ). The interludes suggest that the original 
interchanges between Katie and Margaret were as follows43 : 
"'How old were you when you went to England?' I ask. 
Katie lifts the microphone towards her mouth. After two weeks of sitting next to my rented tape 
recorder, she has lost her awe of this new machine. 
"] was seventeen. " 
"How many were there in the choir?" 
"Only six of us from Kimberley,' she says.' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 31 ). 
These insertions allow McCord to comment on Katie's body language ('Katie's eyes twinkle with 
amusement' :31 ); her tone of voice ("'No," she says abruptly' :58) and her language ('Yesterday, when she 
had recalled Mbambo's final journey to Umgeni, her eyes had filled with tears and she had lapsed into 
Zulu as though she had forgotten my presence' :141) during the recordings.44 What the preceding makes 
clear is that although the collaborators in both auto/biographies may have been seeking to establish 
consensus, and although there are some examples suggesting that consensus was actually established, 
this whole process is largely invisible in the main body of the texts, which provide the outcome of the 
search for consensus rather than display the process of the dialogical search for consensus itself.45 
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Sine Eunice N. did not read Joubert's written rendition of her oral narrative or Joubert's emendations and 
Katie Makanya had passed away before McCord turned her oral narrative into a written text, the final 
versions of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya are largely 
unauthorised. Although they register a striving for consensus, neither text is thus the outcome of .an 
actually ratified consensus between the oral narrators and the writing authors. This feature is (virtually by 
definition) common to many collaborative auto/biographies.46 Seemingly it creates a dilemma for 
adherents to Habermas's consensus theory of truth, because the actual consensus (if any) established in 
the oral interaction before the publication only goes part of the way in establishing consensus about what 
has been written and published. Yet, that the written publication has not been authorised (which needs to 
be distinguished from a text which has been disowned by the oral narrator), does not mean that there was 
no consensus beforehand, and it also does not mean that the claims raised in the text are not true. If 
anything, Habermas's speech act theory rather allows us to make sense of the status of texts which have 
not been authorised. To put it in Habermasian terms, a text which has not been authorised constitutes a 
claim by the writing author that it would find, or would have found, the oral narrator's consent, even if such 
agreement has not actually been declared.47 As is the case with all validity claims, the validity claims 
raised in such texts remain unredeemed promissory notes. Where writing authors do in fact claim that 
they have added nothing, the intersubjectivist theory of truth suggests that they are mistaken. Even if they 
have added no new facts, they have at the very least added their agreement to the already established 
consensus. Consequently, even unauthorised collaborative auto/biographies (which are based on a 
consensus between the oral narrator and the writing author) are closer to the truth in intersubjectivist 
terms than traditional monological autobiographies, in that they have a broader basis of consensus. 
When writing authors assert that they have simply repeated an oral narrator's words this is more often 
than not self-deception rather than intentional misleading of the reader. As I argue on pp 71-75 below, 
the mere reproduction would not constitute an auto/biography as it is understood in the prevailing 
discourse. It would probably never even get published. Simply repeating the oral narrator's words may 
even contradict her understanding of what a book about her life should look like.48 
Foregrounding the potentially distorting effect of the writing author's mediation, Dalven warns that the 
'formulation of direct observation pn The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena] requires the reader to take 
what Poppie says (and what Joubert "reports") as "truth." Again, we must remind ourselves that this 
"truth" is mediated and possibly marred by its own racial blind spots' (1995:86).49 Dalven's objection is 
based on the Cartesian premise that the protagonist of an autobiography produces the truth about herself 
out of herself. But, pace Dalven, the intersubjectivist notion of truth advocated by contemporary critical 
theorists suggests that the utterances in collaborative auto/biography are validity claims that invite 
contestation. They are not permanent truths but preliminary ones, which are valid until they are falsified. 
The striving for consensus between the interlocutors, and the claim that the published text would have 
found the oral narrator's consent, are merely an invitation to the reader to respond to the claims raised by 
agreeing or disagreeing with them. The critic is not offered a finished product, an indubitable truth, but an 
invitation to enter an ever-larger community of interlocutors who scrutinise the text for the validity of its 
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claims, thus participating in the production of truth. Like all texts, collaborative auto/biographies do not 
present the reader with a fait accompli. Instead, they signal the opening of a discourse on the oral 
narrator's life about which consensus between the oral narrator and the writing author has been 
established but which requires the reader's participation in an ongoing search for possible falsification or 
broadening of the consensus.so 
In contrast to unauthorised collaborative auto/biographies, authorised collaborative auto/biographies have 
simply passed yet one more, albeit very important, potentially falsifying scrutiny (namely that of the oral 
narrator). What the significance afforded to the authorisation of collaborative auto/biographies indicates in 
intersubjectivist terms is not that the authorised version is true simply because it carries the oral narrator's 
consent, but that the greater the degree of rational consensus the less likely it is that the claims raised in 
the text will be falsified. In intersubjectivist terms the significance we attach to authorisation. is an 
affirmation of the importance we attach to extending the scope of the consensus. Authorised collaborative 
auto/biographies only assert that consensus exists between the oral narrator and the writing author. But 
since the circle of potential interlocutors goes beyond the dyad of these two collaborators, and since the 
publication is addressed to a potentially unlimited reading public, the consensus between the collaborators 
initiates an open-ended discourse in which each consensus is subject to potential falsification by any 
member of a potentially unlimited reading public which acts as stand-in for the universal speech 
community. 
That the publication of Eunice's narrative was the opening of a discourse with a reading public, rather than 
the closure of a discussion started between the oral narrator and the writing author, is evident amongst 
other things, from Joubert's response to the reading public's reaction. Following Gerrit Olivier's objections 
to the use of voice in the Afrikaans edition, Joubert made changes to this in working on the English 
translation. The various exchanges between Joubert and other interpreters of the text should also be 
seen in the light of an ongoing discourse.st Like Whitlock (2000:29-35), I would like to propose that the 
history of the reception and publication of a collaborative auto/biography can be seen as ongoing 
discourse in search of truth opened up, but not concluded, by the original spoken narrative. Here we see 
the full circle Woodmansee refers to when she writes, '[b]y contributing his or her commentary, the reader 
becomes an overt collaborator in an understanding process of reading and writing which reverses the 
trajectory of print, returning us to something very like the expressly collaborative writing milieu of the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance with which we began' (Woodmansee, 1994b:26). Thus even if a 
collaborative auto/biography tends towards some form of closure such as occurs towards the end of Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (Carlean, 1989:50), this closure of the book should not be confused with 
the closure of the discourse on the claims raised in the narrative conducted amongst the members of an 
ever-expanding community of interlocutors. This, I would like to suggest, is how we should interpret a 
claim like Dalven's that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (like all books, I would add) 'forces the reader 
to engage in an active dialogue' (1995:88). 
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iii. To what extent was the consensus rational? 
Another possible objection to the application of the consensus theory of truth to collaborative 
auto/biography is that the agreements and disagreements between interlocutors are often not rational 
(Olivier 1982:39). Whilst Olivier is correct that exchanges amongst interlocutors are not always rational, it 
does not mean that consensus is never rational. 52 In view of the current inquiry, the question is, to what 
extent were consensus and disagreement between the oral narrator and the writing author rational in the 
sense that they were backed by intersubjectively convincing reasons? 
We have seen that the collaborators at times disagreed about the claims raised by the oral narrators, as 
well as about the rendering by the writing author. From the general description of the procedure followed, 
it may be safe to venture that at least some of these disagreements were resolved in a Habermasian 
manner by giving reasons in the form of further information, explanations or interpretations, with the one 
party being convinced by the reasons given by the other and a consensus thus secured. But, as evidence 
from the interviews with Joubert and McCord indicates, consensus was not always established on the 
basis of rational justification. As a consequence, the genre of collaborative auto/biography pinpoints a 
problem in Habermas's theory, which takes scientific research and political disputes as its example. 
Unlike scientific or political disputes, the original interchanges between oral narrators and writing authors 
are not adversarial.53 They are not agonistically driven by opposing positions raising and contesting 
validity claims. There are several reasons for this: to begin with, inasmuch as it is a narrative in which one 
party reflectively reconstructs her life for the other to understand it, the collaborators relate to each other 
more like reporting and explaining members of the same research team or political grouping, rather than 
contesting ones. Furthermore, the co-operative search for truth in collaborative auto/biography is indeed 
much more co-operative than Habermas's adversarial model with its origins in the theory of science and 
democracy will have it. Finally, understanding in relations of personal narrative often draws on emotions 
and takes place in emotionally saturated relations. This is confirmed by Joubert's claim that she wanted to 
speak directly to the readers' hearts (Interview) and McCord's depiction of her relationship with Katie as a 
deep personal friendship (McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming). 54 
Iris Young has argued against Habermas and Benhabib that the privileging of argumentative discourse 
disregards the ways in which some subjects are more likely to produce knowledge narratively and in co-
operation rather than confrontation. Thus Young suggests that the 'discussion-based theory of democracy 
must have a broader idea of the forms and styles of speaking that political discussion involves than 
deliberative theorists usually imagine. I prefer to call such broadened theory communicative, rather than 
deliberative, democracy, to indicate an equal privileging of any forms of communicative interaction where 
people aim to reach understanding. While argument is a necessary element in such effort to discuss with 
and persuade one another about political issues, argument is not the only mode of political 
communication, and agreement can be expressed in a plurality of ways, interspersed with or alongside 
other communicative forms' (Young, 1996:125). What Young says regarding democratic politics, I would 
like to suggest, applies even to a greater extent to collaborative auto/biography. 
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Add to this the point that there may be certain circumstances (like extreme trauma) in which narrative 
(rather than deliberation) is the most appropriate, or indeed the only way in which knowledge can be 
generated (Njabulo Ndebele; 1998:19-28 and LaCapra, 2001:696-727), then Young's objection carries 
even more weight. For Young, the value of narrative lies in the fact that it reveals the subject in his 
particularity, which cannot be shared by others but must be understood in order to do justice to him. 
Because narratives also situate narrators in their relations to others, including the listeners, they allow the 
listeners to see how their actions are perceived by and affect narrators (Young, 1996:131-132). I would 
like to suggest that, similar to the great narrative myths Habermas refers to (PDM : 157 [PDME : 130]) such 
narratives of individuals and collectives also constitute a source of values and notions of the good life. 
Finally (and this brings us back to point four of Nancy Fraser's catalogue of questions quoted on pp 42-43 
above), individual and collective narratives of the self are an important medium for the interpretation of 
needs and their legitimation. 
A distinctive characteristic of narratives (although some would argue that this applies equally to 
arguments55} is that they are often saturated with figurative language. Elize Botha has emphasised this 
aspect of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, noting that the 'art of writing flows from the knowledge that, 
in a true story too, it is not only the controllable facts which speak, but their ordering in the service of a 
vision, of a deeper insight; that it is not the argument rbetoog1, but the warm-blooded image which has 
the convincing power ['oortuigingskrag1 of the truth' (Own translation, 1978:4 ). Likewise, McCord's 
enchanting style, partly influenced by Zulu expressions, partly indebted to the bourgeois novel, pays 
witness to the role of rhetoric in the successful communication of content and in reaching understanding 
agreements (see chapter IV}. This makes clear that Habermas's emphasis on rational speech means that 
he underestimates the ways in which emotions, narrative, and figurative language contribute to the 
production of knowledge. His emphasis on argument, and his failure to take the potentials of these forms 
of knowledge conveyance and production into consideration, indicate serious deficits. A more 
comprehensive account of collaborative auto/biography would require an extension of critical theory to 
embrace the role of the non-argumentative in the intersubjective generation of truth. 
From the foregoing it is evident that the collaborators on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The 
Calling of Katie Makanya did seek to establish the truth about the oral narrators' lives; that to a certain 
extent this was done through seeking and actually establishing consensus; and that this consensus was to 
some extent based on reason. I now turn to the flip-side of the same issue, namely the ways in which the 
steering media money and power impacted on the relations of truth production. 
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2. The influence of steering mechanisms: money and power 
Habermas's insistence that true consensus can only be established through the unforced force of reason 
is aimed at excluding those steering mechanisms which constitute a potential distortion of truth. 
Habermas summarises these under the two categories, money and power. In his scheme of things, the 
non-discursive forces of money and power produce asymmetric relations between interlocutors and these 
distortions in relations of communication in turn result in distortions in the truths produced. This view is 
echoed in lsernhagen's assertion on the dialogical nature of collaborative auto/biography, a view that he 
fails to develop theoretically, but which, as the current study suggests could be done in drawing on 
contemporary critical theory. According to lsernhagen, the 'underlying axiom here [in contemporary 
collaborative auto/biography] seems to be that the text is only legitimate when it is based on a 
fundamental equality of the participants in the dialogue, or a certain (egalitarian or full) kind of dialogicity.- _ 
Wherever it is not given, there is a danger of manipulation, violation, and exploitation of the subject. The 
question of legitimacy has turned the argument back, once again, upon the very notion of dialogicity. For 
it is only on this notion that such legitimacy can be founded' (lsernhagen, 1987:225).56 Habermas's and 
lsernhagen's comments thus impress on us the importance of the next set of questions: How did money 
and power impact on the production and consumption of the narratives of Eunice's and Katie's lives? And 
were these the only steering mechanisms that impinged on the production of knowledge? In answering 
these questions, both the deficits of the actual collaborative practice in the two cases at hand and of 
Habermas's consensus theory of validity will once again come to the fore. 
i. Money 
The relationship between knowledge and culture on the one hand, and money on the other, has always 
been a contested one, with some participants in the debate insisting that when money enters the scene, 
truth and culture are its first casualties. This is an age-old belief, which Habermas shares with occidental 
aesthetics and epistemology commencing with Plato. It runs through Aristotle's separation of the oikos 
and the polis, which purportedly allows the free man to produce real knowledge in the public sphere. It is 
echoed in Kant's description of aesthetic judgement based on disinterested pleasure and in Horkheimer 
and Adorne's critique of the confluence of art and commerce evident in their coining of the disdainful term 
'culture industry'. Within the concurrent evolution of capitalism and the notion of the author as genius, the 
belief that art can exist insulated from capital has produced paradoxical results. On the one hand the 
ideology of the author as genius subscribed to the notion that art is a value sphere of its own, separate 
from the church, the state, and the economy. On the other hand, the assertion of the genius of the 
individual was tied to the introduction of copyright and the rise of the capitalist book industry as a means of 
securing financial independence for authors. As this shows, the belief that the sciences and arts can and 
should be purged of all economic interest runs counter to the actual situations of scientists and artists as 
human beings with a material existence in which the entwinement of science or art on the one side and 
the economy is undeniable. In its own way, this realisation was self-evident in the European Middle Ages 
during which artists were largely materially dependent on the church. In the Renaissance this material 
62 
III Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity 
dependence on the church was traded for dependence on the courts. And with the rise of capitalism, this 
material dependence on the courts was replaced with dependence on the market. What seemed like 
successive acts of liberation turn out, on closer inspection, to be replacements of more direct forms of 
material dependence with less transparent ones. As books became commodities they had to meet the 
requirements of a market economy with producers securing payment for labour through copyright 
(Woodmansee, 1994b:41 ff.). As commodities, books offered the allure of a source of wealth, while at the 
same time being subject to the laws of supply and demand (Febvre and Martin, 1976:109-127.). 
The notion that truth and culture and their value are distorted by money is equally widespread in the South 
African literary world, and was widely held around the time of the publication of Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena (Die Burger, 31 March 1979).57 It is echoed in Joubert's emphasis on the contribution Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena would make to mutual understanding without making any mention of the 
money involved.58 At the same time C.J.M. Nienaber noted in his prize-giving speech at the award 
ceremony where the Luyt prize was bestowed on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena that relationships 
between the arts and the economy may be indirect, but still commanding (Nienaber's speech. Joubert 
papers). This view that, as commodities, collaborative auto/biographies have an economic dimension 
which can play a greater or smaller part in the choice of themes, style, and form is aired by writing authors 
like Hourwich Reyher, who unblushingly admits that she had to deliver a marketable commodity when 
writing Zulu Woman (1999:7). She constitutes an exception though. It is still more common that writing 
authors remain more hesitant to speak about money than about truth, whilst money remains a prominent 
issue for oral narrators. This should not come as a surprise. Inequalities in access to the public sphere, 
literacy, and leisure that necessitate collaborative auto/biography also explain the different attitudes to 
money and truth held by oral narrators and writing authors respectively. Oral narrators are more often in 
need of money than writing authors, who are more often than not comparatively better off. For them, as 
the Swiss saying goes, money is something one has, not something one speaks about. From their 
comparatively better position, financial survival is not a primary concern. With cynical Brechtian literalism, 
one can assert that they can afford to prioritise truth. As has been mentioned, the prospect of earning 
some money to buy a house was one reason for Eunice's participation in the production of Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena. In contrast, neither Joubert nor McCord, who both belong to the professional 
classes and were comparatively shielded from market forces, were dependent on the income from the 
books to make a living above the breadline. Eunice, who at that stage was an unskilled single parent with 
five children, on the other hand, was.59 As noted above, there are no indications that getting money from 
the project was foremost in Katie's mind. 
Besides various practices on the distribution of income generated by collaborative auto/biographies there 
are also various practices regarding reference to this matter in the publications themselves. Whilst 
confronting the monetary dimension acknowledges Fraser's (1997:11-39) and Benhabib' (2002:49-81) 
insistence that justice is about recognition and redistribution, a look at the various ways in which the 
distribution of income is dealt with in texts also reveals some of the difficulties involved. On the one hand, 
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there are those publications like The History of Mary Prince (1997:56) and Singing Away the Hunger 
(1996:167) in which it is clearly stated that the profits of the book will go to the oral narrator. In The 
History of Mary Prince, the declaration by the editor Thomas Pringle seems to be motivated by charity 
rather than a belief in fair remuneration. But in Singing Away the Hunger, as in Nisa, remuneration is 
considered payment for work done (Shostak, 2000:52-76). Joubert's and McCord's silence on this matter 
has led to accusations of financial exploitation. In what follows, I give some information on the financial 
dimension of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya, firstly as a response 
to such accusations and secondly in order to evaluate the ways in which money may affect the production 
of truth in collaborative auto/biography. 
In addition to the questions of moral and economic justice and exploitation that have increasingly been 
foregrounded with respect to collaborative auto/biographies (Shostak, 1998:401-412 and Mullen Sands, 
1997:39-590.), the question that would concern us from the Habermasian perspective is the effect of 
money on the knowledge production process. Although there were some expectations of a possible 
income, there is little evidence that these impacted directly on what either Eunice or Katie told Joubert and 
McCord. In Joubert and Eunice's case, no more than a moderate success allowing Eunice to earn about 
R 1 000 was expected. If anything, it was the writing authors who were least dependent on the income 
(rather than the oral narrators) who were subject to the pressures of the market. In other words, the 
private context in which the oral recordings were made provided a niche in which the truth told by the oral 
narrators was sheltered against the financial power of print capitalism with its eye constantly on the 
market. As mediators, who were familiar with the prevailing discourses of life-writing and who had an idea 
of what would sell, it was the writing authors who had to transform the oral narrator's narratives into 
marketable commodities. As far as this can be judged, both authors displayed a certain integrity, reflected 
in their faithfulness to the material and a refusal to yield to the allure of 'making a quick buck.' Yet, it 
cannot be denied that in order to get published their texts had to meet certain tacit requirements. The 
mediated but not less influential economic realities of the publishing industry undeniably, even if 
unconsciously, translated into the specific contents that were foregrounded, the style, and the form 
(Mullen Sands, 1997:47). The success of both books depended on the ways in which they could 
transgress the conventional discourse of auto/biography thus appearing as something new without 
stretching the limits, so that they could pass the hurdles within the publishing industry and reach the 
sphere of the reading public. This required careful management, as the section on power (see below) 
shows. 
The economic viability of the publication hinges on various constraints, which translate into the actual form 
collaborative auto/biographies (like all books) take. These include length, language, and price. The book 
may not be 'too long' (Russell Martin's objection to McCord's first manuscript), and not 'too short' either. It 
must be in a language for which there is a large enough reading population.60 And the book must be 
affordable. Length, language, and price, are just some of the mechanisms by which certain readers are 
excluded. Quite often the writing author, who is familiar with these requirements and can anticipate a 
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readership which the publisher has in mind, is able to transform the oral narrative into a format that fulfils 
these requirements. But the effect of this transformation is often that it distances the book from the 
community of the oral narrator. This may be because the oral narrator and the community she stems from 
are semi-literate; because the book is published in a language other than the oral narrator's; because she 
does not have the leisure to read several hundred pages, or simply cannot afford it.61 
The foregoing reminds us that even if money is not always a motive for collaborative auto/biography, or 
even if it is not always stated as one, there is enough evidence that it is often at least one of the forces 
that feeds into the relations of production. This requires writing authors to come to terms with the role of 
money in the production of the truth. It also requires us to reconsider the viability of Habermas's 
insistence that the search for consensus should be uncoupled from the potentially distorting power of 
money. While Habermas is correct in pointing out the potentially distorting effect of economic constraints 
on the production of truth, a more differentiated approach seems necessary which reflects on and allows 
for some connection between knowledge producing practices and money. 
ii. Power 
The second steering mechanism, besides money, which, according to Habermas distorts the generation 
of knowledge and should thus be bracketed from the relations of production, is power. One of the 
distinctive features of twentieth-century social theory is the increasing differentiation and precision 
afforded to the critique of power. In contrast to theories of power indebted to Hobbes, which focus on 
monarchs, we have come to realise that power can crystallise around open-ended and ever changing 
constellations which may include creed, location (urban, rural, colonial), class, language, gender, age, 
race, culture and so on.62 A description of the all-pervasive will to power offered by Nietzsche in the 
posthumous collection titled Der Wille zur Macht (n.d.) runs right through the twentieth century. It is 
championed around the Second World War by Horkheimer and Adorno (1986). In the second half of the 
century Johan Galtung translated this insight into a theory of structural violence which operationalises 
power and provides a register for the measurement of the distribution of chances of survival and self-
realisation (1969). Throughout the century various forms of feminism have suggested ways in which 
power is mutated in the public and the private spheres. And towards the end of the century, Foucault 
sensitised us to the less visible, but no less repressive forms of discursive power (1980, 1982, and 1988). 
In this section I consider the implications of Gardner's warning that, 'power relations in South Africa have 
often been responsible for the dominated group, in order not to antagonise the group that assumes 
hierarchy over them, telling the dominant exactly what the latter wants to hear and believe' (1991:187). I 
pay attention to two aspects of power and their impact on the collaborative production of truth. I start by 
looking at power in the relations of production between the oral narrator and the writing author. Here I pay 
special attention to the emphasis on similarity and trust as means of curbing the potentially distorting 
effects of power. After this the focus is shifted to the ways in which the narrative is managed by the book 
industry. Here I concentrate on the management of discourse by agents in the publishing business. In 
addition to looking at the effect of social power on the production of knowledge about the oral narrator's 
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life, I will follow Honneth's (1985) and Fraser's (1989:144-188) suggestions that a further dimension of 
power, namely the power exercised through discourse, also has to be taken into consideration. Such a 
combination of a sociological and a discursive approach reveals how inequalities in the chance to 
participate in discourse, as well as power exercised through the prevailing conventions in life-writing, 
impinge on the intersubjective knowledge production process. 
Habermas's sociological perspective on power as the ability to participate as an equal in the discursive 
production of knowledge and the lifeworld requires that we look at how differences pegged to power 
jeopardise this equality, placing the truth produced at peril. I argue that it is not the epistemological 
problem of difference per se which makes collaborative auto/biography such an intriguingly problematic 
genre. Rather, it is the entwinement of the epistemological issues with socio-political differences pegged 
to power that makes collaborative auto/biography a useful site in which to grapple with problems facing 
contemporary critical theory. The epistemological problem of understanding across difference is the 
primary concern of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Gadamer. But hermeneutics is limited in its 
tendency to see the problem of understanding across difference as one between traditions presumed to 
be on equal footing. As Foucault suggests, the epistemological problem is compounded when socio-
political differences pegged to power enter the equation. However, conceding that they pose certain 
problems, I concur with Van Niekerk that differences, even those tied to power, are not an insurmountable 
obstacle to knowledge.63 On the contrary, and here the intersubjectivist positions of the critical theorists 
surprisingly overlap with that of Spivak, difference is a precondition to knowledge. As Spivak puts it, the 
'position that only the subaltern can know the subaltern, only women can know women and so on, cannot 
be held as a theoretical presupposition. [ ... ] Knowledge [of other as subject] is made possible and is 
sustained by irreducible difference, not identity' ( 1988:253-254 ). I thus agree with Dalven that 
collaborative auto/biography 'functions simultaneously as an act of appropriation and a complicated 
gesture toward a deconstruction of that appropriation' (Dalven, 1995:81 e.a.), rather than with Wenzel who 
suggests that these are two mutually exclusive operations64 : 'differences in socio~historical context 
between the facilitator and the interviewee could either be regarded as unbridgeable, relegating any 
attempt to record them as a presumptuous and patronizing act or, as a positive gesture towards 
intercultural understanding, viewing it as a complementary dimension of experience' (Wenzel, 1994:45 
e.a.). 
Beginning with the social relations, what then were the differences between Eunice N. and Joubert and 
how were these tied to power understood as the ability to participate as equals in communication?65 And 
how did these social relations of power impinge on the production of knowledge (understood as rational 
consensus) about the oral narrator's life? Born in 1922, Joubert comes from a family which has belonged 
to the professional classes for as long as she can remember. She acquired an MA in Afrikaans and Dutch 
from the University of Cape Town in the 1950's. She has travelled widely and has written extensively on 
her travels in Africa, Asia, and Europe.66 She has read uncountable books and by the time she met 
Eunice she was a professional writer who already had an established publishing record (Steenberg, 
1982:633 ff.). She thus belongs to the highly literate who had successfully used this talent to gain access 
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to the literary public sphere. Of great significance in a country like South Africa in which race and culture 
are key regulators, Joubert is a white Afrikaner who (whether she likes it or not) has certain cultural 
commonalties with the then ruling clique. At the time when the work on Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena took place, Eunice N. was in Joubert's employ. She was therefore dependent on Joubert for a 
job and an income, and her pass, which allowed her to stay in the Cape, was tied to this. She originally 
came from a rural community. Her forebears were pastoral farmers, who had lost their wealth. Eunice 
had merely eight years of formal schooling, after which she worked as a packer in factories and as a maid 
in white people's houses. She read only the Bible. She was uprooted. Her 'long journey' was an 
adventure which allowed her to return to a home, but imposed on her by a repressive state and economic 
powers in which she had no say. There were also significant similarities between Eunice N. and Elsa 
Joubert. Whilst Eunice was classified a black Xhosa, she spoke Afrikaans like Joubert. Both of them 
were mothers, and Christian, with Joubert being slightly younger than Eunice. Pinned to the relations of 
power that were aligned to each of these differences in the 1970's, these differences constituted a 
significant force in the production of truth. 
The relations between Makanya and McCord were embedded in a different personal and social history. 
As a result, the inequalities in power related to their different social positions were smaller and the 
dependencies between them were also less stark than those between Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert. At the 
time of the recordings Katie was eighty-one, and Margaret forty. Katie had been in Margaret's father's 
employ in the dispensary for thirty-five years. As we have seen, she was a significant presence in 
Margaret's childhood. (In the prelude we even see Margaret calling her 'auntie' (See also McCord, 
2000:241 ). And Margaret uses the opportunity to give an indication of the intimacy between them by 
telling the reader that Katie had given her her Zulu name. (See also The Calling of Katie Makanya: 209)). 
By the time of the recordings, these intergenerational relations had developed as they commonly do. In 
this regard, McCord notes, 
I was an adult. I was no longer a teenager and I really began to appreciate the kind of 
person that she was. [ ... ] I really felt much closer to her then as a person than I had as a 
teenager when she was a source of information. One of the other aspects of that relationship 
was that when I was a teenager she was a voice of authority. When I was forty I was able to 
argue with her and there was a difference there. I was no longer the child to be brought up. I 
think that she respected me in a different way than she did when I was a teenager (McCord, 
2000:241). 
Between Margaret and Katie there is thus a longer-standing and more established closeness than 
between Joubert and Eunice (which need not mean that this translated into differences in intensity in their 
relationships). Despite the different levels of education between her and McCord, Makanya (who was also 
better qualified than Eunice N.) seems to have had a clearer sense than Eunice of how she could use 
Margaret's writing skills to her own purpose. Both Katie and Margaret had been to other parts of the world 
and had experienced the different social settings and freedoms these provided, compared to the socially 
and statutorily entrenched inequalities in South Africa. For nearly two years Katie had even enjoyed the 
dependent yet real social mobility typical to artists moving amongst the upper classes, the nobility, and the 
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intelligentsia in Britain. Both Margaret and Katie spoke English, and Margaret had a working knowledge of 
Zulu, which had become Katie's acquired first language too. In the years prior to statutory apartheid, Katie 
had a certain freedom of movement closer to McCord's. As McCord was not Makanya's employer, and 
as she was not dependent on McCord for having a home of her own, there was also less dependence on 
her in this regard than was the case with Eunice and Joubert. 
While the relations of power between Joubert and Eunice and between McCord and Makanya differed, 
both writing authors were aware (even if to a limited extent) of the differences between themselves and 
the oral narrators and how these could translate into relations of power. In Eunice and Joubert's case 
these power relations were especially constraining as they were much more intimately tied to larger social 
and legal networks leaving little space for individual manoeuvring than in Katie and Margaret's case. But, 
instead of just saying, "'[ok], sorry we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the 
blacks,"' which is 'the kind of breast-beating that is left behind at the threshold and then business goes on 
as usual,' Joubert and McCord entered this minefield of power relations precisely because they would not 
condone the existing situation (Spivak, 1990:121). This led Jakes Gerwel to conclude that Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena is a non-sentimental attack on systems which dehumanise individuals and that it 
does not celebrate white supremacy or exhume evil (Gerwel, 1983:2-3). Contrary to Audre Larde, Joubert 
and McCord are unlikely to hold the dictum that, 'the master's tools will never dismantle the master's 
house' (Larde, 1984: 110). Instead, they would probably agree with one of the characters in Patricia 
Duncker's James Miranda Barry, commenting about the slave revolts in the West Indies, that 'the master's 
tools are the only ones we can ever use to pull his house down' (Duncker, 1999:274) and with the author 
of the dustcover for Meehan's Feminists Read Habermas, that the 'masters tools are worth pilfering.' 
Joubert herself has suggested an image which supports this interpretation, namely that one can only open 
the shutters from the inside (Personal communication). 
Having entered this quagmire, how then did these collaborators deal with these differences pegged to 
power? Habermas and Benhabib have suggested two options prevalent in the salons: the one is for 
interlocutors to simply regard each other as equal; the other is for them to bracket inequalities. I would 
like to suggest that most situations in which individuals (amongst whom there are potentially distorting 
inequalities) seek to establish understanding agreements contain a mixture of these strategies. In both 
sets of the collaborative relations under discussion, the interlocutors recognised each other as similar and 
thus also as equals in some regards, thus overruling the socially entrenched inequalities. Overriding the 
socially entrenched assumption of the inequality of the races widespread amongst white South Africans 
would belong to this first category. In other regards they acknowledged the inequalities (such as the 
differences in writerly skill) between them, but bracketed the effects of these on their respective abilities to 
participate as equals in the knowledge production process. Such a double strategy is in fact necessitated 
by the project of collaborative auto/biography itself. On the one hand the collaboration in collaborative 
auto/biography is necessary because of inequalities between the writing author and the oral narrator who 
has been deprived of the skills required to insert her narrative into a hegemonic public sphere. On the 
other hand, it is only to the extent that the collaborators accept each other as equals when it comes to the 
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production of validity claims, that they can establish understanding agreements on the oral narrator's 
narrative. This conclusion throws some light on the dispute between Seyla Benhabib and Iris Young. 
Whilst Benhabib (1992:137) assumes that symmetry in relations of communication is necessary and 
possible, Young (1997:38-59) argues that is not. It seems to me that this dispute can be resolved if we 
distinguish between those domains in which equality is necessary and those in which it is not. It is 
necessary for interlocutors to regard each other as equal participants in the production of truth; but it is not 
necessary for them to assume that they are equal regarding their social positions, writing and rhetorical 
skills, and pasts. The aim of collaborative auto/biography is to use the equality of the collaborators as 
interlocutors to produce a narrative whose goal is to do away with at least some of the inequalities in their 
social positions. These latter inequalities need not and cannot be bracketed. But what needs to be 
rejected is the assumption that the inequalities in the social domain and in writerly skills translate into 
unequal positions regarding the production of knowledge about the oral narrator's life. 
The dialectic at work in collaborative auto/biography is the same as that which has been described with 
reference to every standard speech act in which interlocutors assume counterfactually the existence of the 
equality between participants in the ideal speech situation, even if the facts of the matter testify to the 
opposite (seep 30 above). As with all speech, it is also the case with collaborative auto/biography that 
the ultimate aim and effect of the counterfactual assumption of the existence of the equality operative in 
the ideal speech situation is to make this equality a social reality. As in the salons (seep 37-39 above) 
and the busride described by Jabavu (pp 14-16 above), the collaborative relations between the oral 
narrators and writing authors constitute enclaves - outside the state and the formal public sphere - in 
which equality is necessarily assumed as a precondition to the possibility of the production of truth about 
the oral narrator's life. This assumption of equality denied in the formal public sphere, as well as the 
validity claims that emanate from this collaboration, constitutes a first step to the actual institutionalisation 
of equal relations in a society where it is denied. 
This relationship between inequality and equality is manifest in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. On 
the one hand the fact that only Joubert's name appears as author signals the inequality between her and 
Eunice. On the other hand the relationship between Poppie and the sympathetic third person narrator 
echoes Joubert's relationship with Eunice (Janssen et al, 1981:65). The power associated with Joubert's 
name as a recognised author makes it possible for her to provide Eunice's story with a hearing in the 
public sphere, in the belief that this will contribute to levelling this difference in power in the long run. This 
inequality which is operative in society at large, and which the collaborative auto/biography sets out to 
undermine, has to be levelled in the relations of production between the oral narrator and the writing 
author. It is only if she assumes that Eunice is her equal as a reliable truth teller, that Joubert can actually 
collaborate with her in the production of the truth about the oral narrator's life. 67 
Writing authors commonly employ two strategies to curb the effects of power related to differences. The 
first is to foreground the similarities between them and the oral narrators. The second is to draw on the 
neutralising effect of loyalty and trust. The foregrounding of similarity is evident in McCord's assertion: 
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To begin with, I grew up in Africa, so it was not a different country because my parents were 
missionaries and my mother had also been born in South Africa. Both she and I were always 
considered descendants of a chief from Umzinduzi. There was nothing of the kind of barrier 
that you find between blacks and whites in this country [USA]. And I think there is less of that 
kind of a barrier in South Africa anyway. I was comfortable in African families and in African 
kraals. I visited heathen kraals and Christian houses with my parents as far as I can 
remember' (McCord, 2000:249). 
McCord's response to a comment by a Malawi woman who had read The Calling of Katie Makanya, 
('"Even now that I meet you I can't believe you're a white woman because you wrote that book"') 
testifies to the significance she attaches to similarity between Katie and herself. McCord felt it 'was 
about as great a compliment as I could have got' (ibid.:249). 
At the London launch Joubert responds to the question 'How was it possible for you as a white 
woman to write about the life, the daily life as well as the inner life of a black woman. Was it not 
over audacious even to attempt it?' in a similar way. She notes: 'Many, nearly all of the experiences 
of Poppie spoke to me loudly and clearly. As a woman I had shared much of what she 
experienced. Girlhood, courtship, motherhood. As layer after layer of experience was revealed to 
me, I realised even more that differences in culture, religions, background lose ground before 
common humanity.' She grants that 'there were certain experiences strange to me' like the initiation 
rituals and 'all the individual hardships and iniquities of the pass system, the suffering during the 
riots', but, points to the insights she had gained during the research preceding the book and the 
language (Afrikaans) she and Eunice had in common: 'In that respect all barriers were down' (Notes 
for London book launch. Joubert papers). 
This insistence on similarity as a key to understanding the other opened the way to a debate about 
essential universal similarities that raged around Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (see Schalkwyk, 
1986:190-191) but is equally relevant to The Calling of Katie Makanya. Joubert herself picked up on this 
point in her introduction to the Italian translation: 'I found that her story depicted the essence of 
motherhood, surviving motherhood, which can superhumanly overcome obstacles. It is, to my mind, more 
than just a story of the South Africa of ten years ago. It is a tribute to universal courageous motherhood' 
(Joubert papers). This expresses an ongoing theme in Joubert's writing, namely the search for and 
explication of the power of Jungian archetypal symbols, what the narrator of Bonga refers to as, 'iets diep 
verborge in horn' [Something deeply concealed in him] (Joubert, 1971 :32).68 
Such a reference to essential universal similarities69 is misguided for a variety of reasons. I have already 
referred to the erroneous assumption that understanding is only possible where similarities exist between 
subjects. The debate about universalism is also misguided because it does not distinguish between 
essentialist universalism in philosophical anthropology (an indefensible position within a postmetaphysical 
philosophy which takes cognisance of existentialist arguments) and the universalisation principle in ethics 
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and the law (which, if one follows contemporary critical theorists, cannot be abandoned). If, however, one 
discards the whole idea of universal essences, or if one severs this connection between philosophical 
anthropology and ethics, then moral universalism is no longer tied to anthropological essentialism and the 
assertion of a universal motherhood in order to receive recognition and justice are not necessary. 
Besides seeking to contain the potentially distorting effects of differences by prioritising similarity, the 
collaborators also draw on the neutralising effect of loyalty and trust.70 With Katie and McCord the already 
existing ease, closeness, trust and loyalty that inform quasi-familial relations seem to be well established 
(Cockerton, 1998:172). These so-called 'natural' relations of trust and loyalty can of course be fostered by 
feelings of similarity, but they can also evolve out of reciprocity across difference (Benjamin, 1995:27-48), 
for example when the editor supplies information on her own life (Boyce Davies, 1992:13), or even small 
everyday acts of care described by McCord such as having breakfast together or sitting down to tea -
what Young calls greeting (2000:57-62). However, the closeness of these quasi-familial relations is not 
without its own problems for the relations of production. Close relationships can also be riddled with 
power; power less easy to detect as it gets hushed and enmeshed in the haze of loyalties established over 
years. 
In its equalising effects, such loyalty may well serve to diminish the distortions emanating from inequalities 
in power between collaborators. However loyalty may also have a drawback, in that it may influence the 
quality of the consensus in ways similar to relations of domination. This can happen when disagreement 
is regarded as a challenge to, rather than an assertion of loyalty and trust. Where it is so pervasive that 
distinct perspectives cannot be detected, loyalty can also smother dissent. In the latter case the writing 
author's singular loyalty to the oral narrator may jeopardise the quality of the consensus the collaborators 
claim to have established. As Katie indicates, it is not unquestioning loyalty, but a combination of 
independence and trust which is a precondition to truth telling: "'I can trust you. I can tell you anything, 
even those things you do not want to hear'" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 4). In addition to asking 
whether a specific collaboration is informed by sufficient loyalty for the oral narrator to confide in the 
writing author and for them to see things from the same angle, we also have to ask whether there is 
sufficient trust to allow for that critical distance which would make it possible for the writing author to 
question the validity of claims raised by the oral narrator and for the oral narrator to say things which may 
be uncomfortable to the writing author to hear. 
To what extent, one has to ask, is it possible for the collaborators to challenge each other, and to what 
extent are the disagreements about validity claims resolved because the collaborators reciprocally 
convince each other - as Joubert claims and McCord implies? Where the distance between the oral 
narrator and writing author is erased through the foregrounding of similarity or loyalty, the distinctive 
feature of collaborative auto/biography vanishes in that the writing author becomes merely a writing hand 
to the oral narrator's consciousness. 71 If no disparities are sensed at any time, if the loyalty and similarity 
of perspective are so strong, then Katie and Margaret, Eunice and Joubert cease to be potentially 
falsifying instances to what the other says. With the vanishing of the possibility of dissent, the whole idea 
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of consensus loses its point. Joubert's claim that she sensed no conflict between her own commitment to 
the facts and her loyalty to Eunice (which is reflected in the fact that the third-person narrator in Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is not a dissenting voice but in complete solidarity with the first-person 
narrators) could well be taken as a warning signal regarding the quality of the consensus. 72 In short, there 
is a fine and sometimes-indiscernible line between what Schalkwyk describes as the solidarity between 
the collaborators and what Dalven (1995:84) already views as appropriation. 
So far the attention has been on power as it impinges on the relations of production in the initial context of 
the recording of the narrative, which is but the first stage of production. Starting off with the relations of 
production between the oral narrator and the writing author gives us a glimpse into the micro-power that 
affects the telling of lives. But this focus on the face-to-face relations between collaborators should not 
distract from the larger production context in which the text is situated. On the contrary, one of the 
reasons why collaborative auto/biography has been chosen as an object of study is precisely because the 
relations between the oral narrator and the writing author can provide some more visible and manageable 
glimpses on larger social processes in the production and consumption of life narratives. The initial 
emphasis on relations of power informing the original context of narrating and recording shows how social 
relations of power seep into personal relations of narrative production, and how the collaborators deal with 
this through, for example, the foregrounding of similarity and the neutralising effect of loyalty and trust. It 
is precisely because collaborators are tied into larger social relations of power that they have to devise 
strategies which both echo and counter these social relations they are tied into. Critics of collaborative 
auto/biography often neglect these social practices and institutions involved in the production of life-
writing. Since they are more visible than the machinations of the book industry, critics often focus on the 
power relations and financial arrangements of the relations of production narrowly understood as the 
relations between the oral narrator and writing author. What gets swept under the carpet in such accounts 
is that, as commodities, collaborative auto/biographies enter the public sphere via the publisher and are 
subject to the whole range of steering mechanisms related to the book industry, discursive conventions 
pertaining to life writing, and relations of consumption. Moving away from the initial relations of 
production, the question thus becomes: to what extent do the money and power associated with the book 
industry impinge on collaborative auto/biography through (more or less explicitly) casting it in a discursive 
format thought to be appropriate for consumption by the reading public? 
In answering this, I will look at the ways in which persons in the book industry manage the discourse (what 
Habermas calls the speech system and Fraser the sociocultural means of interpretation and 
communication) of collaborative auto/biography. Studying the empirical details of the publisher's 
interventions in the construction of the final text, the making of a dominant discourse becomes visible. A 
look at the transition from the original interviews to the publication and the various editions, reveals both 
the nature of the dominant discourse and the extent to which the writing author operates as a double 
agent for the oral narrator and the book industry in managing this discourse. Writing authors often act as 
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brokers who engage with oral narrators in the domestic sphere on terms appropriate to personal face-to-
face relations and at the same time anticipate the requirements set by the publishing industry which 
includes an awareness of entrenched discourses of life-writing that are informed by economic 
considerations. 73 
In paying attention to what seems like negligible editorial intervention on the discursive level, we see these 
social and economic interests at work. Thereby the role of agents in the publishing industry as both 
facilitators and censors, anticipating as well as generating a market becomes visible. Here Foucault's 
finding that telling oneself is not necessarily an act of liberation but a forming of the narrator's identity 
according to the discourses imposed by the millennial yoke to confession (Foucault, 1976:17-35), 
provides a useful reminder that even if the facilitation of the book industry is a positive (rather than 
repressive) form of power, it is a form of power nonetheless. A key consideration in the management of 
such discourses by the publishing industry (but also by bookshops, the review industry, the culture 
industry at large, educational institutions, and libraries) is balancing the demand for similarity and the 
continuation of established conventions which stabilise the status quo with the allure of the exotic and the 
imperative to innovation informing both the capitalist economy and modern occidental aesthetics. 
It is in view of this balancing act that the debate whether there is an existing autobiographical discourse 
becomes relevant. Championing the view that there is such an established auto/biographical discourse, 
Gusdorf asserts that 'autobiography is a solidly established literary genre, its history traceable in a series 
of masterpieces' (by which he means the canonical European texts (1980:28)). Defending the opposite 
position, Olney asserts that 'there are no rules or formal requirements binding the prospective 
autobiographer - no restraints, no necessary models, no obligatory observances gradually shaped out of a 
long developing tradition and imposed by that tradition on the individual talent who would translate a life 
into writing' (1980:3). The reality, I would like to suggest, lies between these two extremes. As with all 
the modern arts, collaborative auto/biography has to walk this tightrope between the normalising 
pressures of tradition and the emancipatory innovations that are partly co-opted and regulated by -a 
publishing industry interested in retaining a certain status quo. I would thus concur with Lejeune 
(1989:185-215) and Carlean74 who argue that the success of a collaborative auto/biography on the market 
depends on the extent to which the relationship between similarity and difference is managed. Lejeune's 
emphasis tends to give bias to the exoticising strategies publishers use to generate novelty and curiosity. 75 
But equal attention should be paid to the extent to which publishers manage a sense of sufficient similarity 
so as to meet the expected needs of a readership that takes similarity as a precondition to the possibility 
of understanding and recognition. Although Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie 
Makanya were not commissioned as collaborative auto/biographies, and the latter was even initiated by 
the oral narrator, they still display a degree of tailoring to the audience's expectations in order to ensure 
audience uptake and economic success. 
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The primary discursive imperative imposed on both Joubert and McCord by the prospect of publishing was 
to structure the oral material so that it would fall within the 'acceptable range' of auto/biographical 
discourse Gusdorf alludes to. From Habermas's and Fraser's perspective this raises the question to what 
extent the ordering imperative imposes a discursive design that is inappropriate to the oral narrator's 
claims about her life and her interpretations of herself. On the one side of the spectrum critics like 
Gusdorf, Olney, and Manganyi (Interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming) suggest that the giving of form 
adds to, rather than diminishes, the truth of autobiography. 76 Like Aristotle (Poetics :51 b) they hold that 
giving artistic form to the historical narrative leads to the discovery of its deeper truth. According to this 
view, the imposition of a discursive design is an epistemological necessity which reveals an already 
existing but concealed structure in the life itself. On the other side of the spectrum, Peter Marrington 
argues that this kind of discursive reconstruction is at odds with the requirements of testimony, which 
keeps as closely as possible to the original oral statement (1995:155-157).77 Like Gusdorf, Olney, and 
Manganyi, and unlike Marrington, Joubert and McCord saw a need for restructuring the oral narrative. In 
contrast to Gusdorf, Olney, and Manganyi, McCord and Joubert explain this need in terms of readability 
(Interviews), rather than the metaphysical or epistemological terms of finding a deeper truth. They are 
supported in this by editors' contributions to determining the final form the books would take. 
Whilst its existence is admitted, the extent of editorial intervention in the production of The Calling of Katie 
Makanya has not been established. A comparison of the transcript and the published manuscript however 
gives some indication of the influence of prevailing discourses of life writing.78 A survey of the transcripts 
(see appendix) reveals at least two principles that inform Katie's discourse, namely chronology and 
thematic association. Chronology structures both anecdotes internally and establishes links between 
them. Thematic association, on the other hand, lurks behind what looks like the jumping around between 
different and incomplete anecdotes. Chronology as discursive structure seems to direct Katie more 
towards finishing an idea. Association, by contrast, leads more to fragmentation and incompleteness. 
The transcript starts, not unsurprisingly, with a very sketchy but chronological mention of some key events 
in Katie's life: birth, early schooling, employers, trips to her father's homeplace and to Britain, return to 
South Africa, marriage, children, and meeting James McCord. In the consecutive sessions anecdotes 
become more detailed but also less chronological as Katie's own association and McCord's questions 
open tangents not dictated by chronology. According to McCord discursive reconstruction consisted 
mainly in imposing a chronological form on the narrative (Interview). By favouring chronology against 
anecdotal associations, the power asserted by the prevailing discourse of auto/biography in which there is 
a beginning, a middle, and an end - and in that order - is easily recognisable. 
In addition to the discursive power exerted by the demands of chronology, McCord also opted for couching 
Katie's narrative according to the discursive principles of the novel (Marrington, 1995 and Ngwenya, 
1995:6-7), which sets it apart from discursive orders like testimony, or academic discourses like history, 
ethnology and anthropology. As McCord herself explains, 'when I first taped the interviews with Katie and 
discussed some of her statements with a few Africanists here at UCLA, notably Professors Hilda and Leo 
74 
III /ntersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity 
Kuper [ ... ] they urged me to include a good deal of sociological and anthropological material, which was 
contrary to the popular story I wanted to write and which, in essence, would have cast a European type of 
interpretation on what she has told me' (Personal communication). McCord sees her rejection of an 
academic discourse typical to the sciences of man mentioned in chapter I as akin to resisting the power of 
a European (anthropological) discourse over Makanya's narrative. What she fails to see is that, in opting 
for the discourse of the novel, she, like Elsa Joubert, has not escaped the power of discourse as such. 
This point is convincingly argued by Ngwenya, who suggests that McCord's 'analytical paradigm, without 
which a coherent, plausible and interesting story could not have emerged' (2000:160) is a fusion of 
novelistic discourse and the 'ideology of enlightenment underpinning the work of the American 
missionaries in South Africa. It is this ideology,' Ngwenya argues, 'functioning as a "practice of 
representation", which provides her [Katie] and her editor with the "appropriate" language of self-definition. 
In Makanya's life-story, metropolitan representations of the colonised other are reinforced and validated by 
what seems to be her deliberate reliance on both the "discourses" and the moralistic philosophy of the 
missionaries in depicting her own experience' (ibid.:149). In short, McCord has merely traded the 
constraints of one (originally occidental) discourse for the constraints of others. 
The correspondence between Joubert and Margaret Body, the Managing Editor of Hodder and Stoughton 
responsible for editing the English translation of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena19, provides ample 
documentary evidence of the extent to which the book trade contributed to the discursive reconstruction of 
the text through the management of similarity and otherness. 80 The norm for Body's editorial interventions 
is provided by the English market, against which calibration for international distribution takes place. 81 Her 
interventions range from rather superficial lexicographic changes, to tampering with the genre, changing 
specific utterances, the grammar, and the layout. It already starts with the opening note 'To the reader'. 
What is presented to the Afrikaans reader as a narrative ('Hierdie verhaal .. .') is offered to the English 
reader as fiction, ('This novel ... .'). This change in genre is made with a view to the market: 'You've got to 
make it clear that the book is a novel - we are selling it as a novel - even though it's based on fact' (Body, 
General points for the author :1. Joubert papers. e.o.).82 The discursive management of similarity and 
difference is evident in Body's comment on Joubert's first translation of the opening sentence ('Ons is 
Gordonia-boorfinge, se Poppie' [We are born and bred people from Gordonia, says Poppie] Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena: 3), and Body's proposed alternative, which Joubert came to accept. Body notes: 
'The Afrikaans overlay is deceptive for UK readers who don't readily take in the existence of Afrikaans-
speaking black people[ .... ] So I think you must state Poppie's Xhosa nationality straight away, perhaps in 
the first line: 'We are Xhosa people from Gordonia, says Poppie"' (Body, Specific points for the author :1. 
Joubert papers). 
Body generally tended to allow lexical rather than grammatical deviation. Regarding the former she notes, 
'I agree with you [Joubert] entirely about expressions like "passing by" and "heavy''83 which convey just that 
sufficient sense of difference while their meaning is perfectly clear' (Body to Joubert. 5 September 1979. 
Joubert papers). However, regarding the grammar, Body felt that the dramatic present which is used in 
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the Afrikaans, 'comes between the reader and the matter he's reading. I feel it distances and formalises 
things, and holds the reader at arms length, nullifying the involvement you gain by the simple writing'. She 
thus requested Joubert to allow her to change the text into the past tense, concluding, 'let me say no 
more, just make an impassioned plea, and hope I can woo you to what I'm sure is better for the English-
speaking marker (Body to Joubert. 5 September 1979. Joubert papers. e.a.). Body's thanks to Joubert 
for adapting the text in accordance with her suggestions84 is another indication of publishers' power to 
manage the discourse in ways conflicting with Habermas's notion of consensus. Finally, Hodder and 
Stoughton changed the layout. In the Afrikaans edition, each of the utterances of the first-person 
speakers generally starts against the margin. This has the effect of producing protocol-type sentences 
each focussing attention on itself and its factual assertion. In the English edition these utterances (and 
even some paragraphs) have been made to run on, thereby strengthening the effect of the printed novel in 
which paragraphs and chapters and the novel as a whole predominate, with the result that the text drifts 
even further from orature and the original recordings to the discursive conventions of the novel (see also p 
95-96 below). The extent of the publisher's intervention which has been sketched here should throw 
sufficient doubt on the monological notion of authorship, revealing a practice closer to that described by 
Woodmansee and calling for an intersubjectivist account of narratives of the self. 
This analysis attests to the ways in which not only money and social relations, but as Foucault (1980:78-
108) suggested in his two lectures on power (delivered in 1976, the year in which Eunice's grandson 
Vukile was killed and the seeds for the collaboration between Eunice and Joubert were planted} even 
discourse itself constitutes a medium through which power is exercised. At the same time the evidence 
challenges a simplified Foucauldian position which discounts the role of agency in the exercise of power, 
suggesting the appropriateness of Bourdieu's approach (1992) instead. The evidence of editorial 
intervention in The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena gives us an indication of how persons working in the 
publishing industry manage the discourse of a book in the name of a vague sense of the expectations of 
audiences in the role of consumers. What counts from their perspective is the compatibility of discourses 
to demands of the market rather than the appropriateness of the speech system to the oral narrator's 
utterances and her discursively mediated self- and need-interpretations. Clearly criticism directed solely at 
the writing author's mediating interventions is too narrow. If one assumes what has become a platitude of 
reception theory, namely that the producer's anticipation of the readers' expectations also impacts on the 
text she produces, then purported readerly expectations, which have themselves been shaped by 
dominant discourses, need to carry at least some 'blame' for the discursive reconstruction of the oral 
narrator's narrative. If the foregoing analysis of the relationship between the oral narrator and the writing 
author, the editor, and the assumed expectations of the audience is correct, then it is not an either I or 
situation in which the oral narrator, writing author, editor and reading public are each individually 
responsible for discursive reconstruction. A theory which considers auto/biographical speech acts as a 
conjunction of the utterance and the response to it, needs to take cognisance of the discursive power 
exerted on the writing author as much the power exerted through what is considered sayable and what 
can be heard by the anticipated reader. 
*** 
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In this first chapter of the application of notions of intersubjectivity indebted to contemporary critical theory 
to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya, the focus has been on the 
consensus theory of validity. The core thesis of this theory is that an utterance is valid if consensus can 
be established about it under conditions of ideal speech. This means that the interlocutors are guided 
solely by the unforced force of reason, and correlating to this, that the influence of the steering 
mechanisms money and power is excluded. This general consensus theory of validity was used in an 
analysis of the relations of production of the two texts at hand. It was illustrated that, while the 
collaborators on both Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya sought to 
establish consensus, the communication relations were by no means ideal, and that the techniques used 
to contain the steering mechanism, namely the prioritisation of similarity and loyalty, could themselves 
compromise the quality of the consensus. 
Applying Habermas's speech act theory to the concrete communicative practice of collaborative 
auto/biography, allows us to see the two-fold nature of communication. On the one hand it is informed by 
the idealising conditions of speech reconstructed in the universal pragmatics. These include the 
assumptions that collaborators understand truth in terms of consensus; that they seek to establish such 
consensus; that they rely on reason to do this; and that the relations of production are ideal. On the other 
hand, an analysis of the concrete conditions of communication reveals that these idealising assumptions 
are never completely realised. It also becomes evident that besides the unforced force of reason, other 
factors such as money and power as well as emotions and narrative conventions play a role in the 
establishment of consensus. A theory of collaborative auto/biography therefore cannot rest satisfied with 
spelling out the idealising assumptions informing communicative action against which empirical acts of 
communication must almost always fall short. It also has to foreground the concrete conditions which 
contradict these idealising assumptions and provide an account of their relations to the production of 
consensus. However, it is only against the backdrop of the idealising assumptions informing speech that 
we can see a specific text as falling short of these requirements to which it is implicitly committed. 
Contextualising the failures of concrete texts to fulfil these preconditions of communication makes it 
evident that they are not (only} individual failures. These failures are the effect of the social conditions 
under which collaborative auto/biographies are produced. As long as the difference between the ideal and 
the actual practice persists, we can see collaborative auto/biography as a genre that is born out of the 
imperfect conditions which it seeks to abolish, and as a call for the abolition of those very conditions which 
make it necessary. 
This interest in the abolition of the preconditions of its own existence raises one more problem in 
Habermas's claim that participants may only be motivated by the search for truth and that all other 
interests must be excluded. How should this be squared with the fact that one of the driving forces behind 
collaborative auto/biography (one which is pre-eminent in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena} is the 
interest in emancipation? It would be a reductive reading if one saw in Habermas a champion of a 
narrowly contemplative and predominantly epistemological understanding of truth cleansed of all interest, 
even though his speech act theory may invite such misunderstanding. Instead, like his predecessor 
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Frankfurt School theorists, Habermas is intent on mediating theory and emancipatory practice. This is 
evident in his inaugural lecture where he clearly asserts that the interest in emancipation is internally tied 
to the search for knowledge (TWI :146-168). Consequently, as Benhabib argues (1992:148) and as this 
chapter suggests, Habermas's theory can be employed in an emancipatory feminist project in the 
postcolonial context. Once truth is understood in the widest possible sense to embrace utterances about 
states of affairs in the outer world; the rightness of norms in the social world; truthfulness and authenticity 
in the inner world; and the appropriateness of the speech system in which all these utterances are made, 
then the search for consensus is seen as an expression of the interest in emancipation. Interests then 
relate to collaborative auto/biography in two opposite ways. As potentially distorting forces, interests such 
as money and power need to be bracketed. On the other hand, collaborative auto/biographies themselves 
are bearers of the interest in emancipation inherent to speech. 
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The intersubjective generation of truth claims about the past 
'Ons slaywers sal vir die historici van later die resente politieke gebeuere moet opteken 
- die wet maak die geskiedslaywing in die gewone sin onmoontlik' 
Herman Gillomee. Letter to Elsa Joubert, 13 January 19791 
Collaborative auto/biographies - like autobiography, biography, and history - typically raise truth claims 
about things that happened in the past. Given the Habermasian taxonomy of four validity claims, namely 
truth, truthfulness, rightness and intelligibility the question is, to which of these categories are such claims 
about events in the past best allocated? Habermas himself suggests that autobiographical utterances 
belong to the category expressive-aesthetic speech acts that thematise the internal world of the speaker 
(VS :38~40). But clearly this is a reduction of complex, booklength autobiographical narratives like Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. Even though they foreground the life 
of the protagonist, they cannot be reduced to one category of validity claims. Instead, these texts show 
that extended autobiographical representations, when broken down to the level of propositions, include a 
variety of validity claims. Thus, when it is asserted in The Calling of Katie Makanya that 'On the first day of 
March in 1904 the Doctor led Katie up to the door of his new dispensary in Durban' (The Calling of Katie 
Makanya: 167) or in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena that 'Die tweede Januarie 1971 was my man daar 
in Observatory en se die baas moet nou maar vir my so gou as moontlik 'n plek kry' (Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena: 142) rThe second of January 1971 my husband went to Observatory and told the boss 
to get me a place as soon as he could' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 190-191 )], the most likely 
description is that they prioritise validity claims to truth. 
Using the opportunity provided by these collaborative auto/biographies, the focus in this section is on truth 
claims about the past. This will elucidate certain shortcomings in Habermas's theory. The first deficit in 
his theory regarding truth claims (1) has to do with his narrow notion of truth that is tailored to research 
methods in the natural sciences. I argue that, whereas his theory of truth may be appropriate when it 
comes to validity claims about a still existing external nature studied in the natural sciences, the 
transference of this theory to validity claims about the past is bought at the price of a considerable dilution. 
A different set of problems (2) has to do with the relationship between utterances that raise validity claims 
to truth (what Habermas calls problemsolving non-fiction), and those which do not (what he calls 
worlddisclosing fiction). Confronting this distinction with hybrid texts like The Calling of Katie Makanya and 
Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena reveals how rhetorical techniques common to the novel can be used 
to raise validity claims about the truth. Having thus secured the status of collaborative auto/biographies as 
potential bearers of truth claims, it is concluded that a reformulation of Habermas's position regarding the 
demarcation between fiction and non-fiction is necessary. 
IV The intersubjective generation of truth 
I. Truth claims about the past 
In II Habermas's account of constative speech acts, in which truth claims about the external world are 
raised, was briefly sketched. In these theoretical-scientific speech acts (which are typical of the practices 
of science and technology) the propositional content thematising external nature is foregrounded. 
Focussing on the logic of scientific research practised by the scientific community, Habermas describes 
the double relation of potential falsification to which these speech acts are subject. On the level of 
discourse they are subject to the potentially falsifying critique of the scientific community. On the level of 
action they are subject to potential pragmatic falsification through failed action. Because he takes 
scientific claims about the external world as paradigm for constatives, Habermas neglects truth claims 
which are not about the workings of the still existing material natural world which are typically the object of 
experimental science. Most obvious of these disregarded truth claims are truth claims about past events. 
Whilst Habermas's theory of truth is designed with the natural sciences in mind, the consequence of 
carving out a domain for truth claims about the past embedded in narrative texts (as opposed to fictional 
stories which do not raise such truth claims) is to suggest that they too need to be covered by a theory of 
truth. This implies that Habermas's theory of truth needs to be extended beyond the narrow confines he 
had foreseen. 
What distinguishes truth claims about the past from scientific truth claims about the still existing natural 
world, is that the latter can be subjected to potential falsification through action, for example through 
experimentation. Thus, the claim that the earth is round can be subjected to potentially falsifiable 
empirical tests, like sailing around it, or viewing it from a satellite. Truth claims about the past, in contrast, 
are only to a limited extent subject to any similar potential pragmatic falsification through action. Only 
where material traces survive, can one speak of some form of potential pragmatic falsifiability. For 
example, the hospital built by doctor James McCord as described in My Patients were Zulus can still be 
viewed a hundred years later. 
I would like to suggest that the visits by Margaret McCord and Elsa Joubert to the places referred to by 
Makanya and Eunice N., can be construed in these terms, namely as actions in which certain truth claims 
about the past can be tested and possibly falsified.2 But there is a whole host of claims about what was 
the case in the past that are obviously not subject to potential falsification along such pragmatist lines. 
When Eunice N. says that, 'Ek onthou as kind toe my oompie lekker drank was eendag en my ouma se vir 
horn Penkie jy moet nou ophou so vloek (in Afr) anders gaan roep ek ou Pieterse, 'n Damara poliesman 
.... '(Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977 :'Upington', 6) r1 remember as a child when my oompie was nice 
and drunk one day and my ouma says to him Penkie you must now stop swearing (in Afrikaans) otherwise 
I will call old Pieterse, a Damara policeman .... 1, or when Katie Makanya says, 'And that night I told the 
boy to go and let Ndeyo's mule out of the stable because I could not sleep for worrying' (Makanya and 
McCord, 1954:137), there is no possible present fallible action that can be based on that claim. In these 
cases, the only source of falsification is the critique located in the oral and written discourse of others like 
the other members of Eunice's family that Elsa Joubert interviewed, the other people McCord could have 
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drawn on as sources, and the written texts they both consulted. It is this difference between truth claims 
about the past which can still be falsified through failed action and those which cannot, that underlies the 
McCord's distinction when she says, 'I tried to tell the story as honestly as I could, but there were a lot of 
incidents, where I added descriptions which might not have been accurate. But they were as accurate as I 
could make them. I'm not talking about her husband's home place up in the Transvaal, because I visited 
there and I know those descriptions. The physical descriptions were correct. But there were things that 
had happened in Johannesburg where I felt that I had to set a scene, and so I described a scene and it 
may not have been correct' (Interview ). 
When it comes to truth claims about the past, the question is whether there is anything which takes the 
place of pragmatic testing as a second source of potential falsification in addition to the possible 
objections raised by other interlocutors? If the consensus between interlocutors carries the whole weight 
of the truth claim, an important external corrective on possible falsehoods in discourse which is distinctive 
of the natural sciences falls away. And, if we are to follow the Popperian line in Habermas's thought, the 
less fallibility the less potential for growth in knowledge. The consequence is that Habermas's theory of 
truth claims about the external world (namely that dissent within the scientific community and failed action 
constitute a double relationship of potential falsification) does not carry over to truth claims about the past. 
The situation is rather reminiscent of Habermas's own depiction of the claim to rightness, in which it is the 
possible dissent of others which forms the sole source of potential falsification. When dealing with the 
host of significant events which leave no long-term material trace, we are locked within discourse without 
the recourse to the additional arbitrating effect of un/successful action.3 
But, because of the nature of collaborative auto/biography, problems regarding potential critique and 
falsification are compounded even more than with many other claims about the past. To begin with, it is 
often by definition true of communities to which oral narrators belong that they have been erased in any of 
several ways. Genocide, forced removals, plain neglect, or a combination of these often means that no 
physical or even symbolic traces survive of the past material culture which can count as evidence of 
present validity claims.4 Furthermore, even if documents about past events5 can be found, they still 
belong to the category of discourse rather than pragmatic instances of failed action. Finally such 
documents (like the printed word of Dr McCord, newspapers, or municipal reports) invariably belong to the 
official or hegemonic culture. As such they often distort or silence the voices of those on whose exclusion 
official culture is based and whose entry into the dominant public sphere is only the outcome of the 
publication of the collaborative auto/biography. The use of such documents, like the municipality reports, 
commission hearings, and newspaper articles Joubert drew on and the reviews of the performances of the 
Jubilee Choir on which McCord relied, therefore calls for a considerable hermeneutics of suspicion.6 
Confronting Habermas's theory of truth with The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena and The Calling of 
Katie Makanya also highlights another aspect on which he fails to elaborate, namely selection and 
completeness. If (as the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth suggests) 
completeness is a part of the claim to truth, how does selection affect the truth that is told? If telling the 
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truth is not only about distorting the facts, but also about selection and the completeness of a narrative, 
then some account has to be given of what qualifies as a sufficiently complete account of a life. Gardner 
(1991:188 and 215) raises this pertinent point pertaining to Joubert's selection of facts in describing 
Poppie's life, her activities, and the political background. In comparing Joubert's account of the monyane 
(the church's mothers association) to a fuller one which also considers the material and social relations of 
support and solidarity provided by the women's association, Gardner concludes that Joubert's selection 
results in a warping of the truth.7 
A comment in her notes gives us a clue as to the criterion Joubert used when deciding what to include and 
what to leave out. There she writes that 'strike and unrest should not be social documentation but must 
have place in the character development. Must be integral part' (Own translation. Notes while writing. 
Joubert papers). The interpretative framework on the grounds of which Joubert decides what counts as 
relevant is then how certain events contribute to the development of Poppie as a character in the novel, 
rather than to an understanding of the social history of South Africa.8 If Habermas's theory is to be more 
exact, it would then need to give an idea of what counts as a sufficiently complete account of a life and 
whether certain exclusions can be considered to diminish the truth value of an auto/biography. 
In telling the truth one may still get away with omissions on the basis that one forgot them or considered 
them irrelevant. Additions, however, are less easily justified, especially if the note to the reader asserts: 
'Niks word dus bygevoeg wat nie deur Poppie of haar gesinslede self beleef is nie' [Nothing is thus added 
that is not experienced by Poppie or her family members themselves. (Own translation of sentence 
omitted in English edition.)]. But could there be interpretative additions (for example, when Joubert or 
McCord write how Katie or Poppie saw events) which are essentially correct, even if none of the persons 
immediately involved explicitly saw them that way? Once again, a line from Joubert's notes signals a 
warning. 'Hierdie dinge vertel sy my,' Joubert writes, 'Maar ek las by' [These things she tells me. But I 
add on] (Notes while writing. Joubert papers). The event Joubert has in mind here is the scene of 
Poppie's arrival in Lambertsbaai. Poppie had been seasick all the way. On landing, some adults and 
children came to the jetty to look at the new arrivals. Joubert writes,. 'Sy't op die planke van die jettie 
getrap-trap om haar bene warm te kry en gevoel sy's meerder as die ander kinders wat nie daar uit die 
groat see gekom het nie' (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 24) rshe moved her legs and stamped her 
feet on the jetty to get warm, and she felt: I'm better than the other children because I've come from 
across the sea. I'm strong now' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 38).] Certainly a case can be 
made for additions that the writing author thought are true, such as interpretations of how the oral narrator 
consciously felt, even though the oral narrator herself does not state this explicitly. But the case at hand 
does not belong to this category of conscious feelings, as is evident from Joubert's notes, which continue, 
'Ek dink die kind was net so asvaal, byna wit gekots dat daar nie meerder of minder gevoel kon word nie' 
[I think the child was just so ashgrey, nearly puked white, that it was not possible to feel lesser or more 
important] (Notes while writing. Joubert papers). As these few cases show, the question facing both 
Habermas and a theory of collaborative auto/biography but which cannot be dealt with here due to 
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constraints of length, is which kind of omissions and additions can be made without tampering with the 
truth value of the claims raised by the text? Because Habermas's focus is on single-proposition 
utterances rather than complex texts, he fails to address these questions. 
Another problem which arises for Habermas's consensus theory of truth is the many specific truth claims 
raised in these texts which can be neither corroborated nor falsified by other sources besides the oral 
narrator. Examples of these would be events in which only the oral narrator participated or for which only 
she has evidence (such as things she did when she was alone}.9 If interlocutors have nothing else to rely 
on but the oral narrator's word, the idea of consensus loses its value. This shows yet another limit to 
Habermas's theory, which could possibly be supplemented by a theory of reliability. Just as judges 
sometimes have to substitute the possibility of criticism or corroboration by a second witness with a notion 
of the reliability of the witness, so writing authors have to fall back on the reliability of oral narrators as 
witnesses. If one is to hold on to a Habermasian consensus theory of truth, asserting that it is essentially 
right, one could only do so if one admitted that it is not complete. The core insight about consensus would 
therefore have to be supplemented by a theory of reliability for those cases where neither consensus nor 
dissensus is possible because the oral narrator is the sole source of information. 
To conclude this discussion on truth claims about the past, I would like to give an explanation of 
Habermas's failure to devote more attention to developing a stronger theory of such truth claims. At first 
sight it comes as a surprise that someone who works within the tradition of critical theory, in which so 
much emphasis is put on the marriage of philosophy and the neighbouring disciplines, and someone who 
is concerned with tracing the causes of social pathologies which lead to disasters like Fascism or the 
colonisation of the lifeworld, should pay so little attention to a theory of validity claims about past facts. 
Add to this, that Habermas, like Adorno, is resolute on the importance of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung 
(coming to terms with the past) and this lack becomes even more unexpected. 10 In contrast to similar 
essays about democracy for which he provides ample theoretical explication, none of Habermas's texts 
which deal with Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (which are generally published as non-theoretical political 
essays) finds any echo in a theoretical account of validity claims about the past. This deficit is not even 
made good by sketches in the political essays themselves of a possible theory of validity claims about the 
past which can be reconciled with the general consensus theory of truth. 
A possible reason for Habermas's failure to elaborate on a theory of truth about the past is that he is 
concerned about our relation to the past, rather than truth claims about the past. Because he does not go 
much into factual claims about the past, he never faces the question about when such claims are true. 
Instead, his focus is truncated to the normative significance of the past as a source of learning for the 
present. What matters about the past is not so much the facts as the political and moral lessons we learn 
from it. The measure of the value of a narrative of the past then lies in the extent to which it contributes to 
a learning process which helps us avoid repeating past disasters. Whereas this is certainly a very 
important concern in our dealings with the past, I am not convinced that it is the only one. The matter of 
factual truth cannot be neatly swept under the carpet of normative learning. And it may even be argued 
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that if there is no stronger check than dis/consensus when it comes to validity claims about the past, that 
there is a large possibility that we will not get the facts about the past right as long as power relations of 
the kind which necessitate collaborative auto/biography persist. And if the chances of getting the facts 
right are at risk, the possibility of learning the right lessons from it may be equally shaky. Unless, of 
course, we settle for the rather suspect option according to which we are satisfied to learn the right 
lessons for the present from the wrong facts about the past. 
Two things come to mind when looking at Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie 
Makanya in this light. Both texts are acts of salvaging facts about the past which may otherwise have 
sunk into oblivion. And both texts have lessons to teach. Like the oral histories of many individuals who 
are not famous and who do not go into the annals of collective memory, the narratives of Katie Makanya 
and Eunice N. are likely to have faded into oblivion if they had not been recorded in print. By being 
reduced to writing, the reach of their narratives, both in terms of time and space, has been extended. 
Because they were able to draw on contemporary sources (which also underlie the same fate of being 
ephemeral), an element of corroboration and falsification was possible at the time of production, which 
would not have been the case had one tried to reconstruct their lives a generation later. This, of course 
applies even more to Eunice's narrative, which was published two years after the recordings and is also 
based on family testimony, than to Katie's, in which there was a time lag of forty years and in which Katie 
and her testimony are the dominant focus. 
If, as Habermas suggests in his emphasis on Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, we draw on these two texts as 
sources of moral learning, the question of the specific lessons that can be learnt from them is also a 
question of the context of reception. These lessons may vary from changes in the perception of others, to 
making changes in our relations to them in particular and in our social arrangements in general. As these 
lessons pertain largely to questions of recognition and justice (rather than facts about the past for their 
own sake), they will be dealt with in chapter V below. 
2. Novelization, fiction, and world disclosure 
When dealing with truth claims in collaborative auto/biographies like Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena 
and The Calling of Katie Makanya, two further issues arise. The first pertains to the use of novelistic 
techniques to convey facts, as opposed to fiction. The second pertains to the role of what Habermas calls 
world disclosure when it comes to factual discourses. This section has the rather modest aim of 
distinguishing between novelization 11 (which is a matter of stylistic categories) and fictionalization 12 (which 
pertains to ontological categories). It is suggested that these two sets of categories vary independently of 
each other so that it is possible to use novelistic techniques to convey facts. Drawing the distinction in this 
manner means questioning the way in which Habermas distinguishes between problemsolving factual 
discourse and worlddisclosing fictional discourse. 
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Collaborative auto/biography, Philippe Lejeune maintains, of necessity verges on the novelistic. 13 Whether 
such a sweeping statement is categorically true of all collaborative auto/biography is disputable. 
Furthermore, even amongst those collaborative auto/biographies which do exhibit novelistic traits, it is 
necessary to distinguish according to the techniques and degrees of novelization. On such a scale, both 
Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya would demonstrate several 
novelistic trends. This is not to suggest that they suspend their status as validity claims to truth. Rather, 
these books prompt us to deal with the differences between novelization (which does not affect the status 
of an utterance as validity claim to truth} and fictionalization (which does affect the status of an utterance 
as validity claim to truth}. This distinction between novelization and fictionalization constitutes the focus of 
this section. It starts (1) with a sketch of the muddle found in critics' responses to the use of novelistic 
technique in The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and the relationship of 
novelistic techniques to fact and fiction in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. Then (2) Tom Wolfe's 
description of New Journalism and Miguel Barnet's views on the Documentary Novel are introduced as 
possible suggestions for solving this muddle and exploring the differences between novelization and 
fictionalization. This is followed by (3) sample discussions of extracts from The Calling of Katie Makanya 
and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena to give an initial idea how novelistic techniques like dialogue, 
structure, the use of language, scene setting, characterisation, and the narrator's perspective are 
employed to convey factual claims about the past. The discussion of these examples supports the 
conclusion that, to the extent that they adhere to the principles of novelization as opposed to 
fictionalization, these two collaborative auto/biographies raise validity claims to truth which should be taken 
seriously as such. 14 Whilst Habermas's theory of truth is designed with the natural sciences in mind (see 
pp 31-32 above), the consequence of carving out a domain for truth claims about the past embedded in 
narrative texts (as opposed to fictional stories) is to suggest that they too need to be covered by a theory 
of truth. This implies that Habermas's theory of truth needs to be extended beyond the narrow confines 
he had foreseen. 
i. The confusion of novelization and fictionalization 
Although none of the commentators on The Calling of Katie Makanya question the factual nature of the 
claims made, several of them comment on what they call the novelistic techniques which are employed to 
convey these facts (Ngwenya, 1995:6).15 Comparing these novelistic techniques and the biographical 
aspects, Peter Marrington remarks that McCord 'departs from the etiquette of biography in order to satisfy 
novelistic conventions.' Great liberty is taken, Merrington continues, 'in the transformation of testimony to 
portraiture,' which 'adds pleasures to the text, the readerly pleasures of dramatic unfolding, of 
eavesdropping, of artistic coherence between subjects and their environment, of novelistic inevitability.' 
As an example, he mentions 'atmospheric and material descriptions,' which act 'as "objective correlatives" 
for the drawing of character' (Marrington, 1995: 156). Despite this reference to elements of novelization, 
neither Marrington nor any of the other commentators uses this as an opportunity to suggest that The 
Calling of Katie Makanya is a fiction in the sense that it fails to raise truth claims about the past. 
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The reception of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, by contrast, was burdened from the start by a failure 
to keep novelization (that is the use of the style typical of the novel without tampering with the truth value 
of the utterance) and fictionalization (that is the suspension of the validity claim to truth) apart. This 
resulted in a bundle of contradictions by the reading public and critics, which was exacerbated by Elsa 
Joubert's own prevarication on the issue. This muddle was then further intensified by the shift from the 
Afrikaans edition (in which the note to the reader calls the book a 'verhaal' (narrative), and states that it is 
based on the facts collected on the life of Poppie Rachel Nongena) to the English note to the reader, 
which calls it a 'novel'. Despite the claim to the contrary made in the note to the reader, even the 
Afrikaans edition proved not to be immune to the objection that it fudges the distinction between fact and 
fiction. 
The critical literature as well as Habermas's speech act theory, which insists that we consider utterances 
in connection to the response to them, make clear that two perspectives need to be distinguished even if 
they are connected to each other: Firstly, the status the speaker I writer attaches to the claim (whether 
she means to raise validity claims to truth or not); and secondly, the audience's' response (whether they 
take it as fact or fiction). Starting with the claim by the writing author (and by extension probably the oral 
narrator), Janssen et al point out with regard to the Afrikaans edition that, though the book is presented as 
a true narrative, there is a very old standing and respectable literary convention to offer fiction as truth. 16 
Shifting the question to the matter of audience response, Janssen et al ask if we should take the book to 
be claiming the truth or as a fiction which plays with the convention of pretending to be the truth (1981 :57). 
To which Gardner adds the further suggestion that the success of the uptake17 of an author's claim that an 
utterance is factual is also connected to the experiences of the reader, which may be tied to race, class, 
gender and so on. 'The basic contract the non-fiction novelist makes with his/her readers,' Gardner 
reminds us, is 'the guarantee that his/her story is based entirely on verifiable sources,' which enables 'her 
to exert over them the spell of the classic realistic novel'. Joubert, according to Gardner, 'has undoubtedly 
succeeded in exerting this spell over her white readers' (Gardner, 1991:194 e.a.). 
The conclusion that both The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena were 
considered to raise validity claims to truth by at least some readers, is substantiated by the circumstance 
that they were both prescribed texts in university departments where they were treated as non-fiction.18 
Pace Gardner, it seems that race is not a distinguishing factor regarding the success of the uptake of the 
claim that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is factual. Richard Rive, for one, takes Joubert at her word 
and favours treating the narrative as fact: 'the author describes its documentary nature, and the purpose 
of such a work is surely to unravel facts' ( 1980:58).19 Nevertheless, several attempts to secure the non-
fiction status of the book were befuddled. Jan Rabie describes it as "n wonderlike dokument-cum-
eposroman' [A wonderful document-epic novel] (Rabie note to Joubert, n.d. Joubert papers) and Jakes 
Gerwel (Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 1979:2) paradoxically speaks of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena as 
a novel which is a piece of "'low key reporting"'. According to Gerwel, the book clearly resists readers' 
attempts to relegate it to the imaginary, which leads him to express doubts about the applicability of 
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aesthetic criteria associated with fiction in its evaluation.20 This muddle clearly started before publication 
with the unidentified in-house reader at T afelberg first praising the life narrative for its objectivity and 
facticity, and moving on in the very next paragraph to call it a novel.21 
Finally, Dalven's conclusion that, 'Joubert blurs genre, claiming the work simultaneously as fiction and 
nonfiction' (1995:81) is substantiated by Joubert's own prevarication on the distinction between fiction and 
non-fiction, thereby eroding the distinction between novelization and fiction necessary to secure the status 
of at least some of the book's utterances as validity claims to truth. In Joubert's own words Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena is 'what the Americans call nee-fiction or New Journalism or faction (fiction based on 
the foundation of facts)' (Interview). So when confronted with Jakes Gerwel's question whether it is a 
novel or a sociological report, she responds with the surprising, 'gee nie om nie, Anna Lauw ook vir my 
gevra. Gee nie 'n hel om nie' [Don't mind. Anna Lauw also asked me. Don't care a damn] (Notes after 
publication. Joubert papers). 
Given their interest in securing the uptake of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena as validity claims to truth, and given the doubts the use of novelistic techniques can raise about 
the factual status of their claims, why then do McCord and Joubert run the risk of using these techniques? 
In the case of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena it is possible that novelization serves as a Trojan horse 
to convey facts which were severely policed in the late seventies and early eighties.22 However, asserting 
that she had no qualms about telling the truth and that the truth could not be banned, Joubert denies this 
as a motive (Interview). Both Joubert and Mc Cord have hinted at another reason for the use of novelistic 
techniques, namely the contribution of such techniques to what the writing authors understood as the 
readability of the material. Wanting to make the factual material as accessible as possible, they both 
found that the realist novel offered an established format which guaranteed readability to a wide range of 
fiction and non-fiction readers. 
ii. Disentangling novelization and fictionalization 
If we want to secure a place for collaborative auto/biographies as a bearer of truth claims about the past 
even though they use techniques of novelization, then we need to distinguish between novelization, 
fictionalization, and faction more clearly than the authors and critics cited above do. My suggestion for 
solving this confusion hinges on the distinction between style and reference. In order to demarcate 
novelization from fictionalization and faction, two independent sets of variables need to be kept apart. The 
first set of variables pertains to styles, namely whether claims are made in what one could, for example, 
term more scientific as opposed to novelistic prose. Although style can serve as a marker whether an 
utterance raises validity claims to truth or not, it is not a final guarantee of the intended status of an 
utterance as a validity claim to truth. Though there are various conventional relations between certain 
styles and truth value, there is no logically necessary relationship. In other words, style does not imply an 
ontological commitment, that is whether existence claims are made or not. The second set of variables, 
which definitely does have to do with the truth value of an utterance and the distinction between fact and 
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fiction, pertains to the ontological commitment an utterance implies. Whereas a factual utterance makes 
existential claims, a fictitious one does not. 23 Thus the question we shall face time and again when 
dealing with the various aspects of novelization is whether the novelistic style traditionally associated with 
the suspension of existential claims can actually be used to make such existential claims. In other words, 
to what extent it is possible to raise validity claims to truth in prose which has traditionally been used to 
thwart any ontological commitment. The possibility of using novelistic prose to raise validity claims to truth 
is decisively answered in the affirmative by authors like Tom Wolfe and Miguel Barnet, which is why I shall 
frequently draw on their views on New Journalism and the Documentary Novel, two genres closely related 
to collaborative auto/biography in dealing with this question. 
Asserting that the divide between utterances which raise validity claims to truth and those which do not 
rests upon different ontological commitments which vary independently of style does not however mean 
that all problems are solved for a theory of collaborative auto/biography. On the contrary, it leads to 
questioning what can serve as indicators of fictional and non-fictional utterances. This is a complex issue 
calling for a sociology of literature as much as textual analysis. Indicators pointing to the status of an 
utterance as fictional or non-fictional can often be found in the text itself, but are more often hinted at in 
what Genette (1997) calls the paratext (prefaces, dustcovers, photographs, the context of publication, 
dissemination and reception). Habermas's distinction between the illocutionary and the propositional part 
of an utterance (seep 28-29 above) can help in clarifying this problem. One conspicuous indicator that 
an utterance does not raise a validity claim to truth and which can be associated with the propositional 
content, is when the proposition makes claims that are logically impossible or fantastical in terms of the 
author's lifeworld (for example texts like The Iliad, Tutuola's The Palm-wine Drinkard, or the nonwane 
tradition (Hofmeyr, 1993:35 and 54-55)). A problem with such a criterion though is that in many cases the 
truth itself may be so outrageous that it may sound fantastic. 24 And just as there may be beings (such as 
dual-sexed persons) which confound received categories, or events (like gross human rights violation) 
that actually exist, there are also mundane beings and events which do not exist, so that the credibility of 
the proposition itself cannot provide definitive proof of the facticity of the utterance. 
Another indicator of the truth value implied by an utterance is indicated by the paratext and which can be 
compared with what Habermas calls the illocutionary part of the utterance. The illocutionary force of 
collaborative auto/biographies can often be detected in paratextual markers such as the note to the reader 
(see Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and the 'Preface' to The Calling of Katie Makanya), the title (The 
Calling of Katie Makanya is subtitled 'A memoir of South Africa'), photographs (see The Calling of Katie 
Makanya: between 108 and 109 ), and jacket design (the blurb on the front cover which states that The 
Calling of Katie Makanya was the Winner of the prestigious CNA Literary Award for Nonfiction'). One 
function of these paratextual markers is to ensure that the actual narrative (that is the propositional part) is 
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taken as fact rather than fiction. Mapping Habermas's distinction between the illocutionary and the 
propositional parts of utterances (seep 28-29 above) onto the paratextual note to the reader and the main 
body of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena could look as follows: 25 
c: 
0 
(1) I (Elsa Joubert) claim that I (and possibly by implication Eunice N. 
too) can provide you (all potential readers) with convincing reasons that 
lntersubjective (I - you) 
~ 1-----------------------·----+--------·----
~ (2) it is true that 
c: 
~ (3) Eunice N. {alias) Poppie Nongena experienced a, b, and c {where 
rn 
0 
a. a, b, and c stand for the events reported in the body of the text) e 
a. 
Classification of speech 
act as claim about truth 
The note to the reader constitutes the illocutionary part (1) and (2). The propositional part (3) is made up 
by the body of the text. In (1) the addressor(s) establish the intersubjective relationship with the 
addressee(s). In (2) the status of the validity claims (as truth claims rather than fictional ones or claims 
about rightness) is spelled out. There are two problems with relying on prefaces to determine whether a 
text raises validity claims to truth or not. The first is that the illocutionary stance is not always as clearly 
spelled out as it is in the paratexts to The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena. The second is that even if such a claim is made, as Janssen et al ( 1981 :57) point out, it is still a 
question whether it should be taken seriously or whether making such a claim is part of the conventional 
aesthetic illusion that the text is playing with. 
A further possible indicator of the illocutionary stance is style, that is whether the utterance is made in 
more or less novelistic language. A certain 'blandness' of style, usually of the institutionalised and 
standardised dialect and sociolect, is often used to set apart prose which raises validity claims to truth 
from fiction.26 Mostly this style appears as the expression of a third person narrator who does not identify 
herself with a first person pronoun. But since the most outrageous fictions can be offered in the blandest 
of styles, this too is no unequivocal marker of the fictional or factual status of an utterance. These three 
markers - the credibility of the propositional content; the paratext; or the style - on their own, or in 
combination, at best give an indication of whether the text is meant as raising validity claims to truth or not. 
Before exploring the tension between the clues to ontological commitment provided by the paratext, and 
the novelistic style in which these factual claims are couched, I would like to propose a preliminary and 
89 
JV The intersubjective generation of truth 
very rough typology of the possible connections between the two sets of variables, namely ontological 
commitment and style. If the style is novelistic and the utterances do not make validity claims to truth 
about the existence of people and places27, we have a novel like Robinson Crusoe. If validity claims to 
truth are made (in other words there is a claim that reference is to something which exists or existed) and 
the style is scientific, then we have scientific-academic texts like the anthropological texts (Nisa) or oral 
histories (The Seed is Mine) referred to in chapter I. If validity claims to truth are raised and the prose is 
that typically associated with the style of the novel, then we have New Journalism like Truman Capote's In 
Cold Blood or a Documentary Novel like Miguel Barnet's Biography of a Runaway Slave. Finally, if the 
distinction between utterances which make validity claims to truth and those which do not make such 
claims is (purposefully) erased, then we have faction like S.J. Du Toit's Di Koningin fan Skeba. 28 Faction 
blurs the distinction between validity claims to truth and the suspension of such claims. Collaborative 
auto/biographies like The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena {like New 
Journalism and the Documentary Novel) retain the validity claims to truth traditionally associated with 
reporting and history, and cross it with novelistic style traditionally associated with the suspension of the 
validity claim to truth. This crossing rests on the assumption that the style of the utterance does not 
determine its truth value. It is this independence of variables in the categories style and ontological 
commitment which makes it possible for collaborative auto/biographies to use novelistic techniques to 
convey validity claims to truth about the oral narrator's life. 
Genre Style Truth claims 
Scientific I Academic text Scientific prose 
(anthropology, history, sociology 
etc) (Nisa) Make truth claims (reference to 
extant entities) 
New Journalism (In Cold Blood) Novelistic prose 
Documentary Novel (Biography 
of a Runaway Slave) 
Collaborative auto/biography 
(The Calling of Katie Makanya) 
Faction (Di Koningin fan Skeba) Novelistic prose Mix truth claims with utterances 
which do not make truth claims 
(some referents are extant and 
others not) 
Novel (Robinson Crusoe) Novelistic prose Do not make truth claims 
(referents are non-existent 
objects) 
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As may be expected, these neat theoretical distinctions are of course troubled by specific concrete 
examples as well as by further differentiation within each of the categories. As the argument suggests, 
and as the examples show, collaborative auto/biographies span all three of the first categories. 
Furthermore, some of them are difficult to situate as they may straddle the different crudely distinguished 
classes suggested here. Nisa could thus be allocated to the first class along with academic texts like The 
Seed is Mine. The Calling of Katie Makanya in many respects belongs with In Cold Blood and Biography 
of a Runaway Slave in the second category. And, as will become evident, Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena, which shares some features with the other three texts in the second group, straddles the 
second and third categories. Even the most superficial glance at these example texts reveals that, 
although they are similar in their use of novelistic techniques to convey facts about the protagonist's life, 
there are significant distinctions between them.29 And amongst collaborative auto/biographies themselves 
one finds a range that spans from Van Onselen's The Seed is Mine which combines novelistic techniques 
in the narrative itself, while sticking to the facts and scholarly conventions like footnotes and bibliographies 
peculiar to academic historians; to The Calling of Katie Makanya which is closer to the bourgeois novel, in 
that it declines to provide these meticulous references and scholarly instruments; and Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena, which paradoxically at times even blurs the borders of fact and fiction that are so crucial 
to its own enterprise. 
A further complication in collaborative auto/biography, which impacts on the relationship between 
novelization and fictionalization, has to do with its peculiar mixture of oral auto/biography and written 
biography. This mixture often results in authors striving to bring together diverse impulses. On the one 
hand, in order to draw an accurate portrait of her, they seek to remain true to the distinctive perspective 
and voice of the oral narrator. But this may be at odds with the truth, which means that authors are often 
at pains to reconcile the oral narrator's at times unreliable or plainly false utterances that clash with the 
views of other sources. And finally, to further complicate matters, they seek to do so in a text which 
complies with dominant conventions of auto/biography which, as we have seen, are steeped more often 
than not in a novelistic tradition which is far removed from the oral narrator's own style. That these 
variables - sticking to the oral narrator's voice; correcting her claims which are in conflict with what other 
sources state as the truth; and doing all of this in novelistic style - can vary independently of each other is 
evident from a comparison of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. 
Joubert, for example, stays closer to the original style in her text which simulates the orature of the original 
but, as far as it is possible to tell, McCord, stays closer to the facts than Joubert does, although she 
deviates considerably from the original style of the transcriptions. We are thus again reminded of the 
complexity and impurity of the genre, which constitutes a significant part of its fascination. 
To review the thesis underlying the above typology: Novelization (in the sense of changes to the style of 
the original narrative) and preference for the claims of other sources (even of those that may conflict with 
the oral narrator's), constitute a deviation from the original narrative, but they should not be confused with 
tampering with the truth value of the utterances (that is, with the claim that the utterances are meant as 
facts). For example, when the oral narrator's utterance The man ate the food is transformed into Simon 
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gobbled up the pap, the claim that this utterance is meant factually, remains unaffected.Jo When writing 
authors change the style of the utterance this does not mean that they are tampering with the actual 
propositional content of their validity claims or that these claims are meant seriously (Frege, 1980:56 ff. 
and Russell, 1954:41 ff.). This, I would like to propose, is what writing authors mean (or should mean) 
when they say that nothing has been changed, added or left out in their publication of an original oral 
narrative; namely that the propositional content has not been meddled with and that the utterances still 
have their original status as validity claims to truth. What writing authors do not (or should not) mean is 
that the utterances or style are those of the oral narrator or that the original claim to facticity has been 
suspended. 
In order to form a better idea of the novelistic nature of collaborative auto/biography, we can turn to Tom 
Wolfe's and Miguel Barnet's reflections on New Journalism and the Documentary Novel respectively. In 
his genealogy of New Journalism Wolfe identifies its early proponents mainly amongst feature journalists 
like Truman Capote and himself who wanted 'to write journalism that would ... read like a novel' (Wolfe, 
1980:21-22). Consequently many of these texts were published in magazines and newspapers as non-
fiction, some of them also being serialised.J' Like the discourses they stem from, namely feature 
journalism and ethnology, New Journalism and the Documentary Novel require in-depth research. This 
sets them apart from the headline reporting of the newspaper (ibid.:35, and Barnet, 1981:24). For this 
kind of in-depth analysis, the author sometimes integrates with the life of the protagonist (which could also 
be a football team or a military unit) or conducts extensive interviews, thus enabling him to 'gather 
"novelistic" details' with which to 'create character' (Wolfe, 1980:27; Capote, 2000: acknowledgements; 
Barnet, 1994:203 ff.). The achievement of these authors lies in the discovery that it 'was possible to write 
accurate non-fiction with techniques usually associated with novels and short stories,' which meant that 
reporting gained an aesthetic dimension previously reserved for the novel (Wolfe, 1980:24). The 
Documentary Novel too, according to Miguel Barnet, questions the distinction of genres, reworking 
'several traditional concepts of literature: realism, autobiography, the relationship between fiction and 
history' (1994:204). According to him, the Documentary Novel tries to 'bring together sociological-
anthropological interests and the literary, convinced that they travel together in underground caverns, 
seeking each other out and nourishing each other in joyful reciprocity. If I move back and forth between 
these disciplines,' Barnet says of himself, 'it's because I believe it's time they joined hands without denying 
each other' (1994:205). These texts, which 'cross[ ... ] genre lines' (Randall, 1996:61) encourage the 
reader to ask 'what kind of text I have in hand' (Sommer, 1996:148) and how to read this 'literature beyond 
literature' (Moreiras, 1996:218). Not only does New Journalism consume 'devices that happen to have 
originated with the novel and mixes them with every other device known to prose', but, 'all the while, quite 
beyond matters of technique, it enjoys an advantage so obvious, so built-in, one almost forgets what a 
power it has: the simple fact that the reader knows a// this actually happened. The disclaimers have been 
erased' Wolfe, 1980:49). These texts make existential claims and claim to refer correctly to events which 
actually exist or existed (Barnet, 1981 :21 ). Taking its cue from the realist tradition of the novel on the one 
hand, and autobiographical travel writing of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (like that of Van 
Riebeeck and Pringle mentioned above), New Journalism breaks with the tradition in which realism is 
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used to incarnate transcendent truths. Instead, it adopts the style and techniques of the realist novel to 
refer to a postmetaphysical immanent reality (Wolfe, 1980:55, 57, 66). In short, it uncouples realist 
techniques in fiction, which has no referent in the real world, and ties these techniques to non-fiction, in 
which such a referent does exist. 
There are, according to Wolfe, remarkable similarities between the rise of the realist novel in the 
nineteenth century, and New Journalism in the second half of the twentieth century. Just as the novel 
replaced poetry as the genre of the period, so did New Journalism usurp the position of dominance of the 
novel by transgressing the literary class lines with which the novel set itself apart from journalism (Wolfe, 
1980:40, 42). Without going so far as to say that it replaces other genres I would like to suggest that 
collaborative auto/biography may be continuing this tradition of transgressive hybridity, changing our very 
understanding of what constitutes literature (Compare Pratt, 2001 :29-48). In its use of novelistic devices 
to communicate fact; in its integration of the oral into the written; in its intersubjectivist (as opposed to 
monological) approach to the subject, truth, justice, and the speech system; and in its erosion of some of 
the exclusionary barriers of the public sphere, collaborative auto/biography challenges some of the 
enshrined values of modernity which are tied to the hegemony of certain discourses and social groups.32 
Wolfe's and Barnet's descriptions of the author and of the writing process fit both Joubert and McCord in 
many ways. To being with, both of them base their texts on factual research, which in some ways 
resembles that conducted by feature journalists and ethnologists. Joubert was in fact a practising 
journalist who had written several feature articles for magazines. She even traces one of the roots of Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena to her experience as a reporter writing about the exodus of the 
Portuguese from Angola. Consequently she was familiar with techniques of research and non-fiction 
writing and couching research in terms that ensure successful reception in a popular public sphere. As an 
experienced travel writer, she was also well versed in the second root of New Journalism Wolfe refers to. 
In her extensive travels in Africa in general and her research trips in South Africa in the seventies, initially 
with a travel book in mind, she gained intimate first-hand knowledge of many of the circumstances she 
was to deal with in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (Joubert, Die Volksblad : 11 April 1979). The 
objectifying stance of factual research and journalism was supplemented by what Wolfe and Barnet 
describe as personal acquaintance with the subject. Joubert was on close terms with Eunice N. At the 
time of collaboration, Eunice had been working for her for four or five years (Joubert interviewed by Meyer, 
forthcoming). Finally, the interviews with Eunice, and the research that followed delivered a wealth of 
factual material which Joubert formed (as opposed to invented) into the final publication. 
McCord, through her relationships with her own father and to Katie's family during her youth, had an even 
more longstanding and closer intimate knowledge of her protagonist. Although she was not an 
established novelist like Joubert, McCord had published a short story in the fifties and factual articles on 
nutrition (Interview with Ngwenya , forthcoming). With a mind of her own, as a companion to her husband 
on study trips in Africa, through her connections to academic circles at UCLA, and her own publications on 
nutrition, she was well acquainted with scholarly research methods and was also well-read. Conscious 
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research specifically in relation to The Calling of Katie Makanya consisted of first-hand personal 
acquaintance with people featuring in the book, scouting the various scenes, studying texts related to 
Katie's life and of course, the extensive interviews which make up the basis of her book. 
iii. Novelization and fictionalization in 'The Calling of Katie Makanya' and 
'Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena' 
In addition to these features of the writing process associated with the Documentary Novel and New 
Journalism, Wolfe identifies four stylistic devices from the realist novel which distinguish the New 
Journalist text and which, as the discussion below shows, are also evident in Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. The first is 'scene-by-scene construction, telling the story by 
moving from scene to scene and resorting as little as possible to sheer historical narrative' (Wolfe, 
1980:46). According to Wolfe, the shift from newspaper reporting to New Journalism means that 'the 
basic reporting unit is no longer the datum, the piece of information, but the scene, since most of the 
sophisticated strategies of prose depend upon scenes' (ibid.:66). As a result, a book such as Capote's In 
Cold Blood conveys a strong sense of plot, which is less the case with a Documentary Novel like Barnet 
and Montejo's Biography of a Runaway Slave in which a sense of historical narrative still dominates. The 
second novelistic device is the full recording of dialogue. Instead of sound bites, texts in the style of New 
Journalism would include longer authentic utterances and conversations (Compare Capote, 2000:59 and 
66). The Documentary Novel takes this even further in that it simulates direct speech with the oral 
narrator 'in person' addressing the reader. Thirdly by recording everyday gestures, customs, styles and so 
on, New Journalism achieves a sophistication in characterisation that would normally be reserved for the 
novel (Wolfe, 1980:46-47). With its ethnological emphasis on individuals and groups the Documentary 
Novel goes beyond this too in its presentation of extensive biographical and ethnological information. The 
final novelistic technique employed in New Journalism that Wolfe refers to has to do with the narrator and 
point of view. Sometimes the narrator could be a character in the text; or someone speaking in the same 
tone as a character; or the reader's envoy in the text. The Documentary Novel such as Biography of a 
Runaway Slave, which is a first person rendering of the oral narrator's narrative, develops this to the full in 
that it seeks to represent the oral narrator's authentic and distinctive voice. 
The view stated in the previous section, namely that the use of novelistic techniques does not amount to 
fictionalization is supported by Wolfe and Barnet. In principle, if not always in each concrete case, it is 
therefore possible to distinguish between novelistic as opposed to fictionalising aspects of Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. In discussing the novelistic techniques used to 
convey facts about the past, or what Sklodowska (1996:93) calls the "'belletrization" of ethnography', I 
shall focus on these four aspects Barnet and Wolfe mention, namely dialogue, the importance of the 
scene, characterisation, and the perspective of the narrator, adding two more, namely structure 
(mentioned by McCord and Joubert) and language. A survey of the novelistic techniques used in The 
Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena to convey validity claims to truth about 
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the oral narrator's past allows a better understanding of the differences between· novelization and 
fictionalization and the possibilities of keeping them apart. This distinction secures the truth value of at 
least some of the utterances in these texts. Consequently, these utterances should be judged according 
to the same intersubjectivist criteria as all other validity claims to truth about the past.33 
a. Dialogue 
A comparison of the transcription of the interviews and the published versions of The Calling of Katie 
Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena provides valuable clues on the techniques of 
novelization.34 According to the transcript for example, Katie Makanya said, 
I can still remember my great grandmother. she was very old. But she still told us stories 
about how she hated the Zulus. She followed about a mile behind the impi and her husband 
told her to leave the child because she had my grandfather but also a very small baby on her 
back and her husband told her the other women grumbled because they had left their 
children but she would not leave hers and so she could not go with the impi for fear that baby 
would cry and tell the Zulus where they were. so she followed a way behind. And then the 
Zulus did come and one hit her on the head, she had a big hole there, and then hit the baby 
with a knobkierrie. And there was ano her woman there who jump e in the river, and the 
baby died, and then they went on. And she told me she said, I have done one great sin. I let 
that man kill my baby on my back and I should have made him killme first but of course she 
could not help it but she said her sin was that baby buried in the bushes there. And as for 
those other children left behind, they were all eaten up by the Zulus. (Makanya and McCord, 
1954 :n.p. Typing errors in original). 
In the publication, McCord locates the recounting of these events during a visit by Katie's great 
grandmother to her family. While her great grandmother is taking a rest, Katie's mother explains why her 
family dislikes Zulus. The account from the transcript is rendered as follows, 
"Before they left," Ma continued, 'the warriors warned their women to flee, and leave the 
children behind so that their crying would not betray their whereabouts. Some did abandon 
their children. But your ancestor refused. She tied her baby on her back and took her little 
boy by the hand, and all three hid behind the bushes." 
"You were that little boy?" Katie asked Grandfather. 
"Yes," he said. "I remember very well. Those Zulus passed so close to our hiding place I 
could see the dirt under their toenails. But they did not see us. They were laughing too loud 
at a girl who was trying to hide in the river. This girl's head was under the water, but the 
current caught her skirt and her bare buttocks floated up in plain view. 'That is a beautiful 
sight and we will return when the fighting is over,' Those Zulus called out as they kept running 
up the path." 
"So you escaped?" Charlotte said. 
"Almost. We crept out of the bushes, but too late we saw one last Zulu straggling after his 
brothers. As he passed us his knobkierrie swung down, crushing the baby's skull, and swung . 
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down again on my mother's head. He ran on supposing her dead, and why she did not die, I 
cannot say." 
"What happened then?" 
"That girl came out of the river and pulled my mother to her feet and helped her bury her poor 
dead baby'" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 8). 
This transformation of the transcript to the publication provides a striking example of the first novelistic 
technique, namely the conversion of monologue into dialogue.35 The largest part of the roughly 170-page 
transcript of the interview with Katie is a first-person narrative. Katie hardly ever uses direct speech 
dialogues to narrate events. There is however a great deal of reported dialogue given in indirect speech. 
In The Calling of Katie Makanya much of this reported speech is turned back into dialogue in order to 
sustain the feeling of immediacy associated with direct speech. But, as the comparison of the transcript 
and the published text shows, even the novelized version of direct speech has conventions of its own 
which deviate from those of spoken dialogue. Starting on the most basic level, we see that McCord tidies 
up the transcript of the oral recording to make it look like a printed text one would find in a novel rather 
than a spoken one or even a transcription emulating the spoken. 36 This is achieved by repressing the 
repetition of connectors like the 'oral punctuation' marks and, so, and then and the repetition of reporting 
verbs (told and said), and by rendering originally faulty sentences complete and grammatically correct. 
Thus McCord follows Barnet's advice that in 'a Documentary Novel spoken discourse is the fundamental 
trait of the language, the only way it takes on life. But it must be a recreated spoken language, not a mere 
reproduction of what was on tape. From the recording I take the tone, the anecdotes, the inflexions; the 
rest, the style and fine points, I add myself (Barnet, 1981 :25. e.a.). Thus, paradoxically, the novelising 
use of direct speech which is employed in the novel to recreate the sense of immediacy adheres to 
conventions which differ from those actual oral utterances it is supposed to convey. As with 
representation in general, repressing these very features which are definitive of the oral, is a constitutive 
feature of representing it in print. 
Besides tidying up the transcript, the publication also creates a scene and ascribes the dialogue to 
characters in interaction in that scene. Whereas the transcript provides no clues as to the setting in which 
Katie's great-grandmother recounted this event, nor to whom, the publication creates such a context, sets 
a scene, and identifies interlocutors. The published version turns what in the transcript is Katie's great-
grandmother's reported speech into Katie's grandfather's and her mother's direct speech and interlaces it 
with prompts by Katie's father, her sister, and herself. This complex interaction is held together by a third-
person narrator ('Katie asked') who links the utterances in the publication.37 Surprisingly, the one instance 
of a direct quote from Katie's great-grandmother: 'she told me she said, I have done one great sin ... ,'is 
omitted. While such a transformation of indirect into direct speech and the allocation to different speakers 
leave the validity claims of the first order propositions (Katie's great-grandmother's people, the Mbo of 
Pondoland, were attacked by the Zulus; she disobeyed the command to leave her children behind when 
fleeing the attack; a Zulu I Zulu's spied her out, killing her baby with a blow of the knobkierrie and 
wounding her on the head; a woman had hidden in the river) unchanged, what gets altered though is the 
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parties who raise these claims38 and respond to them. The second order proposition, Katie's great 
grandmother said (that they were attacked by Zulus), is altered into Katie's grandfather or Katie's mother 
said (that they were attacked by Zulus). This example gives a clearer picture of the distinction between 
novelization and fictionalization as well as the places where this distinction sometimes wears thin. 
Whereas the rendering in dialogue turns the reported oral text and transcript into a novelistic one, this 
does not in itself turn the validity claims to truth into fictional claims. The contents of the first order 
propositions (that Katie's great-grandmother disobeyed the order to leave her children behind) can stay 
intact and their non-fictional status unaltered. Where dialogue does meddle with the factual is when it 
wittingly ascribes these factual claims to other people than those who actually made them.39 
The extent to which it is made up of first-person direct speech is a distinctive feature of Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena which brings it closer to the Documentary Novel than to New Journalism. Large parts of 
the text are Poppie's and other speaker's first-person narratives.40 Like the opening line of the book, 'Ons 
is Gordonia-boorlinge, se Poppie' [We are born and bred Gordonia people, says Poppie (Own 
translation)] (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 3), these first-person accounts are mostly given in 
direct speech without inverted commas but with a speaker indicated. The erasure of the inverted commas 
on the page, but with the mentioning of the speaker, seeks to achieve an even greater immediacy of face-
to-face speech than the dialogue in The Calling of Katie Makanya. This face-to-face character of the book 
is supported by what, at first sight, seems like the negligible detail of the layout of the direct speech. The 
first chapter of the Afrikaans edition exists of twenty-five paragraphs. As is common, new turns by 
different or the same speakers are indicated by starting against the margin. This is consistently the case 
in the Afrikaans edition. The effect is one of a series of protocol sentences, each stating and isolating a 
limited number of facts, in the speakers' own words. In the English edition there are only thirteen 
paragraphs in the first chapter. This is the result of making run on lines of several of the discrete speaking 
turns. The effect of this is that the quality of protocol statements (which are reminiscent of factual texts) 
drifts in the direction of crafted paragraphs (reminiscent of the realist novel). The layout of the English 
version subsumes the protocol sentences of direct speech typical of factual journalism under the more 
scenic approach of the novel. The combination of journalistic and novelistic techniques which is distinctive 
of the Afrikaans version of the book is thus diluted in the English version through the way the dialogue is 
typographically rendered. This bias towards the novelization of the dialogue, with its concomitant 
association with the fictional, thus contributes to the weakening of the status of the English version of the 
book as raising validity claims to truth. 
Although cases of the use of dialogue as a technique of novelization which do not constitute acts of 
fictionalization can be identified, both texts also contain elements of dialogue which blur the distinction. In 
The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena this blurring happens mainly 
through the ascription of utterances to different persons than those who made them. 
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b. Structure 
Like Shostak and Sachs, both McCord and Joubert have referred to the importance of a further technique 
of novelization for their texts, namely structuring.41 Two very distinct modes of structuring as a means of 
creating tension and/or meaning, each with different consequences regarding the status of the utterances 
as validity claims to truth need to be distinguished. The first is the rearrangement of the order in which 
events actually happened in a way that simultaneously alters the truth value of the utterances. The 
second is altering the order in which events are told without tampering with the order in which they 
happened. Whereas the former would constitute an act of fictionalization, the latter would constitute an 
act of novelization. 
This distinction can be seen by once again looking at the excerpt of the transcript of the interview with 
Makanya and the published text already discussed in the section on dialogue on pp 93-95 above. In the 
transcript the woman who jumped into the water is referred to after mention is made of the baby which is 
killed. In the published text the order is inverted to increase tension. Looming disaster is deferred time 
and again, till it finally strikes unexpectedly: Katie's great grandmother and her children first experience a 
narrow escape (not mentioned in the transcript), with danger still hovering in the vicinity, then there is a 
diversion, also loaded with tension (the men discover another potential victim}, and deferral (they will 
come back for the woman), then, just as danger seems to recede (the Zulus were running away) and they 
seem safe ("'So you escaped?"'), the actual fatal blows come. In the extract from the transcript the order 
of the events (the killing of the baby and the woman jumping into the river) is not made explicit. Although 
they are narrated in that order, there are no time markers indicating which followed which (other than the 
implicit indication given by the order of the narrative). Such altering of the order in which events are told 
may be necessary to increase the tellability of the narrative in that it meets assumed readerly expectations 
of suspense and would count as novelization. They do not yet constitute changes to claims about the 
order in which the events take place, which would veer in the direction of fictionalization. 
The structuring of events in a small excerpt like the one discussed above, also takes place on the larger 
plane of the narrative as a whole. What seems to be the first interview between Makanya and McCord 
begins with her birth in 1873 and proceeds to 1903, the year in which she started working for Dr James 
McCord, all in the space of less than eighty typed lines. Then there is a page dealing with anecdotes 
regarding the work with the doctor followed by a page on the Cheteswayo war. What looks like a second 
session restarts at Katie's birth and goes into her school years. The structure of the transcript thus shows 
less concern for chronology than themes42 and anecdotal association as structuring devices. In contrast, 
the major structuring mechanism of the publication as a whole is chronology. Paradoxically, using 
chronology as a structuring device may at times mean restoring the order in which events are told to the 
order in which they happened. Novelization in this sense could mean getting closer to the truth, in the 
sense of the order of events, than what is generally possible in oral narrative.43 
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In contrast to structuring as technique of novelization in small scenes and in the text as a whole, (that is, 
rearranging the order in which events were told rather than in which they happened), both books also 
contain elements of fictionalization in the structuring, namely changing the order in which things are 
reported to have happened. An example of such fictionalization is evident from a comparison of yet 
another extract from the transcript of the interviews with Katie Makanya and The Calling of Katie Makanya. 
Slightly beyond the middle of the transcripts, Katie tells McCord how she used to supplement her own 
children's limited education at school by telling them about 'their history', 'the time of Chaka [ ... ] how he 
killed people, and the wars and how the people did not know how to write' (Makanya and McCord, 
1954:97). She recalls one such story she told to her children: 
One manfor instance worked for a farmer in Basutoland and the farmer sent him with so 
many dozen of figs to the missionary, and he wrote the number on a piece of paper and sent 
this man with them. And on the way the man saw how good the figs were and so he ate ten 
of them. But before he ate them he said to the piece of paper, they say you can talk, lets see 
how you talk today. So he covered that paper with a stone so it could not see him, and then 
he ate the figs. And when he got to the missionary the missionary counted the figs and he 
said, There are ten short. And then this man said "That paper is mad. I covered it with a 
paper [read stone] so it could not see and yet it tells you how I ate those figs. And so then 
the missionary wrote down on the paper that there wer ten figs short, and when Cornelius 
went back to the farmer the farmer asked him how he managed to let those ten figs fall out, 
and the man told him he had eaten them but, he said, I covered the paper up with a stone 
and I do not see how it saw me eat those figs and then told the missionary. And the farmer 
did not scold him. Instead he called his wife and laughed and said "Cornelius ate the figs but 
before he ate them he covered the paper up with a stone so it would not see him. Things like 
this I told them and they laughed (Makanya and McCord 1954:97-98). 
In the publication this anecdote is re-embedded in a different context. 44 There Katie's father uses it to 
illustrate to his daughter (rather than she to her children) that she should devote herself to school, 'or else 
you will grow up ignorant - as ignorant as I was when I was young': 
Charlotte stilled her chatter and Ma, too, was silent as Father spoke, his voice like a river, 
sometimes swift and deep, sometimes quiet and shining with laughter. 
'So my father called to me and some of my brothers and said: "I've heard these men with 
straight hair come from the south. Go, therefore, and search out their homeplace and find 
me some guns."' 
He crooked his arm so that Katie could lean back with her head against his shoulder. 
'I journeyed many days. When the food I took with me was finished, I killed a rabbit or buck. 
Nevertheless, I was often hungry and in time I grew thin and weak. But a Boer farmer in the 
Orange Free State saw me and gave me some trousers and put me to work. One day he 
gave me a box of figs and told me to take it to the storekeeper in the village some miles 
away. He also gave me a piece of paper which, he said, would tell how many figs there were 
and what the cost would be. 
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'But on the way I wanted to eat a fig, so I took the paper and said to it: "My baas says you can 
talk. We will see how well you talk today." Then I covered the paper with a big stone so it 
could not watch me, and I ate ten figs. When I was finished I removed the stone and put the 
paper back in the box. Yet when I delivered the figs the storekeeper grumbled because ten 
figs were missing and he would not give me all the money that was wanted.' 
'Was your baas very angry?' Katie asked. 
Pa laughed. 'I don't know. I ran away. I was afraid of his paper. I thought it was magic, 
because I covered it with a stone so that it could not see, and yet it saw and told the 
shopkeeper how many figs I had eaten.' 
Katie laughed at Pa's foolishness, but Charlotte did not think it funny that his people beyond 
the mountains could not read or write (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 10-11 ). 
The transformation of this part of the transcript for the publication clearly fudges the line between 
novelization and fictionalization. Not only is the order of telling altered (novelization), but the historical 
order in which the events were narrated by Katie to have taken place, are also altered (fictionalization). 
The telling of the anecdote is moved a whole generation earlier - from Katie telling it to her children to 
Katie's father telling it to his children. What makes this structural change even more paradoxical is that it 
runs against chronology, which is the very principle McCord used to structure the material. In addition, the 
relocation of this apocryphal anecdote about a stranger'5 turns it into part of Katie's father's biography, 
which is highly unlikely. 
These examples show that, as far as structure is concerned, fictionalization and novelization can be kept 
apart, and that both books show evidence of novelization in the overall arrangement as well as in the 
details of certain events. They also show however that this distinction between fictionalization and 
novelization is not always rigorously sustained. Thus, although the examples reveal elements of 
fictionalization in the imposition of structure in The Calling of Katie Makanya46, they also reveal the 
possibility of structuring in accordance with certain conventions of the novel which does not necessarily 
result in fictionalization. Whilst the imposition of structure may mean a change in the truth value of validity 
claims, this does not have to be the case. 
c. Language 
Embellishing language is yet another novelistic technique that is evident in both Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena47 and The Calling of Katie Makanya. Embellishment is a widespread feature of auto/biography 
and takes various forms (Shostak, 1998:407; Mphahlele interviewed by Manganyi, forthcoming). The term 
itself is probably preferred by authors who either fail to reflect rigorously on the distinction between fact 
and fiction, or those whose writing capitalises on the fudging of this difference. The term serves its 
purpose for those authors who wish to conceal their tampering with facts because it is ambiguous and 
vague regarding the demarcation between novelization and fictionalization. According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary two meanings of 'embellish' can be distinguished: 'To render beautiful. [ ... ] To beautify 
with adventitious adornments; to ornament' and 'to "dress up", heighten (a narration) with fictitious 
additions'. This distinction needs to be sustained if the truth-value of utterances in collaborative 
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auto/biographies is to be taken seriously. It is a distinction which I argue can actually be drawn. As a term 
referring to a decorative effect, embellishment (in the sense of beautify or adorn) squares with what is 
meant by novelization. As a term which refers to changes made in the truth value through 'fictitious 
additions' it correlates with fictionalization. Recalling the distinction between novelization as changes 
made to style, and fictionalization as changes made to referential status, the question is whether 
embellishment in the sense of changes to style (novelization) can be made without constituting 
embellishment in the sense of changes to truth value (fictionalization)? 
Embellishing language in the sense of adornment (novelization) is evident in both The Calling of Katie 
Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. Embellishment as adornment however goes in so to 
speak opposite directions in the two texts. Whilst embellishment in The Calling of Katie Makanya means 
a transformation of the transcript into the 'high-brow' written language of the bourgeois novel, 
embellishment in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena means giving the printed word a literary quality by 
making it read like the spoken word in ways typical of New Journalism and the Documentary Novel.48 In 
The Calling of Katie Makanya the spoken word is embellished with the written. In Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena the written is embellished with the spoken. Whereas the transcript of Makanya and 
McCord's interview states the facts in a rather general way, using sentence structures and lexical items 
typical for spoken language, the novelized publication gives them concreteness and specificity and 
provides a perspective on the actions through the use of more graphic, precise or figurative language. 
That such embellishment need not constitute an act of fictionalization, but can leave the transformation of 
the oral to the written in the ambit of novelization, should be evident from the following examples, taken 
from the transcripts and the publication of The Calling of Katie Makanya already discussed on pp 93-95 
above. 
The shift from orature to literature in the language is firstly evident on the level of lexical items. For 
example, 'tell the Zulus where they were,' becomes 'betray their whereabouts'; 'left their children,' 
becomes 'abandon their children'; 'she would not leave hers' is rendered 'your ancestor refused'; and 'then 
the Zulus did come and one hit her on the head, she had a big hole there, and then hit the baby with a 
knobkierrie' is rendered, "'As he passed us his knobkierrie swung down, crushing the baby's skull, and 
swung down again on my mother's head."' That this is a shift in style rather than a suspension of an 
existential claim is clear. This is also the case with the use of imagery, which would count as a second 
type of embellishment, as in 'Those Zulus passed so close to our hiding place I could see the dirt under 
their toenails'. Along this slippery slope (in which the lexical items and the imagery discussed so far have 
been assigned to the category of adornment) additions like 'This girl's head was under the water, but the 
current caught her skirt and her bare buttocks floated up in plain view. ''That is a beautiful sight and we 
will return when the fighting is over," Those Zulus called out as they kept running up the path"' clearly veer 
towards the fictitious addition denoted by the second meaning of the term embellishment. Clear cases 
exist of embellishing language becoming fictionalization when changes are made to the language ascribed 
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to a specific character. As with the reallocation of utterances (discussed with reference to dialogue 
above), a distinction between the language used and the person it is ascribed to is necessary here. When 
Katie starts speaking in a literary style belied by the transcript, then the distinction between fictionalization 
and novelization is at risk. 
As with dialogue and structure, the brief reference to embellishing language shows that The Calling of 
Katie Makanya49 contains distinguishable examples of both novelization and fictionalization, but that it also 
contains utterances in which this distinction is fudged. Whereas the examples of fictionalising 
embellishing language and the cases of the blurring of the distinction would suspend or at least trouble the 
possibility of a collaborative auto/biography raising validity claims to truth, the cases of novelising 
embellishing language again confirm that there are at least parts of these collaborative auto/biographies 
which raise validity claims to truth. 
d. Scene setting 
Both McCord and Joubert have indicated the importance of scene setting as a novelistic technique in 
transforming the oral narrative into a published text. Since the oral is often quite thin on scene setting 
(Hofmeyr, 1993:106), and the novel is traditionally comparatively heavy on this, the transformation of the 
oral to the novelized publication requires extensive additions to information provided by the oral narrators. 
It is in principle possible for the writing author to insert utterances which set the scene without thereby 
meddling with the truth value. Thus when Joubert notes in the preface to the Afrikaans edition that 
nothing has been added to what Poppie and her family had experienced themselves, she is not saying 
that nothing has been added to what the oral narrators have reported. Insertions from her side, as long as 
they reflect what Poppie and her family have actually experienced, do not contravene her claim in the note 
to the reader, nor do they constitute acts of fictionalization as such. 
As mentioned before, both McCord and Joubert visited some of the sites described in the books.so 
Besides corroborating Katie's and Eunice's validity claims to truth referred to on pp 79 above, another 
purpose was collecting factual material for scene setting. When, in constructing scenes, they include 
information from their own first-hand visits and experiences of places that Katie or Eunice refer to, McCord 
and Joubert are clearly within the ambit of the non-fictional insertion or novelization. But (and here we 
return to the complication of claims about the past) there are also scenes which are lost in their materiality 
and which cannot be revisited. In these instances writing authors rely on their imagination to set the 
scene. This necessitates a distinction Habermas fails to make, namely between validity claims which 
assert that such and such was indeed the case and conjectures that are claims that such and such was 
probably the case.s1 
Examples of inserted scene setting within the ambit of novelization are descriptions of the physical 
environment in which events took place. From her visits to the pass office (accompanying Eunice or on 
her own (Notes. Joubert papers)), Joubert gained impressions of the environment that she uses in setting 
scenes in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. If the transcript were complete, it would be possible to 
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establish which descriptions of scenes are insertions rather than the oral narrator's. But even then we 
would be none the wiser whether these insertions raise validity claims to truth, whether they are 
conjectures, or whether they are fictionalizations. 
An example illustrating this difficulty is Poppie's deportation to and arrival in Mdantsane. Here we find 
insertions which do not figure in the transcript. These include descriptions of the train compartment; the 
conductor's small-talk; and the scene of Amoldon station echoing Poppie's suffocation by the political 
system, her fatigue, and her mood of devastation: 
Hulle klim ver aan die stertkant van die trein af. Dis is af van die perron en hulle staan op die 
rooi grand van die veld. Die gras groei met lang, vet halms. Die hitte slaan uit die grand op 
na hulle. [ ... ] Poppie voel hoedat 'n snaakse soort sweet by haar gesig uitslaan en oar haar 
hele lyf. Dis 'n hitte wat uit die grand uit damp en van bo af uit die lug op hulle neerdruk (Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 148) ['They got off at the tail end of the train. Not on the 
platform, but on the red earth of the veld. The grass grew tall with long, fat blades. The heat 
beat up at them from the earth.[ ... ] A strange kind of sweat was gathering on Poppie's face 
and her body. It came from the heat steaming up from the damp earth and pressing down on 
them from the sky. [ ... ] She looked up at the sun. It is still high, a strange sun sifting through 
a thick mugginess. The closeness comes into your body when you breathe, it brings a 
tightness into your chest, it makes you feel you can't get enough breath' (The Long Journey 
of Poppie Nongena: 197).]s2 
That this could well be a fictionalized insertion is indicated by the poetic nature of the objective 
correlative.s3 Another hint that this is a fictionalized insertion is that this description is extremely close to 
others in Joubert's novels Bonga and Ons Wag op die Kaptein (Gerwel, Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 
1979: 1 s4). While the poetic nature of the description of the environment warns us that the writing author's 
speculative imagination is at work, it does not tell us whether the insertion is meant as a validity claim to 
truth, as a conjecture, or as a fictionalization. Although poetic key may be a marker of fictionalization, not 
all inserted scenes are necessarily marked in that way. In contrast to the scene at the station, the 
exchange with the conductor does not ring the same warning note. Yet, the possibility exists that it may 
simply be a case of a better camouflaged fictionalization. 
As the preceding discussion shows, although it is possible to distinguish conceptually between insertions 
that are novelizations and those that are fictionalizations, this is not always easy or even possible when it 
comes to a concrete utterance. Although there are clues as to which parts of the text might be insertions, 
there are no indisputable markers internal to the text that make it possible to separate insertions that are 
validity claims to truth and probability from those insertions that are fictionalizations. In the final analysis, 
this can be established only by drawing on sources external to the text.ss Although certain descriptions of 
scenes, even inserted ones, can clearly be said to raise validity claims to truth, there are also cases where 
novelization and fictionalization exist in such close proximity to each other (both in terms of general 
technique and concretely on the same page) in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of 
Katie Makanya that it is at times impossible to distinguish them. 
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e. Characterisation 
Characterisation, what Barnet (1981:21) calls 'pulling a few literary strings' on the protagonists of his 
Documentary Novels, is a common novelistic technique which also serves as a structuring principle in 
auto/biography. 56 It includes: the description of the oral narrator's actions; her own account of her interior 
life; her self-interpretations of her actions and interior life; or the writing author's interpretative comments 
on her personality. These techniques of characterisation are likely to give an indication of what the 
collaborators take to be a human subject and thus the topic of a life (namely her actions, dispositions, 
interior life and so on), what is of no interest and what (for example, agency) warrants inclusion in the text. 
In contrast to scene setting, where the focus was on insertions, the focus in dealing with characterisation 
as novelising device will be on omissions. 
A feature of characterisation peculiar to collaborative auto/biography is that the protagonists of 
collaborative auto/biographies generally belong to groups of people who are systematically excluded from 
and thus barely perceived in the culture of the hegemonic language and discourse in which the text is 
published. When they are perceived at all, it is usually as negative stereotypes rather than as individuals 
with distinct characters. One of the aims of characterisation in collaborative auto/biography is therefore to 
counter these ideological stereotypes by giving as full as possible an account of the particular character of 
actually existing persons whose individualism and the articulation of this individualism are denied by 
discriminatory socio-political forces.57 In a society such as apartheid South Africa, where many white 
Afrikaans and English readers were raised to perceive black people like Eunice N. and Katie Makanya as 
faceless types rather than individuals with distinguishable characters, part of the value of Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya resides in the extent to which they succeed in 
undermining the dominant ideology of racial stereotyping. Elize Botha's assertion that Joubert has created 
a character out of the documentary materials whose depth makes it possible for the reader to sympathise 
with Poppie is an indication of Joubert's success in creating a character where types dominate (Botha, 
1980:303). 
To the extent that (collaborative) auto/biography takes the life of a person as its focus, it is to be expected 
that characterisation plays a significant role.58 Since it is already part of what Lejeune calls the 
auto/biographical pact, that the text is understood to be making existential claims and referring to actually 
existing events, the main aim of characterisation is not to ensure existential and referential claims via 
characterisation. The fact that characterisation is not a means to making existential claims distinguishes 
collaborative auto/biography from the realist novel. In the novel part of the point of characterisation is to 
give so convincing an account of a fictitious person that the distinction between reference to actually 
existing persons on the one hand, and the suspension of existential claims on the other, becomes an 
object of play. But paradoxically, the proximity of the significance afforded to characterisation in both the 
novel and in (collaborative) auto/biography, and the use a novelistic technique such as characterisation in 
collaborative auto/biography could result in doubt regarding the referential status of the auto/biographical 
text. 
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The importance ascribed to character as such, as well as the specific characterisation of Poppie Nongena, 
for example, have raised questions about the factual status of the book. The 'narrative strategies of 
Poppie,' according to Carlean 'seem to be geared towards exploring the personality of the protagonist, a 
person whose existential stoic acceptance and fatalism is more typical of central figures in modern fiction 
than of the representative figures in overtly pragmatic and political works. Political protest does not seem 
to be the central narrative function of Poppie. The book reads predominantly like a conventional 
bourgeois novel: a factual novel, but a novel nonetheless' (Carlean, 1989:57). The very technique 
commonly used in novels to strengthen the referential link, namely characterisation through 'intense 
concentration on the moral values of the individual in the tradition of realistic fiction,' (ibid.) thus 
jeopardises the referential force of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. Consequently, when (white South 
African) readers are moved to tears by Poppie's plight, the tears are reserved for the character (in the 
sense of the fictional persona) Poppie rather than extant persons like Eunice.59 Not only does the 
emphasis on character ricochet the reader's' sympathy away from the real world in the direction of the 
non-existent fictional character, but because character looms so large, the relevance of social systems 
and structures like global power relations is obscured.6() 
Given the apartheid stereotype of working-class black women as lacking subjectivity, a feature which 
warrants special attention in characterisation is agency.61 This is the butt of Gardner's critique of Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. According to Gardner, it is in the omission of certain data which results in 
the quietist characterisation of Poppie that Joubert's constraining hand shows. The distorting effect, 
according to Gardner, is evident in omission; in Joubert's 'over-emphasis' on similarities (motherhood and 
Christianity); an 'overstatement of Poppie's several collapses'62; and an understatement of police brutality 
(Gardner, 1991:218-220). While Gardner is right in general, the validity of her objection is limited, not 
surprisingly, by some of the very restrictions that impinged on Joubert. Gardner's objection to Joubert's 
characterisation would have carried full force if the text were a purely fictional work and if it stemmed 
solely from Joubert. But Joubert was herself hemmed in by factors which constrained her characterisation 
of Poppie. 
To begin with, Joubert makes a point of noting that 'the book does not claim to give a complete picture of 
the political and social events of the past forty years concerning the rural, urban, and relocated black 
people' (Own translation of Afrikaans preface. This claim is omitted in the English note to the reader.)63 
Furthermore, the narrative does make factual claims, thus preventing Joubert from inventing aspects of 
character as she pleased and portraying a stronger Eunice than the one presented to her.64 Finally, 
Joubert was also constrained by the information Eunice provided. Consequently, Gardner's argument 
needs to be extended to include the interviews in which Joubert co-determined the selection and 
emphasis on certain aspects of Eunice's character by the questions she asked Eunice. And, as 
Schalkwyk adds, Gardner's objection even needs extension to the context before and beyond the 
interviews. Resignation of the type Gardner objects to in Joubert's characterisation of Poppie, Schalkwyk 
rightly proposes, is in fact part of the effectiveness of the hegemony of systems of oppression and 
exploitation which turn 'questioning inward, deflecting any critical reflection away from external factors and 
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towards the individual's feelings of guilt and helplessness' (Schalkwyk, 1989:272). This would square with 
Gardner's view that under apartheid many black people in South Africa internalised white establishment 
values to such an extent that she (Eunice, rather than Poppie) suffered under extreme false 
consciousness. The problems Gardner sees in the characterisation of Poppie may thus more properly be 
applied to Eunice. Under the sway of the apartheid ideology and religion (Gardner, 1991:216) Eunice had 
so thoroughly imbibed Joubert and the white reader's values, their interpretation of herself, and of her 
needs, that 'one can describe her as a mirror-image or projection of the implicit as well as real author but 
in a black face' (Gardner, 1991:222).65 Selection of the specific aspects of character {like resignation or 
agency) which would be foregrounded as well as a general emphasis on character (rather than on larger 
social processes) was thus at work at different stages: in Eunice N.'s actual socialisation; in the interviews 
with Joubert; and in the characterisation of Poppie when writing the book - with Joubert bearing varying 
degrees of responsibility for each of these. 
Omissions regarding character or events means that the portrayal is incomplete. One effect of such 
omission is to create stereotypes. The other is to turn a complex text into a pamphlet (Joubert, Die 
Volksblad, 11 April 1979:n.p.). Incompleteness need not result in a distortion of character.66 But omission 
can result in such a distortion of the overall picture, that we have to 'figure out what the whole truth might 
be and if it might alter what truth we do receive' (Zimmermann, 1996: 116). In some cases a point might 
also be reached at which omissions result in the suspension of truth value because the utterances can no 
longer be said to make reference to extant beings. There is no hard and fast rule as to which omissions 
are 'mere' distortions and where omission results in the suspension of validity claims to truth at all. These 
have to be debated concretely with each text and each omission67 as Gerwe! does with reference to the 
exclusion the part played by 'coloured' activists in the Cape uprising of the seventies ( Oggendblad, 28 
Februarie 1979:2), or as Gardner does with the exclusion of Poppie's response to the ways in which white 
madams exploit her (1991:208-209). 
To conclude then, characterisation as a novelistic technique is widespread in collaborative auto/biograpby. 
In itself attention to character does not equal fictionalization. Rather, the priority afforded to character in 
collaborative auto/biography can have contradictory effects. It can increase the factual status of the text. 
By sketching a detailed portrait of a protagonist whose individuality is denied by the dominant ideology, it 
strengthens a referential claim to an extant being. In this case, the detail of the characterisation enlarges 
the perceived reality of the person referred to. At the same time, the dominance afforded to character in 
collaborative auto/biography can dilute the distinctions between it and the novel. The effect of this is that 
the referential force of the text and its truth value are questioned. 
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f Narrator's perspective 
The final feature of novelization to be treated here is the use of the narrator's perspective. By changing 
points of view or by 'presenting every scene to the reader through the eyes of a particular character,' the 
author, according to Wolfe, gives the 'reader the feeling of being inside the character's mind and 
experiencing the emotional reality of the scene as he experiences it' ( 1980:46). This contrasts with the 
tradition established by mid nineteenth century British non-fiction, in which the narrator's voice was 'calm, 
cultivated and, in fact, genteel,' and constituted an, 'off-white [ ... ] "neutral background" against which bits 
of color would stand out' (ibid.:31 ). This genteel tone evokes an objective, scientific view, serving as 
marker that an utterance is meant to seriously raise validity claims to truth.68 In the Documentary Novel or 
New Journalism, the 'neutral' narrator as final adjudicating instance who arbitrates over the truth is 
disposed of in favour of the oral narrator's perspective. This position can be taken by the first person oral 
narrator, as in Barnet's Biography of a Runaway Slave, or in favour of the participatory third-person 
narrator of New Journalism. This makes it possible to see the 'action through the eyes of someone who 
was actually on the scene and involved in it, rather than a beige narrator' (ibid.:32). A perspectival 
narrator could have a voice which is distinct from that of the characters, or she could be quite similar to 
them but clearly distinguishable from the author. 
The loss of a purportedly neutral narrator goes hand in hand with the abolition of a metanarrative in the 
text, which is normally captured by the narrator's bird's eye point of view. In terms of objectivist notions of 
truth, the loss of the bird's eye perspective equals the loss of all claims to truth. But in terms of an 
intersubjectivist notion of truth like that advocated by Habermas and contemporary feminist critical 
theorists, the death of a magisterial narrator is not the death of truth. On the contrary, the intersubjectivist 
nature of truth can only come to bear when the various points of view, those of the main characters, of 
other characters in the scene, and the narrator's (if she is yet a different instance) come into their right and 
none of the voices is considered superior in terms of its claim to truth. 
The use of a perspectival narrator as novelising technique plays a significant role in both The Calling of 
Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. In The Calling of Katie Makanya the introduction 
and interludes are rendered from the perspective of the author and interviewer, Margaret McCord. The 
reader is initiated into the interview situation in which two perspectives are evident: that of the author as 
interviewer and Katie's. Along with the photograph facing p 109 (repeated on the inside of the back 
dustcover) which shows McCord and Makanya, and the caption 'The author and Katie Makanya, Durban, 
1954', McCord's perspective serves to secure the factual nature of the book anchoring the referential force 
to a (then) extant person. However, with the transition to the main text, the perspective of a first person 
interviewer in dialogue with a third person informant is substituted for that of an 'objective' narrator. 
Admittedly, the narrator's perspective in the main text ranges from the off-white neutral background Wolfe 
refers to, 
For the first time since she had come to Durban, Katie was without any of her children. To 
ease the loneliness of living by herself, she moved into the Native Women's Hostel, a 
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boarding-house run by the Native Affairs Department. Life was much easier for her there. All 
her meals were prepared, and during the day her possessions were safe. The European 
Matron, Mrs Bailey, was very friendly because she knew the Doctor. She treated Katie with 
respect and often called on her for advice whenever there was trouble at the hostel (The 
Calling of Katie Makanya: 214) 
to the dramatic prose of the bourgeois novel, 
Promptly at nine o'clock, the big green Buick turned the corner into Beatrice Street. Katie 
stood on the front steps, wiping her hands down the sides of her dress and trying to breathe 
in enough air to quieten the pounding in her chest. At last the car stopped almost in front of 
her, the door opened and the Doctor stepped heavily onto the sidewalk. 
For one brief moment her heart almost stopped beating. 
This big man coming up the steps towards her was a stranger .... (The Calling of Katie 
Makanya: 211 ). 
There is thus a range from the neutral to dramatic language, indicating the purportedly objective 
perspective. Even though the narrator's voice is dramatic, it is still a purportedly neutral narrator, 
whose perspective is a bird's eye one, and who has not sworn off the temptation to establish a 
metanarrative in which the writing author speaks the final validating truth about the oral narrator 
through the perspective of a transcendent narrator. The interludes serve an important function in 
that they shift the perspective to the self-identified writing author dialogue Katie. But, whether these 
interludes in The Calling of Katie Makanya sufficiently fracture the magisterial perspective of the 
third-person narrator in the main body of the text, thereby reasserting a dialogical notion of truth, is 
open to debate. 
By contrast, the narrator's perspective in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena ranges from the off-white 
'neutral' one, 
Aan die einde van die jaar gaan Poppie met vakansie Ciskie toe. Dis nou byna twee jaar dat 
sy die kinders nie gesien het nie. Sy neem Kindjie saam met haar. Hulle gaan eers na Oos-
Londen (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 267) rAt the end of the year Poppie went on 
holiday to the Ciskei. For two years she had not seen her children. She took Kindjie with her 
and they first went to East London' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 342)], 
to prose and a perspective similar to the main protagonist Poppie's, 
Stadig met die pad tussen die special quarters en die residents se huise sien sy die jeeps 
van die riot squad ry, stadig ry, draai en weer terugkom. Agter die dik mesh-draad wat voor 
die ruite gespan is, sit die wit poeliesse en die swart poeliesse, sy kan nie hulle gesigte sien 
nie, net die gate in die draad waardeur die gewere sal kom (Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena: 256).69 
By limiting the so-called neutral narrator's perspective, Joubert seeks to refrain from imposing her notion 
of the truth on Eunice's narrative. This creates the impression that the book as a whole, and not only the 
parts in direct speech, stem directly from the oral narrator, or at least someone similar to her, rather than 
from Joubert or someone similar to her. 
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Marquard raises the question whether Joubert succeeds in her stated goal (Interview) of rendering the 
narrative predominantly from Poppie's perspective. He picks out such an extract in which he believes the 
author-narrator violates Poppie's perspective. After Poppie is moved to the Ciskei we read, 'As she lay 
there sweating in the close, half-completed house - they had shut the windows out of fear - she felt the 
emptiness of being completely alone, discarded. She felt some part of her had been lost' (The Long 
Journey of Poppie Nongena: 202). This is an example, Marquard asserts, where 'the author, invisible in 
the text, functions as a novelist in the traditional sense, she describes the non-reflective feelings of her 
character without the intervention of the character herself. In this way the author conveys what Poppie 
feels, using a language which would be "unspeakable" for the character herself. The character remains 
unconscious of the writer's interpretation of what she has told her' (Marquard, 1985:139). It is not clear 
what Marquard means here by, 'using a language which would be "unspeakable" for the character herself.' 
If he simply means that Eunice did not think these words when she was lying on the floor in the house in 
Mdantsane, then depending on the actual events, he might be right or not. And he fails to give a reason 
why this must have been the case. Even if she did not reflect upon her situation (in this or any other way) 
at that time, there is no reason to assume that such a (possibly retrospective) self-reflection could not 
surface in the interview. In fact, a look at the original Afrikaans and the transcript suggests the contrary. 
The rendering of the transcript in the Afrikaans publication reads: 'Soos sy hier in die benoude halfklaar 
huis le en sweet - die vensters het hulle dig toegemaak uit vrees - is daar die vaalte van weggegooi te 
wees, van verlatenheid, van eensaamheid om haar. Dit maak haar gevoelte vir haar kinders dood, vir 
haar man, vir haar mama, vir haar broers' (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 152). This is remarkably 
close to Eunice's own interpretation of her emotions as given in the interview: 'Toe voel ek nou bietjie 
hartseer want ek ken niemand nie, in 'n nuwe huis [ ... ] toe voel ek nou regtig ek is weggegooi is nou kom 
weggegooi, toe word ek nou hartseer, ek ken geen niemand nie' (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977 :East 
London, 1) [Then I felt a little sad, because I know nobody in a new house [ ... ) then I really felt I have 
been thrown away have now been brought to be thrown away, then I became sad, I don't know nobody). 
Even though Marquard is therefore wrong about the specific example he cites, the question he poses, 
namely whether Joubert succeeds in sustaining the oral narrators' perspectives or a perspective of 
someone similar to them, of course remains. This connects to the further question: to what extent does 
Joubert succeed in erasing herself and letting Eunice N. and the other oral narrators speak for 
themselves, or to what extent the narrators' perspective, couched as it is in Poppie and her relatives' 
language, merely camouflages Joubert's views. The general question to be addressed to all collaborative 
auto/biography is: to what extent is the authority of the writing author, which is usually exerted through the 
perspective of the 'objective' narrator, exercised through the perspective of a narrator which disguises the 
author's perspective?7° It is clear that the writing author has to find her way between the Scylla of 
pontificating the truth about the oral narrator's life through the perspective of the purportedly objective 
narrator and the Charybdis of doing so covertly through appropriating the perspective of one of the 
characters. Both of these constitute obstacles to an intersubjectivist notion of truth in which the writing 
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author is one of the participants in the intersubjective generation of the truth about the oral narrator's life, 
on par with and not superior the others. A further problem with this multiplicity of perspectives is that it 
can be taken by some readers to mean that all claims to truth are suspended in favour of perspectival 
relativism. 
Like the other novelising techniques discussed so far, the use of perspective has implications for the 
extent to which collaborative auto/biographies can raise validity claims to truth. Whereas techniques like 
structuring jeopardise the status of the validity claim to truth when it fudges the border with fictionalization, 
the use of a perspectival narrator may raise other difficulties. On the one hand, texts like The Calling of 
Katie Makanya, with a pervasive bird's eye narrator who purportedly transcends the perspectives of the 
oral narrators, echo a monological notion of the truth. On the other hand, texts like Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena, could be seen to dissolve the validity claim to truth into relativist perspectivism. But, 
multiple perspectives need not mean the end of truth. This conclusion only follows if we still hold on to a 
monological notion of truth and equate the 'objective' narrator's perspective to that monologically 
established truth. The validity claim to truth in collaborative auto/biography is only dissolved if the multiple 
perspectives in the text are taken to be the end of the story. But if they are seen instead, as I propose, as 
the beginning of an open-ended search for consensus, then the use of perspective is the condition of the 
possibility for truth rather than the end of it. 
*** 
In the foregoing discussion it was argued that whilst novelization may be a common feature in 
collaborative auto/biography, it can in principle be distinguished from fictionalization, and it would be a 
false generalisation simply to equate auto/biography to fictionalization tout court.11 It was suggested that 
novelization would be the use of dialogue, structure, embellishing language, scene setting, 
characterisation, and the narrator's perspective to convey factual claims about the past, (in other words, to 
make ontological claims and refer to (formerly) extant beings and states of affairs). Fictionalization, on the 
other hand, would be the use of similar techniques, but without making the accompanying ontological 
claims. Drawing on Tom Wolfe's and Miguel Barnet's descriptions of New Journalism and the 
Documentary Novel respectively, samples were drawn from The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena to illustrate the use of novelistic techniques to raise validity claims to truth 
in collaborative auto/biography. As a result, these utterances have to be treated like any other truth 
claims. In other words, they are equally subject to intersubjective critique by a community of readers, and 
their actual truth is a matter of reasoned consensus amongst the potentially unlimited speech community. 
This conclusion raises another problem, namely how to deal with cases of fictionalization and those cases 
where the distinction between novelization and fictionalization is fudged? Are validity claims, like those in 
novels equally subject to intersubjective validation even if they do not make existential claims? And what 
would count as grounds for accepting one non-referential validity claim over another? The answers to 
these questions, interesting and important as they may be for a theory of fiction, are not strictly of concern 
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here. What suffices for the purposes of this study is that collaborative auto/biographies are not, on the 
whole, to be treated the same as fictions, even when they at times use techniques common to novels. 
Another conclusion, which follows from the foregoing, is the importance of the proviso, on the whole. The 
analysis shows that it makes no sense to say of the whole of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena that they raise validity claims to truth. Whilst some utterances in each of 
these texts certainly raise validity claims to truth, others do not, and yet others fail to make this distinction. 
The unit of analysis can thus not be the text in toto, but only individual validity claims. And since books 
differ, there may be different ratios of factual, fictional, and indistinguishable utterances in each book. 
Consequently, the most that can be said about a particular book is that there is a preponderance of validity 
claims to truth or of claims which do not have that status. There may well be collaborative 
auto/biographies in which there are no fictionalizations and no fudging of novelization and fictionalization. 
However, taking Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya, in which all three 
of these categories of utterances (novelized, fictionalised and undifferentiated} are found, as an object of 
study, does assist in seeing how this distinction can be drawn. The task facing the reader is thus not to 
answer wholesale questions like that raised by Doris Sommer, namely 'what kind of text I have in hand' 
(1996:148). Instead of asking whether the book is a novelized auto/biography or a fiction, the reader has 
to grapple with the question, which particular utterances raise validity claims at all. Only then can she 
confront the question, with which of these truth claims she agrees and with which she disagrees. 
Taking a look at the distinctions between non-fiction, novelization and fiction through the gender telescope 
raises another interesting question regarding collaborative auto/biographies. In her study of oral history in 
the Makopane chiefdom, Hofmeyr (1993:25-37) points out that although these distinctions are not 
absolute, women generally tell fictional tales (in the hut} and men historical ones (in the common space 
between huts occupied by men}. By analogy, collaborative auto/biographies, as historical narratives 
foregrounding the personal and individual of 'unknown' protagonists, differ from those public histories 
which record the lives of important public individuals like chiefs, or of the historically visible collective. The 
question this raises - but which has to be left unanswered - is whether there are gatekeeping forces at 
work which divert these texts by and about women to that part of the republic of letters where muddles 
about fact and fiction corrode their status as bearers of validity claims to truth and thus the status afforded 
to them? 
For the purposes of the present study - in which the mutual relationship between the philosophy of 
Habermas and contemporary feminist critical theory on the one hand, and the practice of collaborative 
auto/biography on the other, is foregrounded - the question also arises regarding the implications of the 
foregoing discussion for contemporary critical theory. In part II (p 27), it was mentioned that Habermas 
explicitly states that he restricts his speech act theory to so-called standard or serious speech acts. As 
examples of such non-standard speech acts Habermas cites irony, jokes, and literature. What 
distinguishes serious speech acts from literature, according to Habermas, is that the former go on solving 
problems in the world, whilst literature discloses the world self-referentially (PDM :234-246, PDME :199-
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210). In the light of the discussion in the preceding section, it is clear that these specific demarcation 
criteria do not hold - which is not to say that it is impossible to distinguish between literature and non-
fiction with some other criteria. 
Because he blocks out literary phenomena in his analysis of speech acts, Habermas's notion of literature 
is not sufficiently refined internally to distinguish between novelization and fictionalization. As a 
consequence, he fails to see the ways in which literary devices can be employed to make truth claims 
about the world. It also causes him to err in the same direction as the commentators on Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena who muddle the distinction between ('neutral' and novelistic) styles and ontological 
commitment {whether something exists or not). Underlying Habermas's distinction - serious utterances 
are directed at the world, non-serious ones are directed at the language in which they are made - is the 
assumption that serious utterances are relatively purged of the rhetorical features considered common in 
literary ones. The view that there is any language which is wholly purged of rhetorical features; or that the 
language of science (the paradigmatic discourse for truth claims about the natural world); or that of 
argumentative discourse is free of them, is however widely challenged {Black, 1954; Hesse and Arib, 
1986; Young, 2000:63-66). The discussion of the theoretical views on New Journalism and the 
Documentary Novel, as well as the analyses of extracts from The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena provide further arguments and evidence in favour of the thesis that 
rhetorical techniques common to the novel can in fact be used to convey truth claims - in other words, that 
worlddisclosure is not limited to fiction. 
This conclusion would support the arguments of those critics who share Habermas's intersubjectivist 
assumptions but reject the specific way in which he draws the line between literature and non-fiction, and 
his concomitant disregard for the legitimate role of rhetoric. It also has implications for what is considered 
literature and what is included in literary studies programmes. 72 If the domain of study in literature 
courses is extended to go beyond fiction, then the worlddisclosing capacity of the rhetorical features of 
writing such as collaborative auto/biography can receive the attention it deserves from an aesthetics after 
art.73 Extending the domain of literary studies in this manner would actually support an idea Habermas 
expresses elsewhere. According to Habermas, although the idea of modernity is bound up in European 
art, 'the project of modernity only becomes clear if we abandon the usual concentration on art' (1981:43). 
Extending our notion of literature to include post/colonial collaborative auto/biography, and linking these 
texts to the unfinished project of modernity, allows us to challenge Eurofocussed notions of modernity and 
to explore the ways in which collaborative auto/biography is imbricated in the unfinished project of 
modernity. 
Maria Pia Lara (68-80) and Iris Young (1996:131-132) have put forward the thesis that rhetorical features 
of narratives of the self, which we have seen employed in collaborative auto/biography, are an integral part 
of speech in deliberative democracy and that this is not necessarily a bad thing. Although they do not 
replace argument, rhetorical devices and narratives, according to Young, may be necessary to place 
issues on the agenda for deliberation (Young, 2000:74 and 66). By shaping 'claims and arguments to a 
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particular public in a particular situation,' by fashioning what Joubert and McCord consider a readable text, 
rhetoric and narrative respond to the need to keep the conditions of the possibility of listening in mind 
(ibid.:67 and 70). Narratives of the self in which the novelistic devices discussed above are used are 
often, 'an important bridge [ ... ] between the mute experience of being wronged and political arguments 
about justice' {ibid.:72). Finally, in deliberative democracy, rhetorical devices in narratives of the self can 
be crucial to recognition across difference. In the next chapter, which deals with the intersubjective 
generation of identity and appeals for recognition in the public sphere, I will therefore pay closer attention 
to the ways through which, in 'narratives expressed in public with others differently situated who also tell 
their stories, speakers and listeners can develop the "enlarged thought" that transforms their thinking 
about issues from being narrowly self-interested or self-regarding about an issue, to thinking about an 
issue in a way that takes account of the perspectives of others' (ibid.:76). 
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The intersubjective generation of identity and the appeal 
for recognition in the public sphere 
'The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn 
that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter 
but about the person making the report' 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
'My only wish was for veracity and to convince -
especially because so many of my people are extremely pigheaded' 
Joubert. Draft of a letter to S. Ramsey of Times Literary Supplement (n.d. Joubert Papers) 
Identity is generated, amongst other things, in intersubjective relations of understanding and recognition. 
In a nutshell, this is the view commonly held amongst contemporary critical theorists spelled out in chapter 
II. In that chapter, it was shown that several of these authors (Habermas, Benhabib, Lara, Young) afford 
some significance to narratives of the self as a specific medium in which these intersubjective relations of 
recognition are fostered. Narratives of the self, Habermas and Benhabib suggest, are situated on a 
double axis. On the vertical axis their purpose is to integrate events into a story of the self, in which 
various events are narratively related to each other. On the horizontal axis, the aim of these narratives is 
for interlocutors to gain rationally founded intersubjective recognition from each other for the distinctive 
values (notions of the good) that are concretised in the specific choices they have made in their lives. In 
his description of Rousseau's Confessions, and in her descriptions of contemporary women's 
autobiographies, both Habermas and Lara focus on this second axis, namely narratives of the self as an 
appeal for recognition addressed to a reading public. This chapter is a continuation of this focus. It . 
explores modes of the intersubjective generation of identity through appeals for recognition, concentrating 
on the transformations from the face-to-face recognition of oral narrators in their relationships with writing 
authors, on the one hand, to the appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public, on the other.2 By 
establishing an exchange between collaborative auto/biography and contemporary critical theory on these 
issues, it is hoped that various aspects of recognition will be unravelled, giving each of them greater 
precision; that the link between these and different aspects of the public sphere sketched in chapter II will 
be clarified; and that the outlines of a theory of recognition suitable to collaborative auto/biography will 
emerge. 
There have been a number of publications in English studies, which seek either to refine or to replace 
Habermas's theory of the public sphere. These publications tend to focus on Europe at the turn of the 
eighteenth to nineteenth century and on the USA.3 Confronting Habermas's narrow account of the guiding 
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principles of the European bourgeois public sphere with the workings of texts like collaborative 
auto/biographies in the posVcolonial public sphere, will indicate possible adaptations needed to give a 
more comprehensive and detailed account of the public sphere in general.4 In chapters Ill and IV, it was 
argued that, because the very genealogy and structure of collaborative auto/biographies are explicitly 
intersubjective, shifting the focus from classic monological autobiographies to collaborative auto/biography 
gives us a better idea of the intersubjective generation of truth. This chapter shows how, for similar 
reasons, collaborative auto/biography gives us a better idea of the intersubjective generation of identity 
through appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public than Habermas's own reflections on 
Rousseau's Confessions. Consequently, collaborative auto/biography also provides a much clearer 
picture of the decentring of the developed ego than classic autobiography or Van Riebeeck's Daghverhaal, 
both of which seek to assure their authors of their own centrality and power. 
The current chapter traces the transition from the publicly oriented self-reflection and appeals for 
recognition between individuals, made in the safety of domestic privacy, to the reactions of a reading 
public in order to clarify the ways in which private and public appeals for recognition as well as textual and 
social relations of communication are interconnected. It (1) pays attention to the notions of recognition 
held by the collaborators and to the rhetorical transformation of the original oral, face-to-face narrative to 
elicit recognition from the reading public. This is followed by (2) a sketch of the public sphere into which 
these appeals for recognition are inserted. The focus is on the relationships between alternative, counter 
and hegemonic public spheres and the position of collaborative auto/biography as an interface between 
them. An outline (3) of a theory of recognition appropriate to collaborative auto/biography is given by 
elaborating on the connections between similarity and difference; individual and collective appeals for 
recognition; and the connection between recognition and redistribution. The chapter concludes (4) with a 
description and evaluation of actual readers' responses to the appeals for recognition elicited by Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. 
I. Notions and rhetoric of recognition 
What distinguishes collaborative auto/biography from autobiography is that the appeal for recognition has 
two phases: the face-to-face oral appeal for recognition in the recording stage, and the appeal for 
recognition mediated by print and addressed to a reading public in the published text. Separate as they 
are, these two phases are intricately connected in both directions. The first phase, in which the oral 
narrator appeals to the writing author for recognition, is generally located in the comparative privacy of 
domestic space. Whilst the privatisation of issues conventionally associated with women has rightly been 
criticised by authors like Ben ha bib ( 1992: 153-158), these private spaces also constitute a type of safe-
house partly shielded from the state and white male power from which dissent can emerge. Dissent could 
include the critique of political injustices like slavery, apartheid and imperialism, as well as the effect of 
political injustice on private life. This private reflection also challenges the distinctions between private 
and public, which have the effect of shifting public burdens and costs onto individuals. Yet, because this 
first phase takes place in anticipation of publication, it also constitutes an example of the publicly oriented 
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self-reflection Habermas and Benhabib describe as emerging in the salons.5 It is the onus of the writing 
author to mediate this initial appeal for recognition addressed to her. But because the conditions of an 
appeal to a reading public are different from those in the face-to-face situation, she has to adapt the form 
of the appeal for recognition to its new context. After examining the different notions of recognition 
adhered to by each of the collaborators, I sketch some of the textual strategies used to publicise this 
appeal. Two rhetorical devices will be central, namely the evocation of the original face-to-face situation; 
and the inscription of an appropriate response to an appeal for recognition into the text. 
In the production of collaborative auto/biography, both the articulation of personal subjectivity and 
communal interdependency may take the form of the successful communication of factual claims about 
the self and her past. However, as the quote from Wittgenstein heading this chapter suggests, these 
factual claims are not only communicated for their own sake. In narrating how she acted, the oral narrator 
indirectly gives us an indication of the values that inform her identity. These claims about the past are 
thus also bearers of an appeal for recognition for the oral narrator's identity as expressed by the values 
she adheres to. In looking at the development of relations of recognition in the original situation, I sketch 
some ideas on recognition held by Eunice, Joubert, and Katie and comment on the implications these 
notions had for their collaborative auto/biographies as sites of recognition. 
At the time of writing, Eunice and Joubert held predominantly personal and metaphysical notions of 
recognition. Describing why she considers aspects of what she calls Xhosa religion laudable, Eunice 
remarks, 'Ons doen dit om baie mense gelukkig te maak. Ons voel as baie mense bymekaar kom by jou 
plek, en goeie dinge seen mooi dinge praat, dan voel ans almal gelukkig' [We do it to make many people 
happy. We feel if many people meet at your place and say good things and speak nice things, then we all 
feel happy] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977:'Toordokters wat haar man raadpleeg', 1). The 
significance she affords to recognition by a community here serves as a foil to those moments where she 
is slighted or excluded and recognition is flawed. She gives accounts of how this happens on the personal 
level in being silenced6; in being neglected by her own family7; and by the intricacies of in- and exclusion 
as a young married woman amongst her in-laws.8 
These relations of strained or failed recognition within the family took place against the backdrop of a 
struggle for recognition on a larger social scale. Racial discrimination, the pass laws, starvation wages 
and forced removals were some of the extreme forms of political and economic misrecognition Eunice 
and others had to deal with. However, Eunice's engagement with political and economic misrecognition 
remained stuck in the personal. Until she realised that these appeals achieve nothing substantial, she 
persisted with personal applications and appeals to clerks in the pass offices of Observatory and Nyanga.9 
Only on rare occasions is there a hint that she saw these as struggles for recognition that exceed the 
personal. 10 Preoccupied with what she perceived as her gender-determined duty to take care of her 
extended family, it is not surprising, once all her appeals for recognition addressed directly to other people 
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were slighted, that Eunice should cling more adamantly to metaphysical appeals for recognition addressed 
to god (see Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 127-130, The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena:170-
175). 
Struggling for recognition between an oral narrator and a writing author within the context of collaborative 
auto/biography is not a single and simple event, but (as Jessica Benjamin [1995:27-48] makes clear) a 
complex, inconclusive and non-linear process full of difficulties and contradictions. For instance, on 
several occasions, Joubert has declared her friendship with Eunice, describing its evolution from initial 
curiosity about Afrikaans names in Eunice's Xhosa family, to friendship, concluding that: 
Better relations between groups, reciprocal understanding etc can easily become cold words. 
The foundation on which everything must be built is for me true friendship. love. human to 
human. Woman to woman. That we become what we have been for eternity, part of God, 
together in his hand. What I learnt from Poppie, is not a feeling for political or economic or 
social development or longing for improvement, but I got friendship, and in my limited way 
tried to give (Notes for London book launch. Punctuation partly improved. Joubert papers). 11 
Besides describing recognition in these personal terms of friendship, Joubert also couches it in 
metaphysical terms12 , a feature common in her writing. The intimacy resulting from the interaction with 
Eunice and her family during and accompanying the interviews must have contributed considerably to a 
shift in Joubert's perception of other black South Africans, as is evident from notes she kept during the 
writing process. 13 Despite the assertion of an evolving friendship, the few common historical experiences 
they shared 14 seem to increase Joubert's awareness of the extent to which intimate knowledge of the oral 
narrators eludes her (What do I really know? About Sonny Boy. About Pengi who could tap?' [Notes. 
Joubert papers]). Surprisingly, she concedes to a question she herself has posed after publication, 
thereby contradicting her own assertion that she loves Eunice as a friend: 'Ken ek enige swartmense 
goed? Nee' [Do I know any black people well? No] (Notes after publication. Joubert papers). 15 
The personal and metaphysical nature of this evolving relationship of recognition shared by both women 
brought its own possibilities and constraints, Paradoxically it is precisely in the disregard for larger political 
structures which aimed to make personal friendships impossible, that Eunice and Joubert's personal 
relationships of recognition gain their transgressive value. But in their failure to confront structural 
relationships of misrecognition in political terms, Eunice and Joubert have also limited the range of their 
responses in the struggle for recognition. Joubert might be right in emphasising the significance of 
individual personal relationships of recognition for 'better relations between groups', and for, 'reciprocal 
understanding', but since one cannot have personal relationships with everyone, and given that 
recognition of others with whom we do not have personal relations is an important ingredient in modern 
democracy, this restriction is problematic. It is precisely also the ideology of a gendered responsibility for 
the personal that made it impossible for Eunice to see the value of political struggles for recognition. That 
personal and political recognition cannot be as easily separated as both Eunice and Joubert believe, is not 
only a basic tenet of feminism, but it is also, paradoxically, corroborated by the contents of Die Swerfjare 
van Poppie Nongena itself.16 
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The metaphysical terms in which Joubert and Eunice couch recognition also involve certain constraints. 
Whilst Joubert's description of the evolution of the relationship between herself and Eunice can in itself be 
seen as a theory of recognition, it discounts other approaches to recognition which are couched in a 
metaphysics different from that of Medieval mysticism or those postmetaphysical theories of recognition 
which seek to do without metaphysics as such. Even though Joubert professes that her book was not 
politically intended, this does not inhibit her from also describing it as a beacon in the struggle against 
apartheid (Interview}. Yet, describing recognition in predominantly personal and metaphysical terms 
precludes various forms of immanent and political recognition. On the whole, in Eunice's life, 
metaphysical notions of recognition really do seem to function as opiates, soothing the pain of failed 
relations of innerworldly recognition without doing anything to change the situation. By contrast, Katie 
Makanya's notion of recognition has a strongly immanent and collective character. 
Whilst Margaret McCord 11 shares Joubert and Eunice's views on the significance of personal relationships 
as arena of recognition, Katie Makanya shared Eunice N.'s and Elsa Joubert's religious notions of 
recognition, albeit with a somewhat different inflection. Compared to Eunice's rather devotional and 
redemptive Christianity and Joubert's mystical bend, Katie's notions of religion and recognition are closer 
to that of the medical missionary, James McCord - practical and connected to her work (McCord, 
2000:249-252).18 In fact, the notion of recognition Katie adhered to centred on work. After a truncated 
narrative of her life prior to meeting James McCord, Katie devotes most of her time in the recordings to 
anecdotes in which she and the doctor appear as a team, sharing a common commitment to healing the 
sick through the use of modern medicine. Although it would be inappropriate to describe Katie as an 
activist, she did not shy away from collective action in political activities. In a march protesting against the 
extension of passes to African women in Durban, she joined the front row and was commissioned by 
George Champion to 'speak on behalf of the women' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 229). In contrast to 
Eunice's notions of recognition, Katie's thus exceed the domestic, and include the fields of work in the 
comparatively public space of a medical practice as well as political action. Besides recognition for 
individually held values, Katie's notion of recognition thus also had a stronger collective character. 
Clearly, as the second motto to this chapter reminds us, neither oral narrators nor writing authors see the 
purpose of their collaboration as resulting in recognition amongst themselves. The whole point of their 
collaboration is to publicise the oral narrator's account of her life as a medium of an appeal for recognition 
to a reading public. Conveying the writing author's positive response to the oral narrator's appeal, be it 
explicitly or implicitly, plays an important signalling role in eliciting a similar response from readers. In 
communicating what she calls the love she felt for Eunice (Sunday Times, 7 January 1979:n.p.}, Joubert 
hoped to elicit recognition for Eunice from the reading public too. Unlike literary texts, collaborative 
auto/biographies such as Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya reach into 
the real world in a less roundabout way. Firstly, as we saw in chapter IV, they reach into the world of facts 
because they make existential claims and refer to extant beings and events. Secondly, they reach into the 
real world of readers' actions as they seek to elicit recognition from the reading public. Paying attention to 
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the rhetorical strategies employed in the text to elicit this response could be described as 'a poetics of 
solidarity' (Moreiras, 1996:203). In contrast to an analysis of what Sommer describes as the 'private and 
even lonely moment of autobiographical writing' which 'strains to produce a personal and distinctive style 
as part of the individuation process,' and which foregrounds the intrasubjective axis, the aim of such a 
poetics of solidarity is to explore ways in which collaborative auto/biographies 'preserve or renew an 
interpersonal rhetoric' (Sommer, 1996:151, e.o.) and thereby foreground the intersubjective axis 
Habermas and Benhabib refer to. 
The more the oral narrator's appeal for recognition threatens the reader's material world and his world-
view, the more difficult it is to elicit the required response to her appeals (Nance, 2001 :572). 
Consequently, rhetorical strategies, which take potential 'cognitive and psychological defenses' into 
consideration, are essential if oral narrators' claims for recognition are to succeed (ibid.:570). Nance has 
given an astute analysis of the ways in which readers avoid responding to oral narrators' appeals for 
recognition and to the rhetorical strategies which are used to counter this tendency so that readers do not 
just 'consume calls for social action as if they were purely aesthetic products' (ibid.: 571 ). 19 My focus is on 
the offering of 'precepts, examples, and counterexamples of appropriate reader responses' (ibid.: 578) 
and the evocation of the original face-to-face interaction between the oral narrator and the writing author 
as rhetorical strategies that writing authors can employ to counter these cognitive and psychological 
defences and to elicit the desired recognition. 
Both Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya attempt to reconstruct aspects 
of the original face-to-face situation in the published text so that the 'reader is placed inside the dialogue 
between two voices' (lsernhagen, 1987:222). The most straightforward and common way of doing this is 
to have the oral narrator speak in the .first person, directly addressing the reader and excising the writing 
author who is the original immediate addressee. Although this creates the illusion of directness with its 
own mechanisms of successfully eliciting recognition from the reader, McCord felt that such a simulation 
of Katie's original narrative would actually constitute an obstacle rather than promoting its chances of 
success. The reason for this is because an anticipated (North American) reading public would not share 
the familiarity with the language, culture, and history that facilitated the understanding and recognition 
between Makanya and McCord. Simply relaying Katie's appeals for recognition couched in the utterances 
that were directed at McCord in the original face-to-face situation would result in obscurity for the readers 
McCord had in mind. The imperative of linguistic and cultural translation for her anticipated audience thus 
led McCord to discard the first two drafts in which Katie was the first-person narrator who directly 
addresses a reading public. 20 
Consequently, McCord opted for a two-pronged approach. The main text is written from a third-person 
perspective. This afforded McCord the opportunity to do the requisite linguistic and cultural translation 
through the voice of the narrator. Since the third-person narrator's perspective is purportedly neutral, as 
we have seen in the discussion on pp 105-108 above, this has the effect of masking McCord's mediating 
presence. At the same time, however, it renders her endorsement of Katie's appeal for recognition 
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invisible. The problem McCord faced was how to sustain the intimacy of the recording relationship and 
her endorsement of Katie's appeal for recognition, while at the same time rendering the bulk of Katie's 
narrative in the rather distanced third-person who does the cultural mediation. 
She solves this problem by adding onto the main text a prelude and some interludes in which Katie 
features in the role of the addresser seen from the interviewer's perspective.21 McCord thus explicitly 
represents the recording situation in the prelude and in the interludes, while at the same time using 
various strategies to include the reader as if he too were an addressee in that face-to-face domestic 
context. As a first-person narrator, McCord depicts scenes of the recordings in addition to giving us 
samples of the dialogues between Katie and herself. Although the visual and the interlocutive 
perspectives are the interviewer's, and although Katie does not speak in the first person, the visual and 
auditory directions of focus are towards her, the interviewee, who is addressing McCord, the interviewer. 
Through the interviewer's use of the pronoun /, which serves as a shifter inviting the reader to associate 
himself with McCord the interviewer, the reader gets inducted into the original recording, facing the 
interviewee. 
McCord also uses a second technique to draw the reader into the evoked original face-to-face situation, 
namely the introduction of a third character. While the I-narrator is still arguing her inadequacy to the task 
of writing Katie's narrative, the exchange between her and Katie gets short-circuited by the arrival from 
school of McCord's son, Johnny, who simply barges in and demands from Katie to continue telling him 
about her great-grandmother. The visual effect of Johnny's sweeping entry and his impatience signal that 
the recording situation is not hermetically sealed to outsiders like the reader and that all (apparent) 
objections the interviewer raises to writing about Katie's life have been set aside. In addition to inducing 
the reader into the interview situation via the perspective of the I-interviewer, McCord's son Johnny serves 
as a further envoy for the reader, who, by means of association, can gain entry into an evoked face-to-
face situation in which he (the reader) becomes an imaginary immediate addressee himself.22 
Besides evoking the face-to-face situation, the other device used to elicit recognition from the reader-is to 
provide examples of responses to appeals for recognition which are clearly marked as appropriate or 
inappropriate in the text. The Calling of Katie Makanya contains several such instances. A considerable 
part of Part One of the book illustrates how Katie's cultural migration results in flawed relations of 
recognition: 'Everywhere she went it seemed that she was set apart - in England because her skin was 
black, in Kimberley because she had lived too long among the English, in Ramokgopa's village because 
she was a Christian, and now here in her work because Mrs Height thought she had magic powers' (The 
Calling of Katie Makanya: 103). These examples of failed recognition are counterpointed with examples 
of positive responses the reader can associate with and which anticipate the recognition Katie would 
receive from Dr McCord and the Zulu community for her medical work depicted in Part Two (ibid.: 159 and 
195). In Part One it is primarily singing that serves as the focaliser for recognition. This ranges from Mr 
Xiniwe's recognition of Katie's unique voice (ibid.:20) to the recognition she receives for performances 
before the English public, royalty and aristocracy (ibid.:32-57). 
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It is also with regard to her singing voice that one of the most striking examples of two divergent forms of 
misrecognition is given. At the end of their stay in England, Katie finds herself with Charlotte in the office 
of Mr Vert, the choir's local agent: 
Mr Vert looked at her as though she were an ignorant child. 'I don't think you understand. I'll 
make you rich and famous - so rich you will be able to buy anything you want, go anywhere. 
You'll sing in the great concert halls of Europe, and even kings and queens will pay you 
homage.' 
Katie laughed. 'A black girl like me? Whoever heard of such a thing?' 
'They will,' he promised. When they hear your voice, they won't wonder who you are or 
where you come from. They won't see you. They'll just listen to you sing.' 
Katie's laughter stopped abruptly. She thought of the children in London pointing their fingers 
and calling out, 'Come look at the darkies.' She thought of Mr Pringle, who told her she came 
from the seed of Ham. She thought of a white South African whose words had echoed 
across the dining-room in a big hotel, 'They may look civilised in their Christian clothes, but 
underneath, the blacks are all savages.' At least those people had seen her, and perhaps it 
was better to be seen and set apart than to be a nobody who is not seen at all. [ ... ] 
'I don't sing for people who do not see me,' she said abruptly' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 
56-57). 
Mr Vert's perception of Katie as an ignorant child signals the first jarring note. In an allusion to the 
temptation on the mount, framing recognition purely in monetary terms and in terms of celebrity power, 
Vert misses the point of the recognition Katie seeks, namely recognition that would acknowledge her full 
personhood without bracketing that which makes her different. To Katie, Vert's valorisation of a single 
feature of her personality, namely that which makes her similar to other performers, in addition to his 
refusal to recognise her difference, is worse than the misrecognition by those who see her for who she is, 
even if they use that as the basis for excluding her from the communicative community. 
Since Joubert has chosen to conceal her presence {both in the interview situation and otherwise) in the 
text, she has to rely on other techniques to signal her own positive response to Eunice's appeal for 
recognition and to evoke the face-to-face immediacy of the original situation as means of eliciting 
recognition from potential readers. These techniques include simulating a spoken Afrikaans; having the 
oral narrators speak in the first person; making use of tense; and the inscription of dialogue which echoes 
her own exchanges with Eunice. In contrast to the 'normalised' and sanitised 'algemeen beskaafde' 
Afrikaans of the northeast which has become the standardised written form, Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena is one of the most sustained renderings in South African writing of features typical of spoken 
Afrikaans in the Western Cape, which is used here to suggest the oral nature of face-to-face address.23 In 
contrast to The Calling of Katie Makanya, Joubert has the oral narrator Poppie speak in the first person in 
large parts of the book, thereby creating the impression that the narrative is told to a listener (Janssen et 
a/1981 :58) with whom the reader can associate (Dalven, 1995:84 ). The use of present tense reporting 
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verbs in these first-person utterances further enhances the sense of face-to-face directness24 , which 
makes the 'reader-listener feel as if she were in a room with Poppie, part of a community, talking 
forthrightly' (Dalven, 1995:84). 
Dalven's conclusion that this allows 'the reader to partake in a dialogue' (ibid.:84) is of course wrong. 
What is evoked is not a dialogue between interlocutors but an addresser speaking to a listener. Thus, if 
the association of the reader with the implied listener is to succeed, the implied listener will have to lose 
those features that make him an interlocutor. In other words, the implied listener has to become more like 
a reader than like the writing author. Whereas the original addressee (Joubert) was actually in dialogue 
with Eunice, asking her questions, prompting her, and responding to her, the implied listener in the text is 
addressed without being able to participate in the simulated dialogue. In a sense, the implied reader of 
Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is still like the reader Wolfe (1980:30) describes, who 'just lie[s] flat 
and let[s] these people come tromping through as if his mind were a subway turnstile'. A truly dialogical 
reading would attempt a reconstruction of the questions addressed to the oral narrator and which have left 
their traces in the palimpsest of the text.25 Whether many readers would actually engage in such a truly 
dialogical reading is, of course, doubtful. And to what extent such a dialogical reading will contribute to 
eliciting recognition of the oral narrator as an interlocutor and for her values, is open to debate. 
Like McCord, Joubert also supplements the evoking of a face-to-face relation between the oral narrator 
and the reader with textual examples of responses to the oral narrator's appeal for recognition. Joubert 
seeks to elicit recognition from the reader by projecting her own sympathy for the oral narrator onto other 
voices in the text. One of these voices which bears Joubert's sympathy for Poppie is the third-person 
narrator. In this regard, Olivier (1980:63 and 1982:48) and Van der Merwe (1992:74) talk of an 
accompanying, sympathetically-minded narrator who sees things as Poppie sees them. Other voices that 
convey Joubert's sympathy for Eunice are members of her family; Mrs Retief, the social worker; and even 
some of the pass clerks. 
Since the techniques used to evoke the original face-to-face situation cannot re-enact the dialogue 
between Joubert and Eunice N., Joubert has a character in the book address questions to Poppie, in a 
dialogue similar to that between Eunice and herself. In the transcript, the following exchange between 
Joubert and Eunice N. can been found: 
Eunice, ek kan nie verstaan dat jy 'n kerkvrou is nie. Hoe voel jy nou oor die Xhosa-geloof, 
oor die twee? Madam, God die vader aanvaar ons Xhosa's soos ons is [Eunice I can't 
understand that you are a churchwoman. How do you feel now about the Xhosa religion, 
about the two? Madam, God the Father accepts us Xhosa as we are] (Eunice N. and Elsa 
Joubert, 1977: 'Toordokters wat haar man raadpleeg', 1). 
This exchange between Joubert and Eunice, one that could also take place between Eunice and a 
potential reader, finds its way into the text in the form of an exchange between Poppie and Hannie, the 
coloured servant next door at one of Poppie's places of employment: 
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Die aand kom Hannie na haar kamer toe en sy vra vir Poppie: Sisi, jy is nou 'n getroue 
kerkvrou - sy is self oak 'n kerkvrou, Methodist soos Poppie se Mama - en hoe's dit dan nou 
met hierdie bostoegaanery? [ ... ] Dis onse geloof, se sy [Poppie] weer[ .... ] En die Here het 
ans mos almal gemaak, ans Xhosas oak. Hy vat ans soos ans is (Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena: 198) ['That evening Hannie came to Poppie's room: Sisi, you are such a loyal 
churchwoman - she too is a churchwoman, Methodist, like Poppie's mama - what's all this 
bush-going business? [ .... ] It's our belief, she said once again [ .... ] The Lord made 
everybody, the Xhosa too. He takes us as we are' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 
260)]. 
This is a significant passage showing how Joubert shepherds her readers by offering an example of an 
appropriate response to a plea for recognition. Not only is the exchange between Joubert and Eunice re-
enacted in the text, allowing the reader to imagine interacting with Poppie by means of association with 
Joubert's proxy, Hannie, but Poppie's reply also elicits and sanctions the readers' recognition of the oral 
narrator by asserting that god himself (in addition to Joubert and Hannie) accepts her in her complexity, 
affirming both aspects of similarity and of difference. 
Since the reader does not become an interlocutor but remains an addressee, these techniques used to 
represent a face-to-face engagement between the oral narrator and the reader can at best evoke the 
illusion of immediacy. But even if immediacy is established, the question remains whether this would 
necessarily promote the positive response to the oral narrator's appeal for recognition. And even if 
immediacy increases the chances of a positive response, it raises problems of its own. Evoking a face-to-
face situation in order to elicit recognition harks back to notions of truth and the subject that are indebted 
to a phonocentric metaphysics of presence in which the oral narrator is believed to be immediately present 
in her voice.26 Connected to this, is a notion that face-to-face interaction serves as a model for moral 
appeal. Important as it is for our understanding of ethics, the image of an evoked face-to-face encounter 
with the other has limitations when it comes to relations of recognition in modern society and politics. It 
seems that one of the definitive and persistent features of (European) modernity, also evident in 
Rousseau's writings (1977:274), is a residual longing for the premodern immediacy of a polis where 
everyone knows everyone and where recognition is embedded in the immediacy of face-to-face relations. 
A similar nostalgia that leads Rousseau to idealise a fantasised premodern society may persist in 
idealised notions of immediacy that modern readers project onto collaborative auto/biography. However, 
as artefacts produced in the age of technical reproduction, these texts circulate in the public sphere in 
which modern media and the modern state co-determine each other, and in which democracy no longer 
rests on face-to-face interaction. Although they are often consumed out of a nostalgic interest in 
'premodern' life, these texts are exceedingly modern. It is inevitable that these devices, aimed at 
simulating a face-to-face encounter in which the oral narrator can address her appeal for recognition 
directly to the reader, should fail since they operate in a medium (the printed book) which, by definition, 
assumes distance between addresser and addressee. This failure should not be bemoaned, however, but 
be welcomed, because it alerts us to the need to rethink our notion of recognition of oral narrators and to 
adapt it to modern conditions. 
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The inscription of responses to appeals for recognition in the text is meant to signal the writing author's 
recognition of the oral narrator, in the hope that this will elicit a similar positive response from the reader. 
But mere mimicking of recognition bestowed by others (be they the writing author or other voices in the 
text) would be problematic on several counts. To begin with, the values concretised by the oral narrator's 
actions and choices may not deserve recognition. 27 Furthermore, even where the writing author (or 
anyone else for that matter) bestows recognition on someone whose values are laudable, this in itself 
offers no ground for the reader to do so. And even where recognition is deserved, merely mimicking the 
writing author's endorsement of the appeal for recognition and her positive response to it, is a 
misconception of the notion of recognition implied by the rationalist intersubjectivist model propounded by 
some contemporary critical theorists and advocated here. The type of rationalist communicative theory I 
draw on does not only assert that identities are intersubjectively generated, it also holds that appeals for 
recognition for the values expressed in certain actions can and have to be tested in intersubjective 
arguments premised on the possibility of a rationally based consensus. Precisely because not all appeals 
for recognition are justified and because the addressee can only really be said to have bestowed 
recognition if he knows why he has done so, the question is not only if the techniques used by 
collaborators work, but also if these appeals for recognition themselves are valid. The need for 
intersubjective arguments to evaluate these appeals means that the oral narrator, the writing author and 
the interpreting reader have to acknowledge that, in engaging with each other in the apparent solitude of 
print, they have already entered a potentially unlimited public debate on the validity of the oral narrator's 
appeal for recognition. 
2. Collaborative auto/biography as interface between alternative, 
counter-, and hegemonic public spheres 
In his normative history of the transformations of the European bourgeois public sphere, Habermas, on 
the one hand, extracts general principles of public deliberation which coincide with his speech act theory 
and, on the other hand, describes the concretisation of these principles in social practices and institutions. 
The question which guides his inquiry is how the general conditions of the possibility of the intersubjective 
production of truth and identity through recognition are differently institutionalised in various concrete 
historical, material, cultural and social contexts. Most of the criticisms of Habermas's theory boil down to 
the assertion that he hypostatises one version of the public sphere and declares it as the public sphere. It 
has been argued that the focus on the bourgeois public sphere fails to take into consideration a multiplicity 
of concurrent or even counter-publics and distinctive modes of communication shaping each of them. It 
can be expected that the concretisation of the conditions of the possibility of the intersubjective generation 
of truth and identity in the public spheres in which The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena have been circulating will differ from the European bourgeois public sphere which 
Habermas describes. 
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As was mentioned before, Habermas (STPS :58) associates the evolution of the public sphere in Europe 
with an 'influx of rational-critical arguments [ ... ]with whose aid political decisions could be brought before 
the new forum of the public'. The press, as the standard-bearer of a reasoning public, became an 
oppositional force and its task to criticise government was institutionalised. Sidelined in the official public 
fora, weaker parties relied on the press as a site in which they could conduct their political struggles and 
as a medium through which they could bring their issues to the public sphere (STPS :63). In the 1970s 
and 1980s, when Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena was published, access to the institutions of the 
formal public sphere was restricted.28 The majority of South Africans, like the British of the seventeenth 
century, had no or only minimal formal representation in the public fora that deliberated and decided on 
the laws which governed them. Exclusion and fragmentation also characterised the informal public 
sphere, which is the focus here. Unlike Habermas's description of the British press of the seventeenth 
century, the mainstream media in South Africa served predominantly as an ideological instrument rather 
than a critical public sphere. As a result, the mainstream media offered little space to parties excluded 
from the official public sphere to conduct their political struggles. Alongside this hegemonic public 
sphere29 , a multiplicity of alternative and counter-publics associated with the Mass Democratic Movement 
started to develop.30 These multiple public spheres were separated along language, racial, geographic, 
and political lines. Illiteracy and semi-literacy, along with the prohibitive price of books, barred many 
readers from a public sphere constituted by the printed word. In addition to these cultural, social and 
economic barriers, censorship effectively excluded many voices and viewpoints from wider circulation. By 
the time of the publication of The Calling of Katie Makanya, participation in the democratic formal public 
sphere was no longer limited to whites. The informal public sphere had seen several restrictions like 
bannings and political censorship lifted. The debates in oral fora were no longer driven by the necessities 
of the liberation struggle nor policed by the apartheid state. However, financial constraints worsened for 
both readers and publishers, with publishers becoming even less adventurous than before. Also, certain 
alternative and counter-publics turned mainstream as journals such as Staffrider and papers such as Vtye 
Weekblad and New Nation closed down. Formally, these alternative and counter-publics distinguished 
themselves from the hegemonic public into which the collaborative auto/biographies were inserted by the 
prominence afforded to the spoken over the written word; by their restricted or circuitous connections to 
and impact on official institutions; and conversely, by their comparative closeness to social movements 
associated with the churches and activist politics. 
It was against this backdrop that Elsa Joubert drafted her acceptance speech to the Royal Society in 
London on 17 June 1981, which awarded her the Winifred Holtby prize for The Long Journey of Poppie 
Nongena. In her speech she remarked on the pleasure she derived from 'shar~ng] this deeper knowledge 
of Africa which I gained through her [Eunice N.], with thousands of Afrikaans readers who read this book' 
(Joubert papers). Stressing that her aim was not to write a political pamphlet (Interview), Joubert 
expressed her hope that The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena would speak to the hearts of her English 
readers too. With the publication of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, Joubert had a clear idea of who 
her reading public should be. In addition, she also had a distinct sense of how she wanted the book to be 
read. Unlike other South African authors who saw their literary production as part of the international anti-
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apartheid struggle, she felt uneasy with the welcome The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena received from 
some sectors of the anti-apartheid movement, to the extent that she actively sought to control the use of 
the book and its derivatives for overtly political purposes.31 Joubert emphasised that she and Eunice had 
often said that they were writing the book for the sake of their children, who 'share a common heritage, a 
common land, and will share a common future', and that the book 'was an attempt to combat barriers of 
ignorance and prejudice that exist between our peoples' (Final version of Royal Society speech. Joubert 
papers).32 
Speaking in Durban in 1998 about The Calling of Katie Makanya: a Memoir of South Africa, first published 
in South Africa by David Philip, Margaret McCord remarked, When I wrote this book I was thinking of the 
American public and I wanted to get the story out to the American public. So I wrote it for the general 
public; I didn't mean it to be an academic treatise' (Interview with Thengani Ngwenya, forthcoming, e.a.). 
McCord asserted that, in giving a detailed account of Katie's life to this general US-American public, her 
purpose was to correct the distorted image this readership had of South Africans. She wanted to show 
North Americans that black South African women did not step out of Tarzan or The Jungle Books, but that 
they were already modern (in North American terms) at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
The irony of the tension between the locations and the contents of their utterances seems to escape 
McCord and Joubert. Both expressed a clear sense of the reading public (North-American/Afrikaner) they 
wanted to reach and the effect they wanted to achieve. However, they both articulated these aims in a 
context (Durban/London) which reveals the extent to which the books had burst the boundaries of the 
reading public for which they had originally been intended. The publication histories and reading 
trajectories of both books confirm that, whilst the original recording takes place between a specific oral 
narrator and writing author, and writing authors may aim at a specific reading public, this runs contrary to 
the notions of writing and the public sphere. Like all other books, as they leave the moorings of the site of 
production, collaborative auto/biographies drift into a public sphere in which oral narrators and writing 
authors lose control over their dissemination and reception.33 What distinguishes collaborative 
auto/biographies from other books, though, is that their relations of production and consumption as well as 
their double authorship pull in different directions right from the start. The publicly-oriented self-reflection 
taking place in a face-to-face oral context is subject to different communicative considerations than those 
applying to the wider audience at whom this publicly-oriented self-reflection is aimed. Also, whilst writing 
authors often strain to prime the books for a specific audience, the oral narrator's movement amongst a 
multiplicity of public spheres combined with the universalism of her claims for recognition, pull in the 
direction of as wide a reading public as possible. 
The publishing trajectories, dissemination, and actual readership of both The Calling of Katie Makanya 
and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena34 are concrete examples of how books disregard intended 
boundaries.35 Debates about the implied reading public of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena are 
evidence of the diversion between the intended and the actual readership. 36 Although she primed the 
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book for a narrow audience, Joubert was unable to direct and contain the universalist tendencies in the 
oral narrator's utterances37 and inherent to print and the modern public sphere. The medium of print and 
the economics of publishing houses which feed on and direct global circuits of dissemination combine to 
project collaborative auto/biographies into ever-wider and diverse public spheres than those which writing 
authors commonly claim to have in mind.38 Both the above texts, which had been primed for a specific 
reading public, soon found themselves in circulation in very different local or even in global public 
spheres.39 
This diversity of readership raises some questions regarding appeals for recognition in the public sphere: 
What does the divergence between the writing author's intended readership and the actual readership tell 
us about the nature of the public sphere as such? And what are the implications of this for collaborative 
auto/biographies as bearers of appeals for recognition? These questions take us back to the objections to 
Habermas's theory of the bourgeois public sphere, namely that it neglects the significance and normative 
structures of other public spheres, thereby creating a false image of a singular public sphere. Whilst 
Habermas's account lacks attention to diversity, those views which prioritise the different fragmentary 
public spheres lack an account of the interaction between these diverse public spheres. Such an account 
is necessary for various empirical and normative reasons. Empirically, different publics tend not to be 
insular but rather porous (Mbembe 2002:259).40 Through the transference of contents, participants and 
styles, public spheres intersect, be that as equals or not. Normatively, an account of this interaction is 
essential for our understanding of democracy. To begin with, if a public is a counter-public (rather than an 
alternative public), it by definition also speaks against other/hegemonic publics.41 Furthermore, since 
democracy entails that everyone who is affected by it participates in the deliberation and judgement of an 
issue, we need an account of how different public spheres relate to each other when deliberations and 
decisions regarding matters of common concern are at stake. Because publics interact and because 
matters of common concern will always arise as long as people are sharing a future in a common 
geographical space, there will always be some instances where participation in a common public sphere is 
required.42 Whilst it is certainly correct to distinguish different public spheres and even to suggest that 
people in these distinctive public spheres 'must work amongst their own people to create conditions for the 
destruction of [ ... ] oppression' (Nkululeko 1987:101), collaboration on common issues in sites of 
intersection is also necessary. Collaborative auto/biographies, it could be argued, constitute such an 
interface where exclusionary public spheres overlap with alternative or subaltern counter-publics. More 
specifically, they are attempts to mediate between the public spheres in which working-class narratives of 
the self by oral narrators circulate and the public spheres in which the comparatively leisured classes, who 
consume texts by publishers like Tafelberg and David Philip, are found. 
The notion that there is not just one but diverse public spheres which could be contesting each other, 
assists our understanding of the unique positions of writing authors and oral narrators of collaborative 
auto/biographies. Oral narrators do not inhabit some no-man's land, waiting to gain entry to speech and a 
public sphere via the mediation of writing authors as the term 'breaking the silence' (Lenta, 1984) implies. 
Rather, writing authors and oral narrators alike typically inhabit several different public spheres. In most 
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cases, each of the collaborators draws more heavily on one of these public spheres than the other. 
Because of their different roles in the collaboration, oral narrators and writing authors also cross over 
differently into different public spheres. As auditors, writing authors tend to listen across the periphery of 
their public sphere. As addressors, oral narrators tend to perform across the periphery of theirs.43 
Furthermore, various vectors of dependency determine that narrators (who are commonly in subordinate 
social positions) are more familiar with the behaviours and cultural idioms of writing authors (who are 
typically in superior social positions), be it because they strive to emulate the more powerful, or because 
they have to master hegemonic codes in order to negotiate their own dependency more successfully. 
Both Eunice N. and Katie Makanya are typical examples of migrants who crossed a variety of geographic, 
cultural, and social boundaries - be it out of choice, necessity, or chance, or because they were coerced 
into doing it.44 As a result, they possessed a double or multiple consciousness (Du Bois, 1999:11; Bruce, 
1999:236-244; Gilroy, 1993:1-40; and Lugones, 2000:175-176) and were connected to a variety of 
crisscrossing publics which differed from or even opposed the hegemony of the public spheres of the 
readers which Joubert and McCord had in mind.45 Katie is clearly aware of this because she explicitly 
presents her narrative as an alternative or even counter-discourse to James McCord's My Patients were 
Zulus, which had been published a short while before the recording of her narrative.46 Whereas James 
McCord's perspective transcends individual patient histories and concerns itself with the issues he dealt 
with as a white man inside the institutional power of the medical profession and the American Mission 
Board, Katie's view is a different one premised on her gender as well as her racial and educational 
position. Excluded from institutional management, her perspective is a corrective which is closer to the 
ground and adds the personal histories47 to the institutional one. Her countering of Tarzan and The Jungle 
Book discourses on Africa circulating in the US public sphere explains why Margaret McCord prioritises 
certain aspects of Katie's narrative. Katie's Christianity, her early induction into written culture, and her 
musical performances before Queen Victoria and the British aristocracy all serve to speak against 
Hollywood and Kipling's images. 
There is less evidence that Eunice was consciously countering discourses circulating in a hegemonic 
public sphere. Stunted in her educational development by economic, gendered, and racial restrictions, 
she was more tied to the domestic sphere than Katie (both in her work as a housemaid and in her 
devotion to her family). Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena can nevertheless be understood as posing a 
counter- and alternative discourse to the discourses circulating in the dominant public spheres of the 
1970s and 1980s. The mainstream Afrikaans and English media oriented towards the political and 
economic ruling classes were saturated with news on political violence. Oppositional voices, if they were 
heard at all, were mostly framed as diabolical. This, along with the headline sensationalism of reporting, 
meant that the dominant public spheres were compromising their oppositional and argumentative roles. 
Deprived of access to the press and the electronic media of the mainstream, oppositional forces formed 
alternative and counter-publics in the form of demonstrations and mass meetings in which, as was 
mentioned in the discussion of The Diary of Maria Tholo (on p 18 above), the oral gained importance over 
the written word. In this sense, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena constituted an alternative and counter-
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discourse in that it went beyond headline news, providing one of the most extensive narratives of a black 
South African woman's life, told by herself. It opposed the cliches of the media in the hegemonic public 
sphere with the subtleties of an extensive autobiographical text. It countered the sensationalism of the 
photographic images, which freeze youths in the act of throwing a petrol bomb, with the extensive and 
detailed account of a family's history and life under the state of emergency. As a published version of an 
oral narrative it crossed the boundaries established by the media and inserted a new voice with different 
perspectives and priorities into the mainstream public sphere. Thus it countered the white male voices of 
government reminiscent of Van Riebeeck's with the narrative of a Xhosa woman, and prioritised the 
domestic sphere, showing how the political and the economic impinge on family and home life.48 
As is evident from the two examples of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena, collaborative auto/biographies constitute an interface between alternative, counter-, and 
hegemonic public spheres in that they use the vehicles of the hegemonic public sphere (such as printed 
books published by institutions like Tafelberg) to convey the narratives of those persons who are generally 
deprived of access to these media. That collaborative auto/biographies circulate in more than one public 
sphere should come as no surprise. To begin with, because they are, by definition, the work of two very 
differently situated people, they draw on the discursive resources of more than one public sphere in their 
articulation of the oral narrator's life. But more importantly, oral narrators like Eunice N. and Katie 
Makanya are more often than not migrants between various public spheres. As a result, oral narrators are 
usually well versed in addressing different interlocutors in diverse idioms. Being strangers in various 
locations, oral narrators are also likely to have a decentred and reflective attitude to the values which 
inform their actions. Since, as migrants and cosmopolites, they do not automatically adhere to the norms 
of an insulated 'home' culture, they cannot count on unquestioned recognition from members of a 'home' 
public sphere. Consequently, they are more likely to have multiple audiences in mind for their appeals for 
recognition. In addressing their appeal for recognition to multiple publics, they do not lapse into relativism 
but perform the universalist claims characteristic of communicative reason. In Young's words, 'Since a 
public forum is in principle accessible to anyone, appearing in public involves a kind of transcendence' 
(2000:169). To be sure, this is not a transcendence which goes beyond discourse. It is the 
transcendence - inherent in speech - of the confines of a single public sphere. 
This tension between the writing authors' priming of the discourse for a specific reading public and the oral 
narrator's attempts to move beyond the parochial to the universal is characteristic of collaborative 
auto/biography. It shows in the disjuncture between writing authors' attempts to elicit recognition for oral 
narrators by evoking a decidedly premodern face-to-face intimacy between them and a specified reader, 
on the one side, and the medium in which they do it, namely published print, on the other side. 
Paradoxically, it is the writing authors who seek to evoke the immediacy of a face-to-face situation in 
which 'real persons [are] in dyadic author-reader interactions', which is reminiscent of a clearly 
circumscribable preprint parochial oral public sphere, where deliberation takes place 'among already 
present interlocutors' (Warner 2002:82). And it is the oral narrators whose modernity shows in their 
cosmopolitanism; their mobility between public spheres; and the universalist nature of their appeals for 
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recognition that attain concrete reality in the age of print. Oral_ narrators are thus better aligned with the 
mutually reinforcing coincidence between the universalist features of speech identified in Habermas's 
speech act theory; the universalism of claims for recognition; and their circulation amongst potentially 
unlimited reading publics engaged in deliberation on the validity of these claims.49 Seen in this light, the 
diversity of readership and public spheres is not a problem. They are rather the condition of the possibility 
of addressing a potentially unlimited reading public with universalist appeals for recognition, which 
becomes a possibility in the age of the technical reproduction of the narrative reconstruction of appeals for 
recognition. so 
3. Relations of recognition in the public sphere 
Having identified the universalist implications of appeals for recognition located at the interface of various 
public spheres, the dynamics of recognition in collaborative auto/biography can now be sketched. The 
focus will be on similarity and difference; the relationships between individual and collective appeals for 
recognition; and the connections between recognition and redistribution. 
Because collaborative auto/biography as a site of recognition is located at the interface of various public 
spheres, similarity and difference are central too it. Many views on collaborative auto/biography are 
inconsistent because they confuse or combine (in incompatible ways) what I will suggest are two different 
levels of recognition and their respective connections to similarity and difference. On the one hand, the 
view is held that readers can understand the oral narrator because she is sufficiently similar to them and 
that recognition too is based on this similarity.st The problem with this view of recognition is that it turns 
recognition into identification or assimilation; and where identification and assimilation are not possible, the 
alternative is elimination.s2 The flipside of this first position, which prioritises similarity, is the view that 
prioritises difference, asserting that understanding across difference is not possible and that what the oral 
narrator seeks recognition for is an exceptional identity, which the reader cannot understand without 
appropriating it. As a result, recognition should be based on the unquestioning acceptance of these 
inscrutable differences.s3 The problems with this view is that it often combines with notions of nativist 
exceptionalisms4 , and that it is difficult to account for the possibility of recognition at all if understanding 
across difference is not possible and identities are inscrutable to outsiders. Such assertions of 
exceptionalism and inscrutability can easily be used as an excuse to fend off public critique of 
discriminatory values, which would not withstand the test of intersubjective deliberation.ss Following Young 
and Habermas, I would like to propose a third option which holds that intersubjectively founded recognition 
of both similarity and difference is possible and desirable in societies where there are significant 
differences between members -which is to say, all (modern) societies. 
In order to gain a better grasp of the relevance of similarity and difference, I propose a distinction between 
two separate categories of recognition. The first category is the recognition of someone as an interlocutor 
in a communicative community, which prioritises similarity. The second category is the recognition of an 
interlocutor's distinctive values, which prioritises difference. Collaborative auto/biographies often embrace 
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both of these forms of recognition and thus require of us to recognise both the similarity and the difference 
of the oral narrator. When an oral narrator appeals for recognition as an interlocutor, she asserts that she, 
like the reader, has those formal communicative competencies that entitle her to participate in a 
communicative community. In other words, that she can raise and respond to validity claims, backing 
them up with arguments aimed at intersubjective understanding and consensus (See the discussion of 
Lara [1998:32] on p 39 above). Two areas of participation, in turn, need to be distinguished: participation 
in the informal public sphere (understood as fora like publications, the electronic media, coffee houses 
and shebeens, citizens meetings, funerals, marches and so on that are associated with civil society), or 
participation in the formal public sphere (such as speaking and voting in town councils and parliaments, 
that are associated with government and the state). The existence of an informal public sphere and its 
difference from the formal public sphere is important in understanding the social workings of collaborative 
auto/biography. Because entrance to the various informal public spheres is harder to police than 
participation in the institutionalised public spheres, oral narrators who are excluded from both the formal 
and the dominant informal public spheres can gain access to these alternative informal fora. Alternative 
informal public spheres often serve as portals in which oral narrators can contest the criteria of 
participation or raise their claims to participation in the formal public fora, which have decision-making 
powers. In addition, informal public spheres also serve as fora in which issues can be brought to public 
attention and be widely discussed, be that in anticipation of decisions to be made in the formal public fora 
or in order to challenge them. 
Appeals for recognition prioritise difference when an oral narrator seeks public recognition, not for her 
formal competence as interlocutor, but for the substantial content of her particular and distinct values, 
which are concretised in the life choices that come to light in her narrative of herself. Examples of such 
substantive values expressed by Katie and Eunice include an ethics of care; faith in a Christian god; 
perseverance in the face of hardship; frugality and hard work. In terms of Benhabib's extension of 
Habermas's discourse ethics, only those values which can withstand rational intersubjective scrutiny 
deserve recognition (1992:178-190). This is necessary in order to eliminate those discriminatory values 
which could not find the reasoned support of all who are affected by them.56 Staging appeals for the 
recognition of values in terms of similarity with the reader soon turns out to be counterproductive. Given 
the openness of the public sphere as such and the nature of books as commodities whose trajectories of 
dissemination cannot be predetermined, similarities with the intended reading public are soon perceived 
as differences from members of other reading publics. For example, Katie and Eunice's Christian values 
may be mirrored in some American and Afrikaner readers, but these values soon become a source of 
difference, as the readership stretches beyond the initial, narrowly conceived, reading public. Even some 
of the intended Afrikaner and American readers are likely to experience some of the oral narrators' values 
as source of difference rather than similarity. If recognition as an interlocutor rests on substantial 
similarities, then the oral narrator could at best hope for recognition from a very limited discursive 
community. 
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In the light of the above, I propose that Joubert's emphasis on similarity be interpreted as applying to 
recognition of the oral narrator as an interlocutor in the communicative community and that her emphasis 
on difference applies to recognition for the oral narrator's distinctive values respectively. When Joubert 
says the following: 
Die wonderlikste van die hele ervaring van Poppie was vir my die aanklank wat dit by die volk 
gevind het. Soos die onbekende man uit 'n klein Vrystaatse dorpie wat my een oggend gebel 
het om te se die lokasie was vir horn nog net altyd 'n hool waaruit rook trek. Nou is dit vir 
horn 'n plek waar mense woon. Ek dink die soeke wat ek gevoel het, was latent by elkeen, 
by die hele volk - ek het dit maar net verwoord. As 'n mens weet, breek dit die versperring 
van vrees af. 'n Mens moet besef daar is verskille. Ek en Poppie sal nooit alles kan deel nie. 
Maar ek weet nou waarom sy sekere dinge doen en aanvaar dit. Ons moet in die laaste 
instansie die verskille erken en aanvaar, maar bou op die ooreenkomste [rhe best thing 
about the whole experience of Poppie for me was the echo it found in the volk. Like the 
unknown man from a small Free State town who phoned me one morning to say, to him the 
location had always been just a hole from which smoke rises. To him, it is now a place 
where people live. I think the searching that I felt was latent in everyone, in the whole volk - I 
just put it into words. One has to realise there are differences. Poppie and I will never be 
able to share everything. But I now know why she does certain things and I accept it. In the 
final instance we must recognise and accept the differences but build on the similarities] (Die 
Volksblad, 11 April 1979:n.p.) 
she should be taken to assert that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena provides sufficient evidence for the 
claim that the oral narrator has the required formal communicative competence. This is the only similarity 
that is required and which serves as the basis for acceptance into the communicative community. This 
prioritisation of similarity is the basis for the demand for participation in the informal and formal public 
spheres, which was also voiced by many other individuals and associations in the Mass Democratic 
Movement of the time. It is also this acceptance of the oral narrator as a full participant into the 
communicative community which makes it possible for her to articulate her appeal for recognition for her 
distinctive values. The acceptance or rejection of these values is a matter of deliberation amongst 
members of the communicative community, who are affected by them. 
So far we have dealt with the question to which extent collaborative auto/biography provides a site in 
which oral narrators can raise claims for recognition as individuals. In his critique of The Long Journey of 
Poppie Nongena, Carlean (1989:56) objects that such a focus on the recognition of the individual, which is 
common in the reception of collaborative auto/biography, is 'hardly the stuff of politically radical work' 
which is 'obliged to privilege collectivity'.57 The question we need to deal with then is how individual and 
collective recognition are connected and to what extent collaborative auto/biographies also serve as sites 
for appeals for collective recognition. Indeed, many oral narrators, writing authors and critics alike stress 
that oral narrators in collaborative auto/biographies do not only or primarily raise appeals for individual 
recognition, but that they also represent their communities.58 According to Beverley (1996:28), the oral 
narrator often 'evokes an absent polyphony of other voices, other possible lives and experiences'. In 
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speaking 'for, or in the name of, a community or group', the oral narrator approximates 'the symbolic 
function of the epic hero, without at the same time assuming his hierarchical and patriarchal status' 
(Beverley 1996:29). 
Two notions of representation, which are often conflated, need to be held apart here. The first is that the 
oral narrator represents a collective which is excluded from the hegemonic informal public sphere, in the 
sense that she speaks on their behalf, demanding equal status as interlocutors for all of them. This is 
what Katie did when she spoke on behalf of African women to oppose the regulation of their presence in 
public by way of the extension of the pass system.59 The second notion of representation is that the oral 
narrator represents them in the sense that she stands in for, or is exemplary of them. A connection 
between these two relations of representation is often established when the legitimation for the oral 
narrator to represent a group (in the sense of speaking on their behalf) is derived from the fact that she 
represents them (in the sense of having an identical identity). The view that the oral narrator's notion of 
the good life is similar to that of other members of her community may be supported by the argument that 
in traditional communities, where there is little social differentiation and much social cohesion, one 
member of the community can raise claims for the recognition of everybody else's values. However, this 
view has to be rejected on various counts. It rests on the false assumption that traditional communities 
are internally undifferentiated, that gender, caste, age and so on do not impact on the values of individuals 
- in other words, that the oral narrator and the collective she stands in for share identical identities. Even 
if this may be the case for traditional communities (which I doubt), it would not apply to collaborative 
auto/biographies of modem individuals like Katie and Eunice. The fact that she collaborates with a writing 
author in the production of the narrative of her life, in itself signals the difference between the oral narrator 
and her community. By representing them in the sense of talking on their behalf, oral narrators like Katie 
and Eunice cannot represent them in the sense of standing in for their identities. If an oral narrator does 
make an appeal for the recognition of those values she shares with others (like Katie's appeal for the 
validity of the values informing her and Dr James McCord's common commitment to healing the sick 
through the use of modern medicine}, these values are not rooted in cultural or ethnic similarity. 
The theory presented here sees identities as constructed by, amongst other things, relationships of 
recognition. Recognition has recently become a favoured term in identity politics in metropolitan theory. 
Prioritising a notion of recognition that rests satisfied with a psychological reaction runs the risk of 
substituting doing good for feeling good (Sommer 1996:141). Amina Mama adds a further warning. She 
notes: 'The English word identity is closely linked to others - the notions of integrity and security. I would 
like to suggest that much of what we are grouping under the dubious rubric of "identity politics" is actually 
about popular struggles for material redistribution and justice, and related desires for existential integrity 
and security. Put simply, poverty is probably the worst threat to integrity and security worldwide. It is a 
threat that cannot be adequately addressed through the cultural lip-service strategy of recognition and 
celebration, because poverty, and its offspring, insecurity and loss of integrity, are all matters of global and 
local political economy, matters that demand redistribution and justice' (Mama, 2002:3). 60 
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There have been several indications above that recognition in an intersubjectivist theory of collaborative 
auto/biography is tied to a theory of justice. Even though it contains emotional and psychological 
components, recognition in the way I have been using it here is not just a psychological reaction. As a 
theory of participation in the informal and formal public sphere and as a theory of recognition of oral 
narrators' values, recognition has a distinct political, social, cultural, and economic character. The political 
dimension inheres in insisting that the recognition of others who have the formal communicative 
competence implies giving them full rights of political participation in civil society and government. The 
cultural aspect resides in the reciprocal critique of and learning from the values of others in the 
communicative community. The social and the economic aspects reside in the implication that those 
forms of civil society which are preconditions for deliberation need to be fostered and that collectives and 
individuals need to be supplied with the resources {material, education, time) required for participating as 
equals in rational deliberation on those values for which oral narrators seek recognition. 
4. Responses to appeals for recognition raised in 
'Die Swerfiare van Poppie Nongena' and 'The Calling of Katie Makanya' 
If collaborative auto/biographies are construed as, amongst other things, appeals for recognition 
addressed to a reading public, then the response to such an appeal is no longer of marginal interest to 
literary studies, but central to a theory of collaborative auto/biography. Both McCord and Joubert have 
foregrounded the importance of the social response in stating that the promotion of understanding 
amongst their readers the oral narrators Katie Makanya and Eunice N. respectively was one of their aims 
in writing. At the UK launch of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena, Joubert declared, 'Writing and then 
translating was a very fulfilling task. It gave me a new perspective, it was a privilege to get to know this 
one black family so intimately. My one wish is that it should bring greater understanding and knowledge to 
the reader, in the way that it brought greater understanding and empathy to me' {16 July 1980. Joubert 
papers). In similar vein, McCord has commented, 'While I was writing the book, I had the American public 
in mind. Back in 1954 the popular view of South Africa and of the continent as a whole was still dominated 
by Tarzan of the Apes and Kipling's Jungle Book. I wanted people here [the USA] to appreciate the fact 
that barely seventy years after the first Europeans landed in Natal, there were Zulus {only a few to be 
sure) coming here and to England for a university education' {McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, 
forthcoming). 
In contrast to the original addressees, Joubert and McCord, whose publication of the oral narrator's 
narratives can be conceived as affirming acts of recognition, the addressees of the printed book are a 
silent party whose acts of recognition can only be indirectly communicated as readers' response, often in 
the public sphere. Heeding Moreiras's reminder that there is a danger that 'the canonization of testimonio 
in the name of a poetics of solidarity is equivalent to its reliteraturization' {Moreiras, 1996:204) and his 
assertion that 'solidarity is not a literary response, but that which suspends the literary in the reader's 
response' {ibid.:202), means that we need to expand our theory of collaborative auto/biography to 
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embrace the poetics of recognition as well as the 'hermeneutics of solidarity' (ibid.:203). Then the analysis 
relates the rhetorical techniques employed to elicit recognition to the question as to what extent did and to 
what extent do The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena succeed in eliciting 
the recognition that McCord and Joubert had signalled in the text and that Katie and Eunice sought from 
their audience. 
One response which signals the institutional recognition afforded to The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is the various prizes they were awarded. The Calling of Katie Makanya 
received the Alan Paton - Sunday Times Award for 1996. The Paton Award is for non-fiction English-
language books that have 'Southern Africa as a theme- either historical or contemporary'. Books entered 
must aim at the 'illumination of truthfulness, especially those forms of it which are new, delicate, 
unfashionable and fly in the face of power'. They should display, 'compassion; elegance of writing; and 
intellectual and moral integrity'.61 This formulation reminds us of the prize for Testimonio awarded by the 
Cuban Casa de las Americas (see fn 29 on p 175), which also amalgamates aesthetic and socio-ethical 
criteria. There is an intentional ambivalence about the connections between the recognition awarded for 
the protagonist of the book (Katie Makanya) and the author (Margaret McCord). Whilst the extension of 
the criteria for a book award in the direction of socio-ethical considerations is a welcome indicator of the 
awareness of the links between culture and society, one has to ask to what extent the aesthetic criteria 
means that appeals for recognition which do not meet the criterion of 'elegance of writing' are barred from 
consideration. 62 
Another problem with the amalgamation of the aesthetic and the socio-ethical recognition is the ideological 
effect of the aesthetic (Eagleton, 1990:9). To the extent that similarities are postulated in an aesthetic 
rather than a material plane, oral narrators such as Eunice's lives get transferred to an aesthetic realm 
where they lead a sanitised and depoliticised existence. Transferred to the realm of aesthetic universals 
(a fact exacerbated in the English translation by the depiction of the text as a novel}, the ways in which the 
actual Eunice's life differed from that of her white Afrikaans readers, are forgotten. As Schalkwyk (1986) 
has argued, when this disregard for difference is combined with an aestheticisation prevalent amongst a 
literary establishment under the influence of Leavis, the connection between the reader's politics and the 
real Eunice, and the possible critical effect of the text become obscured.63 In this regard, Steward van 
Wyk, in his article on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, quotes the warning words from George Steiner, 
"'[a] trained, persistent commitment to the life of the printed word, a capacity to identify deeply and critically 
with imaginary personages or sentiments, diminishes the immediacy of actual circumstances"' (Van Wyk, 
1992:37). Seen in this light, it remains an open question whether many readers perceive Joubert's 
'admirable transformation of the traditionally metaphysical preoccupations [ ... ] into the concrete, material 
details of everyday existence' (Schalkwyk, 1989:257) and whether recognition goes beyond sympathy for 
a character in a book to recognition for the real person behind it. 
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To what extent oral narrators perceive readers' responses as a positive echo to their appeals for 
recognition is an empirical question that would have to be established on the basis of oral narrators' 
utterances. That Katie was eager to find out about the readers' responses is evident from her impatience 
to have the book published (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 253). But her appeal for recognition would 
remain unanswered till the publication of the book forty years later. By that time she had already been 
dead for nearly as long. Eunice N., in contrast, seemed less eager to receive direct recognition, which 
may be traceable to the fact that she nonetheless did not initiate the writing of her narrative. Anecdotal 
evidence from Joubert suggests that she derived pleasure from the drama production of Poppie she had 
attended with some friends, even though they did not know about the fact that it was her life that was 
portrayed on stage (Interview). Since she too had passed away by the time of this research, it was 
impossible to find out from her how she perceived the responses to the book. It can nevertheless reliably 
be speculated that the fact that she chose to remain anonymous meant that the circle between her appeal 
for recognition and the response to it was never properly closed. That Eunice N. opted to avoid the 
problems that could arise from publicity rather than to identify herself as the potential recipient of 
recognition may even place a question mark behind the value of recognition relative to other goods, or the 
value of public recognition to some oral narrators who may be more concerned with the responses of their 
immediate community than responses by readers of the hegemonic culture (Compare Lugones 2000:175-
181 ). 
Given the connections between distribution and recognition argued for above (see pp 43 and 131), the 
financial rewards that sprang from Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya 
also need to be taken into consideration - whether one should take these rewards as a medium of 
recognition (Honneth 2002:19-38); as a precondition to recognition; or as a necessary addition to it. A 
selection of the available records gives an indication of the income generated by Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena in terms of royalties, rights and prizes. The original Afrikaans novel, Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena, published by Tafelberg, has seen several reprints even into the nineties. The Dramatic, Artistic 
and Literary Rights Organisation (DALRO) made royalty payments to Joubert to the effect of R1 132,06 for 
the period from 1 July to 31 December 1979; R1 125,47 for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1980; 
and R725, 14 for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1980. The English translation was sold to Hodder 
and Stoughton, who co-published with Jonathan Ball in South Africa. Tafelberg received£ 3 412-17 (R 11 
177,55), two thirds of which went to Joubert (R7 451,70). This amount included an instalment from W.W. 
Norton, who had bought the rights for publication in the USA from Hodder and Stoughton for $15 000 
(Letter to Joubert, 11 August 1987. Joubert papers). Precise information of the remaining twelve 
translations could not be gathered from the Joubert papers. A prepayment of DM 20 000 for the German 
translation was made to Tafelberg. It is not clear from the correspondence which percentage went to 
Joubert (Letter to Joubert, 31 October 1980. Joubert papers). The prize money won for Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena includes the Luyt Prize of R10 000 (at that stage, third only in value to the Booker and 
Nobel Prizes)64; the CNA Prize (R2 500)65 ; the W.A. Hofmeyr Prize awarded by Nasionale Boekhandel for 
publications done by them (R1 000)66; the Royal Society of Literature Award (under the Winifred Holtby 
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Bequest(£ 500))67 ; the Mario Fratti Book Award (awarded by the Outer Critics Circle of New York($ 500)) 
68
; and four West End awards for best actress, script, production, and music. The royalties for the stage 
productions were relatively small, as these were shared with the directors.69 Added up and divided into 
two, this means that Eunice and Joubert each collected a sizeable sum in South African terms at that 
time. Joubert noted that Eunice was, in fact, able to buy three houses, letting out two, and that, with 
Joubert's continued assistance, was able to put her children through tertiary education (Interview). 
Money matters stood differently with The Calling of Katie Makanya. To begin with, Katie asked McCord to 
write her auto/biography for her. Common practice in such circumstances is for the writing author to be 
paid. There seems to have been no agreement about the distribution of any possible profit, maybe 
because there were no expectations in this regard. Although I have not consulted documents on the 
income generated by the royalties of the book, some conclusions can be drawn by looking at the numbers 
published and the retail prices. In South Africa, David Philip's paperback edition sold at R101.00 a copy. 
There was also an abridged edition in English edited by Robin Malan, which sold at a retail price of 
R 112. 00. The abridged edition was translated into Xhosa - Ubizo Lu Katie Makanya - by Pamela Maseko. 
It sold at R53.00. The book was published by John Wiley & Sons in the USA. In April 1997 the hard cover 
started selling at$ 24.95. In February 1998 the paperback was launched onto the market at $ 14.95. In 
South Africa, further income was generated by the Sunday Times Alan Paton Prize (R50 000). Given the 
low percentage on royalties and the fall of the Rand against the dollar, the book thus generated a relatively 
small income compared to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. McCord has indicated her indignation at a 
question by an interviewer about the sharing of the income with Katie's grandchildren, noting that she 
herself, in fact, received very little from it, and that it added up to a miserable wage if divided by the hours 
of work she had put into the book. 10 
In addition to recognition bestowed on the individual oral narrator, a theory of collaborative auto/biography 
in which oral narrators raise appeals for recognition for a group, also needs to consider collective 
recognition. This is difficult for a variety of reasons; the most prominent being that it requires reflection on 
the relations between the cultural sphere of life-writing and the social sphere of politics. Such reflection on 
the relations between culture and society is curiously absent in Haberrnas's theory, an absence which 
Maria Pia Lara urges us to fill. A look at the response to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena nevertheless 
does give some indication of how the cultural and the social may be linked. In his response to the book 
published in the press, the Stellenbosch philosopher, Johan Degenaar, argued that it revealed the 
structural violence evident in South African society.71 This remark sparked a row amongst Afrikaner 
intellectuals spilling over into the local and national press (Sunday Times, 7 January 1979:n.p.). The 
effect of this debate was to popularise Galtung's concept of structural violence (seep 65 above) by linking 
it to a concrete person's life and showing how extreme economic and power inequalities translate into 
physical and mental suffering. Degenaar's response contributed to transferring Eunice's appeal for 
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recognition from the narrative to the argumentative domain. It also amplified Eunice's individual appeal for 
recognition into an appeal for collective political and economic recognition of a group, namely all those 
people excluded from political participation through the iniquities of apartheid. 
To what extent Eunice's appeal for recognition - conveyed by Joubert and translated by Degenaar into an 
appeal for political and economic justice - actually contributed to social and political change is hard to 
determine.72 Probably the most convincing argument against any social effect of Eunice's appeal for 
recognition emanating from the cultural sphere is that, in many respects, state oppression took a tum for 
the worse in the decade following the publication of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. It was only during 
the nineties that the situation started to improve.73 Yet, to conclude from the failure of one book to deliver 
spectacular social change that culture in general has no social effect, and that appeals for recognition 
voiced in the cultural domain are politically ineffectual, rests on confusion. It is not because these claims 
emanate from the cultural domain that their effect is limited. It is because no isolated event, be it cultural 
or social (such as the publication of one collaborative auto/biography; one strike; or one bombing), can 
bring about radical social change in a single stroke. Consequently, a comprehensive theory of 
collaborative auto/biography needs to locate the texts in a network of connections between a range of 
variables that include cultural activities (such as fiction, music, theory), social movements, economic 
structures and military action, in which a multiplicity of agents, structures, and actions combine to bring 
about social change. 
The social effect of The Calling of Katie Makanya is even harder to determine. Whereas the direct links 
with social injustice was established through the public debates surrounding Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena, no similar public debate followed the publication of The Calling of Katie Makanya. The fact that 
Katie had passed away and that the Mandela Republic had replaced the apartheid regime may serve as 
explanations for the limited public response in the form of debates on the recognition of Katie and the 
people she represents as equal interlocutors in a communicative community. A clue to another reason 
why it is difficult to determine the social effect of The Calling of Katie Makanya is given by Margaret 
McCord's statement that she was writing to correct the image of South Africans. McCord sought to 
transform what Habermas calls the speech system and what Fraser calls the sociocultural means of 
interpretation and communication (seep 41-43 above). In contrast to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, 
The Calling of Katie Makanya responds less to structural violence as explicated by Galtung than to what 
Bourdieu (1992:163-170) calls symbolic violence. It would be as audacious to expect a single book to 
alter the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication in one stroke, as it is to expect of a 
single book to transform society. But, as the responses to it indicate, it would be an underestimation of 
The Calling of Katie Makanya to disregard its effect on the ways in which black women of Katie's 
generation are represented and perceived. 
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This brief discussion of the relationships between culture and social change supports a position which 
rejects the extremes of placing all our hope on culture - and more specifically the aesthetic - as 
redemptive force in the way Adorno does, and Habermas's underestimation of the significance of culture 
and the aesthetic in struggles for recognition and social justice. 
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'Should we hold fast to the intentions of the Enlightenment, 
however fractured they may be, 
or should we rather relinquish the entire project of modernity?' 
Jurgen Habermas1 
'In English they say Ladies First, 
but I see that here this afternoon the men have spoken first and now the ladies, 
so you are going back to the old Zulu custom when the women are nothing. 
But now I speak. 
And what I want to know is, do you want to take us back to the old times?' 
Katie Makanya, 19542 
For several reasons a study like the present one has many shortcomings: because of the constraints of a 
dissertation; the way in which knowledge is generated; and the nature of the specific material this study 
deals with. Some of the shortcomings are immediately evident to me. To begin with, constraints of 
length mean that this dissertation is limited in scope. I have only been able to explore the usefulness of 
one theoretical approach to collaborative auto/biography as a possible alternative to those theories 
informed by the monological assumptions of modern European philosophy. This means that I have not 
compared my chosen theoretical approach to other approaches, amongst them the postmodern 
alternatives with which contemporary critical theory is implicitly in dialogue.3 Although I did not foreground 
the differences between them, in portraying a range of positions within contemporary critical theory 
understood in broad terms (from JOrgen Habermas's linguistic turn theory of communicative action to 
feminist positions represented by Seyla Benhabib, Maria Pia Lara, Nancy Fraser and Iris Young) I have 
nevertheless hinted at the variety of positions within contemporary critical theory and the ways in which 
especially Fraser and Young seek to dilute the incompatibilities between critical theory and 
postmodernism. I have also not stated explicitly whether or why the intersubjectivist approach may be 
generally more appropriate than the postmodern alternatives or where postmodern theses can be 
borrowed and reconciled with those of critical theory. 
In devoting attention to the ways in which contemporary critical theory can be made useful for the study of 
post/colonial collaborative auto/biography I am nevertheless implicitly drawn into a debate about the 
relative merits of various feminist theories to South African cultural and literary studies. In the debate on 
the applicability and value of 'humanistic and pragmatistic' American feminism (Lockett, 1996: 11 ); Helene 
Cixous' post-structuralist French feminism (Ryan, 1996:32); and British materialist feminism (De Reuck, 
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1996:41), I have developed one of the more neglected strands to which Jenny De Reuck (1996:41) 
alludes in this debate. My intention is less to assert the exclusive value of contemporary critical theory 
over these other approaches than to propose ways in which the debate could be expanded. It will suffice 
if I have succeeded in suggesting some ways in which the few forays into postcolonial critical theory that 
have been attempted (Gilroy, 1993; Dussell, 1998; Lazarus, 1999:16-67) can be fruitfully combined with 
the extensive work in feminist critical theory by authors such as Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Maria Pia 
Lara, and Iris Young. This is done in the belief that everyone, including the purported beneficiaries, stands 
to gain from the abolition of discriminatory inequalities (Benhabib, 1992:148) and the realisation of a just 
society in which it is possible to relinquish the false option between either dominating or being dominated 
(Arendt, 1981:34). 
Although I have merely alluded to collaborative auto/biographies from other regions (Latin- and North-
America, India, the West-Indies and Britain) and eras (the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries), my focus on two recent South African texts which display a high degree of novelization may be 
so specific that it cannot be applied to post/colonial collaborative auto/biography from other regions and 
epochs. It is possible though that insights gained here can be adapted to other contexts in ways which will 
challenge some of the ideas I offer, and by encouraging alterations and/or additions to critical theory, 
contribute to its ongoing transformation. If such an extension of theses developed here to other contexts 
proves impossible, at least the specificity of these two recent South African cases will have been 
illuminated. 
That constraints of length would make this study limited was already announced at the end of chapter II. 
There a list of five sets of questions was suggested as a framework within which the engagement between 
collaborative auto/biography and critical theory could be studied. I have dealt systematically with only 
three of these sets pertaining to the consensus theory of validity; the intersubjective generation of truth; 
and the intersubjective generation of identity respectively. Restrictions of length mean that I have not 
devoted separate discussion to collaborative auto/biography as a site of the intersubjective generation of 
just norms, and that references to the speech system were dispersed throughout the other sections. 
Another important issue alluded to at the end of chapter II, namely the connections between these five 
sets of questions, has been left unattended. 
Furthermore, the critique of Jurgen Habermas's version of critical theory remains largely restricted to 
exposing its deficits through an exchange - informed by feminist critical theory - with post/colonial 
collaborative auto/biography. Although such a critique provides pointers in which direction revisions could 
go, I have neglected to develop a positive account of a revised critical theory which can include the 
practice of post/colonial collaborative auto/biographies by women in its framework. Such a task would 
befall a study which covers similar terrain, but places the emphasis on the opposite direction of the 
interdisciplinary encounter between literature and philosophy than the emphasis on literature followed 
here. 
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Because I followed the route of an applied analysis of collaborative auto/biography in the light of critical 
theory, I have by implication at best also only set markers that may serve the elaboration of a 
comprehensive theory appropriate to collaborative auto/biography as a genre in its own right. Distilling 
such a 'pure' theory disentangled from the examples may provide greater clarity regarding the descriptive 
and normative principles that (may) inform the practice of collaborative auto/biography. At the same time 
the dangers of generalisation and venturing into a prescriptive poetics that usually accompany such 'pure' 
theory may go some way in explaining, if not in justifying, why I have not taken this step. There is thus 
clearly ample terrain to explore for those who may want to spell out a revised version of contemporary 
critical theory and those who wish to develop a comprehensive theory of post/colonial collaborative 
auto/biography informed by contemporary critical theory. 
Given the assumption defended in this study, namely that knowledge is intersubjectively generated, this 
dissertation does not pretend to be the final word on collaborative auto/biography in general or on Die 
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya in particular. Whilst I offer arguments 
in favour of one particular theoretical approach to collaborative auto/biography in general, and in favour of 
the specific interpretations of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya 
proposed here, the validity of the claims raised can only be ascertained in dialogue with other members of 
a potentially unlimited communicative community. Like Descartes (see p 25 above and fn 8 on p 156 
above), who wrote to Mersenne, 'I shall be very glad if people put to me many objections, the strongest 
they can find, for I hope that the truth will stand out all the better from them' (Descartes, 1991:172, vol Ill 
[111:297]) and like the oral narrators and writing authors treated here, I thus offer these arguments as part 
of an ongoing dialogue opened by the oral narrators and the writing authors and developed by the various 
critics that have preceded me. The claims floated here are at best preliminary truths in an open-ended 
dialogue in which the truth about Eunice N.'s and Katie Makanya's pasts; the success of their appeals for 
recognition; and the value of a theory of collaborative auto/biography drawing on contemporary critical 
theory to a certain extent lie in the future. 
The incompleteness of this study also lies in the nature of the genre of post/colonial collaborative 
auto/biography. I started off by writing that the impurity of collaborative auto/biography constitutes part of 
its appeal to literary and social studies (seep 7 above). This is not meant as an uncritical celebration of 
collaborative autobiography. To forestall such a misunderstanding I would have to add to my description 
of collaborative auto/biography as impure, that it is also flawed. This flaw certainly does not reside in its 
hybridity, but to the extent that one can say this of a genre, in the incompleteness of collaborative 
auto/biography. Collaborative auto/biography, as the brief genealogy sketched in chapter I suggests, has 
its origins in the dubious practices of colonial administration, advocatory discourse, and the sciences of 
man, all of which have been complicit in the control of populations and individuals throughout modernity. 
As the discussions in chapters Ill, IV, and V have shown, even though they may represent examples of 
facilitating rather than administrative, scientific, or advocatory discourses, the imperfections attached to 
the origins of collaborative auto/biography are also intrinsic to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The 
Calling of Katie Makanya. 
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The question is whether the emancipatory potentials inherent to collaborative auto/biography can be set to 
work against this genealogy. Relinquishing collaborative auto/biography as a viable genre for present and 
future writing because of this tainted history would be equivalent to the desire for a pure and transcendent 
break that, through rupture with an imperfect past, would usher in a utopian future. This is the messianic 
hope which informs the negative utopianism of first generation critical theory and the avant-garde. My 
purpose in pointing out the flaws in collaborative auto/biography is not to argue that the genre should be 
shunned. Instead, I would like to suggest that the pursuit of the unfinished project of collaborative 
auto/biography entails its transformation. Many of the justified critiques of collaborative auto/biography, for 
example that it is Eurocentric, apply equally to a range of cultural practices, such as philosophy and the 
novel. But, as feminists such as Genevieve Lloyd (1993:103-110) have argued regarding philosophy, and 
as postcolonial authors such as Zoe Wicomb have illustrated with the novel, collaborative auto/biography 
too can be transformed from the inside. 
That collaborative auto/biography harbours no emancipatory potentials and that it should be relinquished 
as a viable genre for oral narrators and writing authors may be a conclusion that some readers would 
draw from Zoe Wicomb's novel David's Story. In a sense Wicomb, whose objection to collaborative 
auto/biography was mentioned at the beginning of this study (p 7 above), uses David's Story, which is a 
fictitious collaborative auto/biography, to explore the ambiguities in collaborative auto/biography that 
disturb her.4 On the one hand, the character who writes David's story rehearses the familiar claim that she 
operates 'purely as amanuensis' adding, 'I am, as David outlined my task, simply recording' (Wicomb, 
2001 :2-3). On the other hand, she admits to having manipulated David's words and hints at the 
publishers role in this: 'during the final draft and with an anxious publisher breathing down my neck, [ ... ] I 
took liberties with the text and revised considerably some sections that he had already approved' (ibid.:3). 
Towards the end, her exasperation with these contradictions increases so that she concludes, 'It's 
impossible, this writing of a story through someone else.' The novel concludes with an unknown person 
destroying her rendition of David's story by shooting her computer so that, 
My screen is in shards. 
The words escape me. 
I do not acknowledge this scrambled thing as mine. 
I will have nothing more to do with it. 
I wash my hands of this story (ibid.:213). 
I would like to suggest that this ending and the despondency voiced by the character who writes David's 
story about the daunting task of writing an oral narrator's life need not be taken as an outright rejection of 
the possibility of producing collaborative auto/biography. It could also be read as an inquiry into the aporia 
associated with the genre as a way of exploring the conditions under which it might be possible to write 
collaborative auto/biography. The slide from the optimistic, even though self-contradictory, opening to the 
sceptical conclusion is thus a gauge of the deepening engagement with the inevitable complexities and 
contradictions of collaborative auto/biography. It also mirrors the awareness that emerges historically 
from the na"ive beginnings of collaborative auto/biography in the colonial project to the more critical 
143 
VJ. Collaborative auto/biography, an unfinished project 
dealings with it today. Grappling with these complexities and contradictions on the level of the relations of 
production; the form; and the relations of consumption of collaborative auto/biography means grappling 
with the unresolved antagonisms in reality that, according to the quote from Adorno heading the preface (p 
1 above), make their way into art. 
Wicomb has rightly argued that not only older forms of collaborative auto/biography such as Thomas 
Pringle's advocatory texts (see p 11 above), but also facilitating texts such as Die Swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya are fraught with problems. For this reason she has 
suggested that, instead of writing collaborative auto/biographies, authors should embark on literacy and 
creative writing projects so that people can write their own stories (2002:n.p.). She is of course correct 
that people deprived of the opportunity to write their own lives should be given the tools to do so - should 
they so wish - and that the writing of autobiography should be encouraged as a contribution to a 
democratic ideal in which everyone can enter that section of the public sphere in which print serves as 
medium of communication and deliberation. Where I beg to differ from Wicomb is that autobiographies 
emerging from such ventures should be considered the fruition of the genre of collaborative 
auto/biography. Whilst I would agree that autobiographies emerging from such creative writing and 
literacy projects might be one of the late fruits of collaborative auto/biography, I do not believe that they 
are the only way in which the genre of collaborative auto/biography may reach maturity. Rather, the 
coming of age of collaborative auto/biography as we know it so far, is not a switch to a different genre, but 
a transformed version of collaborative auto/biography itself. 
Furthermore, it is to be expected that its contribution to the completion of a communicatively transformed 
project of modernity will transform collaborative auto/biography itself. Since one of the purposes of 
collaborative auto/biography is to contribute to the institutionalisation of those conditions of communication 
under which it would be possible for the subaltern to speak and be heard, and this as a contribution 
towards the abolition of subaltemity, collaborative auto/biography seeks to bring to an end the conditions 
which necessitate it. This does not spell the end of collaborative auto/biography itself. Rather, if the 
completion of the project of modernity leads to greater equality across a range of categories, we can 
expect that the genre of collaborative auto/biography too will be transformed. Once it has contributed to 
its own emancipation from the accidental necessities of its origins in inequality, collaborative 
auto/biography (like painting emancipated from representationalism by photography) can move on to what 
it is actually about, namely the medium in which the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective constitution 
of truth and identity in publicly-oriented acts of self-reflection between equals comes to its right. 
One such an example of the transformation of collaborative auto/biography can be found in the spider-
written Finding Mr Madini (see also p 14 above). Finding Mr Madini combines the workshopped narratives 
of the self Zoe Wicomb calls for, with the pursuit of that alternative tradition in South African writing and 
society alluded to in chapter I in which understanding and recognition across a range of differences is 
possible. The book is the outcome of a weekly writing workshop for homeless people in Johannesburg 
run by Jonathan Morgan. s The facilitating position, and thus the narrative perspective, is passed on from 
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Morgan to one of the participants, Valentine Cascarino (Morgan et al, 1999:106 and 120 ff), and then to a 
second participant, Virginia Maubane (ibid.:191 ff.). The workshops, and consequently the book, were 
structured as a series of 'windows' in which participants had to sketch moments in their lives. These 
include the beginnings of their family history: a definitive moment story: and homeless living (ibid.:27). In 
addition to these narrative self-representations, the participants also write character sketches of each 
other and, on the basis of mutual visits, portray their interlocutors' current situation. A typical cycle 
consists of a narrative in which one participant (Pinky) pays a visit to another (Virginia) and writes about 
the latter. This is followed by a description of Virginia by another participant (Valentine). Virginia then 
goes on to tell two autobiographical stories about herself. The cycle is concluded by a sketch in which 
Virginia narrates her return visit to Pinky (ibid.:50-61 ). Once they were reduced to writing, these cycles 
were discussed amongst members of the group. The discussions deal with a range of issues: the quality 
of the writing: the truth of the claims raised; and the critique and recognition of the values informing the 
writer's life choices (Morgan et al, 1999:24 and 206). The accounts of these discussions reproduced in 
the book remind the reader of the exchanges in the salons and coffee houses described by Habermas 
and Benhabib (see p 37-39 above) and Jabavu's account of the interaction on the bus during which 
passengers 'explained themselves' to each other (seep 15 above). 
Contrary to the narrator in David's Story, the participants in this creative writing project are not haunted by 
quarrels about the impossibility of writing their miniature collaborative auto/biographies of each other. 
Instead, by 'tying knots in our tales, this one to that one, my one to your one' (ibid.: 3) they spin that "'web 
of narratives,'" we saw Benhabib (1992:198) refer to, in which the participants 'are both the author and the 
object,' and the 'self is both the teller of tales and that about whom tales are told.' The collaborators seem 
to share Benhabib's view that the 'individual with a coherent sense of self-identity is the one who succeeds 
in integrating these tales and perspectives into a meaningful life story. When the story of a life can only be 
told from the perspective of others, then the self is a victim and sufferer who has lost control over her 
existence. When the story of a life can only be told from the standpoint of the individual, then such a self 
is a narcissist and a loner who may have attained autonomy without solidarity. A coherent sense of self is 
attained with the successful integration of autonomy and solidarity' (seep 33-34 above). 
The call for the pursuit of the unfinished project of collaborative auto/biography developed here is not 
meant as an argument against projects Wicomb advocates in which people write their own 
autobiographies. In devoting such extensive attention to collaborative auto/biography I do not seek to 
valorise collaborative auto/biography above related genres like biography and autobiography. On the 
contrary, Ellen Kuzwayo's indictment that we Sit Down and Listen (see p 2 above) implies creating the 
possibilities for people who are still systematically marginalized - because they are deprived of the cultural 
and material means of production - to write for themselves and that we then read what they have written.6 
But, if the arguments developed in chapters 111, IV, and V are correct, then such autobiographical texts too 
grapple with problems patently evident in collaborative auto/biography, namely the nature of the 
intersubjective generation of truth and identity in speech. The main difference is that these problems are 
so glaring in collaborative auto/biography that they invite a reflex reaction to relinquish the genre. This 
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hasty response in effect constitutes sacrificing a scapegoat (collaborative auto/biography) so as to tum a 
blind eye to similar problems inherent in autobiography. It is in the sense that collaborative auto/biography 
makes apparent the intersubjective nature of all writing on the self that it is not only often historically prior 
to autobiography, but also logically prior to it. This does not imply that collaborative auto/biography is of 
greater aesthetic or social value. The problems in collaborative auto/biography can therefore not be 
solved by changing genres. Instead the problems have to be resolved by transforming collaborative 
auto/biography through developing the utopian potentials inherent in it. This means stepping 'back onto a 
trajectory already begun' (Nuttall and Michael, 2000:301 (see p 21 above)) and responding to the 
messianic calling to keep alive the unfulfilled emancipatory potentials inherent in speech that are 
concretised in collaborative auto/biography. Sustaining this messianic calling is a dialectical process of 
identifying moments of successful and failed communication and recognition as well as reflecting on the 
relationship between these, as I hope to have done with Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The 
Calling of Katie Makanya. 
In closing this dissertation, I would like to propose an interpretation of the conclusions of The Calling of 
Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, which echoes Walter Benjamin's interpretation of 
critical theory as doing justice to the unfulfilled aspirations of the dead. In the conclusion to The Calling of 
Katie Makanya, Margaret McCord tells us that, on her last visit to Katie at her home in Adams Mission, 
Katie had expressed her impatience to see the published outcome of her narrative she had requested 
McCord to write. I would like to suggest that, in the light of the arguments offered in this study, it would be 
appropriate to interpret her ardour to have her narrative circulate in the public sphere (The calling of Katie 
Makanya: 253) as exceeding this individual publication. Instead, it expresses that utopian desire for the 
institutionalisation in society at large of those relations of social interaction that were foreshadowed in the 
relations of production necessary for the writing of her collaborative auto/biography. And when Poppie 
Nongena announces that she passes the responsibility for the future on to the children (Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena: 267 [354], Elsa Joubert notes 3 September 1976), this should not be understood as 
condoning of revolutionary violence. Instead, it is a calling to future generations to draw on the resources 
of communicative interaction in ways similar to Gandhi's practice of satyagraha (see p 12 above) in 
striving towards the realisation of the just society she was denied but which the collaborative 
auto/biography anticipates and seeks to materialise through the constitutive appearance (Schein) of 
relations of equality between the collaborators. 
To the extent that it is an anticipation of the materialisation of the relations of communication that are its 
precondition, the history of collaborative auto/biography up to the present is a pre-history. Collaborative 
auto/biography is informed by the assumption that, in the process of enlightenment, there are only 
participants. It is necessitated by the fact that inequalities of all kinds exist, many of them the effect of an 
unfair distribution of the benefits and advantages of modernity, which has the effect of excluding many 
people from participating in this project and sharing in its fruits. In true dialectical spirit, through its 
demands for recognition, collaborative auto/biography aims at abolishing those inequalities that still make 
the genre necessary. Whereas this pre-history of collaborative auto/biography is rooted in advocatory and 
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facilitating discourse, its actual coming of age would consist of texts which are not necessitated by such 
inequalities. Such a transformed collaborative auto/biography would go on constituting a site in which 
differently situated subjects would come to terms with the fact that truth and identity are intersubjectively 
generated and use this as an opportunity for the authentic interpretation of themselves and their needs. 
In contrast to those who suggest that we relinquish collaborative auto/biography because of its role as the 
handmaiden of that side of the Janus face of modernity (Dussel, 1999: 12) that are bent on appropriation, 
exploitation, and domination, I would rather endorse Terry Eagleton's suggestion that the future is rooted 
in the failures of the present. It is these failures which 'sketch the dim outlines of a future' (2002). This 
applies to critical theory, which served as a starting point for the analysis of collaborative auto/biography, 
but which gets transformed in the process of its engagement with colonial and postcolonial collaborative 
auto/biography. The same call for the transformation and completion of the unfinished project of 
modernity so that it is appropriate to post/colonial feminist interests also applies to the unfinished project 
of collaborative auto/biography. In this sense, the pursuit of the unfinished project of collaborative 
auto/biography and that other fatefully dialectical enterprise with which it is so deeply imbricated, namely 
the pursuit of the multiple, unfinished projects of modernities, echo each other. 
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between you and me 
how desperately 
how it aches 
how desperately it aches between you and me 
so much hurt for truth 
so much destruction 
so little left for survival 
where do we go from here 
your voice slung 
in anger 
over the solid cold length of our past 
how long does it take 
for a voice 
to reach another 
in this country held bleeding between us 
this body bereft 
this blind tortured throat 
the price of this country of death 
is the size of a heart 
grief comes so lonely 
Footnotes 
as the voices of the anguished drown on the wind 
you do not lie down 
you open up a pathway with slow sad steps 
you cut me loose 
into light - lovelier, lighter and braver than song 
may I hold you my sister 
in this warm fragile unfolding of the word humane 
hear oh hear 
the voices all the voices of the land 
all baptized in syllables of blood and belonging 
this country belongs to the voices of those who live in it 
this landscape leis at the feet at last 
of the stories 
because of you 
this country no longer lies 
between us but within 
it breathes becalmed 
after being wounded 
in its wondrous throat 
in the cradle of my skull 
it sings it ignites 
my tongue my inner ear the cavity of heart 
shudders towards the outline 
new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals 
From Antjie Krog (2000a): 'land van genade en verdriet' - I have followed Krog's translation from the cycle 
'Country of grief and grace' (2000b) even where it deviates from the original. 
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Preface 
1 A person is a person through other persons. For this and similar sayings in five other southern African languages, 
see Ellen Kuzwayo Sit Down and Listen (1990: 122). 
2 isthetische Theorie (1973: 16). 
3 The real identity of the oral narrator has still not been disclosed officially. In keeping with her wish to remain 
anonymous, I refer to her as Eunice N. to distinguish her from the protagonist of the book called Poppie Nongena. 
4 All Afrikaans quotes are from Elsa Joubert Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena (Tafelberg, Kaapstad: first edition, 
fifth reprint: 1980). All English quotes are from Elsa Joubert The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena (Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, Johannesburg in association with Hodder and Stoughton, London: 1980). 
5 All quotes are from Margaret McCord The Calling of Katie Makanya: a Memoir of South Africa (John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., New York: 1997). Margaret McCord is the penname of Peg Nixon. Nixon's maiden name is McCord. 
6 Contrast this to Chabani Manganyi's use of developmental psychology in his biography of Gerard Sekoto (1996). 
7 I believe that this can be done fruitfully. Indeed, one of the claims to be developed in chapter II is that the 
assumptions about the intersubjective generation of truth and identity are universal in the sense that they can be 
extrapolated from within the speech acts of every speaker. One starting point for the extrapolating of such 
intersubjectivist notions of the production of truth and identity in Southern Africa would be notions ofubuntu. For a 
similar immanent reconstruction of liberalism taking the Akan tradition as its starting point, see Appiah (31. 01. 
2002). 
8 Compare Nkululeko (1987: 105) and Maqagi's 'Who theorizes?' (1996:27-30) which is a reply to Lockett (1996:3-
26). Both Ryan (1988:1) and Lewis (1996:94-96) also caution against the appropriating stance of white feminism. 
9 In many ways this is a preparatory study, which explores issues to be developed in Ph.D. on post/colonial 
collaborative auto/biography in Philosophy at Basel University. In contrast to the dissertation in Philosophy, this 
dissertation in English emphasises issues connected to literary theory. Whilst the present one focuses on two South 
African texts, the later study includes texts from Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Europe from the 19th to the 21st 
centuries. 
1
° Kuzwayo 1999. See also Lockett, who holds that, '[i]t is our task, as white South African feminists, to listen to 
black women and not to impose our supposedly superior theoretical insights onto their lives' (1996: 18 also 22). 
11 For an argument against the logic of the exclusion of men from feminist studies, see Schalkwyk (1996:57-76). 
12 Objections to including Young under the rubric of critical theory may be countered with reference to common 
assumptions and her albeit critical engagements with critical theorists and the valuable extensions and refonnulations 
in critical theory that have flowed from this. Young may be considered a transition figure between critical theory 
and postmodemism of the kind advocated by Nancy Fraser (see Fraser in Nicholson, 1995). 
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I. Collaborative auto/biography and the emergence of an alternative tradition in South 
African writing 
1 Eunice and I talk. She says: madam, I don't have words anymore. (Note. 3 September 1976. Joubert papers). 
2 Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord, 1954:48) 
3 One problem foregrounded by most critics is the fact that the oral narrator's narrative is mediated and that editorial 
presence constitutes a distorting influence. See Kathleen Mullen Sands (1997); Ferguson (Introduction to Prince, 
1997, The History of Mary Prince); Dubow and Rose in their introductions to Sachs's Black Hamlet (1996:16, 32, 
42, 46); Kendall (Afterword to Nthunya, 1996: 169-170); and Wright (Introduction to Hourwich Reyher's Zulu 
Woman, 1999:ix-xvii). For the extensive contemporary debate in the Americas, see Thomas Couser (1988, 1989 
and 1998) and the discussion on Rigoberta MenchU's I Rigoberta Menchu; David Stoll's criticism ofMenchU (1999); 
and the various replies by Arturo Arias, (2001a) and in Arias ed. (200lb). 
4 For the equation of intimacy with the self and the mono logical production of truth to which the autobiographer has 
privileged access and which is traceable to Catholic confession, see Gusdorf(l980:35-36). 
5 Also in favour of seeing collaborative auto/biography as a genre in its own right are Carole Boyce Davies (1992:7); 
Thomas Couser (1998, 334-350); and Ted Rios and Kathleen Mullen Sands (2000). 
6 For an account of such a debate pertaining to collaborative fiction see Jones' article on A. S. Mopeli-Paulus and 
Peter Lanham's Blanket Boy's Moon (1995:601 - 612). 
7 On the connection between autobiography and democracy, see Nuttall and Michael (2000:298). 
8 Another silent choice I make is not to follow a poststructuralist reading of collaborative auto/biography. Whilst the 
intersubjectivist position I develop here has certain elements in common with poststructuralism, primarily its critique 
of the author as autonomous producer of his identity (Liitge Coullie, 1991 :3), it differs from those versions of 
poststructuralism which prioritise discourse over agency. Whereas Liitge Coullie describes identity in terms of 
relational subject positions (a view I could support), she does not include other subjects in these relations (ibid.:6). 
The theoretical view I defend, by contrast foregrounds the relations between subjects as mediated through speech. It 
is thus closer to the notion of identity Liitge Coullie develops a few years later in her essay '(In)continent I-stands: 
blurring the boundaries between self and other in South African women's autobiographies' ( 1996). 
9 Compare The Prince (1988:54-82). 
1
° Compare Leviathan ( 1991:62-72 and 117-129). 
11 Compare Jenseits von Gut und Bose (2. §36) and Zur Genealogie der Moral (1. §2; 2. § 11-12; 3. § 12) (Nietzsche, 
1999). 
12 Compare the various essays and interviews in Foucault Power I Knowledge (1980) and Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture (1988). 
13 See Axel Honneth (1992:13-19). 
14 According to Leon De Kock, 'it is arguably true that in South Africa there has been a strong trend towards 
representational capture across cultures. Such capture - often framed as understanding or reaching out across 
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boundaries - has in the past quickly become representational captivity. From this hypothesis, I argue that ifthere is a 
lesson to be learned from our many, interconnected histories, it is the tyranny of representation. Representation has 
often been coincident with action and in many cases, prior to action. After all, the image of Bushmen as despicable 
vagrants, and an ethnocentric discourse of vilification towards Bushmen, surely preceded their large-scale slaughter 
in this country in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' (DeKock, 1997: 223). I owe the suggestion that the whole 
of South African literature is a literature of resistance to Lewis Nkosi. 
15 For this reason, Habermas and more particularly Honneth have suggested a return to Hegel's earlier Jena writings 
to develop an alternative notion of recognition rooted in the dependence of the self on the other, which Hegel failed 
to develop. Habermas (PDM :31 ff.) and Honneth (1989:549-573 and 1992) have argued that this undeveloped 
alternative with its emphasis on communication and recognition between equals opens the possibility of theorising 
recognition as a central category in the relations between subjects meeting in discourse. 
16 Compare Culler (1989:175-179). 
17 In other words the speaker implies that her assertion that 'Understanding is misunderstanding' can be understood 
and that 'Understanding across difference is impossible' can be understood by interlocutors, even by those 
distinguished from her by some relevant difference. 
18 Compare Derrida's ( 1977) argument against Searle (1977) 
19 Aristotle Politics Ii 9 (1253a). 
20 A person is a person because of another person. On relationships of care as opposed to relationships of 
domination depicted in autobiography, see Magona (1999:80-84). 
21 For a similar approach to testimony in Latin America, which also uses the terminology of communicative action 
see Sanjines (1996:245-265). 
22 On Van Riebeeck and other settlers as founders of Afrikaans literature, see Kannemeyer 1978, vol l :17-19. 
23 For recent writing on Krotoa Eva see Bosman (1942:n.p.); Bloem (1999) and 
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Atlantis/4364/ For an overview of the representation of black women in South 
African writing by men starting with Krotoa Eva, see Lockett (1988:21-37). 
24 Coetzee bases his conclusion amongst others on Olaf Dapper's reconstruction (Naukerige Beschrijvinge der 
Afrikaensche Gewesten, 1688 which is based on Jan van Riebeeck's diary inscription and a letter he sent to the 
Directors of the VOIC in Holland) of the 'Hottentot' Eykamma's interlocution with his Dutch captors. Compare also 
the introduction to Van Riebeeck (1884:x-xii). On the emergence of writing in the contact zone, see Pratt Imperial 
Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (1992) and Thomas Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and 
Government (1994). Even when the gathering of this anthropological knowledge is apparently legitimised as to the 
advantage of the indigene, Rose reminds us that the question of power persists: 'in the colonial setting, to act in the 
other's interest was the problem rather than the solution (acting on behalf of blacks has been one of colonialism's 
strongest rationales)' (Rose, 'Introduction' to Sachs, 1996:39). 
25 Biographical information on Pringle can be found in Josiah Conder's introduction to Pringle's Narrative of a 
Residence in South Africa (1835); Leitch Ritchie's introduction to Pringle's Poetical Works (1839); William Hay's 
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introduction to Thomas Pringle: his Life, Times, and Poems (1912); and Lewis Robinson's introduction to the 
Narrative (1966). 
26 For Pringle's writing on slavery in South Africa, composed in the same decade as Hegel's Phenomenology was 
published, see Pringle (1826:481-488 and 1966:216-219). For an account of two female slaves' entry into the 
official public sphere of the courts in the 1830's, compare Woodward (2002:55-83). 
27 For example, 'along thy coasts with grief I mark I The servile and the slave, and him who wails I An exile's lot' 
('The Cape of Storms'); 'sweep the White men from the earth, I and drive them to the sea: I[ ... ] make your choice-/ 
To conquer or be slaves' ('Makanna's Gathering'); 'I am lord of the Desert Land, I And I will not leave my bounds, I 
To crouch beneath the Christian's hand' ('Song of the Wild Bushmanl All quotes from these poems are from 
William Hay (ed.) Thomas Pringle: his Life, Times, and Poems (1912). 
28 Here I follow Chapman's edition (1981 :37). Hay reads black instead of blank. 
29 For Pringle's prose narrative on Makanna, see Pringle (1826:69-76). 
30 A more complete breakthrough in establishing a relationship of mutual understanding and recognition in writing 
would only come after Pringle's return to England. As editor of the collaborative auto/biography The History of 
Mary Prince, a West Indian Slave: Related by Herself(1831), narrated by Mary Prince and transcribed by Susanna 
Strickland, Pringle no longer had to take an advocatory position speaking on behalf of the enslaved, exploited or 
potentially enslaved. Nor is Mary Prince's narrative a reconstructed one like Makanna's. In this text, Pringle and 
Strickland are the mediators in what they presumably take as real communication between Mary Prince and the 
reading public. Rather than continuing a discourse of resistance to domination with a rallying cry to dominate the 
dominator, this text shifts the focus to a call for equal freedom and the recognition of a slave woman, based on a 
shared humanity. For a discussion of the relations of production, see Moira Ferguson's introduction to The History 
of Mary Prince 1997. For a reading which foregrounds the intersubjectivist generation of truth and identity in the 
same text, see Whitlock (2000:8-37). 
31 Compare Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffin (1989) The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in 
Post-Colonial Literatures. 
32 I have argued elsewhere (Meyer, 1993) that it is possible to strip Gandhi's notion of satyagraha of its metaphysical 
baggage and give it a postmetaphysical intersubjectivist interpretation which can be reconciled with Habermas's 
notion of civil disobedience (Habermas, 1985b:79-117). Seen in this light, satyagraha could be described as the 
continuation of communicative interaction by other means. 
33 I use the term scientific here to refer to the disciplinary codes of 'objectivity' (see Behar, 1996: ch 1) that were part 
of the institutionalisation of the cultural and natural sciences in analogy to the natural sciences. 
34 Early roots of this scientific strand, which I skip here, are Lloyd and Bleek's studies of indigenous languages and 
drawings (see some of the contributions to Szalay, 2002) and Darwin's correspondence with Gaika and use of this 
material in his 1872 The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. (See Darwin 1965:21). 
35 Despite trends towards scientifisation, the lay ethnographic tradition initiated by travellers and missionaries 
continues even late into the twentieth century. One striking example is Paulina Dlamini: Servant of Two Kings 
(Filter (ed.), 1986). Taken down in Zulu and translated into German in the latel960's by the Zululand missionary 
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Heinrich Filter, then translated into English for publication in 1986 by the linguist and Native affairs administrator S. 
Bourquin, the book narrates the life of a Zulu woman before and after her conversion to Christianity. 
36 For the dispute over the devotion of whole ethnographic and anthropological studies to the auto/biography of a 
single person see Behar (1996:12-13 and Shostak 1998:404). 
37 For similar reflections on the connections between the relations of production and the truth produced in the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, see Posel and Simpson (eds.) (2002) especially the introduction ( 1-13). 
38 Ten Africans, first published in 1936, is edited by the ethnologist Margery Perham. It is a 'collection oflife stories' 
recorded by various researchers or written by the protagonists themselves. Amongst these can be found 'The story of 
Nosente, the mother of compassion of the Xhosa tribe,' recorded by Monica Hunter. In addition to the visibly 
marked intervention given in square brackets (dates, glosses, and descriptions of the narrator's physical behaviours 
during the interview, and even some of the questions posed to Nosente) there is an even more palpable though 
unmarked editorial presence evident in the anthropological categories typical of the first half of the twentieth century 
which prioritise rites of passage and emphasise the impact of modernisation on traditional lifestyles. 
39 Nisa: the Life and Words of a !Kung Woman is an anthropological study of the life stages of a !Kung woman in 
her fifties. First published in 1981, it is representative of what Armbruster (2000:6-10) calls the first phase in 
feminist critical anthropology in which the study of women by women foregrounded commonalities rather than 
differences (Shostak, 1990:5 and 7). The book juxtaposes generalising anthropological introductions on each of the 
stages of life with Nisa's first person narrative. A sequel, Return to Nisa, was published in 2000. 
40 Trained at Columbia and the University of Chicago, Rebecca Hourwich Reyher conducted a series of interviews 
with Christina Sibiya, first wife to Solomon ka Dinuzulu, in 1934 for a book which had to 'produce immediately 
salable[!] material' (1999:7). Narrated in the third person it was the first extensive collaborative auto/biography on a 
Zulu woman. The liberties Hourwich Reyher took in 'rearranging and reauthoring' leads Gunner (Afterword to Zulu 
Woman, 1999:199) to refer to it as a 'factional account of Sibiya's life.' For two Cuban texts also informed by 
Chicago School Sociology, see Barnet's Biography of a Runaway Slave and Rachel's Song. 
41 In Black Hamlet, the Lithuanian born Jewish doctor Wulf Sachs, who 'began studying natives at an African mental 
hospital' in Pretoria in 1928, seeks to verify the universal applicability of Freudian psychoanalysis through his 
conversations with the nyanga John Chavafambira from then Rhodesia. First published in 1937, it is the first 
extensive psychoanalytical text in South Africa. Taking his conclusion that 'the manifestation of insanity, in its form, 
content, origin, and causation, are identical in both natives and Europeans' as a starting point, Sachs embarked on 
this collaborative project 'to know ifthe working fundamental principles of the mind in its normal state were not also 
the same' (1996:71). 
42 First published in 1963, The Ochre People is Jabavu's homage to her home people, its rhythms and the 'emotions 
aroused by gazing into the mirror of ancestral conditions and "umbilical" attitudes' ( 1982: 177). With Drawn in 
Colour (1960), it is the first full-length autobiographical travel narrative by a Xhosa woman. Although not a 
collaborative auto/biography, it warrants inclusion in this study because of the twelfth chapter, in which Jabavu 
depicts a scene in which a young woman describes her life to a group of fellow travellers. 
43 After his successful Kaffir Boy and Kaffir Boy in America, Mark Mathabane embarked on two collaborative 
auto/biographies. The most recent is Miriam's Song. This was preceded by African Women, Three Generations 
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(1994), in which his maternal grandmother, his mother and his sister tell their lives in the first person. Mathabane 
expressly links their struggle with the resistance to domination by white settlers since Van Riebeeck's landing in 
1652 that led to democracy in 1994. It remains a unique study by a black South African man on the lives of 
proximate others. 
44 Edited and published under the name of the writing author Carol Hermer, The Diary of Maria Tholo is of interest 
both as a document in its own right and because of its contact points with Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena. The 
book is based on 'a series of weekly, tape-recorded interviews', which were cast into a diary format 'to lend 
immediacy to the events' (Hermer, 1980:x). The recordings made between February 1976 and February 1977 focus 
on the uprisings in Guguletu, neighbouring Nyanga, where Eunice N. 's family lived. It also carries an extensive 
account of the December 25th and 26th events, which triggered Eunice N.'s telling of her experiences to Elsa Joubert 
on which Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is based. 
45 Mirriarm Moleleki's This is My Life is one of a set of four booklets written by four women activists from 
Zwelethemba (Moleleki, Nonthemba Ngcwecwe, Nongeteni Mfengu, and Neliswa Mroxisa) with the assistance of 
Anne Schuster and Annemarie Hendrikz. Moleleki's narrative is written both to recall her life and especially her 
activism as well as to 'give encouragement' and 'motivate women in the farms' amongst other things to contribute 
their individual stories to those already published (1997:2). 
46 Finding Mr Madini is the compilation of life narratives that arose from a creative writing group facilitated by 
Jonathan Morgan. As part of this Great African Spider Project (Morgan, 1999:50), the participants were asked to 
write 'windows' about themselves (ibid.:27) as well as about the other members of the group (29-105). These were 
initially edited by Morgan who then passed on this task to another participant, Virginia Maubane (191 ff.). 
47 Based on interviews Anne Benjamin conducted with Winnie Mandela during her banning to Brandfort, the book 
was adapted for the American market by Mary Benson. Published in German in 1984 and in English a year later, it 
tied in with the international anti-apartheid movement and explains why dialogue is no option and why violent 
resistance is the only alternative. In addition to Winnie Mandela's first person narrative, the book contains letters 
from Nelson Mandela to his daughter Zindzi and to Helen Joseph and testimonies by Winnie Mandela's fellow 
prisoners and comrades. I Phoolan Devi (1996) and I Rigoberta Menchu would constitute analogous texts from 
India and Guatemala respectively. 
48 Portraits of worker women from various fields of employment are set in a context of statistics, photographs, and 
background material in this book co-authored by a collective for the London-based Catholic Institute for 
International Relations in 1985. For the lives of domestic workers, see Suzanne Gordon's A Talent for Tomorrow 
(1985). For worker auto/biography, see Thomas Thate (1995). 
49 With characteristic irony, Miles (1992) subtitles his book 'polisieroman' (police novel). It is based on the 
documents given to the author by the attorney of the deceased policeman Tumelo John Moleko. Moleko, who the 
author describes as an ordinary person, had accused his superior of assault. The case took on ever-greater 
proportions as attempts were made to terrorise the plaintiff into silence, finally ending with the slaughter of him and 
his wife. For a US American text in similar vein, see Capote's In Cold Blood. 
50 The Seed is Mine: the Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper: 1894 - 1985 sets out to show how, along 
with constraints of the inequalities and iniquities of black and white farming relationships and a battle for domination 
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(Van Onselen, 1996:280, 317, 320), '[f]arming-on-the halves facilitated inter-racial social practices that transcended 
the clause of the economic contract binding the parties together' into relations of trust and even friendships (Van 
Onselen, 1996:7, 61 ). The instrumental relationships necessitated by shortcomings on all sides, ('Blacks with labour 
and livestock, and whites with capital and land - men whom a shortfall in resources had pressured into economic 
partnership and social proximity' (ibid.:283)) was accompanied at times by genuine communicative interaction, 
which was 'often surprisingly egalitarian' (Van Onselen, 1993:503). 
st Although the modern European formulation of the problem of understanding across difference is indebted to 
hermeneutics, I have opted against a hermeneutic methodology in this study because of what I perceive as its lack of 
attention to questions of power. For an attempt to marry Habermas and Ricoeur see Thompson (1991). 
s
2 For a survey of the history of the philosophical questions of hermeneutics and the views on the 
in/commensurability oflanguages, see Taylor (vol l, 1985:248-292). 
s
3 For the false universalisation of the male European perspective, see Amato (1997) and Outlaw (1996:135-157). 
s4 For a discussion of this point in a historical account of slave writing from the United States, see Couser (1989: 
ch 6). 
ss For black South African authors' use of the 'Proustian notion of learning to see the self through engaging with the 
non-self through reading, see Nuttall ( 1996:2-18). 
s6 As in Pringle's 'Afar in the desert'. 
s
7 For intersubjectivist anthropology, see Dennis Tedlock (1995:253-287) and A. Boskovic's review (n.d.) of 
Jackson's Minima Ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the Anthropological Project. 
ss One such an example is the ongoing assumption of and I or search for universals that constitute a universal human 
essence. This emphasis on similarity (while preserving an element of exoticism) guides Rebecca Hourwich Reyher's 
Jungian search for psycho-symbolic universals in Zulu Woman: 'From them [her hosts in then Natal] I heard stories 
that moved me by their simple humanity, and proved that for me the most fascinating search in a foreign land would 
always be for sameness, rather than difference, and that these Zulus, despite their gleaming black nakedness, were 
not different from my New York and Maine friends, only a lot more interesting' (Hourwich Reyher, 1999:7). 
Similarly, Marjorie Shostak sees a representative of a culture which is unique in the oral narrator Nisa in that it 
carries the seed ofuniversal human nature (Shostak, 1998:402 and 411-412). 
s
9 According to Sachs (the writing author of Black Hamlet) he had found in John Chavafambira a nyanga who 'would 
speak to me freely as ifhe were thinking aloud' (Sachs, 1996:72) while Sachs was 'speaking to him as one doctor to 
another' (ibid.:73). That this professed equality is shaky is evident from Sachs' admission that Chavafambira's lack 
of trust in him is justified: 'There was another important difficulty, and that was his mistrust of me. He mistrusted 
every white man, for he fully realized that a white man always wanted to get something out of him, and, as he told 
me once frankly, why should he expect that the woman anthropologist and I should be any different? The truth is 
that he was quite right in that respect; for a long time (and perhaps all the time) John was to me little more than an 
object of psychological research' (Sachs, 1996: 139). 
60 This is especially the case in collaborative auto/biographies with significant others like Mpho Nthunya and K. L. 
Kendall's Singing Away the Hunger and Wilfred Cibane and Robert Scott's Man of Two Worlds: an Autobiography. 
For Nthunya, see Farr (2000:125-144) and her interview with Nthunya and Kendall (forthcoming). For Cibane, see 
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the interview with Cibane and Scott by Ngwenya (forthcoming). For family memoir, see Gillian Slovo interviewed 
by Margaretta Jolly (forthcoming). For US American collaborative auto/biographies involving proximate others, see 
James McBride's The Color of Water: a Black Man's Tribute to His White Mother, Philip Roth's Patrimony, and Art 
Spiegelman's Maus. For examples from India and the Caribbean, see Bilkees Lateef The Fragrance of forgotten 
years ( 1984) and Jamaica Kincaid My brother ( 1997). On the ethics of writing the biography of the proximate other, 
and relational modes of identity, see Paul John Eakin (1998). 
61 For an early overview of auto-ethnography, defined as cases where 'researchers possess the qualities of often 
permanent self-identification with a group and full internal membership, as recognized both by themselves and the 
people of whom they are a part,' see Hayano (1979:99-104). Quote from p. 100. 
62 Compare for example the eloquence of their speaking voices as rendered by Mathabane and his sister Florah's 
assertion that his grandmother and mother spoke 'pidgin English they had learned from years of working for white 
people' (1994:316). 
63 This bus-ride displays some of the characteristics of the relationships between the salon and coffeehouses the 
public sphere and auto/biography that will be discussed in chapter II. For Jabavu's own use of the term 'salon', see 
The Ochre People (1982:213). 
64 Nonetheless, Shostak did not neglect to provide Nisa with gifts and parts of the income from the book. Money is a 
recurring theme in Return to Nisa. Compare the exchange between Shostak and Nisa: 
"'What do you think of our talk? Has it been good? What do you think about it?" 
"Our work is good." 
"Because I pay you well? Or is our talk good in other ways?" 
"For you, maybe it hasn't been good. For me, it's been good." 
"No, for me, it has also been good. I mean in your heart. Does the talk make you happy?" 
"The talk makes me happy. Because I see money, a lot of money. And by working [with you, Shostak], I can get the 
things I need." 
"I know the money is good. But for now, let's set that aside. What about the talk itself - does it make your heart feel 
good or, at times, your heart feel bad?" 
"Listen," she said, steering the answer in a different direction[ .... ]"' {Shostak, 2000:225). 
65 As in, '[s]ummer went by so slowly that it seemed in danger of missing its annual appointment with autumn. The 
two eventually met for a typically brief highveld encounter, before autumn, always the more purposeful in 
demeanour, scurried off to pass on its message to winter' (Van Onselen, 1996:69). 
66 See also Daymond ( 1991 :31 ). 
67 See the comment to this effect by Bishop Manas Buthelezi in the tribute opening the book (Mandela, 1985:19-22) 
and Nuttall and Michael (2000:299). 
68 This is for example the case in Miles' Kroniek uit die Doofpot in which Tumelo John Moleko's status as an 
ordinary person is repeatedly mentioned (1992:15 and 243). 
69 For the implication of this for women's autobiography written in Empire see Whitlock (2000: 160 ft). 
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7
° Countering Rousseau's conception of freedom as severance, Okot p'Bitek has expressed what I call freedom with 
others and he unfreedom, as follows: 'Man is not born free. He cannot be free. He is incapable of being free. For 
only by being in chains can he be and remain "human." What constitutes these chains?' 'It is by such complex titles 
[as son, mother, uncle, wife] that a person is defined and identified[ .... ] The central question "Who am I?" cannot 
be answered in any meaningful way unless the relationship in question is known' (1998:73). 
71 See Lenta (1984:147-158). 
72 Gilroy is of interest here, not only for the hermeneutic quality of his concept the black Atlantic, but also for the 
questions he raises regarding the usefulness of Habermas's theory of modernity for black Atlantic literatures (Gilroy, 
1993:42, 46, 49, 53, 196). 
II. Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory 
1 With the first sentence the intention of a general and unforced consensus is unmistakably uttered (TWI: 163). 
2 One of the most exciting features of our society is that language stretches across race. 
3 For introductions to and overviews of critical theory, see Held (1980) and Wiggershaus (1994). 
4 For commentaries which focus on Habermas's philosophy oflanguage, see McCarthy (1984) and Cooke (1994). 
5 For the most part, I rely on The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham et al: 
Meditations (1984), vol II; Discourse (1985), vol I; and Correspondence (1991), vol III. The first page number is 
that of the Cottingham edition. The number in square brackets following that is the page reference to the French 
Adam and Tannery edition. 
6 For Descartes' canonical position, see Russell (1984 :54 2 ff.); The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy ( 1995:193 ); 
Helferich (1992:199 ff.); and Kenny (1997:107ff.). Although Habermas takes Hegel to be the modern philosopher 
par excellence (PDM :13-16; 26-28), he construes his responses to Hegel to apply equally to Descartes and Kant 
(ibid.:29). My immediate interest here is not to correct the distortions Descartes has suffered at the hand of his 
modern successors and to replace the myth of Descartes with a more apposite reading of his works (see Perler, 
1997:285-308). Instead, I am picking out those tendencies in Descartes' writings which allowed a reductionist 
modernity to claim him as its founder and which persists in holding some contemporary views on autobiography. 
7 Both the Discourse and the Meditations are philosophical arguments 'introduced in the guise of autobiographical 
narrative', and Descartes' prose is modelled on a 'popular narrative genre, that of the spiritual autobiography' (Pavel 
1996:354). See also Oksenberg and Kosman (1986) for the autobiographical meditative aspects of the Meditations 
and the Discourses. 
8 
'I shall be glad if people make as many objections as possible and the strongest ones they can find. For I hope that 
in consequence the truth will stand out all the better' (Letter to Mersenne, in Descartes, 1991, vol III: 172 [III:297)). 
9 Fallibilism is Karl Popper's (1992) term for those epistemologies which hold that scientific theories have to be 
falsifiable in order to contribute to the growth of knowledge. Claims which cannot potentially be proven wrong, that 
is claims that are not falsifiable, offer only analytic, empty truths or bogus, mythological ones. 
10 See also his 1981 programmatic essay 'Modernity: an unfinished project', reprinted in the collection edited by 
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d'Entreves and Benhabib (1996), which also includes critical responses to The philosophical discourse of modernity 
and the 1981 essay. 
11 In the English translation, he expresses his dissatisfaction with the tenn universal, suggesting fonnal instead (see 
PC: 92 fn 1). 
12 The Gennan tenn Verstiindigung covers a range of meanings on which Habennas's theory silently capitalises. The 
weakest meaning correlates to the English 'understanding' in the sense of understanding the meaning of an 
interlocutor's words. The strongest meaning correlates to the English 'reaching an understanding/an agreement'. 
Habennas's claim is that these two meanings are intemaIIy connected. One has only understood the meaning of an 
utterance if one knows which reasons would make it possible to reach an agreement about the validity of what has 
been claimed in the utterance. Meaning and the grounds which establish consensus, are intemaIIy connected. For 
his later distinction between strong and weak forms ofunderstanding, see WR (102-137) reprinted in PC (307-342). 
13 For a critique of universalism as a mask for the generalisation of particularist interests of the modem European 
bourgeois, see Outlaw (1996:135-157). For a critique of what she caIIs 'abstract universalism' and its replacement 
with concrete universalism, see Benhabib (1992: 147-177). For a rejection of the critique of universalism as 
Eurocentric, see Benhabib (2002:24-48). 
14 In the second footnote added to the English translation of 'What is universal pragmatics?', Habennas adds that he 
focuses 'on an idealized case of communicative action, namely "consensual action", in which participants share a 
tradition' (PC :93). What exactly constitutes a shared tradition is left unclear. For example, would a common 
language mean that Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert shared a common tradition? Does a common religion suffice? Or 
does the fact that both Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord were 'modem' constitute a common tradition? Do sex 
and class differences constitute a different tradition? It seems to me that Habennas's addition is at cross-purposes 
with his general goal in the universal pragmatics. If a common tradition is his starting point, then the 
unconditionality of validity claims is at risk. See also Habennas (TKH Bd I :72-113), where he specificaIIy 
elaborates on the comparison of world-views and speech systems. The clearest statement of this universalism is, 'If a 
statement is true, it merits universal assent, no matter in which language it is fonnulated' (TCA vol I :58 [TKH, Bd. I 
:93]). 
15 
'Dieser Auffassung zufolge darfich (mit Hilfe pradikativer Satze) dann einem Gegenstand ein Pradikat zusprechen, 
wenn auch andere, der in ein Gespriich mit mir eintreten konnte, demselben Gegenstand <las gleiche Pradikat 
zusprechen wiirde. Ich nehme, um wahre von falschen Aussagen zu unterscheiden, auf die Beurteilung anderer 
Bezug - und zwar auf <las Urteil ailer anderen, mit denen ich je ein Gesprach aufnehmen konnte (wobei ich 
kontrafaktisch all die Gespriichspartner einschlieBe, die ich finden konnte, wenn meine Lebensgeschichte mit der 
Geschichte der Menschenwelt koextensiv ware). Die Bedingung fiir die Wahrheit von Aussagen ist die potentielie 
Zustimmung aIIer andem. Jeder andere miiBte sich iiberzeugen konnen, daB ich dem Gegenstand das besagte 
Pradikat berechtigterweise zuspreche, und miiBte mir dann zustimmen konnen. Die Wahrheit einer Proposition 
meint <las Versprechen, einen vemiinftigen Konsensus iiber <las Gesagte zu erzielen' (VS:l36-137). 
16 It is partly in response to critics such as Wellmer (1989), that Habermas has acknowledged certain deficits to the 
consensus theory of validity, most notably that truth cannot be equated to warranted assertability. Whilst he has 
given up warranted assertability as criterion of truth, he stiII holds on to a consensus theory of validity but affords 
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added emphasis to a pragmatic theory of fallibility in the double relationship of truth claims (WR :51-52). 
17 
'Der Vorgriff auf die ideale Sprechsituation hat fiir jede mogliche Kommunikation die Bedeutung emes 
konstitutiven Scheins, die zugleich Vorschein einer Lebensform ist' (VS: 181-182). 
18 See also Thompson (1982:116--133) and Cooke (1998:14). Whether these conditions are sufficient and necessary, 
or whether others need to be added is a matter of specific dispute. The general point, though, is that the first 
requirement be guaranteed. Whether 2 to 5 merely explicate it, and do so sufficiently, is an academic issue as far as 
the general theory of validity is concerned, although it may not be so in certain concrete situations. Whether the 
requirement of sincerity is part of the description of the ideal speech situation is also doubtful, as it is already 
covered by the validity claim to truthfulness. In line with Habermas's own notion of critique, it can be assumed that 
he would not insist on having the final word regarding the description of the ideal speech situation. 
19 Also in the critical literature, the validity claim to intelligibility soon falls by the wayside. A recent example of this 
is Cooke's assertion that 'Habermas identifies three basic types of validity claims' (Cooke :Introduction to PC: 
1998:3). This neglect of the validity claim intelligibility is rather surprising given his view that an awareness of the 
role played by language in the generation of knowledge is what he finds most lacking in idealist, empiricist and 
dialectical materialist epistemologies alike (LS: 15-85). 
20 Although Habermas's consensus theory of validity covers all four validity claims (namely truth, truthfulness-
authenticity, rightness, and intelligibility) (VS : 141) he has focussed most of his attention on consensus in the sphere 
of practical reason. One of my aims here is to explore the nature of the rather neglected validity claim to truth, 
which he treats in his early writings on speech act theory and to which he returns in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. 
21 For another performative approach to autobiography, see Gusdorf (1980:44). 
22 Similarly, Lara (1998:69), 'the "who" of a discourse "as a narrating self' understands herself in the simultaneous 
act of grasping the coherence of her view and transmitting it in a narrative fashion'. Habermas's formulation should 
make it sufficiently clear that he does not hold that personal identity evolves from intersubjective social relations as 
Freundlieb (2000:92-93) argues, but that the intra- and intersubjective are co-constitutive (gleichurspriinglich). A 
similar point is made by Nkosi (1983:117), who asserts that the task of 'the Negro writers who live in Western 
societies' is to 'reveal our inner geography to the world as well as to ourselves.' 
23 Likewise, Taylor (1992:36) asserts that 'one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self only in relation to certain 
interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-
definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-
understanding - and, of course, these classes may overlap. A self exists only within what I call "webs of 
interlocution"'. In terms of recognition, Benjamin (1995:37) puts it as follows: 'The need for recognition entails this 
fundamental paradox: at the very moment of realizing our own independent will, we are dependent upon another to 
recognize it. At the very moment we come to understand the meaning of I, myself, we are forced to see the 
limitations of that self. At the moment when we understand that separate minds can share similar feelings, we begin 
to learn that these minds can also disagree'. 
24 In similar vein, Gusdorf ( 1980:39) asserts that the 'man who recounts himself [ ... ] is not engaged in an objective 
and disinterested pursuit but in a work of personal justification'. 
25 On narrative as a medium for communicating values, see Young (1997:72 and 2000:70-76). 
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26 At this point there is an inconsistency in Habermas. In his discussion of Rousseau's autobiography he asserts that 
Rousseau's claims are not measured according to the truth of historical claims but according to the authenticity of the 
self-representation (NMD :206). Instead I am proposing an interpretation which is in harmony with the views 
expressed in his speech act theory, namely that every standard speech act raises four validity claims even if it 
foregrounds one of them. According to such an interpretation autobiography constitutes a shift in emphasis from the 
claim to truth to the claim to truthfulness-authenticity and the appeal for recognition. Such an alternative 
interpretation does not exclude either truth or truthfulness-authenticity, nor does it make the one logically subject to 
the other. Paying attention to recognition claims, which supervene on utterances that also raise claims to truth, does 
not mean the suspension of the claim to truth. If appeals for recognition have no basis in fact, then those appeals 
themselves cannot be judged appropriately. Whilst it might be true that the purpose of raising factual claims about 
the past differs in a 'purely' historical enterprise as compared to one in which truth claims serve an appeal for 
recognition, truth claims about the past should surely still adhere to the same criteria of validity. In other words, 
different purposes in making truth claims does not imply different criteria of what counts as truth. Even though 
claims for recognition may supervene on truth claims about the past, these two claims need to be distinguished. 
Whereas a truth claim about the past states the facts regarding what has been the case, the claim for recognition adds 
the further dimension that the protagonist claims that these facts reflect the authenticity of her needinterperations and 
that she deserves recognition for this. For example: the claim that she married and the claim that this was an 
appropriate interpretation of her needs which deserves recognition are two separate claims even if the latter can only 
be raised on the basis of the former. As a validity claim to truth, the claim about past facts cannot be suspended or 
measured by a different set of criteria simply because it is recounted in the context of a claim for recognition without 
jeopardising the notion of truth and thereby opening the door to those who, for example, deny the existence of past 
injustices. 
27 
'But, dust and ashes though I am, let me appeal to your pity, since it is to you in your mercy that I speak, not to a 
man, who would simply laugh at me' (Augustine, 1961 :24). 
28 Like Lejeune (1989:186) and Isemhagen (1987:222, fu. 3), I thus believe that a study of collaborative 
auto/biography is interesting, not only for what it reveals about this particular genre, but also because it actually lays 
bare features of classic autobiography which may otherwise be easily overlooked. In this sense, starting with 
collaborative auto/biography actually tells us more about classic autobiography than the other way around. 
29 Of course, to the extent that they are speech acts aiming to be understood by readers, both Augustine's and 
Rousseau's autobiographies cannot but contain intersubjective elements. In that sense, Habermas's contrast of 
Augustine and Rousseau is also misleading. The difference is simply that the latter makes explicit what is only 
implicit in the former, in the same way that collaborative auto/biography, in tum, makes the intersubjective nature of 
Rousseau's Confessions explicit. 
30 The universalisation principle does not mean that everyone has to do everything that a norm prescribes, but rather 
that only those norms to which no one objects are legitimate. For example, ifthe norm prescribes that drivers must 
use unleaded petrol or that a mother may have only one child, it does not mean that everyone must drive or that every 
woman must have a child. It means that no one objects to the use of unleaded petrol or to mothers having only one 
child. 
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31 The paradigmatic case would be Hobbes's allocation of matters of religious belief to the private sphere of values 
and of normative issues of common concern to the jurisdiction of the state. 
32 Nancy Fraser has argued that, on the empirical level, in its various discourses on welfare, the state actively 
intervenes in discussions of what appropriate values are. On the normative level, deliberation on values is necessary 
if these values provide the basis for validity claims about which norms are legitimate (Fraser, 1989: 144-187). 
33 An analysis of the relations of communication in shebeens may well reveal similar local equivalents (see Nkosi, 
1983:10-11). Jabavu's (seep 15-16 above) description of the communicative relations found in public transport, for 
example on buses, also points in this direction. 
34 Habermas would thus agree \\-ith Gusdorf that consciousness of an individual life is necessary for the rise of the 
self-reflection typical of autobiography. However, Gusdorf sees this individualism in opposition to interdependence, 
whereas Habermas, Benjamin, Lara, and Benhabib all assert that they are two sides of the same coin. Apel's 
reminder (1976:359ff) that even a monologue is an interiorised dialogue, allows us to see Gusdorfs (1980:29) 
assertion that autobiographical 'narrative offers us the testimony of a man about himself, the contest of a being in 
dialogue with itself in its mediation of the intra- and intersubjective. 
35 Compare Olney (1980:24).: 'If part of the function of criticism is to judge [ ... ], then it is not just a joke to say that 
judging an autobiography to be "bad" is very nearly the same as judging a life to be "bad"'. 
36 
'Private autobiographies interrelating intimacy and public life became interesting and novel, just as earlier epic 
dramas had been vital to building up the identity of the nation' (Lara, 1998:75). 
37 
'The same respect for everyone does not extend to similar persons, but to the person of the other or the others in 
their difference. And solidarity for the other as one ofus refers to the flexible 'we' ofa community, which[ ... ] keeps 
on extending its porous borders outwards. The moral community constitutes itself purely through the negative idea 
of the abolition of discrimination and suffering as well as the inclusion of the marginalized in a reciprocal 
consideration for each other. [ ... ] Inclusion here does not mean the enclosure within the own and the exclusion to 
the outside. The "inclusion of the other" means that the borders of the community are open to all - especially also 
for those who are strangers to each other and who want to remain strangers' (EdA :7-8). Likewise, Rorty has also 
suggested that narrative encounters across difference have the effect of extending our notion of who to include under 
the pronoun us: 'For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one's 
community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreements as possible, the desire to extend the 
reference of"us" as far as we can' (Rorty, 199la:23). 
38 For similar points, see also the essays in Benhabib (1996b) and Young (1990:116-121 and 2000:81-120). 
39 See the collection on his theory of the public sphere, edited by Calhoun ( 1992). 
4
° For the exclusion of women and the proletariat from the literary public, see Landes and Fleming in Meehan 
(1995), Negt and Kluge (1972), Fraser (1997:69-98) and Habermas's introduction to the second German edition of 
Strukturwandel (1990: 15-20). For the black public sphere, see Paul Gilroy (2000a: 177-206) and The Black Public 
Sphere edited by The Black Public Sphere Collective (1995). 
41 Habermas shares Heidegger and Cassirer's view that, in its world-disclosing function, the grammar of the speech 
system sets the conditions of selection and ordering of experience (PNK: 215; SE :23; WR: 34). He agrees with 
Wittgenstein that language is a system of constitutive rather than regulative rules constituting a socio-cultural 
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lifeform (VS:75). Finally, he gives Piaget a linguistic reading, noting that the foundational language 
('Begriindungssprache') is a system of basic predicates of proven foundational languages ('bewiihrter 
Begriindungssprachen') that express cognitive schemata (VS: 167). See also Bohman and Lafont's contributions to 
the special section on world-disclosure in the Deutsche Zeitschrift far Philosophie 1993, vol 41 (3) and Lafont 
(1994). 
42 Changes in the speech system, which mark the shift from Ptolemaic to Newtonian, and Einsteinian physics, have 
their equivalents in the shift from Aristotelian to Augustinian, Kantian and postmodern ethics. 
43 This connection between the evolution of language, knowledge, and life-forms was already asserted by Herder 
(1993:86). 
44 Despite Austin, Searle, and Habermas's bracketing of literature from speech act theory, several literary theorists 
have written on these early speech act theorists' relevance to literature. They have covered a range of positions. See 
Ohmann (1971); Pratt (1977); Derrida (1977; and 1982:309-330); Fish (1980:ch. 9); Johnson (1980:ch. 4); Felman 
(1983); Petrey (1990), and, for its application to autobiography in poststructuralist vein, Bruss (1976). 
45 I do not dwell on the problems created by Habermas's attempts to squeeze the four validity claims of his speech act 
theory into Weber's sociological thesis that modernity is characterised by the differentiation of society into three 
value spheres, each with its own validity, and that the specific validity claim at stake in literature is authenticity. One 
problem is that the taxonomies of the sociological and the speech act theoretical thesis do not fit onto each, which is 
why I suggest that they be kept apart. Another problem is the shifts in Habermas's use of the term authenticity. 
Whilst he uses the term to apply to art (including literature) in The philosophical discourse of modernity (240-246) 
and in 'Modernity: an unfinished project', he uses it in Nachmetaphysisches Denken (207) to refer to an authentic 
interpretation of needs. (I touch on the latter in chapter V when dealing with identity and claims for recognition). 
The difficulties caused by this shift could possibly be resolved if one argued that art is the sphere in which an 
authentic interpretation of needs takes place. Although I would agree that authentic art is tied in some way to the 
authentic interpretation of needs, I am sceptical though of an aestheticist reductionism which restricts the question of 
the authentic interpretation of needs to art. 
46 See also Lara, '[S]ocial criticism has always taken images, metaphors and visions from expressive language in the 
same way that art displays a new perception of life [ .... ] it is not only artists who provide new frames for social 
criticism. If one understands the major role of art itself in the dialogically constructed social world, and that there is 
feedback between different validity spheres, then anyone capable of finding a new way of framing things can attain a 
disclosive effect that strengthens their arguments through the influence of other validity spheres' (Lara, 1998:113). 
Axel Honneth, too, has given a reading of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, which suggests that world-disclosure is not 
a prerogative of art, and that world-disclosure can be a form of critique that in itself is subject to criticism (Honneth, 
2000b: 123).1 
47 In my Ph.D. I explore the validity claim that the speech system is appropriate as well as the connections between 
the four validity claims, such as the relationship between truth claims and appeals for moral recognition, which are 
dealt with in isolation in two separate chapters (IV and V) in the present study. I also pay special attention to the 
relationship between world-disclosure and the appropriateness of the speech system on the one hand, and truth on the 
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other, as this is reflected in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. 
III. Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity in 'Die Swerfjare van 
Poppie Nongena' and 'The calling of Katie Makanya' 
1 Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord (1954:94). 
2 We have probably now reached the point where I do not want to go closer and she does not want to reveal more. 
There is a wall, not of lack of understanding, but of a total lack of desire to understand. For me there is something 
disgusting in what she has to reveal to me, for her in the breaking down of the walls that have to exist between us. 
Do I want the knowledge? My whole psyche rejects it. (Notes while writing ( 4 June 1977) Joubert papers). 
3 On the importance of the relations of production from a feminist perspective, see Ryan (1996:34). 
4 Ever since Barthes (1977:142-148) and Foucault (1979) have declared the author either dead or out of bounds for 
literary studies, focusing on the writer in particular, and production aesthetics in general, has been shunned by many 
in the literary establishment. Whilst the critique of literary theories which derive the meaning of the text from 
authorial intention convince, the blanket exclusion of the author and the context of production from literary studies 
seems to me an overextension of Barthes' and Foucault's essentially valid insight. Disposing with a monological 
modem notion of objectivity, and replacing it with intersubjective ones means that we need to look at textual 
utterances as speech acts through which the speakers I authors and the listeners I readers attempt to establish relations 
of understanding amongst themselves. While questions about authorial intentions and readers' responses are 
admittedly notoriously difficult to answer, a theory of literature which sees texts as communicative actions engaged 
in by social agents and ties these texts to a social theory of emancipation, cannot avoid considering the relations 
between interlocutors and their intentions as these are expressed in- and outside the text- despite the difficulties this 
involves. Furthermore, bringing oral narrators and writing authors into the picture does not automatically mean a 
relapse into the psychologism Barthes and Foucault have warned against. A large deal of my focus is on matters like 
social position and behaviour, which are not reducible to the intemalities associated with psychologism and its 
related problems. And even when the focus includes the oral .narrators' and the writing authors' motives, this is not 
done to reduce meaning to psychological intention, but to establish the connection between motive, behaviour, and 
the modes of production of knowledge. In her 'On the author effect: recovering collectivity' (1994a:l5 ff.) and The 
Author, Art, and the Market (1994b:35 ff.), Woodmansee suggests an alternative to an author-centred literary theory 
rejected by Barthes and Foucault on the one hand, and the structuralist and poststructuralist occlusion of the author, 
on the other. Woodmansee's conclusion that neither the Romantic conception of the author as the individual genius 
that is connected to the notions of copyright and the rise of the financially self-supporting artist, nor a notion of 
discourse as its own progenitor, provides appropriate models of authorship, leads her to suggest that we pay greater 
attention to collaborative notions of authorship. My suggestion is that such an alternative, relational notion of the 
author can be derived from the intersubjectivist theory of communication and studied as a practice in collaborative 
auto/biography. For collaborative authorship, see also Carringer, Laird and Ede, and Lunsford in the special section 
on literary collaboration in PMLA 116 (2) and Ede and Lunsford (1994). 
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5 Both Eunice N. and Katie Makanya have passed away. Eunice N. died on 12 April 1992,I and Katie Makanya in 
1955. It was therefore not possible to consult them personally regarding their motivation lfor participating in the 
production of their respective life-narratives and how they perceived the relations of productidn. 
6 Joubert had previously refrained from making it public that Eunice was in her employ as 1a domestic servant. In 
earlier accounts (for example McClintock 1991:196-197) the fact that Eunice came specifically to Joubert on 
Boxing Day 1976 remained an unresolved coincidental event. Joubert justifies the concealment of this fact with 
reference to Eunice's stipulation that she wanted to remain anonymous and that she wanted :to protect Eunice from 
the media. Joubert herself had felt overwhelmed by media attention, and constantly fear~d that reporters would 
! 
manipulate her, or twist her words (Interview, and Jan Rabie to Cape Times reporter "'Poppie' author is 'tired of 
publicity"' (n.d.)). Kendall and Nthunya, the collaborators on Singing Away the Hunger, have, also commented on the 
strain of publicity and the media on oral narrators not accustomed to media events (Personal qommunication). 
7 In the draft acceptance speech for the Royal Society on 17 June 1981, she writes, 'through her I could get closer to 
Africa, the land I love' (Joubert papers). 
8 Gardner depicts as naive Joubert's claim that she knew the lives of black people on account of these investigations 
(1991:186). Citing Dabi Nkululeko's question, "'can an oppressed nation or segments of it, engaged in a struggle for 
liberation from its oppressors, rely on knowledge produced, researched and theorized by: others, no matter how 
progressive, who are members of the oppressor nation?' Gardner discounts the validity of Joubert's research 
(ibid.: 187). 
9 
'Agterplaas' ('Backyard'), one of the stories from this collection is of particular interest. : In this story, the white 
narrator expresses her frustration at the distance between her and the black service personnel she encounters in her 
daily life: 
'My !ewe beweeg op die periferie van 'n bestaansvlak wat ek nie ken nie. 
Daar is kontakpunte, oppervlakkig: 'n woordjie aan die petroljoggie, die melkafleweraar vir wie ek more se. En daar 
is die swart vrou wat werk in my huis. 
Sy is nader aan my as 'n suster, ken my intieme !ewe op 'n dieper vlak as wat 'n suster my souiken. 
Maar ek ken haar nie. 
Selfs die naam waarop ek haar aanspreek, is 'n gebruiksnaam, is na willekeur gekies, het nie die binne-verbintenis 
met haar wat my naam met my het nie. Haar eie naam word my nie verstrek nie; my tong so~ dit nie kon hanteer nie. 
Sy is my brug na die onbekende, maar dis 'n brug waaroor ek met moeite loop' (Joubert, J980:59. Although the 
collection was published in 1980, this specific short story was written before 1976) [My lifo moves on the periphery 
of an existence I do not know. There are contact points, superficial: a word to the petrol attendant, the milkman to 
whom I say morning. And there is the black woman who works in my house. She is clos.er to me than my sister, 
knows my intimate life on a deeper level than what a sister would know me. But I don't know her. Even the name by 
which I address her is a name for daily use, is chosen arbitrarily, does not have the internal ¢onnection with her that 
my name has with me. Her own name is not given to me; my tongue would not be able to haqdle it. She is my bridge 
to the unknown, but it is a bridge over which I walk with difficulty (Own translation)]. 
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10 I mention these apparently anecdotal asides ~ere, and in greater detail with reference ~o Katie and McCord, 
because they give an indication of the extent to which the collaborators 'greeted' each 1other, in the sense of 
recognising each other through material gestures which set a context for communication. Young has suggested that 
Habermas's and Benhabib's narrow focus on argumentative interaction fails to pay sufficient attention to the acts of 
social interaction which set the social context within which this interaction takes place (Youn&, 1996: 129-130). 
11 Compare Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena (184-186 and 263-265), The Long Journiey of Poppie Nongena 
(239-242 and 337-340). 
12 Also, '[s]y het haar hart aan my uitgestrort. Miskien was sy net so krampagtig aan die soek na iemand wat wou 
luister as wat ek aan die soek was na iemand wat vir my sou kon verklaar' [She shed her heart out to me. Maybe she 
was just as desperately seeking someone to listen, as I was seeking someone who could explain to me] (Joubert in 
Griitter, l 978:n.p.). 
13 Similarly, Joubert in Griitter (1978:n.p.). 
14 McClintock even suggests that white writers were facing a legitimation crisis, and that t4e only way in which a 
writer like Joubert could respond to this legitimation crisis and remain relevant, was through the words of a black 
collaborator like Eunice (1991 :203). 
15 The prelude and interludes are themselves separated from the main narrative by being ~rinted on unnumbered 
pages and set in italics. The page numbers cited here are calculated relative to the numbered pages. 
! 
16 The first sentence ascribed to the oral narrator, Katie Makanya, in The Calling of Kati¢ Makanya refers to Dr 
James McCord's My Patients Were Zulus, ghost-written with John Scott Douglas in 1946: 
'"He mentions me,' she taps at the book in her lap. 'But you know, Ntombikanina, ' - she still! calls me by my African 
name - 'there are some things he forgets.' 
'Different people remember different things, 'I reply" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3). 
With these opening lines the triad which shapes Katie's collaborative auto/biography is estab~ished: James McCord's 
autobiography from which it picks up, but also sets itself apart; Katie's oral narrative; 3rlld Margaret McCord's 
mediation. My Patients Were Zulus is James McCord's memoir of his mission practice from the end of 1899 till his 
retirement in April 1940, and his return to his native USA. It is told with the enthusiasm of a man who succeeded in 
realising a laudable ideal despite the odds, namely 'laying a solid foundation for Zulu medidl care' (James McCord; 
1946: 148). As such it reflects the characteristic sweeping force of a public masculine life-mirrative reminiscent of a 
singular teleological notion of history, associated also with those figures James McCord venerates, namely 
' Livingstone (James McCord, 1946:22) and Smuts (ibid.:191). In this record of his public apd work life, as in Van 
Riebeeck's Daghverhaal and travel narratives from the nineteenth century, the 'I' is both thelcentrifugal force which 
I 
directs the narrative line and from whose eyes the flow of events is seen. Along the way, ot~er individuals and types 
I 
surface and recede as associates, allies, or adversaries. The title and some of the chapter he~dings (e.g. 'My dreams 
had black linings', '/ open a Zulu dispensary', and 'My cottage hospital' e.a.) already give a clue to this. The 
protagonist, James McCord as individual, is often constituted by the presence of the Zulus, as generalised type ('A 
doctor's best-laid plans are likely to go astray when his patients are Zulus' (95)). At times these types are compared 
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to whites as types - both to highlight similarities and differences ('Zulu women love a bargain as much as their white 
sisters' (74)). In this typology, references to some individuals stand out. One of these is Katie Makanya (James 
McCord; 1946:57-58, 92-94, 98, 107-108, 120, 122, 225). Although Katie's auto/biography converses with that of 
her long time employer, it is not simply an additive filling in of 'things he forgets', but a transformation of the notion 
of a self and its narrative representation. It is a narrative of a life, rather than a memoir of a career, which integrates 
the private and the public. It also unabashedly displays its status as a collaborative auto/biography. 
17 This manuscript has been lost. 
18 This adds to the importance of the question raised by Peter Merrington (1995:156), namely why McCord did not 
write the book earlier. McCord has answered this with reference to her family situation. Over the years she returned 
to the unwieldy masses of transcriptions every so often. But, as the wife of a professor in African Studies, and as a 
mother, she had little time at her disposal to devote to this project. Only once her children were grown up, and after 
her divorce, was she able to concentrate on it. In other words, although she had the power of writing, which Katie 
alludes to and which Katie herself claims to have lacked, gender related constraints contributed to McCord's silence 
too for a long time (Personal communication with McCord and email correspondence between McCord and 
Thengani Ngwenya). 
19 This element of authorial self-reflection in collaborative auto/biographies is attested to throughout Shostak (2000). 
20 The forging of experimental results in a market-driven pharmaceutical industry is an example of the former, the 
effects ofreligious intervention in the sciences exemplified by the case against Galileo is an example of the latter. 
21 For similarly objections, see Fraser (1989: 113-143), Dux (1986: 112), Joas (1986: 146), and Holzer (1987:44-50). 
22 Joubert has referred to two such instances where she changed the first draft following Eunice's objections, namely 
the birth of Weekend or Fezi, and a description of Poppie's mother-in-law sitting on her children's bed (Joubert, 1987 
and interview). 
23 Clippings amongst Joubert's notes include articles, possibly from the Cape Times, with titles like: 'Black youth raid 
shebeens' (12 October 1976:n.p.); 'Mobs stone, bum vehicles: Man shot dead in new unrest' (13 October 1976:n.p.); 
'Police disperse liquor raiders' (n.d. October l 976:n.p.). The reports give vivid descriptions of events, without much 
critical analysis or explanation. These articles may have sparked Joubert's questions to Eunice, but they go well 
beyond them in their depth. I would thus like to suggest that although the articles may have played some 
corroborative role, they actually were more important as a starting point from which Joubert might have pursued her 
questions. Of course, it may still be argued, as Van der Merwe (1992:71) implies, that these articles had a distorting 
effect on Eunice's narrative because they constituted a false start. 
24 For a detailed analysis of which percentages of the text are covered by which speakers, and a possible explanation 
for this, see Janssen et al (1981 :57-66). For the compilation of several voices in collaborative auto/biography, see 
Thomas Couser (1988), DeMallie's introduction to the Black Elk transcripts (1985:39), and Krupat (1989:158-161). 
25 It may well be this stronger critique which accounts for some readers' closer identification with Jakkie than with 
Poppie. Thus Sara Blecher (the daughter of Hilary Blecher who was responsible for the international stage 
production of Poppie) writes to Joubert, 'Your portrayal makes me distrust his solution and my mother's 
166 
Footnotes 
interpretation definitely discredits his actions but still in a weird way I do identify with him' (Letter from Sara 
Blecher to Joubert. Joubert papers). 
26 On the difference between anti-rationalist empathy and rational understanding, see Giordano (1998). 
27 On the significance of new technologies in North American anthropological writing, see Isemhagen (1990:38 ff.). 
Although Lejeune (1989:204-206) makes mention of it, the impact of new technologies for recording and 
transforming the oral into a written text in collaborative auto/biographies remains to my knowledge unreflected in the 
critical literature. Comparative studies of texts based on recordings (like Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena and 
The Calling of Katie Makanya) with texts that precede such technology (like The History of Mary Prince) or where it 
was simply not available (like Singing Away the Hunger) may provide interesting insights regarding the transition 
from orature to literature but go beyond the scope of the present study. 
28 The prelude cleverly, but misleadingly, uses Johnny's arrival from school as the initiation into Katie's narrative 
(The Calling of Katie Makanya: 4) as if Katie were telling the story to him, rather than to McCord. This allows 
McCord to lure the reader into the position of the addressee taken here by her son, while she erases herself from the 
narrative and becomes 'an unseen presence' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 4) (For further detail on this, see chapter 
V below). According to McCord, Johnny was in fact not present at the recording sessions. 
29 The transcript of 11 September is headed, 'Katie to machine alone' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:21). 
30 One of the few is: '(What is the difference between Umkulunkulu and God asks Peg)' (Makanya and McCord, 
1954:27). 
31 
'When did my husband get sick? Oh it was a long time ago' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:91); 'Yes, I remember 
Professor Z.K. Matthrews [!)' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:98). Probably McCord asked about illegitimacy 
(Makanya and McCord, 1954: 100); and about conversion to Christianity (Makanya and McCord, 1954:26). Some of 
the questions may have been prompted by pictures, 'You saw those walls in the pictures. Those walls are built by the 
women' (Makanya and McCord, 1954: 114). 
32 This is evident from McCord's dissenting remarks in the margin of the transcript (Makanya and McCord, 
1954:59). 
33 Pratt emphasises this fact in her speech act theory of literature, which makes clear that literary texts are written 
with an audience in mind and that the felicity of speech acts rests on regulating conventions. The screening of texts 
by the book industry operates as a mechanism anticipating and regulating the extent to which the book will receive 
successful uptake by an audience (1977:ch 3--4). This is also true of seasoned writers (see HanifKureshi, 2001 :vii-
xviii). 
34 
'Vir Klaas, met waardering vir hulp en aanmoediging' [To Klaas, with appreciation for help and encouragement]. 
35 For another account of the extent of collaboration in posthumous publication, see her husband's Epilogue to 
Shostak's Return to Nisa (2000). Joubert's husband had likewise requested her to complete his posthumously 
published novel, Ons Oorlog. Although she did some work on this, her son is identified as the person responsible for 
its completion (Interview, and preface to Steytler, 2001). 
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36 The much debated note 'To the reader' of the English edition was in fact drawn up by the editor Margaret Body, 
and not by Joubert, although it carried her consent (Letter Joubert to Body. 20 November 1979. Joubert papers). 
Danie van Niekerk ofTafelberg also agreed that the note to the reader was an 'improvement, more strongly focused' 
(Letter to Joubert. 19 November 1979. Joubert papers). 
37 Elize Botha is one of the few reviewers who, despite Joubert's attempts at concealing her presence in the text, 
insists, 'it is not only Poppie's book. It is also Elsa Joubert's book, whose art of writing could build up a world 
around Poppie through her [Joubert's] artistic ordering and vision' (1978:4, and 1980:301. Own translation). Alan 
Paton also remarks on this in his foreword to the British edition, '[T]he heroic nature of Poppie Nongena, and the 
great skill of the writer, Elsa Joubert, make of it an epic.' And, '[o]ne is left with two overriding impressions. One is 
the courage of this woman in her never-ending struggle to live under the cruelty of the laws. The other is the art of 
the woman who tells her story' (Joubert papers). 
38 Joubert's persistence on making her voice as invisible as possible was again asserted when Poppie was first staged 
at the Market Theatre. The production had a white woman at a typewriter, representing Joubert, as a permanent 
presence on the stage alongside the actual action. Joubert intervened, insisting that this character be removed, so that 
Eunice's voice would be the focal point and her own intervention concealed (Interview). This is a common feature of 
collaborative auto/biography, sometimes at the insistence of the oral narrator, sometimes at that of the writing author. 
See for example, '[a]fter signing the contract for this book, Malcolm X looked at me hard. "A writer is what I want, 
not an interpreter"' (Alex Haley, Foreword to The Autobiography of Malcolm X, 1965:7). For an example of the 
writing author's self-erasure, see Elisabeth Burgos-Debray's introduction to L Rigoberta Menchu an Indian Woman 
in Guatemala (l 984:xx). On the question whether the nature of the relationship between the interlocutors should be 
displayed in the text, or could be explicated in accompanying texts, see Tedlock (1983:321 ff.). 
39 Contrast this to the interpreting and dissenting voice of the third person narrator in Zulu Woman (Hourwich 
Reyher, 1999:65, 74, 108, 126), and the writing author's first person voice in Black Hamlet (Sachs, 1996:83, 127, 
159). 
40 Joubert has also used the images of being a tape-recorder (Interview) and a mirror. In her notes for a launch in the 
UK, she writes, 'I try to hold up the mirror to life in the black community, in other words to act as a scribe, and that, 
to my mind, is the prime function of the writer' (Joubert papers). 
41 In this regard, a comparison to Missionaris, Joubert's novel following Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena, is 
incisive. There, two main narrative voices can be discerned. That of the missionary Van der Lingen, whose life is 
reconstructed in the text from written records of the eighteenth century, and that of the researching writer, who tries 
to understand him in her reconstruction. Missionaris opens with the question by the researching author: 'Na 
tweehonderd jaar, hoe kan ek deurbreek tot jou !ewe, missionaris ... ?' (Joubert, 1988: 1 ); and includes critical and 
distancing comments like, 'Maak Van der Lingen bier 'n fout? [ ... ]Is dit 'n subtiele klein vergryp' (ibid.:163). [After 
two hundred years, how can I break through to your life, missionary?' And, 'Does Van der Lingen make a mistake 
here? [ ... ] Is it a subtle little violation? (Own translation).] In Missionaris the voice of the researching character 
who reconstructs Van der Lingen's life is often at odds with Van der Lingen's, doubting his rendering of events. On 
this difference, Joubert has noted that while she was totally on Eunice's side, and simply wanted to convey her story, 
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she used her own encounter with Van der Lingen's texts and their reconstruction to work out her own issues for 
herself (Interview). 
42 On collaborative auto/biography and novelization, see chapter IV. 
43 As mentioned above, although a question and response structure is visible, the transcripts do not report the 
questions. The interludes in the publication, by contrast, are construed as little dialogues at the time of the recording. 
44 To what extent these interludes are fictionalised is difficult to say. 
45 By contrast, in Telling a Good One, Mullen Sands (2000) provides a painstakingly detailed account of the various 
processes involved in the production of collaborative auto/biographies. 
46 Collaborative auto/biographies are often necessitated by the fact that the oral narrator is illiterate or quasi-literate. 
But there are also other reasons why oral narrators do not authorise the written text. These include technical 
communication difficulties; political conditions (as in the case of Winnie Mandela's Part of My Soul Went With Him 
(1985); lack of interest (as in Eunice N.'s case); or because they were unable to read the written text because they had 
died (as in Katie Makanya's case); or (like 'Nisa') did not understand the language (1990)). In this sense Mpho 
Nthunya's Singing Away the Hunger (1996) is an exception. 
47 Isemhagen's (1987:225) and Causer's (1998:338) requirement that the ~ustice of the portrayal has to do with 
whether the text represents its subject the way the subject would like to be represented', is a necessary but not 
sufficient requirement if one takes an intersubjectivist approach to truth. Within the latter paradigm both the writing 
author and the oral narrator, and not simply the latter, have to be consent to the portrayal. 
48 See Rios and Mullen Sands (2000:1-3). 
49 Dalven's inverted commas use of 'truth' suggests that she might be referring critically to an objectivist notion of 
truth in which the monological subject can produce the truth about herself; or to a relativist notion, in which truth is 
always particular and under erasure. 
so This process is best illustrated by David Stoll's (1999) criticism of Rigoberta MenchU and Elisabeth Burgos-
Debray's l Rigoberta Menchu that was in tum followed by the various responses collected in Arias' (2001b) The 
Rigoberta Menchu Controversy. It is also evident in the responses following Mende Nazer's Sklavin (2000) and 
China Keitesi's China - A Child Soldier (2002). See www.mendenazer.org and 
www.enteruganda.com/about/chinastory.php 
51 One of these was Joubert's exchanges with the director Hilary Blecher, who suggested certain changes to the script 
for the New York production of the play. Joubert consented to many of Blecher's suggestions, while turning down 
others (Blecher to JOubert. 29 December 1981 and Joubert's reply of 10 January 1982. Joubert papers). Another 
example is the exchange between Joubert and the Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh, (which had included extracts of The 
Long Journey of Poppie Nongena in a school booklet on apartheid). In reply to a letter from Tafelberg withdrawing 
the rights of the German publisher to reissue the booklet, the editor writes, '[w]e must assume from your comments 
"completely biased", "unscientific", "violating the truth" etc. that you do not believe we have achieved our aim of 
providing students in Germany with an objective study of apartheid in South Africa. Our book is intended to 
provoke discussion' (Letter to Joubert. 29 July 1983. See also letter from Hodder and Stoughton, 21April1983, to 
Joubert. Joubert papers). 
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52 Presumably, Olivier would consider his own responses to Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena rational. 
53 For this distinction and its relevance to narratives in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see Du Toit 
(2002:3-4). 
54 Contrast this with Sommer's view that 'testimonial is an invitation to a tete-a-tete, not a heart-to-heart' (1996:143). 
For an extension of an intersubjectivist theory of knowledge to include the emotions, see Honneth (2000a:216-236). 
55 See Lakoff and Johson (1980). 
56 Like Isemhagen, Krupat (1989:132-201), who also operates with the criterion of dialogicity, refers to its 
Bakhtinian roots. Whilst Bakhtin (1981) goes some way in giving the concept content, I would argue that he is thin 
on the normative aspect, (namely making explicit why dialogism is preferable to monologism) and on spelling out 
the communication relations under which dialogue can be established. It is for this reason that a marriage between 
Habermas and Bakhtin is advised. One of the outcomes of such a marriage is that Habermas's insights can also be 
carried over to the study ofliterature on the back ofBakhtin's dialogical interpretations of the novel. 
57 The editorial in which book prizes is discussed notes, that, 'although serious writers do not write for money, they 
are equally entitled to remuneration for their work, just like any other person in any other occupation' (Own 
translation. Die Burger 31March1979:n.p.). 
58 The idea that money corrupts the truth or cultural value of collaborative auto/biographies is widespread. It is 
evident in Wulf Sachs' decision not to let any money pass between him and the oral narrator John Chavafambira for 
work on Black Hamlet (Sachs 1996:74). It is also behind the initial romanticisation of her !Kung informants by 
Marjorie Shostak (2000:63-76) and clearly expressed in the following exchange between Shostak and Nisa: 
"'What do you think of our talk? Has it been good? What do you think about it?" 
"Our work is good." 
"Because I pay you well? Or is our talk good in other ways?" 
"For you, maybe it hasn't been good. For me, it's been good." 
"No, for me, it has also been good. I mean in your heart. Does the talk make you happy?" 
"The talk makes me happy. Because I see money, a lot of money. And by working [with you, Shostak], I can get the 
things I need." 
"I know the money is good. But for now, let's set that aside. What about the talk itself - does it make your heart feel 
good or, at times, your heart feel bad?" 
"Listen," she said, steering the answer in a different direction[ .... ]"' (Shostak, 2000:225). 
59 In this sense Eunice had more in common with Mpho Nthunya, the oral narrator of Singing Away the Hunger, than 
with Katie. 
60 In this regard it is significant that The Calling of Katie Makanya first had to be a success in English, before it was 
translated into Xhosa. Cases of books following the inverted route (i.e. from an African language to English) are 
very small. Exceptions are the collaborative auto/biography-oral history Usukabekhuluma and the Bhambatha 
Rebellion by Zungu (1997) and A. C. Jordan's Tales from Southern Africa (1973). 
61 In the case of The Calling of Katie Makanya these might have been reasons for publishing abridged English 
editions in paperback, or for translating it into Xhosa. 
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62 On the significance of these differences in collaborative writing, see Ede and Lunsford (200 I :363). 
63 In her analyses of the representation ofblack women in white Afrikaans writing, Gardner (1991) tends towards the 
Foucauldian position, while Marlene van Niekerk in her review of Gardner's book, calls for the abolition of this 'sort 
of cognitive Apartheid' through 'a truly hermeneutic conversation that searches for ways in which the (strangely) 
other can be understood' (Van Niekerk, 1992: 127). 
64 This is also the position Margaret Lenta takes against the view that knowledge production across (racial) 
difference is impossible. Arguing against Ampie Coetzee, Lenta writes, 'No South African resident would deny the 
difficulty of achieving sympathetic understanding of a member of another racial group, but to condemn as 
presumptuous or useless efforts to do so is a despairing verdict on our predicament. It shows too an excessive 
preoccupation with race, as if it were the only factor which unites or separates people. Elsa Joubert's response to the 
black woman's narration of her life is that of a woman and a sister. It is significant; I think, that Coetzee's pronoun 
"he" ignores the possibility that their shared womanhood could form an important link between the author and her 
subject' (1984:158, fn. 3). 
65 My approach to difference is indebted to Young's structural notion of difference (2000:ch 3), which sets itself 
apart from notions of difference common in identity politics. 
66 Her travel writings include Suid van die Wind, Die Sta/ van Monomotapa, Swerwer in die Heifsland, Die Nuwe 
Afrikaan, and Gordel van Smarag. 
67 In The Calling of Katie Makanya this relationship between equality and inequality is the theme of the interludes in 
which Margaret's and Katie's voices are presented in amiable dialogical interaction reflecting on the relations 
between them. 
68 In notes drawn up after publication, Joubert explicitly states the Jungian notion of individuation and universalism 
as a thread running through Ons Wag op die Kaptein, Bonga, Die Wahlerbrug, and Die Swerjjare van Poppie 
Nongena. Joubert's husband was a committed Jungian (personal communication) and, as we have seen, she has 
attested to the importance of his contribution to her own writing. (Notes after publication. Joubert papers). 
69 Recall a similar tendency in Black Hamlet, Zulu Woman, and Nisa. 
70 On the significance of loyalty and trust, see Couser (1998:341) and Isernhagen (1987:224). According to 
Schalkwyk the distinction of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena lays precisely in its 'achievement of a genuinely 
close and sympathetic rapport between narrator and transcriber, even when almost every event in the work seems to 
deny such a possibility' (1989:257). On the distorting effect of the absence of reciprocal loyalty and trust typical in 
relations of unilateral dependency, see Sachs: 'I would ask him [Chavafambira]: "Do natives tell lies easily? Are 
they the same with their own people?" And his reply was invariably: "When you don't want to hurt, you tell a lie; but 
I don't mean anything wrong. Or when you are much afraid of people. We don't like the white people; they are 
always cross, cheeky with us. We don't know what they will do with us. Therefore I don't care what I say to a white 
man if only I won't be punished. There is nothing bad in telling a lie if you don't cheat and don't do harm with it' 
(Sachs, 1996:197, see also 139). 
71 What distinguishes the author of collaborative auto/biography is that she is not subsumed under the subject of her 
text, but stands her ground as an equal. This, Wolfe notes, is necessary because the fear of intrusion on the oral 
171 
Footnotes 
narrator's life, or uncritical loyalty, result in banal texts: 'A writer needs at least enough ego to believe that what he is 
doing as a writer is as important as what anyone he is writing about is doing and that therefore he shouldn't 
compromise his own work in fear of intruding in the subject's life' ( 1980:68). 
72 Carlean goes even further, pointing out that, 'the bulk of the narrative is given indirectly from her [Poppie's] 
perspective, thus endorsing the values she expresses as the values of the book' (1989:56). These values, Carlean 
identifies as 'conservative middle-class [ ... ] religious and fatalistic' (ibid.). If it is correct to argue that the third 
person narrator's stance towards Poppie echoes Joubert's stance towards Eunice, then one may well be justified in 
questioning the extent to which disagreement about the interpretation of events in the light of shared values was in 
fact possible. 
73 Carole Boyce Davies writes of Winnie Mandela's Part of My Soul Went With Him, Shostak's Nisa, and Joubert's 
The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena that 'they are manipulated chronologies, constructed and ordered to meet the 
very narrow conventions of published autobiography' (1992:4). She adds that, 'ordering imperatives that reside at the 
root of male autobiography and that are allied with individualism and colonial or patriarchal authority often remain 
intact. These are also subject to the marketing expectations of publishers and reader requirements' (1992: 13). 
74 Like Lejeune, Carlean also asserts that, 'capitalism[ ... ] constitutes the major raison d'etre for works presenting the 
lives of underdogs and, because of the ideology that may provide the middle class reader with a reformist, or a guilty, 
or at least a voyeuristic interest in them, works of this kind have become increasingly popular in Europe and 
especially America' (1989:54). 
75 Lejeune focuses on worker autobiographies commissioned by French publishers. 
76 According to Gusdorf autobiography is the product of reflection, which he equates to the giving of structure. This 
is a precondition but also the 'original sin' (1980:41) of autobiography. Likewise, Olney, holds that the 
autobiographer 'half discovers, half creates a deeper design and truth than adherence to historical and factual truth 
could ever make claim to' ( 1980: 11 ). 
77 Merrington nevertheless admits the value of the imposed design in praising The Calling of Katie Makanya for its 
'readerly pleasures', amongst which he includes the 'conventional portraiture', 'dramatic unfolding, of eavesdropping, 
of artistic coherence between subjects and their environment, of novelistic inevitability' (Merrington, 1995: 156). 
78 This perceived need for tidying up and giving form is not restricted to the writing author, the publishing industry, 
and the interpreting reader. Katie, the oral narrator herself, already sensed it, which is one of the reasons why she 
approached Margaret to write her story. Margaret Blackman, quoted in Isernhagen (1987:226 fu. 16) also refers to 
the importance of oral narrators' request to writing authors to write their narratives, precisely because they want to 
have these ordered according to what they perceive to be an acceptable discourse, and because they believe that the 
writing author is better equipped to do so than what they are themselves. 
79 For her report on the translation which she had done herself, see Joubert (1982:93-102). 
80 Some indication of editorial intervention in the Afrikaans edition can be gleaned from the in-house reader's reports 
(Joubert papers). I restrict the discussion to the novel in English. A comparison \liith the various stage performances 
will reveal the nature of specific dramatic discourses in different settings. In his review of the play in New York, 
David Coplan comments, 'the final production was geared more closely to the expectations of American theatre-
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goers by an increased emphasis on music and dance on the one hand, and an overt, unambivalent political statement 
on the other' (1983:80). In this regard, the exchanges between Joubert and the director of the play, Hilary Blecher 
are equally incisive. In a letter to Joubert, Blecher complains about the New York producers of Poppie: 'They don't 
really understand our attitude to theatre which doesn't have to do so much with how long an American audience is 
able to sit but rather with truth and authenticity, with a sense of vision.' The produces had apparently forced Blecher 
to change something regarding Vukile's death (Blecher to Joubert. n.d. Joubert papers). Prior to the production, 
Blecher had insisted that she has not altered the text, but her depiction of the situation leaves no doubt as to the 
demands of the discourse of the theatre and the power of the producers to enforce changes. Blecher writes, 'There is 
nothing in the script which does not exist in the novel,' but then goes on to add that the 'alterations that I suggest have 
to do with theatricality- how a climax would best be built up, [ ... ] making certain elements more accessible to a 
New York audience without sacrificing authenticity. In other words I have tried to serve the novel and your purpose 
while keeping in mind the demands of the stage' (Blecher to Joubert. 29 December 1981. Joubert papers). 
81 Danie van Niekerk ofTafelberg even narrows it down to 'the reader in Kent'. The position of English as master 
narrative is also evident in Van Niekerk's comment that the possibility of international distribution depends on the 
success of the English translation (Van Niekerk to Joubert. 19 November 1979). 
82 Hodder and Stoughton's reason for selling the book as a novel are not stated and Body seems ignorant of the 
contradictions this gets her into. On the one hand, she insists that the book is a novel; on the other she wants to 
ensure its referentiality to an actually existing place by requesting a map from Joubert to include in the book. 
Although she complied to the request for a map, Joubert did not do so without objecting: 'I personally don't like the 
idea ofa map in a novel' herself slipping into the term novel (Joubert to Body. 29 July 1979. Joubert papers). 
83 Passing by = passing away. Joubert's English translation comes from the Xhosa, which refers to the souls flowing 
by as if a river. Heavy= pregnant (Joubert to Body. 29 July 1979. Joubert papers). Joubert has this translation 
from Ezekiel Mphahlele's wife adding yet another (even if minor) source of collaboration (Interview). In a letter to 
Body, Joubert herself comments on this management of otherness, 'I decided [ ... ] to retain some Afrikaans and 
Xhosa words, as well as some direct translation of Xhosa expression to convey some sense of "otherness" (n.d. 
Joubert papers). Reflecting her sense of difference between the Afrikaans and English audiences and the protagonist 
of the narrative, Joubert had also offered to shorten the first fifty to sixty pages of the English edition, as 'the small 
events described are of interest to the South African reader because they identify with the children; it might not be 
the case with the British or American reader' (Joubert to Body. 14 June 1979. Joubert papers). Body felt that the 
anticipated English reader would be able to associate with these details and they were retained. 
84 
'It is good of you to give way to our prejudices over the present tense' (Body to Joubert. 24 September 1979. 
Joubert papers. e.a.) 
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IV. The intersubjective generation of truth claims about the past 
1 Our authors will have to record the recent political events for the historians of later - the law makes the writing of 
history in the normal sense impossible. 
2 Although some such visits did serve as potential falsifications to truth claims raised by Makanya and Eunice N., 
they also had a more general scope, namely furnishing the writing author with information to set scenes (see pp 100-
101 below). 
3 To my knowledge (in contrast to, for example, Stoll's [1999] book on Rigoberta Menchll), no empirical work exists 
in which the truth claims in either Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena or The Calling of Katie Makanya have been 
subject to potential falsifying scrutiny by historians. 
4 Charles van Onselen makes this point with regard to Kas Maine, 'This is a biography of a man who, if one went by 
the official record alone, never was. It is the story of a family who have no documentary existence, of farming folk 
who lived out their lives in a part of South Africa that few people loved, in a century that the country will always 
want to forget. The State Archives, supposedly the mainspring of the nation's memory, has but one line referring to 
Kas Maine' (Van Onselen, 1996:3). 
5 These are different from documents which constitute events themselves, such as marriage certificates; the granting 
and denying of passes; and so on. 
6 For an exemplary use of official documents in relation to oral history, see Hofrneyr ( 1993 :59-121 ). 
7 A similar question can be raised about McCord's characterisation of Makanya, which omits her anti-Semitic, her 
anti-African, and her anti-Indian sentiments expressed in the oral interviews (see Makanya and McCord, 1954:124). 
8 I shall return to this point when looking at characterisation as an element of novelization below. 
9 These are still cases of truth about what happened, as opposed to cases of truthfulness, which are about the question 
whether the speaker uni consciously deceives herself or others about her interior life and her interpretation of herself 
and her needs. 
10 On coming to terms with the past, see 'Entsorgung der Vergangenheit' (in Habermas, 1985); 'Grenzen des 
Neohistorismus' (in Habermas, 1990); 'Was bedeutet "Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit" heute?' and '1989 im 
Schatten von 1945. Zur Normalitiit einer kiinftigen Berliner Republik' (in Habermas, 1995); 'Uber den offentlichen 
Gebrauch der Historie' and 'Aus Katastrophen Lemen? Ein Zeitdiagnostischer Rilckblick auf das kurze 20. 
Jahrhundert' (in Habermas, 1998). For an application of Habermas's notion of Vergangenheitsbewiiltigung to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see Duvenage (1999). 
11 I follow the Oxford English Dictionary's use of the terms to novelize, 'To convert into the form or style ofa novel', 
and its derivatives novelistic, and novelization. For an analysis which focuses on one aspect of novelization, namely 
the use of dialogue, see William Andrews's 'The novelization of voice in early African American narrative' 
(1990:23-34). I use novelization to denote that process by which the style of the oral narrator's narrative is 
transformed into a text that has features typical of the style of the novel, without its truth value being tampered with. 
12 Here, too, I follow the Oxford English Dictionary's use of the terms to fictionalize/fictionize, 'To give a fictional 
version (of actual happenings)'. I usefictionalization to denote that process by which the truth claims raised in the 
oral narrator's narrative are changed so that its truth value is suspended. The more precise meanings of these terms 
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should emerge from the discussion of examples of novelization and how they differ from fictionalization. 
13 Compare Joubert's remark that Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena is a novel which portrays the human being 
within a social/political ideology: 'It has its disadvantages: it can't portray the whole socio-political situation, but only 
as lived through the people. It has its advantages: the writer from the outside sees conflicts, streams, which the 
participant cannot see, and can interpret them, on condition that he interprets truthfully. Also: that's why it becomes 
a novel. Of necessity the content touches on the author's own unconscious, identify with your character. Also the 
danger that you emphasise that with which you identify' (Notes after publication. Joubert papers. Slightly adapted 
for translation purposes). 
14 The following discussion brackets two issues regarding fiction, namely the distinction between fiction and lying 
and the value of fudging novelization and fictionalisation. What lying and fiction have in common is their 
divergence from actual fact. Where they differ is in the status a speaker claims for them. The success of a lie 
depends on the speaker's claim that it makes a factual statement and that this factual statement is true. Fictions, on 
the other hand, suspend the claim that the utterance is true. My attempt to distinguish novelization and 
fictionalization so as to rescue a kernel of truth in collaborative auto/biographies is guided by expressed or implicit 
commitments by the collaborators to tell the truth and by the belief that these truth claims should be judged on their 
own terms as truth claims. In keeping claims to truth (chapter IV) and appeals for recognition (chapter V) apart, I do 
not explore the other side of the same coin, namely the equally interesting question of how the fudging of the 
distinction between novelization and fictionalisation can be put to use in making moral appeals. 
15 According to Peter Wilhelm, one of the jurors of the Alan Paton - Sunday Times Award which was granted to The 
Calling of Katie Makanya, 'one has to rely on Margaret McCord's verifiability to classify the book as non-fiction in 
the first place. One has Katie and her sister and the Jubilee Singers engaged in elaborate conversations that took 
place, if they took place at all, decades in the past. The issue is whether this stitched-together memory is "fact" that 
constitutes an entity that, as Tim [Couzens] says, "reads as easily as a novel"; or whether it is, in fact, a novel -- in 
the same way that Gore Vidal's Lincoln is a novel. I was certainly persuaded that the book told the truth, though 
perhaps about events so technically peripheral that no scholar would devote years to searching, classifying and 
verifying -- as Van Onselen did in The Seed is Mine' (Personal communication). 
16 The preface to Robinson Crusoe would be a case in point. To what extent textual strategies such as prefaces 
asserting the factual status of a text (such as Truman Capote's In cold blood) can actually secure that status, is an 
important question in its own right that cannot be further investigated here. For argument's sake, I also accept that 
generally fact and fiction can be distinguished in principle and in practice, even if there are some cases where this 
may be difficult. 
17 For Austin's use of the term 'uptake' (the way in which the audience responds to the utterance), see How to do 
things with words (1975:117-118). 
18 I refer to personal communication from Prof Jeremy Popkin (Department of History, UCLA) to myself and a letter 
from Moya Deacon, an Anthropology student at the Rand Afrikaans University, to Joubert (Joubert papers). 
19 Although Gardner's suggestion that race is one of the factors determining the success of the uptake of a truth claim 
may be considered empirically wrong if one calls Rive to mind, her general question, 'What determines the 
successful uptake of such a claim?' still stands. Pursuing this further, will, however, take us beyond the scope of the 
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present study. 
20 
'Haar aangetrokkenheid tot die historiese feitelikheid en tot die, [!] reisverhaal loop uit in die stuk "faction" 
waarmee niemand daardie tipiese burgerlike spel kan speel van dit tot blote verbeeldingsfeit te (ont-)heilig nie,' and 
'as roman is daar besliste voorbehoude teen Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena [!] aan te teken (hoewel 'n mens 
huiwer om met "estetiese" oorwegings te kom na 'n werk wat so 'n duidelike sosiale funksie wil vervul') [Her 
affinity for the historical facts and the travel narrative results in a piece of 'faction' with which no one can play that 
typically bourgeois game by (de-)sacrilising it to purely imagined fact' and 'as a novel there are certain objections to 
Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena (although one should be hesitant to approach a work which so clearly wants to 
fulfil a social function with "aesthetic" considerations] (Gerwe!, Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 1979:n.p.). For a similar 
failure to distinguish New Journalism and faction in South African writing in general, see Zander (1999:99). 
21 
'Die faksie-roman klink feitelik waar --- veral omdat dit in die idioom van die swartman [!] self geskryf is' [This 
faction-novel sounds factually true --- especially because it is written in the black man's own idiom] (Joubert papers). 
22 Compare the historian Herman Gillomee's comment in the motto to this section. Isabel Hofineyr detects a similar 
politically triggered migration of historical narrative to its adjacent fictional counterpart (dinowane) in the Ndebele 
oral tradition, as forced removals deprive the custodians of oral history of access to the material stratum of the 
mnemonically employed landscape in which memory is banked ( 1993 passim). 
23 For the question of what the reference of these fictional claims is, and what reference to non-existent objects 
entails, see Bertrand Russell (1954:39-56). 
24 Thus Greig Coetzee states that he has had to tone down some of the events portrayed in his autobiographical play 
White men with weapons because they would not seem credible. (Interview with Debbie Liitge, forthcoming). 
25 When it comes to the distinction between novelization and fictionalization, the differences between the English 
edition of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena and the Afrikaans Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena are incisive. 
Whereas the note to the reader in the Afrikaans edition refers to the text as a verhaal (narrative), thus allowing it to 
be taken as fact, Margaret Body's rendering of the note 'To the reader', 'This novel is based on the actual life story of 
a black woman living in South Africa today', dilutes the claim that the text is of a factual nature. An explication of 
the illocutionary force of the English edition would thus be 
We (Elsa Joubert and Margaret Body) claim that we can provide you with convincing reasons that 
this is a good novel about 
a person (whom Elsa Joubert shall call Poppie) who has experienced the following things. 
By calling it a novel (albeit one based on fact) rather than a narrative using novelistic techniques, Body's intervention 
results in a severing of the innovative coupling of novelistic techniques with factual validity claims, which is one of 
the hallmarks of this text, as of New Journalism and the Documentary Novel as such. 
26 Compare also Judith Liitge Coullie (I 991: 18-19). 
27 In Russell's terms, the reference is to non-existent objects. 
28 For the ideological function of the blurring of the fact - fiction distinction in Di Koninging fan Skeba - see Meyer 
(1996). 
29 The similarities and differences between New Journalism and the Documentary Novel are tangential to the 
argument. These differences matter when the question arises whether Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena and The 
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Calling of Katie Makanya are more similar to the former or to the latter. This debate is opened by the fact that Elsa 
Joubert herself places Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena in the tradition of New Journalism (see also Carlean, 
1990) and by Merrington's (1995:156) suggestion that The Calling of Katie Makanya is a transformed testimony. 
Wolfe cites Truman Capote's In cold blood (1966) as a classic exemplar of the genre of New Journalism. Whilst 
some similarities can be identified in In cold blood, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie 
Makanya, the differences are equally telling. Capote's book is subtitled 'A true account of a multiple murder and its 
consequences'. According to Capote's acknowledgements, it is 'derived from my own observations', 'official 
records', and interviews with the persons directly concerned'. These 'collaborators are identified in the text' (Capote, 
2000:Acknowledgements). The book is a record of a morbid fascination with two individual's acts of crime, 
psychopathology, and the power of individual officials of the criminal justice system to extract the truth and maintain 
justice'. This account of the medicalisation and juridification of human interaction in which the socially respected 
victims are elevated above the guilty social outcasts is conveyed in the (masculinist) journalistic style of the upbeat 
New York reporter. In contrast to In cold blood, the 1966 first-person narrative Biografia de un cimarron 
(Biography of an runaway slave), a collaborative auto/biography of a runaway Cuban slave Esteban Montejo written 
with the ethnologist Miguel Barnet, played a significant role in establishing quite a different literary tradition, namely 
that of testimony. Testimony, or what Barnet calls the Documentary Novel, was institutionalised by the creation of a 
literary award in the nineteen seventies, by the Cuban Casa de las Americas, which described entries for that 
category as follows: "'Testimonies must document some aspect of Latin American or Caribbean reality from a direct 
source. A direct source is understood as knowledge of the facts by the author or his or her compilation of narratives 
or evidence obtained from the individuals involved or qualified witnesses. In both cases reliable documentation, 
written or graphic, is indispensable. The form is at the author's discretion, but literary quality is also indispensable"' 
(quoted in Beverley, 1996:39, fu 3). The Casa de lass America's prize was thus similar to the Alan Paton/Sunday 
Times Prize, which was awarded to The Calling of Katie Makanya. See chapter V below. 
30 It is another question whether greater specificity also leaves the proposition itself unchanged. 
31 This was also the case with Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, which appeared in the Sunday paper Rapport. 
32 A significant distinction Barnet draws between New Journalism and the Documentary Novel is relevant in this 
regard. Barnet insists that the in-depth research required for Documentary Novels takes us beyond the journalistic in 
an important way. The Documentary Novel does not only add more journalistic facts: 'The difficult thing is to 
remove the mask, the prejudiced class outlook which is superimposed over a historical event. Ifit is a popular event, 
the press has probably given it a special meaning and provided an official explanation. The mission of the 
Documentary Novelist, on the other hand, is to reveal the other side of the coin by engaging in serious research and 
fact-finding, discovering the intrinsic elements, the real cause and events' (Barnet, 1981 :24 ). In the association of its 
practitioners and style with the mass media, one can expect that texts written in the tradition of New Journalism are 
more likely to support a hegemonic status quo. The media generally also shares this feature with novelistic art, 
which, even in questioning their ideology (see Goankar, 2001 :4-8), is more often than not associated \\<ith the middle 
and upper classes. According to Van der Merwe (1992:71 ), although Joubert used reporting in the Afrikaans 
newspapers of the time, she went beyond the journalistic in that she added things about which these papers were 
silent. Given her own social position as a member of the professional class, it is not surprising that Joubert 
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nevertheless tends to associate Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena more with the novel than with testimony, even if 
the class and social position of the oral narrator Eunice N. (and also that of Katie Makanya, for that matter) may be 
closer to a protagonist of testimony. 
33 Whilst this emphasis on the validity claim to truth does not preclude these texts from being judged in terms of the 
standards of authenticity this is not my concern here. 
34 This type of analysis can, of course, be done in much greater detail than what has been undertaken here. 
Constraints of length force me to select a few examples from each of these texts, focussing on the similar novelistic 
techniques employed. The equally incisive comparison of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerjjare van 
Poppie Nongena to identify the differences in novelization has thus been bracketed. 
35 For the use of dialogue as novelistic technique in autobiography, see Doris Lessing, interviewed by Margaret 
Daymond (forthcoming). 
36 My discussion here is restricted to the conversion of the transcript to the publication as it relates to novelization, 
and brackets the very important general issue of the conversion of the oral (voice) to the written (print). For an 
example of a transcription which tries to capture as much as possible of the original oral text, see Hofmeyr (1993, 
appendixes 2-5). For discussions of oral auto/biography, see Judith Liitge Coullie (1999); Yali Manyisi, interviewed 
by Jeff Opland; and Zolani Makiva, interviewed by Duncan Brown and Susan Kiguli (forthcoming). 
37 This complex structure, compared to the transcript, confirms Hofmeyr's (1993:106) depiction of orature as 
typically having only two characters to a scene, in contrast to the novel which is able to manage more. 
38 A similar thing happens in the opening line of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena, which is ascribed to Poppie, 
but, according to Joubert, was in fact uttered by Eunice N.'s mother (Interview). 
39 This change McCord makes to Katie's oral narrative, namely ascribing an utterance to another person than the one 
who has actually made it, is similar to the change of which Stoll accuses Rigoberta MenchU, namely that she testifies 
to an event (the murder of her mother) which she did not witness. Whilst the event itself is correctly described, the 
implication that Rigoberta was present at it is false (Stoll, 2001:392-410). It is important to keep in mind though 
that texts such as Katie Makanya's, Eunice N.'s, and Rigoberta MenchU's make a variety of claims. One of these is 
truth claims. These are made parallel to other claims, such as rightness, truthfulness, and the appropriateness of the 
speech system. Habermas's thesis that each validity claim be measured according to its own standards means that 
truth claims should be treated separately and according to their specific standards. They should not be compromised 
by the presence of other validity claims nor should they be judged in terms of those other validity claims. In other 
words, if MenchU, Eunice N, or Makanya make false claims about the past, these claims are false - full stop. The 
other side of the coin of this strict separation is that even if there are factual errors in these texts, this does not 
invalidate the other validity claims to truthfulness, rightness, and intelligibility-appropriateness of the speech system. 
On the contrary, these validity claims too have to be tried on their own terms. In this way Stoll (1999) and others (in 
Arias (ed.) 2001 b) who point out the factual errors in such texts may be right about the unacceptability of certain 
truth claims raised in these texts. But they are wrong to conclude that the other validity claims are thereby 
disqualified too. 
40 For an analysis of the distnbution of first- and third-person narrators throughout the book and its ideological 
function, see Janssen et al (1981 ). 
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41 Shostak (1998:409) asserts that 'an overriding structure needed to be created, a "literary" one that would grab the . 
attention and maintain the interest of American readers'. 
42 For an example of a collaborative auto/biography in which structure is more heavily determined by theme and the 
short story form, compare Nthunya's Singing away the hunger ( 1996). 
43 The same applies to Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena. What appears to be the transcript of the first session 
between Eunice N. and Joubert covers nine pages. It also starts with her birth and lingers with her childhood days. 
The second and third sessions return to two characters mentioned in the first session, namely her grandfather and her 
uncle Pengi. Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena also breaks with the order of telling, sticking, as far as could be 
determined, to chronology as overall structuring principle. Thus chronology, the most common structuring device of 
both the classic novel and of auto/biography (rather than the order of telling, theme, or even plot), determines the 
structure of both books. Van der Merwe suggests that Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena is structured according to 
chronological principles rather than the plot of the tragic novel that requires a worsening of the protagonist's fate. 
According to Van der Merwe, Poppie's removal to the Ciskei constitutes a worse fate than Stone's death, which 
would require an inversion of the events compared to the order they are actually narrated in (Van der Merwe, 
1992:73). 
44 My discussion brackets issues pertaining to the relationships between orature, writing and power thematised in the 
anecdote as well as the social positions of the characters. 
45 An earlier version of this tale was already published in 1694 in J. Wilkins' Mercury or the swift messenger. 
46 Although I have restricted myself to The Calling of Katie Makanya, I believe that Die Swerjjare van Poppie 
Nongena shows similar elements of fictionalization due to the imposition of structure. 
47 In his report, an unidentified in-house reader for Tafelberg remarks thus on the combination of truth value and 
style: 'The narrative of Poppie Nongena is not only an authentic and stirring report of the life story of a black woman, 
but it is, according to me, an important part of contemporary historiography, recorded in a packing and severe 
journalistic style -- objective, but in places so sensitively personal that it disturbs the reader' (Own translation. 
Joubert papers. e.a.). 
48 For a recent narrative written in the same key as Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena, see A.H.M. Scholtz's 
Vatmaar (1998). 
49 Once again the assertion that the same applies to Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena has to stand as an as yet 
unsubstantiated hypothesis. 
5
° Compare Joubert's notes of her visit to Eunice's home (Joubert papers) and McCord (2000:251). 
51 For information on the necessity of imagination in the Documentary Novel, see also Barnet ( 1981 :25). 
52 For a similar use of the imagination in scene-setting, see McCord's description of Katie's flight from Johannesburg 
station at the outbreak of the South African War in 1899: 
'The train whistle sounded again and the cars bumped together, jerking forward. Samuel shrieked in fright. Ethel 
screamed. Katie almost fell off the edge of the cattle car into Mbambo's arms. Perhaps, if it had not been for her 
children, she would have let herself fall. But Samuel's shrieking was like a chain pulling her down. Mbambo 
reached into his pocket and pulled out two one-pound notes, pushing them at her; then he ran along the platform as 
the train slowly began to move. 
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"Even if I'm dead I will keep on running and running until I find you," he shouted above the clanging of the iron 
wheels and the rush of the wind"' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 137). 
s
3 Compare also Merrington's (1995:156) reference to objective correlatives in scene-setting as an example of 
novelization in The Calling of Katie Makanya. For a similar objective correlative, compare also Van Onselen, 'On 8 
September 1961, and with the ploughing in full swing, Pakiso gave birth to a daughter named Mpho. Inside the 
small corrugated-iron structure the baby would wake by night and demand the milk that soothed her until dawn; 
while out in the fields, the tractor would occasionally fall silent at midday and refuse to move until the patriarch 
replenished it with the diesel and oil that sustained it until dusk. And, just as surely as Pakiso learned that demands 
made of the breast could be physically draining to the point of exhaustion, so Kas realised that the leviathan's 
appetite was unrelenting. Like Pakiso, Kas managed to get through the moments of doubt by focusing on the 
expectations ofa longer-term reward' (Van Onselen, 1996:446-447). 
s
4 Gerwel's reference to Ons wag op die kaptein, page 178 (English, To die at sunset), is a misprint. It should read 
page 78. 
ss An example would be Elsa Joubert's assertion that the episode in which Poppie visits a lawyer from the Black Sash 
is her own invention (Personal communication). This was in reply to a question whether the lawyer's documents 
could be traced and consulted as part of the process of comparing official and unofficial written accounts of Eunice's 
life to her own oral narrative and Joubert's rendition of it. 
s
6 For characterisation as structuring principle, compare also Greig Coetzee, interviewed by Debbie Liitge 
(forthcoming). 
s7 Compare Mante Mphahlele (2002). 
ss See for example the exchange between Mphahlele and Manganyi in this regard (forthcoming). 
s
9 For a related point, see Carlean (1989:58). 
60 For the significance of these supra-individual structures in life-writing, see Marcus (1986: 165-193 ). 
61 The significance of agency is also evident in Ellen Kuzwayo's initial critical response to Mpho Nthunya's Singing 
away the hunger (see interview with Nthunya and Kendall by Vanessa Farr, forthcoming) and in Gilroy's (2000b:l 1) 
resistance to the representation of black people as either a problem or as victims. 
62 One such moment of resignation is found in the significant closing paragraphs of the text, 'Vir 'n paar oomblikke is 
sy weer swak, begin haar mond te bewe, kom daar iets soos kermgeluide uit haar mond. Van die begin af was dit nie 
ek wat die moeilikheid gesoek het nie. Here, waar is dit dan lat ek uit jou pad gedraai het?' (Die Sweifjare van 
Poppie Nongena: 276) ['For a moment it was as if a weakness had come over her again. Her mouth started 
quivering, a small cry rose in her throat. From the beginning it was not I who sought trouble. Lord, Lord, where, at 
what place, did I tum from your path?' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 354-355)]. 
63 While this disclaimer covers Joubert against some of Gardner's objections, Gardner may convincingly retort that a 
book which screens out these factors is wrongheaded. 
64 In this regard Joubert has pointed out that her 'creative imagination' was constrained by the facts (Joubert, Die 
Volksblad, I I April l 979:n.p.). These constraints are relevant to Gardner's (1991 :219) objection to the name Poppie 
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(little doll), which underscores the protagonist's childlike helplessness. According to Joubert she was constrained in 
her portrayal of Eunice by the facts (Eunice's family actually called her Baby because she was the youngest daughter) 
and by Eunice's self-representation (Eunice herself chose the pseudonym Poppie). 
65 Mager's (l 996:300) question whether Katie's missionary discourse is her own or McCord's raises similar questions. 
66 And (purported) completeness is not that unproblematic either. For example, Rousseau's (1953:65) claim that his 
Confessions are true because nothing is left out, is a ruse, even, one may venture, an excuse to dish up those saucy 
details which would otherwise have been considered unimportant. 
67 Probably discussions of relevance will be one criterion of whether an omission is significant or not. 
68 For a critique of the possibility of'rhetoric-free' speech as bearer of a neutral perspective, see Young (2000:63 ff.). 
69 The perspective which is created both by Poppie's view ('sien sy die jeeps'); the Cape Afrikaans plural ('poeliesse'); 
and the mix of English and Afrikaans ('residents' and 'riot squad') is lost in the English: 'In the road between the 
special quarters and the houses of the residents she saw the jeeps of the riot squad slowly going up and down. 
Behind the mesh wire in front of the jeep windows she could see the white policemen and the black policemen 
sitting; she couldn't see their faces, only the small holes in the mesh through which the guns would point' (The Long 
Journey of Poppie Nongena: 329). 
70 This, according to Janssen et al (1981 :60-63), is indeed the case in Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena. 
71 Compare J.M. Coetzee, interviewed by David Attwell (forthcoming). 
72 See for example Pratt (2001). 
73 The various images of disclosure used by Degenaar in his interpretation of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena as 
'a book which opens our eyes for the "structural violence" in our society' (Deurbraak, 19 February 1979:19. Own 
translation.), would go in this direction. See also his question, 'Whether we speak about 'structural violence', 
'institutional violence', 'concealed violence', or 'silent violence', the basic question is if our eyes are open to recognise 
this political pain for what it is, and then decide what we are going to do about it?' (Degenaar, Die Burger, 19 
Januarie 1979:n.p.). 
V. The intersubjective generation of identity and the appeal for recognition in the public 
sphere 
1 Quoted in Sommer (1996: 130). 
2 The focus on recognition is not meant to imply that it is the only or the most important aspect of the construction of 
identity. Other aspects may include the own body and intersubjective interaction with other bodies (Benhabib, 
1992: 152), or interaction between the body and the environment. 
3 See Keen (1999) and McCann (1999). 
4 Studies of collaborative auto/biographies by black women authors in Britain, like Mary Prince and Mrs Seacole, 
would also trouble Habermas's notions of the European public sphere. For the black public sphere in Britain and the 
USA respectively, see Gilroy (2000a and 2000b: 153-248) and The Black Public Sphere Collective (1995). 
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5 The extent of the oral narrator's awareness of audience certainly has a significant impact on her narrative. The 
details of the impact of this anticipated audience on the private interview are not my immediate concern - which is 
not to deny its significance. 
6 
'Ek sit en luister toe so na die nonsens wat die man praat, maar ek bly toe stil, want mans wil mos nie he jy moet iets 
se nie' [I sit and listen to the rubbish that the man is talking, but I keep silent, because men do not want you to say 
something] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Witchdoctors that her husband consults': 1 ). 
7 
'Toe voel ek nou bietjie hartseer want ek ken niemand nie, in 'n nuwe huis [ ... ] toe voel ek nou regtig ek is 
weggegooi is nou kom weggegooi, toe word ek nou hartseer, ek ken geen niemand nie' [Then I felt a little sad, 
because I know nobody in a new house [ ... ] then I really felt I have been thrown away have now been brought to be 
thrown away, then I became sad, I don't know nobody] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: East London: 1). 
8 
'lngetroude vrouens kan nie anderkant sit nie, hulle moet duskant sit' [Newly married female in-laws are not 
allowed to sit on the other side, they must sit on this side] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Journey': 3; similarly 
'Huwelik': 7). 
9 Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Kaap vv': 7. 
10 
'Ek het nou nie so sleg gevoel toe ek uit die Kaap ry nie. Ek is nou eerlik ek het glad nie so sleg gevoel nie, want 
ek was vol van die regering. Dit was te veel vir my. Ek kon dit nie meer gestaan het nie. Ek het glad nie eens gelyk 
om na die offis te gaan nie, want dis dieselfde storie elke dag, jy moet weggaan en jy mag nie hier wees nie, en 
eendag het mr. Stevens my pas na my gegooi en gese wat soek jy nog hier fjy] moet weggan uit die Kaap uit, jy 
behoort nie hier nie' [I did not feel so bad when I rode out of the Cape. I am honest now, I did not feel so bad at all, 
because I had my fill of the government. It was too much for me. I couldn't stand it anymore. I didn't even like 
going to the office, because it is the same story every day, you have to go away and you are not allowed to be here, 
and one day Mr Stevens threw my pass at me and said, what are you still looking for here you must go away from the 
Cape, you do not belong here] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977 :'Kaap vv': 8. e.a.). 
11 See also notes for Royal Society acceptance speech (Joubert papers). 
12 Embroidering on the comment, 'That we become what we have been for eternity, part of God, together in his hand,' 
she quotes from a 1515 document by St Theresa, "'Christ has no body on earth but yours, no hands but yours, no feet 
but yours; yours are the eyes through which is to look out Christ's compassion to the world, yours are the feet with 
which He is to go about doing good, and yours are the hands with which he is to bless us now"' (Notes for London 
book launch. Joubert papers). 
13 
'My hele begrip van kaffer en meid is aan't verander' [My whole conception of kaffir and maid is changing] 
(Notes while writing. 4 June 1977. Joubert papers). 
14 For example that both she and Eunice had been given pins celebrating the Queen, and both of them could recall 
seeing Halley's comet (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Upington': 7). 
15 Joubert's scepticism about the possibility of knowing others is general and not determined by race (Interview). 
16 Joubert denies a connection between feminism and the anti-apartheid struggle (Elsa Joubert interviewed by 
Stephan Meyer, forthcoming). 
17 In response to the question whether she adopted the position of writer, researcher, or friend when interviewing 
Katie, McCord notes that she wrote the book as 'a very intimate family friend' whose relationship with Katie (who 
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had served as her 'surrogate mother' when her own mother was out of town) was very close (McCord interv~ewed by 
Ngwenya, forthcoming). 
18 For work as medium ofrecognition, see Axel Honneth (2002: 19-30). 
19 Nance deals with testimonio that calls readers to action and which shows a substantial overlap with collaborative 
auto/biography. As will become clear in due course, I take the calls for recognition as calls for action in two ways -
a psychological and a political response. Nance draws several of her examples ofreaders' evasion of calls for action 
and techniques used to counter these from mediated testimony. Her focus leans towards the oral narrator's rhetorical 
strategies. Whilst some of these strategies can certainly be discovered in the published texts she relies on, one would 
have to pay at least equal attention to the original oral interaction and the transcript to get a more direct picture of the 
techniques oral narrators themselves use to ensure that their appeals do not fall on deaf ears. Because Nance's focus 
keeps slipping between the oral narrator and the writing author, she does not pay sufficient attention to a feature 
which is actually definitive of several of the books she draws on and which can, in fact, be discerned in the published 
text, namely the textual strategies writing authors use to convey to a reading audience the initial appeal for 
recognition the oral narrator has addressed to them. It is these techniques that will concern me. 
20 McCord also gives an example to show why she could not follow the option of having Katie do the linguistic and 
cultural translation from her first-person perspective herself. According to McCord, ascribing the opening line of the 
main narrative to Katie ('She looked like a witch'), in which Katie's great-grandmother is depicted, would be 
inappropriate. McCord explains that the English translation witch is the closest she could find for the original 
sangoma. She argues that English does not sufficiently allow for the distinction between sangoma and matakathi, 
and Katie would not have described her great-grandmother in these potentially confusing terms. McCord argues that 
rendering the main text in the third person would allow her to make these sometimes unsatisfactorily imprecise 
translations without ascribing them to Katie. (All of this does not hinder McCord from using the word sangoma and 
glossing it at a later stage in the text. Ndeya, Katie's husband, says to her "'You sangoma - you witch. You bring 
me bad luck"' [The Calling of Katie Makanya: 121]) A different translation for sangoma, which does not confuse 
the issue, would, of course, have been diviner (I owe this point to Thengani Ngwenya's translation in his interview 
with McCord, forthcoming). 
21 Although I distinguish between McCord the author and McCord the interviewer (by which I mean a protagonist in 
the book), I do not further pursue the question to which extent these perspectives are similar. 
22 McCord's dual-pronged approach (a third-person narrative introduced and interrupted by first-person interludes) 
requires that special care be taken with transitions so that the reader - who has so carefully been drawn into the 
evoked interview situation - is not jolted back by the shift from the prelude to the main text. With McCord in the 
role of interviewer's and with her objections to writing Katie's narrative swept aside by her son's unproblematising 
eagerness in which there is no space for his mother's hermeneutics of suspicion, McCord has Katie telling her story 
to Johnny, beginning with her great-grandmother's visit to Katie's family in Uitenhage. Already the addressee has 
shifted. Katie is not addressing the interviewer, but a third person who has both her and McCord's confidence, 
namely Johnny. At the same time, through a multiple series of minute shifts and associations, the interviewer recedes 
into the background. She herself returns to her own childhood, in which Katie told the story to her (then the listening 
child), the story she has heard so many times she 'can almost repeat it word for word'. The 'cadence of her voice' and 
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the ritual repetition have a lulling effect on McCord as the difference between the present and McCord's remembered 
past (when she used to be the youngster listening to Katie) is erased ('I close my eyes and the years drop away'). 
Then, in a second shift, she is transposed (retaining the age she was when she first heard Katie's stories) in space and 
even further back in time to the location of Katie's remembered past. But now, she (just like the reader) is 'an unseen 
presence' in the body of the text. The reader (who was drawn into the recording situation of immediate recognition 
via Johnny) is now pulled into the main narrative as an unseen but immediate observer via McCord. That this 
transition across the divides of time and the page break should happen in minute and subtle steps is necessary so that 
the carefully established rapport with the reader is not ruptured. 
'"I still don't think-,' I begin, but at this moment my nine-year-old son Johnny bursts through the front door, tosses 
his school cap and satchel on a chair and skids across the wooden floor to drop down at Katie's feet. 
"You promised-,' he says. 
'Not until you've greeted your mother,' Katie tells him. 
'Hi, Mom,' he calls back over his shoulder. 
'Not like that!' A gentleman stands when he addresses a lady.' 
Obediently he clambers to his feet. 'Good afternoon, Mother. ' 
'Good afternoon, son,' I reply and glance over at Katie for her approval. But her attention is focussed on Johnny. 
'Very good. Now! You wanted to hear about my old ancestor?' 
'Yes.' She waits until he adds quickly, 'Please.'. 
'It was a long time ago.' 
'How long?' 
'When I was four or five. Half as old as you are now. That must have been - '(she pauses, counting on her fingers) 
'-in 1878. I was standing with my sister Charlotte by the wagon tracks in front of our house.' 
Lulled by the cadence of her voice, I lean back against the sofa, listening to a story I have heard so many times I 
can almost repeat it word for word. I close my eyes and the years drop away. I am a child again, an unseen 
presence on that African hilltop beside two little girls in blue cotton dresses. Their closely cropped hair frames 
their faces. Their bare feet scuff up the dust. They are watching a short black man cracking a whip over the heads 
of two oxen which are pulling a cart towards them. In the cart an old, old, woman throws off her blankets. 
PAGE BREAK 
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv 
1 
Uitenhage 
1877-1855 
She looked like a witch. 
Her skin was wrinkled and black as a dried prune, and ... ' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 5-6). 
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Although McCord has draMi the reader into the text, it is by no means the bridging of the traditional distance 
between the text and the contemplative reader Tom Wolfe has in mind: 'Why should the reader be expected,' asks 
Wolfe, 'to just lie flat and let these people come tromping through as if his mind were a subway turnstile?' Wolfe 
believes that the reader is best hauled into the text by 'starting off a story by letting the reader, via the narrator, talk to 
the characters, hector them, insult them, prod them with irony or condescension, or whatever' (Wolfe, 1980:30). 
Although McCord uses the interview situation, it does not degenerate into heckling. Once it has served its purpose, 
and the reader too is nudged through the transition to the past, the addressed reader exchanges the situation in which 
an apparently immediate appeal for recognition is addressed to him, for the more evidently contemplative, mediated 
perspective of the distanced viewer. 
23 For example, 'Die ou mense wat resettle was, het baie swaargekry in die plek. Mens sukkel vir 'n kar om die siek 
mense by die dokter te kry en die dokter se die pad is te sleg, hy will nie kom nie. Die ou mense kon nie die ver ente 
opdraende en afdraende stap nie. Hulle het baie afgesterwe' (Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena: 156) ['The old 
people who were resettled had a hard time in that place. You struggled to get a car to take the sick people to the 
doctor. The doctor refused to come because of the bad road. The old people couldn't walk so far, uphill and 
downhill. Many died' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 207)]. The oral nature of the original Western Cape 
Afrikaans is lost in the standardised English translation. 
24 
'Maar die boekies was nie die grootste ding nie, vertel Poppie, want al die mense bet boekies gekry. Die grootste 
ding was die extension' (Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena: 82. e.a.) ['But the passbooks didn't give the trouble, 
says Poppie, because everybody got them. The biggest thing was the extension' (The Long Journey of Poppie 
Nongena: 113 e.a.)]. 
25 Such a truly dialogical reading could take the form of the reader speculating on what the writing author's utterances 
were: 
Venel my m11 jou 1·1wrges/agte en wanr julle vandaan kom. 
Ons is Gordonia-boorlinge, se Poppie. 
My mama het ons vertel van onse grootouma Kappie, 'n ryk ou vrou wat met haar bokke geboer bet in die rantjies 
anderkant Camarvon. 
Wat wt1s haar m11? £11 hoe ltet sy ge(vk? 
Haar van was Plaatjies en sy het die hoe stamneus gehad wat onse oompie Pengi van haar geerwe bet. 
Wat ltet sy oor die 1•er/ede te i·ertel geha1l? 
Sy het vir Mama-goed vertel van die ou dae en van die groot man, Donker Malgas, wat gedood is op die eiland in die 
Grootrivier. 
E11 wat 11og? Het sy jou ma enige lets vertel van die runderpes? En die A11glo-Boere oorlog? 
Sy't onse mama vertel van die runderpes en die beeste en skape wat vrek en van die Engelse oorlog ... (Compare Die 
Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena: 3). 
(Tell me about your 1111cestors 11111/ wlzere you come from. 
We are Xhosa people from Gordonia, says Poppie. My mama used to tell us about our great-grandma Kappie, a rich 
old woman who grazed her goats on the koppies the other side of Camarvon. 
Wltm 1w1s her surname? Ami what did she look like? 
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Her second name was Plaatjies and she had the high-bridged nose that runs in the family - our oompie Pengi got it 
from her. 
:l11tl what did shem·e to say about the past'! 
She told mama about the old days and about the big man, Dark Malgas, who was killed on the island in the Great 
River, which they call the Orange River these days. 
~niat else? Did she tell your mother anything about the rinderpest? A11d the Anglo-Boer war'! 
She told our mama about the rinderpest and the cattle and sheep that died and about the English war ... (Compare 
The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena : 11 ). ] 
26 See Christopher Norris: "'Voice becomes a metaphor of truth and authenticity, a source of self-present 'living' 
speech as opposed to the secondary lifeless emanations of writing' (Norris, 1986:28 in Sklodowska, 1996:86). For 
similar objections, see Beverley (1996:273) and Zimmerman (1996: 112). 
27 This, as Primo Levi reminds us in the foreword to Rudolf Hoess's autobiography, would be the case with 
autobiographies by perpetrators of crimes against humanity (see Rosen's essay on Levi and Hoess [2001)). 
28 In South Africa, as elsewhere, demands for access to the public sphere as well as studies of the public sphere, have 
prioritised mass media like print journalism, broadcasting and electronic media. For details on the South African 
public sphere, see Mpofu (1996, chapter 2) and Nicholas Evans and Monica Seeber (2001). For the contribution of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the transformation of the public sphere, see Posel and Simpson (2002). 
29 This public sphere included institutions like the South African Associated Newspapers, Perskor, and The South 
African Broadcasting Corporation. 
30 These included white-owned black-oriented newspapers such as The Sowetan and vernacular papers such as 
Illanga; newspapers such as New Nation and Vrye Weekblad; journals such as Staffrider and Agenda; publishers 
such as Ravan, David Philip, Taurus, and the Congress of South African Writers; Radio 702; and a host of oral 
spheres in schools and tertiary institutions. 
31 Joubert's ambivalence regarding the political effects of her text is evident in the control she sought to exert over its 
subversive content. This ranged from the control over the script for the production of the play in New York, and her 
control over the allocation of the film rights for fear that the narrative would be turned into propaganda. In a letter to 
the German publisher, Ferdinand SchOningh, she also objected to the printing of an excerpt from the book in a 
school booklet dealing with apartheid, prohibiting republication (Letter to Ferdinand SchOningh. Joubert papers). A 
comment by a friend of her son, namely that the play Poppie gave the anti-apartheid movement something concrete 
to use in their struggle, prompted her to jot down in her chronicle of events surrounding the book that it disturbs her 
('Dit ontstig my'). A benevolent interpretation of what was at stake for Joubert may be derived from Warner's 
critique of alternative publics which are cast as social movements. These 'acquire agency in relation to the state. 
They enter the temporality of politics and adapt themselves to the preformatives of rational critical discourse. For 
many counterpublics, to do so is to cede the original hope of transforming, not just policy, but the space of public life 
itself (Warner 2002:89). 
32 Similarly, see Joubert in Gruner ( l 978:n.p.). 
33 According to Ricoeur (1995: 131 ), 'the text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective communication: 
it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication'. He adds: 'In contrast to the dialogical situation, where the vis-
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a-vis is determined by the very situation of discourse, written discourse creates an audience which extends in 
principle to anyone who can read. The freeing of the written material with respect to the dialogical condition of 
discourse is the most significant effect of writing. It implies that the relation between writing and reading is no 
longer a particular case of the relation between speaking and hearing' (Ricoeur, 1995: 139). 
34 Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena and The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena may well be the books that have 
drawn the greatest focus in terms of reception aesthetics in South African literary studies. In their articles devoted to 
the reception of these books, Gerrit Olivier (1982) and David Schalkwyk (1986) concentrate on the public responses 
found in the press. Olivier uses this analysis to criticise Jaus's reception aesthetics. Schalkwyk uses it to criticise the 
effect of the dominance of New Criticism in English Departments on the reception ofliterature. 
35 The Calling of Katie Makanya was injected into the public sphere it was intended for by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
of New York only after it was successfully published by David Philip in South Africa and had won the Alan Paton -
Sunday Times Prize. Publication by Wiley meant its insertion into an international distribution network through 
Wiley & Sons' offices in Europe, Australia, Asia and Canada. Jonathan Ball published an English translation in 
South Africa in association with Hodder & Stoughton with offices in Europe, Australia and Canada. It was 
published in the USA by W.W. Norton. Translations into twelve other languages have since followed. The play, 
Poppie, toured Europe, North America and Australia. It goes without saying that the economics of publishing; the 
dissemination of the texts through global markets; and communication and social networks were more significant 
forces than the writing authors' intentions in determining who the readers should be. 
36 In contrast to Joubert's assertion that she intended Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena for a (white) Afrikaner 
audience, Richard Rive, one of her ardent defenders, claims that it 'is one of those rare South African books which is 
not written by a White for Whites about their moral responsibility towards Blacks, such as liberal writing in this 
country tends to do. It is a work by a very human writer for other persons about their relationships towards their 
fellowmen. And in this it succeeds' (Rive, 1980:59-60). Rive's defence of the book is rejected by Aggrey Klaaste 
who, ironically, shares Joubert's view that it is a book for whites, concluding that "'(w]e don't have to be told the 
story of Poppie Nongena. We live it' (The Sowetan 20 July 198l:n.p, quoted in Schalkwyk 1986:190). A survey of 
readers' responses at the University of Zululand showed a similar disagreement. From the fifty-one predominantly 
Zulu interviewees, 20 were of the opinion that the book was addressed to whites so that they should understand the 
situation of black people, and 31 were of the opinion that it was written for black and white readers. 
37 The universalist tendencies I have in mind are those which inform speech and which Habermas explicates in the 
universal pragmatics (pp 26-27 above). It also includes the universal nature of oral narrator's appeals for 
recognition, which I deal with below. 
38 It is, of course, a matter of debate to what extent writing authors can actually have specific audiences in mind when 
writing and to what extent their own declarations that a book was written for a certain public are actually fictions of 
their own imagination. 
39 The evidence that could be gathered shows that readers of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena and its derivatives 
included Joubert's intended audience, namely the Afrikaner political class and establishment, critics, and the petit 
bourgeoisie. In the jurors' report read at the award ceremony for the Luyt Prize, Prof C.J.M. Nienaber of the 
Department of Afrikaans en Nederlands at the University of Natal noted that Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena had 
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shaken the conscience of a wide reading public ('op 'n hoogs eerlike wyse die gewete van 'n wye leserspublike met 'n 
skok wakker geskud' (Nienaber, 30 March 1979:2. Joubert papers). By implication, Nienaber's notion of a wide 
reading public is still limited to white Afrikaans readers, though. The actual readership soon exceeded Joubert's 
intended audience, crossing language, racial, geographic, gender, and class lines to include members of Eunice's 
family (Interview); African students; working-class Africans; members of the African intelligentsia and 
professionals. Joubert also refers to an African chef at a local grill who went to the library on Mondays to read the 
serialised version that appeared in Rapport, a black advocate from Durban, and Ezekiel Mphahlele's wife as readers 
(Notes after publication. Joubert papers.) The book was also read by Afrikaans critics, classified as coloured, such 
as Rive and Gerwel, English readers in South Africa and abroad, German and Italian readers, and theatre-goers in the 
USA, Europe and Australia. Some of the numerous readers who can be identified by name from letters they had 
written to Joubert include her son Nico Steytler, Herman Gillomee (Professor of History), Marinus Wiechers 
(Professor of Law), a reading circle in the Northern Cape (see card from Elsa van Rensburg), and Sara Blecher (the 
daughter of Hilary Blecher, the international producer of the play) (Joubert papers). A note bearing the heading 
'Divide between reader and author' shows that Joubert was aware of the fact that even this Afrikaans reading public 
did not constitute a homogenous group (Notes. Joubert papers). The Calling of Katie Makanya also displays a 
divergence between the intended and the actual audience. The first actual readers of The Calling of Katie Makanya 
were not the intended North American ones, but South Africans. By 1997 the book had reached the North American 
readers it had been intended for (amongst whom McCord specifically picks out African-American readers), the 
British and European reading public; readers from other parts of Africa; members of Katie's family; critics; and 
Xhosa readers. It has been prescribed reading on various campuses, for example in History at Clemson, South 
Carolina, and at UCLA and in Linguistics at the University of Illinois. McCord has read at bookstores in the USA; 
addressed various reading clubs (Interview, and announcement in San Francisco Chronicle, 1 June 1997:n.p.) and 
academic communities (La Verne Campus Times, 14November1997:n.p.). For press reviews, see Washington Post, 
6 July 1997:X8; The New York Times, 6 April 1997:Sunday Page 20; San Francisco Chronicle, 20 April 1997; and 
http://www.culturedose.com/review.php?rid= 10001837 
40 
'Public discourse,' Michael Warner reminds us, 'in the nature of its address, abandons the security of its positive, 
given audience. It promises to address anybody. It commits itself in principle to the possible participation of any 
stranger. It therefore puts at risk the concrete world that is its given condition of possibility.' What 'addresses a 
public is meant to undergo circulation' so that the addressee of public discourse 'is as always yet to be realized' 
(Warner, 2002:81and55). See also Young (2000:168). 
41 
'(O]ur inquiries into the development and functioning of black public spheres must recognize the inherent political 
significance and impetus behind the concept. Theoretically, speech communities are democratic forms in which 
public opinion takes shape, opinion aimed at directing or influencing public policy, norms of behaviour, or political 
consensus. Although these are idealistic and perhaps unrealistic goals for counter-publics, which are by definition 
divorced from substantial control over how public power is deployed, they define the point of the analytic exercise 
nonetheless [ .... ]. True, the contemporary black public sphere is partly the creature of the political economy of a 
global, advanced capitalist order, but in the past it has offered - and may yet again offer - space for critique and 
transformation of that order' (Holt, 1995:328). 
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42 Thus Young (2000: 173) remarks, 'Unless multiple spheres are able to communicate with and influence one 
another, however, they are only parochial separatist enclaves with little role to play in a process of solving problems 
that cross groups, or problems that concern relations among the groups. Inclusiveness in the democratic process, 
then suggests that there must be a single public sphere, a process of interaction and exchange through which diverse 
sub-publics argue, influence one another, and influence policies and actions of state and economic institutions.' 
43 It is possible that this element of performance is common in collaborative auto/biographies. There are, for 
example, some analogies between Katie's participation in choir performances in Britain and the oral narrator Black 
Elk's performances in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Shows in Europe (see DeMallie 1985:7-10). 
44 This is not meant to level the differences between Katie and Eunice, or to equate them with the elite 
cosmopolitanism of diasporic authors like W.E.B. du Bois and Richard Wright. It would probably be more 
appropriate to draw similarities between Katie and the Jubilee singers' voluntary metropolitan cosmopolitanism, on 
the one hand, and slaves and Poppie's enforced colonial cosmopolitanism, on the other. As a singer in Britain, Katie 
had performed in a cosmopolitan public sphere (The Calling of Katie Makanya: chapters 4 and 5). This international 
connection must have continued through her sister's study at Wilberforce and with her own association with the 
American Mission Board to which the McCord dispensary was attached. In Durban, she herself associated for a 
while with the political activities of the ICU and with activists such as Bertha Mkize and Violet Makanya (The 
Calling of Katie Makanya: chapters 18 and 19). She must have had contact with local political circles through her 
husband, Ndeya (for information on Ndeya Makanya's political activity, see McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, 
forthcoming) and through her sister, Charlotte, who was one of the founding members of the African Methodist 
Episcopal Church and of the Bantu Woman's League, and thus also with national circles. Less socially and 
politically active than Katie, the most prominent circuits of information and deliberation Eunice had access to were 
the Mothers Union of the church (Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena: chapter 40), in which she was an active 
member, and the networks of communication in the townships which, through her brother Jakkie, reached into her 
immediate family circles (Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena: part VII). For the cosmopolitanism of the Jubilee 
Singers, see Gilroy (1993:72-110). For slave cosmopolitanism, see Gilroy (1993:187-223). For a global view on 
contemporary migration, see Hardt and Negri (2000). For migrancy in South Africa, see Bozzoli (1991) and Van 
Onselen ( 1996). 
45 Compare, '[r]ecruited to participate in the school choir, Makanya sees her world become two conflicting spheres: 
her black family and the white audience' (Gomez, The San Francisco Chronicle, 20 April 1997:n.p.). 
46 Recall Makanya's first words: "'He mentions me," she taps at the book in her lap. "But you know, Ntombikanina," 
- she still calls me by my African name - "There are some things he forgets." 
"Different people remember different things," I reply' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3). 
47 According to Margaret McCord, many of these personal histories of patients were left out of the final version of 
the book at the suggestion of the editor at David Philip (Interview). 
48 The hegemonic public sphere served as an ideological instrument in the legitimation of apartheid precisely because 
the images of black people that circulated in the hegemonic public sphere reduced black people to objects in a labour 
process and to subjects of patronage. An aspect of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie 
Makanya on which I do not elaborate and which warrants research is the way in which it put into public circulation 
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representations of the private lives of black women and through this undermined the images of black women and 
families circulating in the hegemonic public sphere. 
49 For the significance of print for the openness and consequently the universalist implications of the public sphere, 
see Warner (2002:63). For similar universalist arguments, see Mbembe (2002:265). 
50 So far the emphasis has been on appeals for recognition across different public spheres which are racially coded. 
A more comprehensive theory of relations of recognition than I am able to offer here would have to include a range 
of differences. This could include relations of recognition between oral narrators like Eunice and Katie and 
professional African men like the advocate from Durban who thanked Joubert for giving shape and meaning to his 
life (Chronicle of events. Joubert papers), or of other African women readers. (For Black women readers, see Nuttall 
[1994].) 
51 According to this view, it is possible for an Afrikaner reader to understand Eunice. A positive response to her 
appeal for recognition is based on the fact that Eunice is like him. This is the line Elize Botha takes when she asserts 
that 'Sy gryp ons aan, [ ... ] nie omdat ons meen dat ons deur haar die stedelike swartmens van ons tyd leer ken nie, 
maar omdat ons, in haar wanhoop om die stelsel waarin sy vasgevang is, in haar vreugde in die goeie dinge van die 
alledaagse lewe, in haar kommer om haar kinders, in haar dors na die Here - in al hierdie dinge en nog meer, onsself 
herken' (Elize Botha, 1978 e.a.) [She touches us, [ ... ] not because we mean that we get to know the urban black 
person of our time through her, but because, in her desperation over the system in which she is trapped, in her joy 
over the good things of everyday life, in her concern about her children, in her thirst for God - in all of these things 
and more, we recognise ourselves]. Botha's interpretation also shows how differences are often turned into false 
similarities. Botha's reference to the system Eunice is caught in assumes that the white Afrikaner reader is caught in 
the same system in the same manner. But, not only is he likely to be a beneficiary of the system (which is not to 
deny that it demands a certain price of him); he is also differently situated in terms of the capacity to change it. 
Margaret McCord also prioritises similarity over difference when she seeks to convince readers that Katie and her 
family were not characters from Tarzan or The Jungle Books, but that they were modem Christians similar to the 
American readers themselves. 
52 Theorists from various paradigms have argued that the emphasis on similarity is one of the prime ingredients of 
domination. Liquidation of difference through identification or through assimilation means the end of politics. For 
those who cannot be assimilated, the liquidation of difference leads to the ghettos, the townships, the homelands and 
the extermination camps (Horkheimer and Adorno [1986] and Gilroy [2000a:54-96]). 
53 This is the position Katie debunks in the prelude when she responds to McCord's objection that she cannot write 
Katie's life story because "'we live in different worlds,"' with the assertion that "'God only created one world"' (The 
Calling of Katie Makanya: 3). 
54 See Mbembe (2002:252-256) and Gilroy (1993:96-108). 
55 Compare with Jenny de Reuck (1996:38). 
56 De Reuck (1996:38) makes a similar point against what she sees as an element of anti-democratic authoritarianism 
in some of Cecily Lockett's (1996) views. 
57 For the emphasis on Katie as an exceptional individual, see Edwards (2001:2); Lambert (1996:212), and Mager 
( 1996:299). 
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58 This is a widespread interpr~tation of much subaltern and ofpostcolonial autobiography as such (see Buthelezi in 
Mandela [1985:19-22]; and Mante Mphahlele (2002]). 
59 Compare also Joubert's call for the end to censorship, the unbanning of books, and greater recognition for the 
work of black writers made in her acceptance speech for the CNA prize for Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena (9 
May 1979. Joubert papers). 
60 Compare also Fraser (1997:11-39) and Benhabib (2002:49-81). 
61 The criteria were provided by Phylicia Oppelt of The Sunday Times. The jury which selected The Calling of Katie 
Makanya consisted of Lyndall Shope-Mafole, Peter Wilhelm and Tim Couzens. Wilhelm's explanation of his 
preference for The Calling of Katie Makanya ('It had to do with events that take place on the margin of history, 
which are touched by the times but which -- embodied in the people who make them happen -- say something about 
the average human spirit, neither triumphalist nor self-aggrandizing. The story was told quietly and with conviction, 
elegantly') suggests that recognition for the author's writerly skills shades into recognition for the protagonist's 
values. Wilhelm's description of the selection process for the Paton Award (at which three jurors and a Sunday 
Times representative are present) suggests that this process includes the give and take of validity claims supported by 
arguments aiming at consensus. (Wilhelm, for example states, 'I was certainly persuaded that the book told the 
truth,' and 'I found this [a feature of another book] less than persuasive.' e.a.) His indecision, when reflecting on this 
process, namely whether to describe it as objective or subjective, illustrates the widespread belief (which is also 
shared by Joubert and McCord, pp 50--58 above) that these are the only two (equally dissatisfying) ways in which the 
process can be described. (According to Wilhelm, 'the award does not set out be objective. Nor subjective -- though 
the panel decisions are arrived at through processes more subjective than otherwise.' [Personal communication]) If 
Wilhelm's reflection on the process is correct, then the choice of the winner and the recognition this implies would be 
arbitrary. Describing this process in the intersubjectivist terms advocated throughout this thesis instead, avoids such 
a conclusion, and may even be a better reflection on the process than the one offered by Wilhelm. 
62 The various prizes awarded in respect of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena and its derivatives presumably 
fudged the aesthetic and socio-ethical recognition in a similar way. These include the Luyt Prize, the Hofmeyr Prize, 
the CNA Prize, and the Winifred Holtby Prize of the Royal Society. Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena is also on 
the list of Africa's hundred best books - see http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/africa/cuvl/Afbks.html Hilary 
Blecher's production of the play won an Obie Award, an Outer Circle Critics Award, a Drama Desk Award, the New 
York Times Critic's Choice and four Laurence Olivier nominations, including the award for best actress. 
63 Examples from newspaper reviews provide ample evidence of the ways in which the political message was both 
acknowledged and suspended through its aestheticisation. Van Reenen (Rapport, 1978:n.p.) states that the book 
provides insights to the Afrikaans reader without which he cannot be a responsible citizen or say 'we did not know'. 
And Blignault (1978:n.p.) softens her assertion that the book 'rips down the veil between white and black people' 
with the remark that 'it is not a political accusation' but a 'literary work in which empathetic observation and 
experience are convincingly given artistic and permanent form' thus portraying a 'human dilemma which bears 
universal meaning' (O\m translation). 
64 Transvaler, 31 March l 979:n.p. 
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65 The prize money was shared with Andre Brink (Letter from CNA to Joubert, 20 March 1979. Joubert papers). 
66 For information on the W.A. Hofmeyr prize, see Beukes et al (1992: 124). 
67 Letter from the Royal Society of Literature (14 April 1981. Joubert papers). 
68 Letter from Outer Critics Circle (May 1983. Joubert papers). 
69 These included Sandra Kotze of the Performing Arts Council of the Orange Freestate, Marius Weyers of the 
Performing Arts Council of the Transvaal, Manny Manim of the Market Theatre, and Hillary Blecher, who was 
responsible for the international production. 
70 Personal communication. McCord has, however, speculated that the book has brought the Adams Mission 
community, where Katie's house still stands and where her son Desmond Makanya lives, some financial return. 
Desmond Makanya had included a copy of the book in an application for government assistance for a local hospital. 
According to McCord, this might have contributed to the approval of a sizable fund. McCord has also been involved 
in the 2002 fundraising tour in the USA of the Sinikithemba HIV+ Choir from the HIV I AIDS project ofMcCord's 
hospital. The tour tied in with Harvard Medical School's collaboration with the hospital on HIV I AIDS. 
71 Alluding to the Habermasian language with which he was certainly familiar, Degenaar wrote, 'the more rationality 
is built into a society, the less structural violence, because the more rationality the more justice. One form of 
rationality is to include each group - as a source of interests, demands and arguments - which has an interest in 
politics in the making of the laws that determine the structures' (probably Die Burger, after 20 January 1979:n.p.) 
72 In a letter to Janet Byrne of W. W. Norton, the South African publisher Danie van Niekerk remarks, 'I believe it 
(Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena) has done more than any other book to start changing white South Africans' 
racial attitudes; its impact has been compared to that of Uncle Tom's Cabin in the US' (31 January 1985). Whilst 
Van Niekerk presumably meant to foreground the contribution of Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena to improved 
racial relations, the analogy he draws with Uncle Toms Cabin also sounds a warning note regarding the possible 
patronising effects of both books. A few years earlier, a Ds Japie de Vos (who might have been connected to the 
Publications Control Board) had expressed his scepticism about the possibility of writers and readers speaking to 
each other, given the breach of trust that existed between authors and the general public after a range of books had 
been banned. De Vos also posed the sceptical question to Joubert if she thought that the people who should really be 
reached can be reached with a literary work like Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena (Letter from De Vos to Joubert. 
27 January 1979. Joubert papers). 
73 The fact that an Anthropology student at the Rand Afrikaans University could still write to Joubert in 1990, 
thanking her for the way in which Die Swerjjare van Poppie Nongena has changed her perception of her fellow 
citizens, attests to the limited influence of such books, challenging Van Niekerk's view and favouring De Vos's 
scepticism (fu. 71 above) (Letter from Deacon to Joubert. 12 June 1990. Joubert papers). 
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VI. Collaborative auto/biography, an unfinished project 
1 
'Modernity: an Unfinished Project' (1996:45-46). 
2 In this extract from the 1954 interview with McCord, Katie recalls her participation in a march to the Durban City 
Council to protest against the reintroduction of passes for African women. After the men of the delegation had 
spoken, George Champion asked Katie to address the members of the Council (Katie Makanya and Margaret 
McCord, 1954: 120). 
3 I use the term postmodern with reservation, keeping in mind Butler's (1995:35-38) objection to lumping a range of 
poststructuralist positions together. For an example of such an exchange between feminist critical theory and 
postmodern positions, see Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler, and Drucilla Cornell in Nicholson (1995) 
and the contributions to Nicholson (1996) Feminism I postmodernism. 
4 In this sense David's story engages (sympathetically) with J.M. Coetzee's Foe and (critically) with Nadine 
Gordimer's My Sons Story. 
5 Besides Morgan, who also participated in the writing, there were ten other spider writers. The group, which 
included two women, consisted predominantly of men, mostly from South Africa but also from Ethiopia and 
Cameroon. 
6 On creating the conditions for writing, see Bennet (2000). For working-class autobiography, see Thomas Thale 
(1995) and Judith Liltge Coullie (1997). 
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Notes on the appendix 
The appendix contains extracts from the interviews Margaret McCord conducted with Katie Makanya in 
Durban in 1954 and the interviews Elsa Joubert conducted with Eunice N. in Cape Town in 1977. 
The first extract consists of the transcript of the first interview with Makanya (pp 195 - 197). It covers 
Katie's life from her birth till she met Dr James McCord. The second extract (pp 198 - 200) deals with the 
constitution of the choir and their visit to Britain. In the next extract (pp 201 - 206) Katie speaks of her 
friend Mbombu, her sister Charlotte, and her relationships to Indians. The last extract (207 - 208) deals 
with her son Livingstone's mental illness. 
The first extract from Joubert's papers (pp 209 - 210) is her notes of a conversation with Eunice N. (3 
September 1976) four months prior to the decision to write the book. The next item (p 211) is a note 
dated 4 June (1977). In it Joubert reflects on her feelings about the writing process. In the extract titled 
'Doringbaai en Lambertsbaai' (pp 212 - 214) Eunice tells about her first trip on a boat and her childhood in 
a fish factory. The extract headed 'Huwelik' covers her marriage (pp. 215 - 225). This is followed by an 
account of how a sangoma treated her husband and how she views the compatibility of Christian and 
Xhosa beliefs (pp 225 - 230). The next two extracts deal with the uprising of 1976. The first of these 
focuses on the early period of the uprising (pp 231 - 234). The second (pp 235 - 238) deals with the 
events of Christmas 1976 leading to Eunice's grandson's death. These were the events she first narrated 
to Joubert on 27 December 1976, which gave Joubert the idea to write about Eunice's life. 
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Appendix I. Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord 
ed by Margaret McCo.rd Durban 1954 
.•.. ·vi nee at Fort Beaufort in 1873. July 28, 
f·:!.f..::· I 
about eeven. Mother was a student and· 
a Basuto, MotlB r is a Fingu ••• 
afterwards. Father left ad.we wnet tio 
figs, peaches 
. d quinces •. H.~ had some cattle and 1sold milk. 
overnpient school. As .far a~Std. III, then " 
left for Port E. where She. was stuQ, ing, 
to Bedford. Then I 'Q ok herplace _inPort 
private studies because 
Mis P Hutdll in. Fro m Glasgow. 
missionaries. Becase I was 
children and so w.hen one 
,,~~ they t,old another to get me "for a very 
\!:.):::~. ' ' . . . 
~ their ch.ildren. When I left the Hutcins ~ \ . . . . 
V:er:b:v Rev. Jaxri.es Pritchard also fom Glasgow. 
. ~~·~~::.'~~., . 
.their l1 ttle child she was ~:µr·e~ years old. 
when mother send wor'd. I must cm 
\, . "·:_· ·" . 
in18.!l. onaries, V,,prt/-o:v, 
' ... 
in Kimberley 
o school anymore I privately worked. As a 
I found money better in kith en and 
kl5 s. a week. · as a nuse .only lOs a week. 
sent for him to ome home to Petersburg so 
J 
far as Joburg. After a 
wagon to take us to Peter 
·.ii:;:~:s .3 weeks to 'travel by wagon there. Father 
at. home ·ad when' there was plenty of fb od 
and b~a~s, t~en we went home • 
~ ' 
th. ere we h.8.d all our hol:~old thins we hadn 1 t 
' ,,. ···~ 
... • 'W • ""'•·· 
d reisbank (,Qi urch pe-W like benches) my 
. ' " . ~ 
saw tha1( soon the mona.y would• be .allg> ne 
h)rot:tier .we c,an' t stay here it ,is too l~~ely 
\'{! ; ··~?\'~~~t: " . . 
.., .. _ I 
t" 
\, 
Appendix I. Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord 
i was about 2X 19. B\ 
In 1891 I went overseas. We wer-: a chotr t;hat was s i-1,-si n 5 for 
the we ~ang in the gardens inthe evenirg s at Kimberley. A 
Euro pean, ·Mr. Howen, sre ard us and came to us and sa1 d he 
wated to take us to ~n~land. He got-. anoth"l.r mis sio•1ar;r, Mr. 
Walklett who started the choir, and themmen we got read·r to 
travel some of the parents of the children 1'0uldn' t let them go. 
So when we left ther~ wal'I :B.soir anos, one contralto one bass am 
o e tenor. I was the soprano, my sister contralto. In lovedale 
we wat sone others, to q,ueenstKingwilliamstown md then to 
Cape Town. Toured the cape, then P.E. Get~ ng more singers 
and st nginp;. In lovedale we got a tenor voice, a contralto 
nd at kwtown we go1 another soi:r mo and a 1--,.,ss, bak to 
Kimberley arxi got anoi·ner one so we wer-,, now 16 in number 
incl. EuroieSn.s and M'ss CJark for Fort Beaufort the pianist, 
like a mtron. Conductor wa Mr. Baum. 
In 1893 we came back. 
I worked a year in jhb. Then I re t this bemti.ful Zulu 
youno man and he was after me for a lon6 tl1te but I conldn 1 t 
understand what he std. He :kl d to write allhis lettersin 
English and I did the same too. I an not playing he l'laid I 
wm t to get married strai.ght away withyru. So we I wentto 
Rev. Gooenough to find out whether l:e was a xn or just as all 
Zulus. This missionar'r told me he was this Rev.s students and 
he' lmew the parents of him too there at Adams. l'hen after two 
mort hs we were married and Goen enollgh was ir esen t at the wedni nf. 
I cane do·vn in 1895 whm Samual was six '110nths old, not to sav 
just to see the place to see if I would like this place. After 
that. I went upto Jhb ap;~in. I always used to i1terpret for Mrs. 
G. for her preachin~, and I used to interpret on the mias, and 
my husband too. But whe nI had a child l couldn 1 t do it any 
ma' e. My hands .vere full. I cme back here ci1 ring the 8oer war. 
He l:a d a shopup at Empucheni, I was down here workin6 in the 
gardens. Tba t was when Dr. McCordhad to go back to Engl and. 
'l!h.en Mrs. Wilcos and l'llrs.McC cusedto come som.ti.-es over here, 
and they head: us singl ng when in a ch oir when so:re one wal'I 
get t 1.rig l~_rri ed. 
:.; ,,:.·-··· ; .. : ... · . 
-l!llillliONl ..... ~· ... -...u;, .. ·,~~ .!.. . 
.. 
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One of my boya was burnt and Igot stuff from Mrs. Mee. I knew 
her first,. 
l.) ~ 
;She came over and said the doctor would be oming soon and she 
wanted me to come and h~lp him. Mrs.Bridgeman,old nr s. came ov 
and said I should do it and help my own people and also not chege 
the doctor too much money, That was old Mr~ B, 
In 1903 I started helping the doctor. 
I. 
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W'l;l!': u. pu.J lllilU.ll. •ll \!.!Ill,-., •.Ult• l;~; ;:;,..(J1..·n eJ-' I J.1.> ( •• :1, . •. 1, .. ·".JiiU ••.J.." lo.'.\ • 
.fam!ly were all tub11rci1lar, He died anite soon. '/j:?-1 
NelJ , a tenor, was a chief 1 r- son, a F1m611 from Tuma 1 s Post, He too '-/' 
was a po tman. He Wll!l very tall and bi:; and strong, younger 
than Charlot.te, olrler than me, He wnn ver:r rp1iet but he di'1 his 
work well. 
Wellington and Martha wer"' 'Ne.'!levans, but Nell and we were Presbyterians. 
They .1oined cmr choir when Sna.mela was makinei; it strong. 
Mr. Howell of bristol i:;ald !'or the trip, but iv.r. Blamer, Royal Acad. 
Of Music wa:o our onductor. We went froml\imberlev to LovedalP., where 
Johanna Jonaerus ,ioined u.~. She wns the child 111f slaves, hence 'er 
Dutch mme. She was Zulu, Also Franc is Goba ,ioined us, She was a 
Xosa, and a proper one too ( i, "!. almost as light as a col red). 
Then we 1vent to KingWilliamstown, and lvir. ani lYlrs. Xiwene (or Xinewe) 
(Abatemllu from the '.L1ranioke:l) joined us •!rith two boys, John Xiwen,e, 
their neuwhew, and his cous:tn, Albert Johnus. We went then to East Lon-
don, Aliwal !forth, Be&:,erf•dorp, and back to Klrr.berle:v wher"' we got 
Georf[;e ii.cClellan and Sonny Copeman. And then at Cape Town 'NA got Miss 
Elsie CJ ark, the nlanist and acted as our matron, from Fort RP.aufort, 
and nlso Mr, Geo. Clar}< ""'10 tookover as agent in advaoe when lVlr, Letty, 
fromPortrmouth, left us. Mies Elsie ann Mr. G"!orge werP. not rtilated.. 
Before ''ff) sailed in the Warick Castle, li!P.Blame!' tooku::i to Rol1in 
Island. ina small boat ~o se"' if we would be sick sick • .'ie wer"! not 
tho11,;h I felt a ]J.ttle fnn'1'T. t:lut ·on the ship it wn.s terrible. I 
was vcrv ve~T silt. 1\. lar1y In Cape Town told us ahout Jemon .iuice, 
and luckil~r we bo11:;ht lot~ of lemon~ ancl fruit in Cape 'l'own. 'fhat 
was lucky. 1"or four da"s I hfl'.l nothing but lemon .inice. Charlotte, 
Johanna and I had one ca oi • rp1d we werr-i a_; 1 verv ver'l s icl·; for four 
da~rr-: •. Charlotte was th 0 r1.r:>.t to get well, and i wasthc' lar-:t. 'l'he 
cabin and the cbctol' werP. ver,rnice. In l''ort i3E'la11fort I got a ne·'dle .. 
in m-r arm. I did not tel] w 11·other. But when I told this doctor he 
said· wiJlyou let me tak") i.t 011t ana I said Y"Hl. So he injected my 
arm, :•'fl(j then J:L; rnbbedwl.it." nowder o'flit, and then he cut it to take 
ont tiP noAdle wh.i.ch W"lS r'1'3ty. He ,_,ot 0i1t half, and thr-i rest ls in 
my arrn even to this cl.av. ·rr.·1 Capt.a i.n wri r· very kind. At the beginniri,,:, 
ho ::ih,_w r•d 11!1 t11P. l;()p ripr,rl: ,l"lck an<l l;olrl 11:". "'<1 coul/l ni. t tho·r0 i.no11r 
dP.dc cll:.irc>. At fl.r::il·. 1·11 · .:.!. :· l!J. :-"~'.en,~/!!'!< (J.r>t:'l of Sont;I: ••!" .·,,:· · :·) 
'.VC)C v:•1•'.' 1l'; .iucU c1vl. 1'}10··· c·i. ,.,· :·t. r l;')tl to wr~nt t.o ::iton the 
to· · · t.>1~·r W(J11ld s·~e us th0r':! an·:1 l:lc ,,..,,, 1 .. ·, ··;_)E'e t:1'J 
l 1 J.e.~l ,·,~·' , , ~·l1~·:· .,r,.....11·!·· ;.1 .. ~r.'1~r tv:i.r.houi~. n~'.1J.·in._). tint, 
tlierA wn~ r.i. 1·1inif1tl'!1'.', '!!Ylh'' t;.·:11t·~ · J:.o ·1f1, "'·1 '·.·r 
n.- ;, ,1:·'-l·l, anc] ho.for•' .. ~ pl·. to l:.is b1l:1;9.f, 1rH'! ~ter"?! :.111 vr.,r·r fr·!···".d]·: 
1-r· .1-· -- ··1·,··i.1• pr0.imli.cA '1nr1 .. ,,.,['"l very kin.d. 
We ;,ot r. 0 l!.'<··ldn anj Sn l;1•·•c}-' ... ~.,d ~!en t !·.c· l i.•1 ·I 1+"' ;; O'.,:J. iiot,,lin 
the St!'and. Oh, London. It; was a ver~.r bL, cit'r and th"l b'dlcl:tn:;::r: 80 
t:1ll. .• ceoss the street ·,va!" a verv tall hotel, and there wer~ Sollth 
"fri.cm ... there ·.~ho cn1'1' . .., t-0 t"l'< to llS· In london the child;.en were_ 
ver'"r diffic11lt • .l:hr.,·1r folJ·.~·rAd us a 0·1t and stared i;i.nrl S'li•l vh, lo(J'k 
at .l:'.:1 darkies, bnt the do have twinklin;;> e;r,'!s <md white teeth •. jj1:t. 
the·r t.!'L0d tc t.ouc·: 1J8 ~·n·:1 so 1ve staye('I :inside th':' hotel in our r<JOt:J:S. 
CJn Sund'.l.'' ···o we11t to .l.'he Cit.v 're,r.• :i e "'h r·Dr. Joseoh Park0:r was thP. 
pre"chAr. 11.ft'1'0.r tb" s0rvlce a man nnd wor.1an came runnin~ up to 
1 ..r. L'.>la,,·1er and !)aid 11 ·11e ar<i wonderinu who these people are that 
e.r"l foll ·win6 you ar;:-n.n:'l , "And ivir" til(ner laugher and intor11dc11ed 
us. to his brother v1ho wa~-: a lawyer, andhis sister wl;o Jived i·Jith 
that brother. 
"Ne s~HL, at man:r i!;ur<l0n r11rt.i.eri. At one ::,nrden part at Lord Nu,tsford 
at itich.mond we met the.moth~r of Queen !MrY - that is v.i;~en B5~z. 
;i;ra'fldmot:.her and ·~;u.een Victoria's cousln. She \Vas then 2 or w •P. rh"!~e ,arden parti·"lS weir·· oJwa·rs in the afternoon, and there er· 
tabieP"'set un and 1,~1: .. "l cf foorj, sandw1sh'1-" :uvi !'\akes and soft 
drinks, not liriuor. ·:ie ]1\{ •l that food. But ver~T often we g~t 1th 
tir"ld of the cakes. A:W ays 11.t tea the table f' would be co~er .cl ~ · cak~s. Orv~ da:r I told t·:ts.~ CJar'I<: shA must have j°ld t~e= dp~o~t:r 
we 11.ked cakes fnr thev i~ave us nev"r a pie~.e "o b~eab' ,_n h~u la1n;hed 
and pl'1af'e we wer!i! ve!''' tl.J'.'r>.r1 of all t~1is s e ,tnes~' llv s "' . 
and sDld.she told th0lll not.11tn~ like th11.t but. they alw'.".ys,at., tthese 
t av 'llint:S and sta,nn,,, a a 
cak"s thr>.mselves. One t.h'e "' 6 werP. !' · d ealie-mea1. 
hot;el and the man ma1e i1s no!'rid::;e - real. pDrri g~dmh· d oe.tm e.1 ./ 
.Phis "TOS the fi't'St til1'0 •fir>. harl had it, tl:lou"'h we ,... 
/ / 
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H0.rrlHle i.t.: i:it d.lnn"?r tlr:10 , .• ,.-1 ··r·~ would ·-·1t not-,\·i.n_,, else. /ilh~,.., r'! sf.I•)-! ..:.:.".,, 
ho": W~ J.ik~r] tb.l~ he c· n•" "'lC°i -·.·i-.1 rn wn.r· ~O!'r'l l1r., har1 no• ::-eel"' lllOC'"l. 
Anu 11 fP."I cln•r:'J latPr he nitHr> i.t n~n.ln ti.ncl 11'tide a l··it of it. '.'le liked 
.tt ver•1 li:uc:, nnrJ it. '··;·1'1 a'1 t-.hri•1) we w0r0 bnck .in Africa. '.'lo NPnt to 
anoth~:o .•J•rr1en l"artv Rt. .i:i.nrv0,r 1 s (the Harve•r of nrq'V0'T Greeno.ere but 
I do not imo '! ll' he ev:ir c.'.w ! 1-.0 Durban). }!P ·.ve:' ver". rich. ;i,,, Diso 
','/fll1t to 11•1 i:,.orican.~, :lnt>on•:.'.°ln i',11rd.;,etr. l".utze. She was a verv rich 
old ladle ".'!10 rnarriud an A:er;can 111iich younoer tlun herself.· Shi; li,1eci 
near Lo11dun. ;It these ;;Sl'l rd'.:"1 rartie s we s anc;, und so met im~ s they also 
1:.8-~ a b:>n•.\ th t ~layed aft"lr u~. At thcE'•~ r.lace: ther·: were often man;r 
uo.itl;t ''fr1.cans. lhe:r came anrl .'·poke ro 11~, somet.l•e s in Zul11 ~o:i;~t. mes 
in k.Lt.ch·iri kaffir .• And alw'J"'1 t:l1" first thin_, the~r :1sked was "Don't 
yo11 mi so :ro11.r utchwala?" w.~ ;•10re a 11 Ghrist ia ns, to1 ncl. ·~re girls never 
dranl< beer.fcrhaps th<~ o11md i.<l roirett.,,es, but not reallv much even at 
home• i'Je '-"i r:hed th"~' di.l not u,1.;. this every ti·e • We 01iked the food 
in Eno1Gn(1, specin] l'! l':l1e be~f which wiir VP.ry roft - not tough like 
011t hP.l'0. "nd I liked the lot.s of ve6etabJe·-, sw~d all:r turnips and 
ca.rrotr 11:: rhflrl to,0P.ther, t.1-ti.t ••ms very 6 ood. 
1~e wer th'•I' · for 2 :yl'lar:· Jl.'1'1 ?> months. c'Je "lnt to Ireland nn·! Scotlaricl 
ancl t.o \;helsP-a on ttie 0tb<>r rt.de. And at Portsmo11th we staye·l at the 
South Flo.ce notel (;;,,.,,lt~ P!'JlRce':) I liked IrelaY'\rJ the be.st and very 
much. It-. ··r·"' more op"n anrl lik<> home. We ,·.ent. t:.hert'l to see th" store 
t\obinson nnd Clcavnr· wr•0r" 1·,;~" •r·o\re sh.1rt.ri :in •. l "1"11" l:hl...,,.1,:'l •. <Jnd :ln [)11i,.!Jr 
we 8nw l.'I ::ichool where "!Ven bi.g m~n with ('.,re'r hair were stillJen.rning, 
rind "'~rm I': a. ii1is:'l Steele, ri. :'JP.st African, who w11s studying ;-e 1ictne. 
We vi."lit'l with her a11d sl'"' hHI a s~r~leton b:r her bed, a.nd 1 s::iid are 
yon not; afrind to sle<ip wirl• r.i ts rmn,anr'l w110 wa<· h" before hP. bf:lcame 
your sk'.'.'Je ton, and '" i. s ""te·11e lathhed nnd S'' id o-.he did not mind hi.m 
ir h··' let. llf'lr learri how he w11:' m111JE'J anr1 sl1A rltoi not-know '.YllO hi" tn:'l he,,n, 
At 1lorl:;hi11" We met; ll Ill._, rnt; l>.1 d{ ml.ln rr'C>lll 'N...,f:t afrlCH WhO W.'1!1 ll rlt1Cl;<•r 
and ha<1 hi:i onn bO~•.t, nndhe was nt the warm baths before he .,.,ent bak. 
to West l\frica •. Miss StA le ~V"R v"!r;r ver'r black, and she told ii;e~ that in 
h~r coqntr:1 it was much ':··'·tor l~h:in llerc, 'J.n(1 r,hr,1. was whv :'he was :-:o 
black. lwen the pnln-.s of ho~!." h·.nd.'.'l ";ere black. Later when ·.·1A san,:, at 
the Crv11t:Jl Palace 1 cu· 1er1 to my rls tor and told her l conJ,; s ··n l>; · ss 
Steele far away bacl~ tn tl"' ·ind i.enc e. 
ln Sheffiel:l when ,.,..., weM wi:ilkin¢ to th·'~ Lall for a rehearsal '1!e met 
SOm!3 it1r.ericans, the .t:lowi?. Boys - the;r \•'ere all races, negroPR, •bht•1e e, 
and "'l-iter:. Th"!~r tolr3 us Engl rd was a godforsaken countr~r bi1t Are rtca 
WBI'! God 1 !J own country. So 1 ai:;ked the!!: wh" fil1e;r c1id net give their 
concer'·11 in America t.r•An rin•1 U1·~·r laughed and sn:i.d "J·,st yon wnit girl 
untlJ~.rou flnd out whr\1-. 1\1'' .1·, .1 i:·h JYlOr·)P. .•.rr1, ['h')y cuim to t.h·: hill] to 
011r rehet•.rsal. t11r. l:l1amP.r dl.d not usuall·r t:ermlt r.his, but h<i did for 
ther:1 bec1Hse the~r 1.•1erq line l'°Lcans. The'! were ~ivin!!> conerts .too, classi-
cal music, and also a~1.nc~ t.1111ic and t'•P dancing. WI'! gave corcerts in 
halls which we rent.'ld, 1:trvl "1 so on Sunday nio,llts inch urches we ~ave 
a Service of Son . .::,, !'Incl 1.11'1 ,..,..rn monle packed the burch • 
. ihe i w,., sun, in tho Grv:ot · l Pn.J ace I was ver n~rvous. ~:r body felt 
thnt 11, <Y'lS ~hiv;ori·~ .• · 'l'h<>•1 when I lookeLl ont ,:ind saw all t1-.e n•an'r many 
pe0'1le, I cJl,1 7101· wnr;rr, • .l.":--.~r» was a lJl.5 11.ac;-·ine the re. wl•ich turned 011t 
tho ) ., to11t. sr; i_,.'l on .~I O".t 1r11,c:: tc, •m::l thcr waA a 500-J:.Uropean c1;olr 
that took t: cse sie0ts an•I s1"1, thS' :·c•n::,n, wo d.s and all, imrr:ed.i.ntel:,r. 
'1ie san . .;, twice. The Da·m of JJay. l'he re is Music by the River• 
Li za 11 ze e 1.lingn.n::,,a ( r'n lt'i 11 i'hey .t'romis e Oh Lord) and a] ~o the . 
Lord's fraver in !!.n.).lsh, !'Ind liive a. ·rho110 l:,t; to Africa, and ilnka D'3boran 
We san;.; for ·J.ueen Victoria nt Usborne on t;i1··~ l:cJ.e of Wi,git. d<i travelled 
frorr, Lr)ndon by train a"1r) l-.'.~<) • across on the bout, and when ·.v". ::,ot. to 
her bf:· >e:e th,:, toot:' 11.'1 tr a hu:;e wai tin::. room Dnd 1o ld us the .~11e")n 
]<no·:: .... ,_, ·:;·:r" tiro,d :·.•nr.I thnt .. ,") n-11.st r".st. itnd ·.ve chnl16ed th"lre. One 
we s<1n~~ tn Jtfrican dresr 'lccorJ.in:!; to 011r tribe, anri then an0tllor we 
dreSS"!f) l'1 dreSSeS. rher0 'NP,re P,any pCOn}e in th<:i room where t\'8 ·.),1Jof">l1 
was, ev0n Indians. A180 n ·inst Coast Afrl.C8n boy. '£he r~.ueen was very 
old :•nd vP.r-r ki'.1.rl. Sh<> wo.s not Jike we il1Jl;,i;in'3d, big and n-~,,."1ificent 
with 11 cld·'ln cro;•m 0·1 her h~arJ. She wss 1111itr.o JittJe and ver-r old and 
she.wore' n nico ·utiit0 bonnP.t o,., hl?r hrad and n black dress "rttb blade 
bP-ads on Lt, arid ·no i"lwel~r"' flXcept her wedr'.lin8, ri.nD and soi:.~ other 
rirg,s. irn .. d little l:'Y'l.nCfJS!'! Alice cried 011t: "l do n~t Jike t.n.~1 se 
pP.onle, 11 and the ·~·uP.<i'l .<i•dri., 11 biit lh<:!!""l nrfl .;;ran'li'l l) oeor-le. But 
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P / es aliC"' did not llkfl 11s, /1,11cn .11.t f:ll" .vu"'", ....... "-'~·- .. ., . __ t'1. o s · · ~ . ,. , "' Governor llflnl'lra 1 1 n Son tl1 Earl of ,~tr.lone sh~ came with h1.n when ile .V'l_,, 
i < •~ p~rJn]"' 11.'lrl 11ftAr Wfl had :-11~ Africa :1nd t:.tl!'.~ m')t !:J:\:1 n .. ,p·1n 11 .J.A " '· , ...... • ·. ·· "'' ('!~ r· 
r "L. ·1· ~A"' Oin, ana ·u1,J l'l10 Merrv Pno.,.int .. 1 Th0 Dn:·m o Dav anu 1 zn : '·':'. ·. "". 1.' 11 1.. "' oii t:.1.~ afternoon, CHme :.irtl Hpoko t.o 11:.'. ·1n:I r::,1'1 law verr, d ,., se,; ;'th Afrlc·l ::;11e 
and 1 l10P'l to se!:1 yo11 "><;·in before yo1J ::,O I.Jack to ;.:io l' · · • 
said she "n.;oyed our :clri.Jin;:,. 
"l,ueen JU.i.zabeth is a litt::l~ like "-'1 een Victoria, speciall·r abont the 
bust. I t.hou!=)lt that l ·n~~ a:{O when shew:-.:> a print ess an.i car.0 out 
h~t'e on thFJ doyal 'l'onr •orj_t:J1 her parenLf· and E'rircess lv;arc;ar0t. o 11 t 1 
d.lll no, ~e<'l them very w~1 J •Aca1i~.e l wa ... far away ard ther.., IRUS much 
_crowdi11,, nnd l got ther·' ':!h'm other''' ·N'.·:r~ :~lrend:r beforA ire. 
Ut_~~~ 
1 rem"l'!lb-cr there wa!"" hOt'Sl'J that bAlo~ed to a o::>1•red man betw"'len 
school anl my hone. '['hr horse was ca)] ed Prtnce, he had a wo1md and so 
hl~ 61.~t"r tAthernd ht:~ nnd d:t •1 not r:lne h:l.m. We 11sedto rld"' hi'.r. on t.he 
wav 1,..,,,,., rr0m school, two 0~h<'lr iSirls :·rK.l I 00111•1 climh on hi·: hack. 
Une re ' th11 mnster ca110 ht us and said No wonder the her se do ~~1ot 
gl'lt h s wo1url well. An:l W" r.'Hn a·.vA'T for f.:~ar.' h('l ···onld ''iii ip n :"' b"!c·,.111e 
re wn0 so nngry. We iir'l not. rtrl~ th8 t poor horse again. 
t{ace •{elations 
.i..on2, ai:,o when l'nahommed can~e with a i:a t.i.tionto open a store at Adams 
l si,l,ned it. Your father a::iked me whv and l said I didn't know but 
he told us 1•1e ne~ded a store. An:i your father said, 11 Katie tm n't 
you know you shoulcl nnv"'r tr1rnt a man who WMll'S a red cap". lllohommed 
wus eJ ..:iuleiman, anl l;n' e3nlP.imnn are the worst of the .Lnclians. 'rhey 
rob and chAa t us. I have of ten thou~l1t of that si nee that ti me. 'i'he;r 
wear a red fez. .L think the Indians hav·1 robbed 1rn enough an:l now it. 
ls l:.1:1.•: that; thw1 all e_,o a1v:i.;r. 
At th(~ Ume of the riot, the·· wer"" ver:r bad. l'he'r attackedwomP.n and 
childr•rn, and l do no lik"' t-.hat at '111. Llut. on the res"'rvA·sore of 
the peo~ln wer0 1,;:;J,.d <Jn:l 0·\cT.ted. t'he'' r~·,cider1 to gp anfJ klJl 
Maho»•;o:~n. Bnt .some one told Ismael. And he C' lJ. ed the police 'vho came 
and 6narcl0d them. !HY1 whP.n t-.he people snw thA police the'· dii1 1"!.0t go 
to h.ah··.,·ed'~· sl-.orn. l·ne '.v.,,nr. 'o tiina'::i. (ll" h:c t-.h,., ::itnr"·~ cm t-.h0 
hill np:·coach:tri0 w],..s). 'l'he:~ brok0 \':i:> wincl0"!'.3, B11t the' d1rl n"t 
l'IAn t :.o kll 1 Uirm .• <: ; " 'I'" .''.'J bR.r1. !·ir-· i 1.• nn ··J '! n.ii.t:! 'l"lt nf "C"1r 
fat.her!". And uftt>.rvmrrlr· t;l1 ""'! \V<'lr ~:Ol'''" tht>.'f f;11rl hnrt G'. ·rl. l'I,.., r,] I 
fl :ct N'.lhommed was not ::io o~d- bnt. bl~," nephAW, the on!'l th".'lr··· n'"" 
Uh, sh arn·J. 
'l'he Gol · re'.1.. £he · t.b in;. l;l•"''' ar·~ better than ns. And the Enro'l! nns 
treat them bett<ir too. ;111t ._.,,,, rlo not l;t1i;i~: tit~'! ar1 any ,;,ood. 
iio~1 can I say what .l. thi·1k of the af1~Jcan Gon.-,resl'. I do ot knO'.'/ 
what t0ey think tn'':.' ''~"~ ~oln,~ to do for ns. 
As for t.i1e liov':)rnment - vou me1-m this Uantu £dl cation act and ho•.•1 
the" want to t::1iui th': n•:t.s::iion school f'. '1'he peoole in the rese!'Ve sn'i 
the misslonari0d dl·.1 nor consult us whenthey turned the reserve'· over 
to the ,,overnment ln 1010. Nrw cb they <r:> nrult us now. !'he·r ;•iant u.ci 
to ::1a-r what we think abo11t the schools. Why sho1.tld we tell t'r.e ,_;;ovArn-
mAn :; :N'l do not w1.1n t i. t, l'hr•n waen l'le want so;-e t ine; thfl :;OVe:'-~-nent 
wi.11 swr no we c:b no: •1> l;his for 1Js bocf1•1se yon dld not wrn t 11 :> t.o 
take th~' schools. So ·11h·r sho11lr1we say enything likA thP. m'~~i.'.::ri::irl"s 
wA.nt 11s to, 'l'h0 p~orl"! thev say and wh~r shonl'l not. th<>. • .:,ovo.rr~'l'.;,nt h~ve 
t.he r-.~hoolr- no"-'• l'r:r>·· have the r~serves. It ~-~ .;;ood th'l'' 'la""' .,ri 0 
sh eel:'<. 
/ 
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then a cousin of ours, who had married his sister, was the one who 
collll emne(l him very much. But I liked this man very much and before 
I knew about his drinkin.:, I ~1anted to marry him very much. He was 
a tall, h<indsome nan, errl he was e-.iucated, and he seemed all right. 
But my father was right. I know his whole family now and they are 
all drunkards. An:l so my father could not object when Ifound a 
good man to marry. He did not mind tat he was a Zulu, it was my 
mother who minded that. But after she ~~t to know him she got to 
like him. She came and stayed with us when Samuel was born and 
then she forgave him for being a Zulu. 
After we were married we stayed with my aunt for two weeks until 
he got our nouse finished. He built this house himself. He built 
two rrom, a sleeping room and .a- dining room and then a kitchen, 
wood and iron, attached to the house but you had to go out the door 
and into siother door. When he took me in we had what we wanted. 
I had lor.s of thinos given to me when we got married, two chairs, 
all the crockery and linen and stuff like that but he bought the 
furniture. I made the curtains, cream for the dining :c omand blue 
for the bedroom, and Wt'J had a wood floor which I scrubbed. We were 
goin~ to paint it but then I -.vent hom and Ndeya sold it to the 
church of Mr. Goodenou.,J:i and he went to Germiston where he was 
going to work. The lla111XVGU1XJlX;lll walls were painted cream like 
this here. He helper'l me to put the furniture wmre I wmted it. 
And he hune, the curtai.ns after I made them. 
My first child, Samuel, was born about ten months after we were 
married. I went to a doctor, Dr. Dickson, and then my aunt helped 
me. My aunt is a midwife, She sent Nedeyo away. We were alone, my 
aunt and I. The pains started inthe afternoon and he was born the 
next day. Inthe morning. When the ~ins started I was very unhappy 
because I started to vomit and I hate that so much. When Ndeyo 
saw his son t:tn t same day re was born he was very glad. He said 
11 The boy looks like my father11 • Nedeyo decide5 on his name. He 
called him Samuel Nottsford. I do not khpw why he called him 
Samuel, but it was Nottsford after Lord Nottsford in England be-
cause I had told him about tln t garden i:arty at Richmond where tl:e 
choir sang. 'fhe bab•r has a native name too. His name is Bantu. 
My sister in law in Johannesburg (Philip's wife) had told my 
father that those people were very bad, and so when the baby .was 
born my father said, "Oh, a'ce.ntu 11 • 
One day Mbombu came when my child was asleep. 
"What are you doing. 11 
"I am ironin:i; • 11 • 
"Where is the child" 
"He is in the bedro;:,m asleen" 
Sohe waited and waited for the C' ild to wake up but he didn't. 
The he said, 11 The child sleeps a 1 ng time" 
Yes he does, and all the better for me because then I can do my 
work. · 
And while I 1vas v.orkil1!1; there, Iwfoombu went inside and toolca ·. 
shawl out of the dresser and wrapped the bal)~T up and went away• 
He was goin6 to show his baby to the mistress he v.orked for• (He 
worked in the kitchen of a lady· an:l he had told thE lady that 
his borther had a child - meaning really his friend Ndeyo) And 
while he was goin6 he met Ned yo and his cousin. And he said, 
"Look here is your boy. The mother was workirg aru:. the door was 
open and the bab:r was sleeping and ro I took hiin. 
And I was at ho~ bu~y work ire with the food, getting read;r for 
one o'clock. I set the table and ~ot; the foa:i ready and Ndeyo an:l 
his cousin came in for their dinner and they said down and they sai 
i 1Hmmm, where is the bab;r." 
An 1 I said he was asleep. 
And thi:iy said "What ti!ll('l did he 150 to sleep" 
About eieven after his bath. 
"And now is is after half-past one• Go and get the child. 
"What is the :ratter. y 0 ., a wn:rs see the child when it is awake. 
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Go na.v ard :,et the child hefore we .,!,O away. 
So I ·1ent to get the chUd and he was not there. so I told Ndevo 
And he said "What is th is. Why do you let tr.a child sleep and· • 
leave the •1oor open. YO•l think the waahil'lb is nore thanthe child. 
You go and finl that child do ycuhear. You have have him here when 
Igetbavk. 
And so I went and lookA d for the child. I ran to Ame Has. And 
the baby was not ther ·• And l went to the other houses, and I went 
to the store. And the >..c rr.e n at the. a tore told me she saw a man 
goine, Jl s~ with a baby in a white shawl, going that way towards 
Dornfontein, anl so 1 can:e home and loolced in the dresser and I 
aarw the srawl was !:)'One. And 'HY heart told me it was Mbombu, it 
couldn't be anyone else. So after Ndeyo ho.d gone, while I l'Ias 
washing; the dishes I wRs thirk in~ of ~oh;:; to the police station 
and all the thi!1;$s I conld do ,~Mbonbu came back with the bab;r ard 
he lau,j1ed and said "'rhls ls a bl.i!,man this bariy " but I said 
"libombu, I don't want t;o spel.'k to you plaese. I 1 don't want t~ see 
yOJ. • P11t tho. t baby rJo•nnan(l 3,0 away. II Sc re laughed and put too 
bab,· '1o.vn "n·l whf"n h'l left "here was a m-'~! '\_»'' of clothes for t;he 
baby an .1 fJOrne 1nOi1"0 - :-. '- '..-i :" n'i.atress had ,:-;iven Mbo"'b'l :-: ::e 
hahy. f!l<" m5.stres~ said i' , .. ,., ·~' v· ._.· fi•10 ba'o·r and h~mu:et 
brine; hilll a;:;l'lin on0 d'•Y !'O f't''" r· 1 .1 :,;;,'"" .~o n ':-,- ~il;n. Anl he 
left sn;r:tn.:~ Sala[/1_\;~ _ _.,".' ,, ~ . 
:'!:010 ·~_11J_ w~;" a very nic '.1 rnen .Ii~ was Ndeyo 1 '" ,;ood frion,1. H".' wnr: 
bl.1~ ::md fnt 'rnt. -rl ' w•, 1ot 8 <'.'!\l ··,d face. And he was 
alwayR la.u~ing .. , ~ :' ,_ i_-, _,. Oh Borrbu, Ilrnno.. 
One ria;r \,,bomhu ca1·0 Pr11'\ t;h0;:>0were son10 .,01111 _:1,;_'ls ther · • .11.,1·1 1-:e 
l'.d0CI Lo •·nke ·love l;o 0110 or l;l1enc girl·~. Nowhe was a mat•r:l.odman. 
an.i )_,.- J:~ pt plnch in;; hlr. ":10 s at n:e not to t€'l1 them that he was 
marrlecl. And the~r said, 
How i:1 it lnbormu th'· t yon arr: not. rnarri ed. All Zulus get ,narried 
you.n5 • 
'rhat ls not oo. Woulrl yo1 cflJ. l Makanya young? 
Well,he is not so old.Yes, re is young. 
You dn't k'1ow how old he is. He is older than :nyself. 
How, can Maktmya be older than you, Ym look older than :Makanya. 
No, liiakanya is very old. Don't :rou see his wife is old too. She 
is no loni::,er preti·:r. Sh') la old ancl he is old too. 
If me is so old how Ct!n §he i0et a baby. 
Why not • Don 1 t you know about Abran 1 a ·,vif e? Did rot Sl?11ah get a 
bab:r when she was old ftnd grey? 
How, but thot was God's 1'1iracle. 
Ia it? Ullt. God can mak'3 miracles today. Evrm 8IT1ong us. 
Arx1 the lf,irla kept ou:tet, an:l then she said to me in Seautho, 
"This man is mad," and Mbo~bu didn 1 th hear. 
At this tine Mbombu was fat. He uaedto co n:e to 01r hout''-' all the 
time. 'ihenever he was off for a funda;r he came to us and he ate 
his dinm r here anl then he went home afterwards. He went too 
to Mr. Uoodenough 1 s church. His wife live(; in Natal at.the 
Umgeni Mission Station (Am. Bd.). At the time of the !3oer war, 
his 1:iatresa asked him to stay and look after her h')USe llhile 
she and her husband ran aw•w to Cape 'l'own. And so he did not want 
to come back to Natal when M1•. Marwick told them to go. But Pi\r. 
Marwick told everybody. And h13 came to the house arid he told 
Mbornbu like he t.o ld the others that t.he;r would be in much trouble 
if he did not bo anr:, th:;t h- must leave the hmse and e,O • And so 
at last he went with that la at g;roup who walked. And when he got 
to Durban he was very thin, and very tired, and very wrorried. 
But he still laughed. H,. told me that they hl d to walk and they 
bl d •10th in::, to eat. Tho·' hl d the money but they couldn't buy. All 
th<~ boors an:l solddiers 'r;ad been through ther'l and bought every-
thi'18 in the stores ( toolc everything), and so the;r ran to the 
water and drank inthe r:l.vP.rs, and they did not get anythin6 until 
the;r ~ot to Charlestown, and so what did M'l:ombu do - he pulled _ 
his belt ti:,hter. But this Mr. Marwick, he also did not have to 
eat th:l t ti "'le. Peopc:e tlJiri k alnt of lii.r. Marwick • He left the 
train at p~:Burg becau,..'3 h'9 lived at Richmord. My husband car,,e 
down by the la St tra I •1 two w-'-eks after -,~. 
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were three. So when thA chief had flnim ed h:ti rre did. ne he 
called Nkuku and it was Nkuku wro caine to get the bottles filled. 
Not anyon-; in the chief's kraal. 
Mombu died. He got tb. I think he caught co:td on that walk. You 
see they walked for one XBll.Patx wellk and a few days and then 
came \\l> wn by train inthe open cane trucl<:s. Andwhen' they wallld it 
ra!.red, and they slept in the openfields. I was there a~d my hus-
band too when that train re.me in. And we saw .Mbombu, and he. was 
very thin. But he laul!,h ed. And I said "Why do you laugh Mbombu 
you ar~ dead" and he lau~ed some more and said "Yes I amhalf 
dead.'' And then we took hini to a tea room arrl. gave him some tea. 
My husband J;B.id. And then he went to his home beyond Inanada. He 
took the train to Pho"lni.xancl. then I think he must have slept at 
Inanda becuse his home was at._..Umgeni Mission and it was far. I 
do not know how he 5ot there because he could not walk any more. 
I did not see Mbonbu agi:tin. But I used to inriuire when the dis-
pensar71 came here, ancl the neople told me he was very sick add 
fit for •1othing. My husband went to see him when he was sick. He 
came back and he said to me, Mbombu is stilJ the same. His mouth 
is always bid, with lau'!J'lin .• He doe snot change, but he is very very 
sick. he will be luck~r if he picks up. He w-lks now with a stick 
bee.a use his legs and knP.Ss do not hold him. And he is very thin. 
He is finished. 11 And then sorre peo le told me he was dead. He did 
not come to see Doctor. He sa , a Dr. Hill at l/erulum. 
My husband and lilbombu went l.o school to~ether at Adams. They 
both 'M:lrk"ld for Miss Dav and I heard than talk about it and so 
I fourtl out the;v,! wern 11'1 tl1e sa1ne class. 'fh0y wer.e abOut the 
same a:;;e. I suppose l'libombu was arourxl about 30 wherr he died. 
My husband learne,:'. his trade in Durban from Mr. Dalton, then 
he went to Greytrex in Joh:,• nne sburg to work. 
Charlotte went to Wil~erfor~e University and after she got there 
another African, a~ ... came there. And she left him there and 
came home after she ,;raduated with her BsC. She got to Cape Town 
and tauJ;ht in a c loreo school there becaus'9 she could not J:9. ss 
because of the war. '.Ph-:-n wtJ en the war was over she went to 
Pietersburg. By tm t ti·1"e my mother was dead. And before she died 
she tad mde oome bricks, or had a man nake them, and they were 
· alread~r burned ard ny fether e-,ave them to Charlotte and said he 
·did not want them to buiJd a ho11se with my mother dead •. And so 
Charlotte had a man buiJd P,er a house and it was in her name be-
cause she started a school. It was a "lice house, five rooms and 
a pantry and a kitch"ln 0•1tside. And she had no trouble because it 
was big. 51.e 1:1ld t:r.r~!'! ;;;irls fD m the Cape living with her at t.ha.t 
school. But they were V!'!rv Ja zy, al ways settl n;;, headaches and so 
they la id down', and when. I went to vi dt her I said why don't_,. 
you get rtd of th -rn, sA.V.1 them,home if they are so :i-azy and Lt 
their o•m11:.,eople look after them. And then bhe chief s daughters wer·.~ livi% wl.th her. 'l'he chief's hous/\3 was not far away, but 
his dau,,.t.t.er.s were 0·1r co •si11s so Charlotte asked if they could 
live with her while the7 went to het• school, and the chi.ef ··rns 
please .• And. these g1. rls did the housework. And then the school 
children in the afternoon they hoed in tr·,e :!>ardens and so she had 
a d_,, 6 arden. Alto~etre r she had about_ 50 pupils. It was after 
she 
6
0 t. n1uri --d that ~.he Bl shop came, I th:L •k it was Bishop 
Dtir ri c· 'lho ca::iA on t frn ;i~ ;1.me ric a, and he said Carl otte yon ~~~ 
too far herP-, MU the st•ident s can."lot omc f-r'O'" the Calll • bt L. Y 
di-;J 'l'r ·r were tree. :\nd•."011 :course lf ar'l too fn r 011 t of pJ ace· If 
yo•1 ;1,~:~· slck when can ynll ;:,et a ci:lctor our her"l. And then t~i~0 Xos::i. t.1 .:tlt>erforce ';,r:i.'lnated and he c:1 •e out too and he cam 1 
i 1 ,.,. J t • tl'" r~ "n·1 th,.."r "'1ade her schoo .. Pietersb•Jrg an.d marr. n· ,,11 <" .o "e = -, '·- . . . - . t dr ~ 11 b~ o-. Rr th~n, 8.nd tool-: in n J.ot of boys too. And he used o - ··· - , th~r:~ Anrl a c"'lrtn.,in rran t.oM thA Boers and the:r came and told ~in 
h"' c •1ld not drill the boys because the'T we!'El afraid hF' was ~ - g s~ldier~ to f1Jlt a;s l'1st t:h!'lm. But he snid How can he dst~P· oud 
- . i "' anr] th""' ~us t. run an .1 11mp an 
cannot keep boys wi t.hC'111 ~ ".'lfi.err Sv, · ' " drill th"'m and 
so he would not stoo. It WRS "03-rt of his d,1ob to n-1.,he went or 
he sa~d he would ,;o to .iail but he would not stop it. A' 
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He di1 not pay cattle f ... r Charlotte .when t.he wer0 mnrr:l.e·l be-
cause be did not have anythin..~ but he promi.Md to pay. But I don't 
think that he ever did. They were in that place for about five 
years before they went to 710ar Johannesburg (Edendale) to teach 
there. 
I went to visit my mothor in Pietersbur0 before the Boer War, 
before she CRme to visit.T'e. To get Usana. Her mother died and 
her brother was living with my mother, and her father gave me the 
girl. So I went to get h~r then. Her father ras a realative of 
mine. Ard her mother called me Cissie, so I was Usana's aunt. 
Mrs. McCord used to make dresses for re r. And she lived with me 
a lon.:, tim0 and looked after Margaret. Am. at the time of th0 Boer 
was sre c aine with me down here, and I sent her to the Ummni:> :t 
Home (school)• And then when....ahe was in Std. IV I sent her home. 
When the war started and ·ve came down here my mother went home. 
aie bon ::,ht a cart a lcl two oxr>n and .!'he wanted me to go to Pieters-
burg with her, and 11he 11ll.td we could i.:;o toget.her in the wagon. But 
I ~aid yo11 better seLL the wagon beca.use by th0 time you "'et there 
the Boe Pfl will all be 0•1t and they make take your oxen and kill 
them.You better go b'! tra1.n or ca 11 Chn.rles Machaba to come for you. 
So my ··other sold thl'l cart a11rl oxen and :.vent to Pietersburg b:r 
train and Charles Machaba came there for her. He was an Uncle of 
our!'!. 
And then after the war was over and all W'.l.s calm my husband I 
went to Johannesburg to l'eLi our house there, and tren I "'lent to 
vtslt Ch1rlotte. 'fhe place'! 1 ·oked .1ust th"' sllm~ except my 
futher' s bi6 old honse had drop~i:i down, and he was living in two 
ro1.1.nd huts. Charlott"' wal' .i ust the sa•1ie.. She told' me many stories 
ab•·llt .America. She lik~d it very much. She was very sorry I had 
not 6 one ther , sh0 said I could have got my education and been 
we .. l trained. But I did all her sewing while I visited her for that 
month. She told me sh·:> could have married twice in America, both 
American negroes. One went to t.he Gold Coast as a missionary and 
the other was a mis:'lionarv too but I do know know where. But 
she did not like the Ne9~r0e s there. They were too ill-tempered, 
ani the:r liked to flght ... sorioething like th".! Zulus.· She liked 
America very much. She told me the people there wer·~ real 
Christians, not .iu.'."t prof ·ssed to be like many of the people herr:: 
but they were reallc' workin,;S for God. She told me ab.-·nt the cold 
which ,_.,as so ba.d a fire di:1 not make you warm, bnt thE> peop) e 
ther · had elt=1ctric stovP.i'.' thP t got red and heated up the houses 
inside to keep yo•.1 warm. She li\ced it ver'T rnuch. And she went 
back twice. The women tbere called her to conventions. One was 
about 1907 or 08, and th'l neJ<:t time was after the first world 
war. That time wbile she ''ras awfly her hu~band. d. ed. He had high 
blood pressure. 
My rrother died of a fever, I do not know wh<>.t kind. 
My f~ther lived a lon~ ti e. Then he went down to the Cape to 
get llP.nry 1 s children. He>it''T went to live with my grandfather 
and he had two children, a boy and a girl. But father could not 
stay there because JU was terribly cold that year, so he came 
away. And he said he thou16 ht it too cld also up in the Transvaal 
and he 1vould wait u11til .Tuly and then the children would come• 
But hA has asthma, and the .Uoctor said he must have ca 116ht cold 
with that because he went home and he died w~thin the month. 
My fatre r had marrie . a .a.in. And I had my stepsister May here 
a~d J.. i·.nnt her to Umzumhl. But when she finished there Doctor 
wanted her for a nurs' because allthe li:uronean teachers told hlm 
how smart she was. And me was too. But whenI wrote to my step-
motl"~er she said she wented May to come home. She said she did not 
want t11ay to get old li\n ns before she got married, beca1JSe me 
want"ld a son-in-law. Ann so I had to send May home. And she 
did get mnrried to a very nice husbann. She l:ll.d two child.ran and 
then she died. Of ch~st trouble. When I went to Johannesburg 
my stepmother was living in Sonhiatown and I looked her up and I 
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said Wher-1 is May, and she naid May is dead. Am I said how did 
she die. And she said she di d of Chrst trouble. And then she said 
that .May was not well after the second child, but her mother in law 
was very strict with her and made her worl< very hard even when sre 
was in that condition. She was very very thin·. And so I said and 
where w:.'s you son-in-Jtaw. And my stepmother said, "In Johannesburg. 
And I said why did he not ~o home.He knew his wife needed to be 
well looked after and sre said, He stayed in Johannesburg beca uee 
he wa:; workino and he sent his money home. And I said but he . should 
have 5one home to see his wife was all rie,ht. And my stepmother said 
You ar~ r14J.t. 
In our n stom when a girl 6et s married, th·:n she belongs to her 
husbands people. °he is suppos.s-0 to stay with his mother for a time 
for a year or until me gets her first child. Wheri she has a dlild 
her husband has to build a house for h;~r, but in the same circle 
and she has to cook for his people and e;.ive them food. But if he 
mi.es, the11 me ra s the rig.ht to go bak to her ovm people if she 
is unhappy. Then if she marries again, her people tell her husband·s 
people, arrl the cattle that are paid for her go to her first 
husband's people, nine if she hi. s had one child, eight if she had 
two children, and so on. 
. 
My stepmother wanted a son in law because she thought she was 
wonderful. 
When I was in England a ver~r silly white man ca.me to me and said 
he would not mind beil1.::.', n·,1rried with me. And I said to him you 
are talkine; nonsense. It is not ri~t for a white and a black to 
mix. God ma.de the white people here and he made tne nu bk ck 
people in Africa all together ani he divided their countries by a 
very very wide river tra t the people could not cross. And so why 
should you talk. that way. I do not like to hear it. There are. many 
very pretty black boys in Aft•ica whenI want to get married. And 
so he laugh! d and went away and did not lX>ther me any more. 
After my father died, th~n Henry's boy died too. His girl went to 
stay wi thPhillip, aro ::he ;~ot married to a Zulu but I have never 
seen· her since. -
It was after my father died that I took my stepsister May. Her 
mother did not want her to get educated but May wanted to go to 
school. And so I told her mother, all my father's children l:a ve 
been educated, a'ld ltiay must go to s cllool also. ~e wm ts to go 
and who are you to soy sh A must get married instead. My father 
would send her and so I will take her now. And then my stepmoth"!r 
did not Ss.y anything. And. I took her. But then she did go back and 
get married when she finished at Umzumbi School. My stepmother 
went to live in Sophia town, and she go l. marri:?'d aeJl.in to a Zulu. 
Amerlia went away to Mafeking during the Boer war be.ck to her 
people, and I never heard of' her again. · 
The first Indian to cor.e to the Adams di~pensar•; was the man from 
Illovo. His accident: a man - they say it wa~ a native but itwas 
reall ·r a white man came in and grabbed h ls wife 1 s j ewellry • You 
know the Indians vd men wear necklaces aroimd theirneck ma.de of 
gold pounds. 'fhey fix it some wa.v with string and they make 
necklaces of money. And this man gra. bbed H. And the old man 
wa ted to fighi~ him, so thls man chopped him to pieces inthe 
head. 'J:'hey said they kne1·1 lt was not a native. His ~rm was 
blacked, but it was a white man's arm. And behind the ears, here 
it was :ihite. The old !T'an said so, and the old ·noman too because 
she was looki~ carefull:r while he was chopping her hus'cand. Then 
shfl screa.m-;d and the ne141b0rs came and this man ran away. And 
his frl"nds broue!,ht th<i old rran to tr.A doctor. A~ thf1 Doctor , 
op<3ra.ted and wanted l1im to stay in tr.e hor-p:l.tr>l. cut the man se.-'-1 
"I• 11 walk, bos:o 11 and tha. .i..loctor said, yo11 will die before Y~ 
get to Illovo. And. the .11an said "I am tired I will sit down. And 
so the doctor asked his frierrl.::i if they conld carry him ontheir 
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backs, an:l then the irdians tallced inindian lan,·uage and the old man 
laU;:!;l::ed and said "I'll w1:1llc 11 boss, but hi.'.' frie~ds said they would 
try. They. walk~d and sat an·J sat and walked a,,d sat, and they 
gave hiM t~:e me-.icine like the Doctor said, and he got to Illovo 
and lived .iust that om ,.,it:;h and in th"' morning he was gone. This 
his frlends came to l;A1) thA Doctor. 
The Indian have much tr 'llbl'l in childbirth J.ik9 the native 'M:lman 
and they ·ake a very J.flrge rwise too. I re P.ni;er one case we had. 
I fl riolet t.:e road. But lhi:o Ind tan woman worlrnd for a Miss Green and 
she ca.I led the JJoctor and asked hi,, to i:,o bocause this woman wa 3 all 
alonr. • . .:..o ·Ne went th er.,. And sh.'1 wn s in a. b_ig bed. And we helped 
her an() .bcr b£lt.•y WRS a ho,r. A11.d tbere wan an old wo1TB.nsittin. the:r.,,. 
Arx:1. VHF•n the be.by ce.me she took it, a>ir1 1oihe pulled his noze, ~ nnd · · 
put 'iJ'.'P I;,. ·rrJb lns:tdc >tr- "1011th .... and pOk'l: i1 .n,, :1n.l I said -.vra t ::i.re 
yo1 1 dot.1._,. i\.l1'i ::;> i.r~ th ls 111.y caste he ls ·iot your c"~·:···. A11.1. 
I am p11ttlne, him ri.:;1it; •.• ~-1 .. ,.,. ~he squeezed the head togetl1er. 
And 1'he to Jr. , e /;~ .. ., ,. ·d·' .,, .;h.i.M 1."'n neV'1P :111ve this soft pJa. ce · 
here on t,op of the h~a·lhr.cRuse they squeeze the bone-" 1~o~·thA,.... 
'1':.~ l 'i. • ·~: b:.11-:.s !'bont. th"\ caste all the tie. I rerne·rber once 
whe'' 1 .,,., ·in :l:lhe '·'·IT' ·ti :1.0,_·:~ :'!o..'l a.11 Indi.RYJ. woman ne,t to me. 
I kn"!"' her. Her husb...\nn WI:>::'· .John,who 11s~r1 I·.~ ·-ro·lr for·B11tche•' .c1nd 
;:l9ns. 1md·.vP, lived t.ogl'.'ther rmt in Sydenham :t11 the old dayfl. A'1d 
one dny :inol;her Ind.i.n.n woino. n cane by to see some other Indian 
pa:ttent and this Indi::i.n wo "an turned to tlv~ side and covered her-
self up. And when this otrer Indian woman - >lb.a was very beautiful 
with lovtil:r c:l othe l'1 .<lnrl .il'Pi'~ls and thick black hair - went out I 
SI• id, Wln 11ld you r. ov Ar' •1011p r:n 1 f, That wo :n n 1 '•o ked so nic A fld 
she s., ·.led and I think she wanted to speak to you. And th.is wormn 
said. "She is not n:y ce.stfl, She is a beef eater." You see some 
of th?.>" do 'lot eat beef because they sav the row is their mother 
beca11:·e the:r drink tbe 111Uk, and if. they eat bP,ef they ar" eating 
ti1eir mother. But I do not know whv she covered herself with this 
'M:lrre n anrl yet she sp eRkl" to me and is my r riend and she knows I 
do not 6 0 'Nithout beef. I think thero must be another reason. 
Perhaps there is a te.dnes." b1~tween tre m. Because this woman was my 
friend an,.i I was not !::er cas1;e. 
Jeena ttlO did not eo.t ireut. Eggs, yes but not meat. Though now 
I thin.-. tnos e gnun,::;er onP- n eat fowls. Some of the Indians even 
eat pork and like it ve r" . uch. 
On'l tim2 I had a ver;r sood friend, an Ind:i.an woman, Kat los, and 
I lik~ d n.~r very 11111ch • She WA s tall a.nd li·~h t complexioned, and 
she wore big earrint.,s an~l rings in her nose too. She was a Mondras 
- the kind that wears a w.oi te mark or ptnkish one on the forehead. 
· ihe wa" very beautif111. And her husband too was a very vet'y nice 
man.He v.orked at a factrr'T• l11ardevu we called him. The~r had two 
girls. She used to 1:-!ak e :"'° curry and food lilcn that but I never 
ate lht. And she even wa."\hed the dishes t.o show me it was ver:r clean, 
but I did not likG 1.t. I c:ould not eat all the oils like that. 
And I don't. like garlic. (Note Rosie's co•·ment ahat Indian wo:re.n 
eat fried ~arlic by th~ handfull when nursi~ a baby because 
thev say it makes milk). After we went to Adams l came one day 
to see .them and the:r wanted me to sleep, but 1 told them I had to 
~o t'.J Pastor lvlakanyas. And th""n 1vhen the d spensary came to Durban 
they were living on Leopolville Street, ani l '.vent to see them. 
She. <:JJ.Ve :ne a bi..;, bowl of rice, uncooked, and told me to <Pok it 
for the cnildren. Aru1 she was sorry because she had not worked that 
week and !md no money to buy mutton to make me a special curry 
al thou r. she did not eat 111eat she would buy it for me• And then 
the ne ""'. t time I went ther: she told me her daughter was getting 
married to someone in Johannesburg. After that they went away 
and. I nid not know whe rA. Someone told me they thought she was 
livin_, w·_th relatives in Umb:i.lo. But I ltllked her very much • 
. I 
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Nimrod e:,o ma.L'ried, and then divorced. He has two children boys 
who are with him. His wife is v0r;r flif!P.ty, danclng, i:arti~a, ali like 
that. At first s:OO said ah~ <1H. not want cl1ildr"ln, that they ar~ a 
nusence. Nimrod fell in lov0 wi.th her because 1'100 is very ga;r and a 
good singer. Then she cace down here and e tho11.~ht she would stay at 
~darr.a, but she did not. Sh'~ :-·· i l i 1-. w H :- t00 r1 ry ther ", s:OO Vil!. a not us~d 
·:o the c.oi.intr;r. 
·rhe next bo;r w .• s Livin,,stone. He went to Itroio .i.•1 t}•c cape. I ~~nt 
him therebe~•:1.1.s0 lt was an a:::,riculture sc.houl. It was just t\,,O months 
before ne fJ.n:1.shed. I t::P r. 11 l~tter from him and he said that he had two 
jobs offered hL-n. One was in N;raaaland, 15 pounds a month, and the 
other was at "1apumulu. So I wrote and told hL1 not to go to Nyaaaland. 
He was too y~n0 • He should ~o t.o i.iap1mulu where m would help hi·:". and 
see him aomet.Lrre s. Ard so I arranged for his nunt - his father' f' ai ater 
the one '\ho lost her huabard- to t;6 and at.ay with him for a while, and 
I bought him some pots and a paraffin stove for hi.in to use.· But instead 
of him comirg home I got a telAgram to say he was nenally ·ill. We were 
all surprised. What was thP. cause of it. But when Igot tlere he said 
"Oh Mother they have -poironed me. Because they were afraid I would t~ke 
their pll ce i:ere. II So then I bro1lgh t him here~ and the Doctor got a . 
specialist, li1r.Smith, t,0 examine hi.:oi. And he said he might get rr er it. 
He said it was just like umhiezo. He asked if I knew. ~iezo - the. t 1s 
when. girls cry ard cry - ar:d he said it was like thS.t and he might get 
over it. But he wasn 1 t cryin;.i;, his eyes were just twitching. But·he did 
not get over it. He got worse. I tried everything, even the native 
cb otora. Ard those Zanzibars. They took five pour:ds but they re v~r dote 
anything. He ·atla.ys said it was because he was poisoned at school. He 
thougjl.t his fAther was tryinll; to poison hh. He woull. come in and if his 
father was eat In.~;, he would not. Mt for fear of poison. So I would dish 
him up fresh fuod o.nd re. wonld 0at that, md then I woo~d eat the food 
I l's. d prep,, red for him that tad the poison in. And he used to help me 
around tr:e hoi se, chop wood., fetch water, do anything I asked him to cb, 
and then he'd say, Old Lady, is there sonething ,r:ore you wmt me to do, 
and I would say No, and so re would say, 11 Then I am going to stroll down 
the street to see Nchan!!>a's people, and tren he would go out, andpret.ty 
soon he would come back. Ant:l one tiire l sent him to that ctJ. urch where 
they say they heal peep le, but when he came back he said, 11Mother those 
people make such a noise thot thP.Y rrake me worse than I em. And I will 
not go a0 ain. 11 And he did not t,O a!:1:13-in. He kn~w he was m~ntally ill. 
The Doctor examired him and he kn"!w that, but he ad.vised me to always 
do mat he wanted and to be verv kind to him. He used to worry me. 
He would come i11to town :l.n the iniddle of the night and knock at the 
hostel and sa:y "Those people they tell me I an, crazy. I do not like them 
You must come home and stay with me. 11 And so I said, 11How can I come 
home. If I come home, \'hat w111 you eat? Who will look after you? Wher "l 
will the mone" come from." So the re xt df:W I would take a tazi and take 
him out, and "-'Y evening he wollld be inhere a:5ain.He wated to stay with 
me. Edward used to help me very •'uch with him. If he came to the hostel, 
I would call Edward to come and take hin to the dispensary and give 
him some fo a:l and put him to sleep there. He would come in, walkall 
the wey from Adams, start out. men the .others want to sleep, and I would 
ask him 11How do you cOire through the cane fields at Isipingo, 11 and he 
said 11 No one can do my any ha rm. They mow I am not alone. Ihave aix-
hors; pa'l er in me. I am strong and w111 knock them down. 11 He didnot 
like to be at Ada.ms with his father and his aunt, his father's sister. 
It was she used to called hi' crazy. He aaidto rre one dFJ;f 11 I'm ~ ing 
to hit that old v.onan one of these days. She treats me like a crazy man 
and I am ''Ct crazy. It is just that people who are jea1. ous of me poisi n 
me and nake me like this. 11 So I would get a tazi and take himhorre ad 
tellhim he must stay the re and l would leave him food and say trere it 
is and I am wasting' a lot of money omi~ in a tazi so you must stay here 
and he would say 11liohoho, as soon as you so away they will take the 
food and eat it all. 11 And he used to walk everywhere. Sometime she 
would go to Umbumbulu to Violet and I d1.d not know it, and s:nnetimea 
I thought !le was there but he wasn 1 t, he had 0 one to Mathlongo to 
visit a boy who was at school with him, Wilf~ed Kuzwayo. I was afraid 
·people would killhim. So I sent him to Mari tzbrug to the asylum. At ~ .,first they made me pay,' 1/6 a day, but after two months l went to see 
i1..<LMr. Chest.er, (John,Chester who used to be in Native ~fairs, a very 
"t"'r nice man) ani he a:'dvised me not to raY it. So I didn t. 'fhen after a 
. · while they let him go because it 10oked as if he were better• So I took 
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him back to Adams. And he planted a big gar den, ne al i es, and cabbage 
and lo ts of things and he to•.'k p;ood· care of it, and I thought 1f he 
was 8P ing to belike this then everything would be all right. But then 
he got v.orse again. Anc: O'le &lnday while Samuel was sitting reading the 
paper he took a big stick a·1d hit Samuel on the forehead ani hit him 
very hard and the blood came, and ro Samual grabbed a stidc ani ·11en t 
after him. And Livi~ stone came rnnning to me and said Oh Mother do 
not let my brother kill me. And Samual,said, I am rot ~oing to kill 
yai • I am gain"' to @.ve you n real thrashiri.g because you hit me. You 
had no business to do that. See this blood? 
Yes. 
Well, why di::l you hit ire. 
I don't know. 
And then everyone came ro me and said, You are keepi~ this boy at home 
and he is· crazy. And then he burned all his clothes, and a bi.!, cl eek. 
I had a bi.:.. dock then and it was ·1few, and he burned it. And so his father 
came an:l alltile others and the;1 ::laid I was the one who held him ard kept 
him from ?}) in-;; to the asylum, and so I let them take him to Bloemfontein. 
I have never seen h 1m since. I ;lust write to tre man whO looks after them 
to see how be is, and he says th.at he is .just the same, n:> better and no 
worse. For a time they used ~o say it looked as if he was improvin~, but 
not any no re • He is .just the same. 
Margaret went to the Umzumbi school, ard then she finished at Marionhill. 
She f!P t her teacher 1 s ce,..,tifica te there. And then she taught. She was 
never interested to becorre a Catholic. Not like Nimrod who had a rosary 
and a book of Catholic prayersbefore I sent him to Othlanga. Margaret 
didn 1 t take to these things. Then she taught, and she is still teaching 
in Johanre sburg - at Sprin ,s. In 1928 she narried a very nice nan, a 
Khumalo. He is a Zulu, but hl.s family went t;o the Free State in the tim 
of the Zulu wars, and be speaks Sesuto well. He is a sergeant in the 
charge ~ffice in the poiice in Sprin~swhere she teachers. Whew. she 
has many children, seven livin6 ard four that died: UBoy, Dtx'ba,UmBube, 
UDriver, Wandile, HoHo, Ugugu, Intombi, - all boys and two g1 rls, and 
dead, thr e boys and on':' 6 irl. The girl mo died was quitebig, she 
came down ard stayed tv.o months with me and then me went home and got 
sick with dysentry and died. 'l'he beys I did not see, they died when . 
they were little. One from convulsions and the other from stomach trouble. 
The 2rd 3rd 5th and 6th di~d. 
I never had my babies in tho. hos ital or had a trained midwife, bee use 
I had my babies very easy. I had a lot· of pal n but they were a3:1 normal 
births and as :,,oonas they we."n. born then I was never sick. So I did not 
go to a hos·.ital. And nowadays they have clinics, inJohannesbu.rg, in 
Durban, ard even at Adams, and here the woiren are very particul r now to 
go to these clinics, and if the;; want to go th'b tho~ital the~r get 
papers frorr. these clinics. Sa.,uel's wife had her two children at 
McCords, a boy and also Goodryn, v.ho is now nursine; there, and t>e other 
boy she had at the Addi"lg t.on. The two children who live w1 tli me now• 
One of them is Goodryn•s child, theboy. The other is like my own.You 
see Marp;aret 1 s yoongest girl came to Adams, and she got i,,to trouble 
When she was only fifteen, she was in Std. 5. So I took the babY, and 
raise her lil:e my own. And h'>.r ·other I 1"ent far away u-p to a Catholic 
school in tile Transvaal, and she is now in Std. 7 •. Goodwyn went to 
Inanda to schOol, and her hns'mnd comes fro there. He is a teacher at 
Umbumbulu, and he comes to see me in the holida;rs and sometine s he takes 
the child to Inanda to visit, and sometL1•es his mother co1re sto visit 
the grandchild too. 
I 
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remand lui vir Eunice op en s~ sy hoer daar is opdromming op die 
parade en dat die polisie gasbonune gooi. 
Klaas bel en s~ dat hy 'n lynonderskep het en 'n vrou hoar s~ het: 
tell the old madam to lock the doors and windows , the hordes are 
marching. 
Eunice en ek praat. Sy s~: madma, ek het nie meer woorde nie 
Sy s~ die kinders s~ die ouer mense het mak geword, hulle aanvaar 
alles, hulle baklei nie meer nie. Nou moet die kinders baklei. 
Sy s~ dit is so. Hulle kan nie meer nie. Sy kan nie eens 
meer na die paskantoor gaan nie. Dit word r.et naar en siek binne 
haar as sy die plek sien. 
Fiaar ouma is gebore in Carnarvon, en kan vertelvan die Boere-
oorlog. Haar ma is na Upington en sy is daar gebore. Sy is op 
Lambertsbaai ge9roud met haarman wat uit die Kaap daar tydelik 
kom werk het. Eaar kinders is in die Kaap gebore. Toein 1962. 
kry hy 'n perrr~t om in die Kaap te bly, maar sy nie. Sy s~ hulle 
het maarlelank elke dag na diekantoor gegaan. Haar man het nagdiens 
by die garage gewerk, dan kom hy soromer van werk af saam met 
haar, dan sit ty op die harde bank heeldag, sommer en slaap. 
Sams word hulle naam geooep en kan hulle ingaan. Meestal loop 
die voete net so op en neer voor hulle verby, asof hulle nie 
gesien word nie. 
Elke keer kry sy 'n week extension, of veertiendae. Niks 
meer. Op die o~ end kon sy nie meer nie, en toe hulle haar 'n keuse 
gee van waar syl<:an gaan - almal na vfeemde plekke, toe kies sy 
maar 'n nuwe voorstad va.1 Oas-London, omdat dit naby 'n stad is 
vir haar kinders se opvoeding. Sy was nog nooit daar gewees nie 
Sy is afgelaai in 'n pasopgerigte vierkamerhuis. ~aar was nie 
strate qf winkels of busse of ander geriewe nie. Sy hetnie die 
menze geken nie. Soggens rnoes die kinders danker begin loop mm 
by die skoal te kom, vyfuur het sy hulle iets gegee om te eet, 
en hulee aangemoedig. Die busse hct ver van hulee begin. Hulle 
" rnoes sewe-uurby die kliniek wees, anders kry hulle nie 'n nonuner 
nie. Winkels was ver se loop. Toe sterf haar man. Ey het 'nsenu-
instorting gehad. 'n Toordokter het horn verkeerde medisyne gegee 
en binne 'n paar dae washy dood. Sy het teruggekom Kaap toe om 
geld te verdien vir haar kinders.~Txlm Die vier jongstes het na 
haar man se broer en ma gegaan by Herschel, die seun het in Oos-
LOndon gebly omte werk. Daar was nie geld vir skool nie, die meisies 
in st. 7 en £, het net op dieland gebly. Die jongste twee het skoal 
gegaan. Toe sterf die broer in die stad en die skoonsuster is nie 
goed vir die kindar2 nie.Na sy by my kom werk het, is hulle terug 
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op skool, maar die seun verdien nog om a.s. jaar terug te gaan. 
Die jongste meisie en die seun se onegte kind het sy na Kersfees 
saam met haar terug§ebring. Die jong seuntjie bly by die broer 
in die huis wat oorspronklik aan haar toegestaan is. Die seun 
van 21 werk en stuur geld vir die susters, en onderhou die broertjie 
en was en kook vir hulee en spaar om a.s. jaar matriek te maak. 
Sy s~: sy het maar aanvaar dat dit die lewe is wat die Hers 
vir haar best em het en da t synie meer kan stry nie. 
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Ek word bewus van 'n vreemde antipatie. Ek het geen meer begeerte 
om met die boek voort te gaan nie. 
Ek het gewus geword van 'n antipatie by haar ook. Dit is asof ek 
meet grawe, uitboor, besonderhede wat ek geen reg op het nie, by haar 
moet uitkrap. 
Ons het waarskynlik nou die punt bereik waar ek nie nader wil gaan 
en sy nie meer wil ontbloot nie. 
Daar is 'n muur nie van onbegrip nie maar van volslae onbegeette 
om te begryp. Vir my is daar iets afstootliks in wat sy aan my moet 
blootle, vir haar in die afbreek van die mure watdaartussen ons moet 
bestaan. 
Miskien kry ek 'n boek en is ek 'n bediende kwyt. 
Maar ek dink dis meer as net die blok of teenstand op menslike 
vlka. 
Die opwinding van uitvind, vangebiede en ervarings'v·eld betree 
wat virmy geheel en al onbekend was, is weg. 
In die massa goed wat voor my l~ is daar 'n bedieiging socs van 
'n kankergroeisel in die liggaam. 
Wil ek die kennis he. My hele psige verwerp dit. 
Dit is vir my onaangenaam om daarmee te werk. 
Anders as wat dit sou wees as ek bv. die lewe van 'n Rooihuid 
of 'n eskirno sou beskryf. 
gevreet aan myself. 
Dit is al die tyd, gedurig, gedurig 'n 
Selfs my omgewing word weggevreet, soos muise kaas, van binne 
vreet. 
Klaas het vanaand die sleutel van haar kamerdeur moes regmaak en 
die deur was oop en ek het ingegaan, wat ek nie van hou om te doen 
nie. Ek hou nie van die ruik, van die vreemdheid, van, hoekom kom 
die woord by my op, van die bedreiging nie. 
Dit kwel my dat diemure swart gerook is, deur wie? ek moet dit 
laat skilder. more. nog 'n steel kry. 'n tafel. Waarom moet die 
toestande waarvan sy vertel in my eie agterplaas voortgeset word? 
My hele begrip van kaffer en meid is aan 't verander. 
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ndrjngbaa1 en Lambertsb~ai 
·roe ans eerste keer daar gekom hat,, ek ;.;e,et nie waffer stasie 
ans afgeklim het, tussen Vredendal en Klawer weet ek nou nie, 
rnaar ans het met 'n bakkie doringbaai toe gekom. en my broer het 
ans daar ontmoet, die wa·i: by my ma se su;;:te!:" was, die een wat nou 
in Ciugletu is, Livingstone. Ek onthou die eerste keer wat ek die 
§ee gesien h:=t1 het e!( voels ges~en op die klippe toe dink ek 
dis mense, toe vra el< vir my broer wat soek die rnense binne in d 
hoop klippe steek: uit die wate;:: co en die 
di.e see wa.n-:. die xflxx;&xxxfil!XX:ti::i::4':xrl±xxxEx:axEx±nxklxzxx1u~x2nx::1xz 
pikk·:wyne sit daarop e~-: was darn ek he gedink dis rnense, toe s~ 
hy dit.: \·oels. c1aar'.'ane1aan gaan ons nou huis toe, na my ma se 
suster toe:, maar t.o.: onsnou Claar kom was sy al he~lmtemal b2eter 
Evlle het in sin!-:hu :.s?. gewoon, ha1:le h:;;t cit genOEom oarrakse, wat 
die:: £abriel<.e v-i:i:: hull.:; gebou h~t, elke mens het een o.i: tw.:e 
kamers gc:11ad, lang huise, aanrnekaar, elke gesin sy eis hu_;_s, 
ande:r:E: een, and::>\--s twee and:rs drie kame:.: . .L:<Ia ses sus·ter ae man 
pro:dikc:mi:, daai tyd el:<.·S mens huis sekry wat da2.r gekoo het, 
fa.brie!c het gegee, toe kry my rr.a wer!;: by die :• abriek en toe moet 
ek saam mst my brcer kos weg·br .:.ng, maar toe ekby di £abrie~<. 
kom, toe ky~~ ek rand en ek sien die water ondei., deur die 
planke, maar toe skr.::e ek want ek get geC.ink ek sal ~ou deu:::: die 
planke val, toe ek op die plan.1<e trap toe wi]<.kel die planke, 
en toe word ek so bang, die £abriek se iiloer bet skeure ingehad 
en die plan!<.e was las, toe skree ek so dat my b:r:oer my rnoet 
uitvc.t want ek wa:"' br.ng ek sal deurv.:l, toe moet my ma kom en 
se hulle moetmy wegvat, aaa:c;;andaan as ek my ma kos wcJring,. 
staan ek ·;er, dan meet my broE:r alleen gaa i. 
I<:annie onthou hoe oud ek was nie, tussen my ma en my ouma. 
nooit' inDoringbaai gaan swem nie, eers die see gewoond geraa.,, 
op lambersbaai met kleurlingkinde·{ s gespeel en seegewoond geraak 
Los my ma se suster daar en kom met boot van Doringbaai na 
Lamberstbaai toe. ons het so seesiekgehad dat ek nie eers 
kg ek was so bang om uit te kyk, ons het op die skuit se eek ge 
sit met komber se om, was wind, was my so naar gewees om op die 
see te wees. ?abriek se skuit, D.baai en L.b. se skuite hetop 
-
en af ge~aan. N:e klein bakkie nie, skuit met mas op, wat vis 
oplaai, seile maar as wind oraait is, sit nie seile nie, regte 
skuit, met enjin. enjinkamer, en driver. was bang op skuit teklim~ 
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Ho'et julle opgeklim. Gaan met bakkie van die wal af. die klein 
boot, met roeiers, dan in bakkie, dan gaan staan bakkie teen (. 
die skuit dan klim jy met bakkie op skuit, rnotorkarwiele hang 
af langs skuit, dan moet jy miskien aan die sku t vang, op die 
wiel trap en dan bo indi..e skuit en diemense help ;julle op, die 
vistermanne help jhu, maar so siek ek en my ma, opgegooi, hulle 
het vir ens emmers gebrinlg, ons kan mos nie oor rand hang nie, 
onsis vroumense, ek 'n kind, met my ma. ons kan die land sien 
toe ons vertrek, maar later niks meer dieland nie, dis mos 
wate die kant en water alkant den weet jy mos nie waarnatoe jy 
gaan nie So sewe jaar oudl,z Cggend gery, c1iesel:.:de dag daar gekom 
kon nie ·;eet het nie. die vistermanne het so rondom ons gestaan 
en ges@ dis seesiek want ons het nie daa~van geweet mens kry 
seesiek nie, hulle het ons gehel( en water ge1:rJ.ng, maarons het 
opgebr~ng. hulle het nie ~i~ge~ang nie, net 'n trip gevat L.b toe 
FJ:Oe h,_t ::,b. gelyk . kan nie meer onthou nie, as jy so seasiek 
gehad h'o-t, hf:t jy lus virnis:.;: as Ij.y by hawe korn. Skuit kom staa 
so teen die jetty, dis nou b_ie rnakliker, daars rnanne wat die 
skuit nadertrek met die toue, laat skuit teen jetty kom, dan 
klim jy af somxner op die jettie. 
---- My ma he-t 1 n fabriekshuis gekry, maar kan nieonthou hoe en v1aar 
nie, kombuis en 'n kamer. n.:ot ek en my ma. Sy kry sorrmer dadelik 
vaswerk by fabriek. maak vis skoon. cleaner;;. daars twee soo::. te 
perke, is pakkers. Sardientjies, kop En S:ert a.Esny, krap 
skowv;e a~, om geblik te word. Pa.~ker:o. pc.k dit in blikkies. Word 
dan in groot sifpot gegooi met wiele aan, ysterpot wat soos 'n 
sif is, hy't wiele, dis om die stoompot in te gaan. baie groat 
baie lank stoompot, 'Jat omtrent vier v~n daai trollies ysterpott 
bree ysterpotte. pak die vis in die blik, sit blikkies netjies i 
ry in tray, dan kom vat diemanne wat dit wegvat na die masjien toe 
wat deksels opsit. daars manne wat die tamatiepaste met 'n lepel 
ingooi, u~t groot blikke, voordat die blikkie na die pakker korn, 
gooi die manne 'n lepel rnpaste in, as dit natural is, gooi hulle 
cu.mi.ks in nie. Eers vis goed skooi:Wtaak:, gooi dit in tray, daars 
.,, 
manne wat dit kom wegvat, dan is daar damrnetjies wat gebou is, 
sementda.."'ltletjies met water, nou word die vis daarin gegooi k in 
die eerste darn, en die anders skep dit uit in tweede dam, die 
anders s~ep dit in derde dam, iomt siftlraye, en dan word dit verby-
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gevat, dan gooi hulle die v s op die pakkerstafel dan pak die 
pakkers dit daarvandaanlin die l>likkies, en daars wee·_ manne 
wat dit wegvat na die rnasjien toe wat die deksels opsit, 
i 
Ek het bietjie daar skoolgegaan, na roomse privat skoal, maar 
toe het ek weer weggegaan na U. maar toe het ans huis daar gebrand 
by U. en toe het ans dit daar weggegaan. my oornpie, hy was lekker 
drank en toe het hy die huis aan brand gesteek, hy wil h~ ons 
moet weggaan met sus Ressie se kinders, dis sy huis, hy wil die 
huis veooop , my ouma se last born. '!'oe is ons weg, ouma 1"1·:;,t 
saamgekom, toe is ans weer na L.b. Ek onthou hy wa. d::aik, daai 
t:yd drank volop, my ma se suster daar by ans, Miet·a, -1an r ... bucht 
ge!<:om, vir ouma kom kuier en tlaa maak my ouma a· tyd 'n gebed 
EruCcZ!xxxxdYJtxl:xm¥ en toe ons nou die aand die gebed maak, toe bid 
my oompie so lank en ek het aan die slaap geraak, en toe ek 
wakker skrik toe bid hy nag altyd, my ourna was lief om pl2t te 
sit, ek was baie lief om by my ouma te sit, nooit anders gesit 
nie, ma en haar suster op stoele. toe sing ans nou en klaargesing 
en gebid, van my ma se £amilie af toe ons, my kinders oak, is baie 
lief vir sing, lekker ges.!..ng, en toe mce- t gebid word, en my oompie 
so lank gebid want hy was drank, ek het aan slaap ga erak en wakker 
geskrik en weer geslaap, later my ouma my gaan neerle, want e:~ 
was a. verstandige kind, en e!c het toe maar gaan slaap en ou mag 
hoo ek my ma sesuster roep, ma, ma die huis brand, toe skrik 
ek ook wa!-cker, toe kon ek die vonke sien deurkom, d5? learner 
begin 1:a rand, toe hardloop hy weg, toe die huis brand, toe my 
i:J-ma en haar suste.rl.hom soek toe die huis brand en die mense kom 
help om die brand uit te sit, toe hardloop hy weg en gaan kruip 
buitekant weg ender ou wa wat agter in d onse jaart gestaan het, 
indie oggend het my ouma horn gaan aankia by die polisse, toe word 
hy gevang en maand gestraf, net buitekamer gebrand, ek onthou hy 
hetnog so baie gehuil en ge~ my ouma moet horn vergewe. 
Toe ans nou weggegaan. Gery met trein van u. stasie, afgeklim 
by Graafwater,, toe werk ma nag altyd in fabriek, broers almal 
by haar, Jackson en Rcb ert en Li1• ingstone. Toe' e t ans daar 
..t.i.r - - .:...- ' """ ..,.c:::;L- ,,..,..,_,. • • . .: -~ • " 
vas§ebly en &ar het ek ook beg n w erk in aebriek, .Lab.1.iek h-t 
de:tienjaarkinders gevat vir cleaners 
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Hoe het jy jou man ontrnoet1 rN Larobertsbaai, deur 'n vriendin ~ 
van my hetek horn ontrnoet,ek het horn nie geken nie, ekhet sy mense 
g:ken,1 sy boetie, s~ oudste boetie en sy vrou, Kleinbooi 
N\sai;ci, hy het op die see gewerk,was 'n visserrnan, hy het naby 
one gebly, toe het sy klein broer nou korn kuier , ek het horn 
gladnie geken nie, rnaar toe het 'n vriendin van my,hulle was 
almal van Eerzchel af, toe was hulle nou so bymekaar, toe't sy 
nou vir my voorgeste. by die man, hy't in LB. in die fabriek 
korn werk as boilerman, om vuur te stook, ,tevore toe hy nog jonk 
~was, het hy op kontrakte uitgegaan aa die suikerlande toe, hy's 
in Eer sche1 gebore en skool,:regaan, hy' s 'n regte xhosa, toe van 
die suik~rlande het hy gegaan hierbo na die plek waar hulle 
kalk werk, ·Taung soes hulle s(;·. eers met kontrakte na Durban 
se kant toe, toe '.i:aung ook met kontra;<::, a daarvandaan toe na :S?,< 
Prieska, eers huis toe, ook op kontra~, Asbestosmyne. toe't hy 
weer huis toe gegaan, toe na sy broer gekom, was toe so 22,24, 
wwet nie seker nie, sy ouers was nie geleerd nie, hulle het alty 
in Hers~hel gebly, nog altyd daar, maar sy p2 is nou oorlede 
Sy oudste broer op see,werk as visserman, sy v~ou se naam is 
''~.:asily. Sy xhosanaam is Dmslotsho, rnaar KleiJ:""hulle is op 
Vrystaat gebore soos my skoonrna s~, skoonma ook in vrystaat 
gebore, daarorn het hy daardie naarn, op plase gewoon. 
Ek kan onthou toe'ek hom gesien het, net gesien, nooit gepraat 
met horn nie, e!<:: bet gewe kby ander iabriek, hy by ander fabriek, 
ek het saaro met hierdie meisie wat ook van Eerszhel, Peziele 
sy was nou my iriendin saam in die factory, tons het van die 
kerk afgekom, sy boeite het na die Methodistkerk gegaan, net 
soos'ons, toe loop ons nou uiFe~~r~erk en gesels. Ek weet nou nie 
hoe kan ek siennie, ek het nis van horn gehou nie, hy't mos van 
H. af gekom, ek was nou nie daardie mense gewoond nie maar ans 
was nou baie lief vir mekaar, eh en die meisiekind, ons het nou 
maar so guy gespeel toe hulle nou met my praat, maar ek het nou 
regtig nie omgegee wat hulle s~ nie, maar toe lateraan toe begin 
skrywe hy nou self briewe,na my toe, hy stuur dit met sy broer 
se kindertjies, skelm, skelm, ek was toe sestien, toe beginne 
raa:.::. ons nou gewoond aan rnekaar, toe's hy nou baie lief 
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om kerk toe te gaan, en elke dag van die kerk af kom, stap ons 
nou saam, en as ons nou klaar gewerk het in diehuis, gaan ons 
nou see toe, dis nou al die meisiekinders en julle boyfriends 
dan stap julle nou langs die see en kom julle terug namiiddag 
voo:.:· di;: son sak, dis maar net 'n handjiehouery enjy' s net 
versigtig vir dieouers, onse ouers mag nou ni die kerel sien nie 
dis 'n skelm besigheid, jy moet dit so wegsteek en as hulle dit 
uitgevind het,dan kry jy nog 'n goeie pak slae. hull· hou nie 
daa!:'van nie, hulle kan nie sien as ek skr}"ve nie, ek s kr~ e as 
ek gaan slaap, dan stuur: ek: dit met my suster.tjies terug, jy mag 
dit nie doen voor jou oaers nie,al \-erte. die kinder:, jy stry 
af, jy't dit nie gedoen nie- Hy was 'n Rcit mannetjie, net bi~tji 
langer as ek, nic dik nie, net 'n mcoi lyEie gehad, ko t hare, net 
soos ek, lig van kleur, ligter as ek, hy't baie smart aange~ek, 
hy wac: 'n baie s]~on man, baie gehou van sy skoon hemde, daai tyd 
was die klere goedkoper, fuans was mos lief vir die vaal broeke, 
daa:i_ tyd was dit mos die: streep suite, die dubbelbreasted suite 
en hy het alle suite gehad as jong man, bet sondag aang~rek, 
alle soorte kleu e wat by su. t p2s, in week ka~<iehemde en broeke 
vir die werk en dan blou overalls bo dieklere, kep gedra in die 
werl<, maar bru:'..n hoed vir dieker:-(, baie liet <;ir bruin hoed en 
bruin streep suit, daa.i. tyd baie lit!lf vi:r to match kler;;. 
smart ~<ort mannetji2, baie gehou •/z.n skoon klere, baie netjies. 
proper X:-,osa gep::aat, kon nie Afrikaans prata t nie, het A. r. 
op Lb. gelaer. Op 'J:ang:. s praat hulle mos di :·anagalo, toe' t my 
xhosa ook bter geraak, ek het mos bietjie op skool geleer en 
op lb. geleer. ' 
Hoe lank het ju/1e mekaar ge·:en voodat julle nou planne gemaak het" 
Ons maak mos nie planne nie, ons is mos anderste, hy't net ges~ 
hy wil met my trou as 'n vrou maar toe het ek mosliewerste gelag 
wantek het gladnie daaraan gedink nie, maar toe pra§!a'8Ximos so, 
as ons bymekaar kom praath ons moet trou, maar ek het nie van 
daardie soorei gehou nie. En toe een oggend staan ons voor die 
husp, dit was ek en Meisie en my twee broers ons staan en sing, 
dit was vroee oggend, Sondagoggend, ons ka~xx~ staan en kam 
ans k.oppe ons gaan nou kerk toe, en ons staan voor die huis en 
Was baie lisf as ans nou bymekaarg~om het sing, staan en §ing, ans 
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sy kan oak Shosa praat 
Meisic het ook Xhosa gesing, haar ma :het by 'n 
saam met 
xhosaman gebly 
Toe staan ans voor die deur en ek sien hier kom sy boetie en \, 
nag twee ander mans en toe skrik ek en rneisie dat ons in die 
huis in hardloop want toe weet ons sommer wat hie~die mense hier 
kom soek, toe kom vra hulle nou vir my EXIna , dit was nou my ouma 
en my ma en my stiefpa, toe korn die rnense, rnaar van skrik het ek 
en meisie in die huis ingehardloop en my broer staan, en het 
sonur,er doodstil gebly, toe's die singery klaar en ons hardloop 
in, toe staan daai mense nou buitekant en hulle we4et nie met wie 
rno~t hulle p~aatnie, wantons is weg, toe praat hulle met hierdie 
broer van my wat nin Guguletu is, en hy kan nie xhoza praat nie 
maar hy kan dit verstaan, en hulle vrawaar's die grootmense en 
hy se die grootmerse is in die huis, toe gaan roep hy nou my ma 
want hulle s_e vir my ma sissie, my broers. 'foe my ma uitkorn toe 
skrik sy ook want sy het nie die mense verATat hier nie, en me 
kom sy ook indie huis in en s~ dieroense meet inkom, ek weet nie 
wat het hulle nou gepraat nie, want ek was ni~ daar nie, maak tee 
en 12at diemense drink, dit was nog vroeg, so negeuur indie some 
en ek het toe ma:xx nou ~ATaad geword want ek weet nie met wie moe 
ek pratat nie, ek en Meisie is nou so oormekaarwante k hou nie 
van die besigheid nie en toe roep rny ma my in en my ourna en my 
ma se suster, die wat nou die juffrou was in die Eth. church en 
hulle vra toe my of ek hi.rdie mannetjie ken, die Ri hard en ek 
stry toe ek ken horn nie, en my ma s~ jy lieg ~y ken horn, ek s~ 
ek ken horn nie, en ek word toe kwaad, en hulle xxxXEB: wo d toe 
met my woelig en hulle s~ jy s~ jy ken nie die roannetjie nie en 
ek sien jou elke dag as jy winkel toe stap, dan stap julle saam, 
en ek word hoe kwaad en ek gaan buitekant toe en ek huil want 
hullE: se jy gaan nou trou met die man, en ek se ek willie die man 
he nie, en hulle se jy qa~n,nou,wys, iy gaan trou met die man. 
,,t.i.. a..::::.t. ~ -- -'-..U-. .tA' >(..'I:;;:" - ~ ~ ""? - ........... - ,,_.., ! 
en toe's dit nou 'n hele troewel besigheid en hulle se jy gaan no 
trou met horn, want ek het regigi ni ged nk ek sal met horn trou 
nie, dit was maar net 'n speletjie en toe is hyserious en ek het 
nie gedink hy sal dit doen om vir my te kom vra nie, want ons 
p!aat dit nie uit nie,as die man hou van jou, ashy gese het hy 
wil jou he,gaah hy sy mense stuur.solank julle net gepraat het 
k h gee nie om om J
0 Y wil trol 
en hy weet jule is lief vir me aar en Y 
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met horn of jy wil nie, hy gaan jou vra jy gaan trou, daai tyd 
was ons bietjie dom.Tcili laat roep my ma my pa se mense watwoon \. ge.LCOI toe 
ook in L.b. want dis nou so indie xhosageloof. as my seun EGX 
toe gaan mo~t ek sy pa se mense roep waantoe gaan. bos toe 
en as die meisie moet trou, al bly ek met 'n ander man, as een 
van my dogters trou, moet ek sy pa se rnense roep, nie hierdie 
man se mense nie, toe laat roep my ma nou my pa se mense, toe s~ 
hull~ die mense mo t weer terugkom. toe'e hulle nou gepraat lobol2 
baesigheid, toe gaan d e besigheid nou voort. Twee manne •1an my 
pa se mense hEt gekom, toe's dio:: stiefpa ook by, maar hy't nie baj 
te s~ nie, hy m<Et. maar sit en luister, in my ouma se huts die 
l;" 
mense het op 'n sondag teruggekom, toe sicn ek horn nog as ons 
nou winkel toe stap, toe*s ek baie ontevrede maar toe's al die 
roense my vriendinne, Mei~ie en Katrina, was nou so bly ooordat 
die man my nou vra om te trou, toe weet ek nie hoe om kop u,t te 
trek nie. Was my eerste boyfriend, ek was nou mos altyd baie 
kinterig. Ey moes m2er as honderd pond betaal. hy't gewerken 
gespaar en s y oudste roers help horn ook. as 'n family ooreenQom 
dan help hulle mekaar hy moet die ge d virmy pa se men£e gee, 
dan gee hulle die geld vi my ma as huliee nou klc-.ar is, hulle 
kan nie my ma roep laat sy op 'n s toel sit en die geld ontvang 
nie,sy mag nie .. hy't nie als gelyk baetaal nie, eenkeer bring 
hytwintig, eenkeer deritg toy hy alles betaal het wat die mense 
wil h~ dan eers kan hy trou, vi horn jaar gevat. ek h~t rneer 
tevrede geword, maar het nie meer uitkomkans nie. Dit wa,i; nou 
ons hobby om see toe te stap, na sondagete stap ons nou almal 
see toe, bru .. n en swa•.::t, dit was lekker om op die klippw te gaan 
sit en die branders te kyk, daar was 'n kafe by Malkcpbaai, ons 
het altyd baie ingegaan en icecreams gekoop, daai tyd,die flair 
rokke gedra en daai checkskirts, 1952, die new look, en doekies, 
maar ons het baie gehou van vleg en kaalkopioep. 
lateraan las die boetie die kerlc, toe begin drink die boekie toe 
gaan hy nou na die gnglican kerk toe op Lb. toe gaan hy weg uit 
my kerk hit, gaan toe vas kerk toe tot ons getroud was, in Xhosa 
die dienste, Anglican kerk daai tyd, StPeters, kleurlinge eerste 
ingegaan in die oggend, na die kleu::.·linge gaan d~- xhosamense 
in want hull2 kon niemekaar verstaan nie. 
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H 5. Kerk is uit in rigting van Grawater se kant. wit gebou, , 
ragte kerk, nie eintlik predikant nie, p edikers Father 
baie wit fathers wat elke maand kom, maar mense gaan elke ~eek. 
Vir die troue maak die meisie amper niks reg as jy ouers het nie 
die ouers gee alles vir jou, koop al~es. my ma het alles koop, 
met lobola~eld, maar met haar eie geld, ook, want sy't geilerk 
in die fabriek en my twee broers het gewer~9 die lobolageld kan 
nie alles daardie goed koop nie, dis klere, ketels, kombuisgoed 
komberse lakens toe't sy vir my 'n kitchendresser gekoop en 'n 
tafel, diebed het dieman ge!loop, ek kon toe niks maak nie, ek 
~ 
het die ge ed vir my ma gegee, die troudatum is nie vir ons om 
ta bes:_uit nie , dis vir die oue•: s, hull.:_ kom so twee driemaande 
bymekecar as hulle die lobolageld bring, d an praat hullew:!er dan 
beslu t huite wat om te doen.maar voor ons getrou het, het eers 
verlowingsring gebr ng, was daai stampring, maar dithet later 
gebreek, toe word daar skaap geslag by my ma se huis, party gehou 
die middag, maar die jongspan h2t toe hele aand p2rty gehou, die 
grootmense het gaan slaap, daai tyd my ma ge~merbier gemaak en 
koek g~bak, mense nog nie soos vir alles nie vandag, koek en tee 
en gemeerbier en vleis, lekker warm dag. maande darna vierof vyf 
getr:>ou. 
oggend getrou, maar voor ans trou, ans mense, die man se mense 
maak 'n choir wat moet sing in diekerk en meisie se mense most ook 
'n chorit het wat moet sing in die kerk, en dan practise hullenou 
want die name word mos dric weke geroep in die kerk en dan practise 
hulle baie hard al daardie drie weke en dan as jy nou kerk toe gaa~ 
jy kan niks virjou doen nie, die men:.;emo<=t a:_t virjou doen, jy w 
word aangetrek, jou hare word reggemaak, hule doen dit self, nou 
I 
moet hierdie twee choirs ~as die man gaan teken moet sy choir sing 
en as ek gaan teken moet my choir sing en dan is daar nou special 
sange wat hulle sing as die pred. die papiere teken, in kerk mag 
hulle nou nie klap nie, kan net sing dan in die kerk daar is nou 
menze watnou judge, watterchoir is nou diebeste, gaan nie prys kry 
net, net points kry, nou probeer elke choir die beste sing. 
As die ker';: nou uit is, dan begin hulle nou v·oor diekerk dan' sn 
dit nou 'n handeklappery en 'n dansery, hulle wil nou nie h~ jy 
moetin • n kar klim nie, ongelukkig het d.~ t gereent die dag toe 
. . t eai: daar nou 'n kar 
ek getrou het, dit was naby diehuis, maar oe m 
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kom vir die wit rok. 'l'P.ourok, wit lang rok, met slu ier, 
dit was gekoop, my ma het ditin die kaap ge:..:oop, hazz lb. se 
mense he.t amper elke naweek kaap toe gekom met bus tot graafwater: 
met trein na Kaapstad.koop alles wat sy nie in lb. kan kry nie 
soos roksmaterial. strooimeisies - :Nogfali, Xhosameisie en my 
oudste broer, nagvfani het vir my gestrooi, en dan nog twee 
ander meisie, Margi, en? sulke klein meisies, lang kantrokkies 
aangehad, hulle wac-; verskriklik oulik, dan dieman h. t ook 'n 
strooimeisie en strooijonker, staan saam voor preekstoel 
reendag, nie wind, warm, net gereent. toe's di~ troue nou vandag 
by ons huis en dan die volgende dag meet jy nou weer diselfde 
aantrek, net soos jy was en can moet julle nou weer van jou huis 
af ( jy slaap by diehuis) en dan die volgende mag rno~t dieman 
nou kom van hulle huis a[(hy gaan weer huis toe eerste aand) 
dan mo.thy wwer kom met sy strooimeisies en strooijonker, en 
dan mo•:t hy jou kom haal, en dan stap julle, dit was nou 'n 
baie le:~eer warm son dag, toe·:.-t die mense nou verskrilllik gedans 
en dit was bc;,ie llteh!k:er. le Julie getrou, dit was in die middel 
v. d. weE!°" , pred .kon net in die week kom, hy' t hier va'1 die kaap 
af gekom, mense het weegebly v.d. werk af. 2e dag weer 'n troue 
by die man se plek, my ma het 'n bees en 'n skaap geslag, my 
man se mense hetook 'n bees en skaap gaeslag, 'n trou ei smos 
'n baie groot ding by ons, brood en bier en brandewyn, dielaaste 
soort bier is daar, dan kan hullenou drink so verhullc wil. 
in de huis die bure help julle om die goed daar neer tesit, 
want die huis word te klein vir julle., in die reent, hulle 
skuil onder s:anbrele, as diemense nou lekker dronk is, hulle 
gee nie om vir die reen nie. Julle sitnouin die huis, ek met 
die strooimeisies, en die anders dans hier in die h ui s, dis 
lekker, die anders gaan in en uit, ja, ek weet nie wat dit was 
nerves of so nie, ek het nie geweetwat gaan om my aan nie, maar 
die tweedagag toe ek na dieman se huis gaan, toe was dit nog n ie 
so lekker duidelik vir mynie, ek weet nie of ek aan die slaap was 
of wat het aangegaan nie, maar die tweede dag toe die son ndergaan, 
daar was sulke klein kindertjies,nou moet jy gaan uittrek, jou 
wit klere, dan moet jy ander klere aantrek, my ma het my so ligte 
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blou voile gekoop, dit was oak lank, sy't dit laat maak by ~ 
'n ounooi daar in lardbertsbaai en 'n blou doekie wat metso 
'n punt agtertoe gehang het, en as jy nou daai goed uittrek 
moet jy no die xhosa klere gaan aantrek, die lang rok en die 
swart doek, van duitse sis, German print, nou moet jy kart 
klein Schotsh tjalie ornsit, dan knoop hulle dit vir jou vas 
hiersovoor, dan is jy nou 'n jonggetroude vroutie, 'n makoti, 
dan, as ons trou, wat ans mense baie strict is, jy mag nieas 
jy indie wit rok is mense kyk en rondkyk en lag ,nee jy moet 
net afkyk, jy mag nie gesels nie, jy moet net so sit, en die 
mense kan nou s~ wat hulle s~, en die ander kan nou remarks se 
jy moet net stilbly, jy mag nie rondkyk en s aamlag nie. al is di i. 
in die kerk, so gou jy die wit rok aan het, jy moet net stil wee: 
jy ma£t. nou ni& lelik wees of kwaad wees nie, jy meet mooi gesig 
h~. die man sit by jou, en hy kan oak ui tstapnou en d an as ljy 
man is wat rook erl. hy kan stilbly, jy moet stilbly, die strooime 
is€es kan praat, jy moet sag antwoord as hulle jou iets vra. 
Die tweede dag het ans na sy mense toe gegaan, hulle het oak 
groat bruilof gehad die hele dag, dieselfde mense wat by my plek 
was, en die twwede dag kom hulle nou oak weer oar. Ek wetE!: nie 
of ek aan die slaap was of wat nie, maar ek w eet nie wat bet 
rondom my gegaan nie, maar ek het eers kon besef wat het ek 
nou in is, toe die son onderraak, want toe gaan die kindertjies 
huis toe, en toe se die ssster van my ,sy was baie jonk, hulle 
se vir haar, kom ans gaan huis toe, maar toe se sy nee ek gaan 
nie huis toe nie, ek gaan saam met my sissie huistoe maar toe 
voel ek soos iemand wat skrik, wat die kind se sy gaan nie huis 
toe, sy gaan saammet sissie huis toe, toe kom ditnou in my 
gedagte ek gaan nie meer huis toe nie, toe huil ek sommer 
toe hmil diekind en toe huil ek saam, toe\l!ord ek nou verskrikli 
hartseer, toe moet die mensenou met my praat, en dan as jy nau 
~xx klaar die lang rok aan het, laatnmiddag, nou's jy makoti, 
en dan word jy nou na die groat huis geneem, waar diegroot mense 
nou sit, groat manne en vroue, in man se huis, van jou mense 
die ou vroue en au manne, en van die man se mense, die au manne 
en ou vroue, nou nyaljalwe, nou word jy vermaan, julle moet 
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oor hoe moetjulle julle gedra en nou word julle ales vertel hoe 
moet julle saamlewe, en nou vertel hulle vir jou julle is nou ander 
soort mense, nuwe mense en die vrouens vertel jy m<etna die man s 
mense kyk en jy moetnou weet jy is hierdie mense se kind, en vir 
~ 
.. 
die man vertel hulle ook hy moet nou weet hy is nou kind van jou 
mense en hy rnoetinspring in enige ding wat hulle oorkorn en dan sQ 
hulle vir jou wat vrou is jy moet nou nie die rnense gaan uitmekaar 
maak, diefarnlly, as jy nou ingekorn het die family uitrnekaar maak nie. 
Dai is nou die hardstepunt in die xhosase trou, want dis no die 
droewigste want nou vetel hulle vir jou sulke woorde day jy huil 
indi.e voorhuis , jy sit langs die tafel met jou strooimeisies en 
strooijonge en almal wat nou behoort, en die ou mense sitnou ronsom 
die hele huis so vol, sit so dat hulle voor jou kan sit. En alles 
wat klere is, watjy nou gaebring het, is hier ,nou word dit so een 
vir een ui~~ehaal , d an moet jou mense nou wys wat jy nou alles 
gebring h~t ,dieman se mense sien daars goed wat kart is, wat hulle 
meen dit moet daarby was, dan complain hulle somrner nou, en as jo 
mense hier is moet hulle nou geld hithaal om die plek vol te maak, 
hulle roep dit op die naam, jou pa se jas, jou skoonpase jas, die 
manse susters moet elkeen iets kry, al is dit 'n doek, hulle noep 
dit op dienaam, dis 'n verskriklike werk, die eenwat virjou klere 
gaan koop moet versrkilik versigtig werk, so werk dat alles daar wees. 
want hulle s~ ons het loboal betaal so ons wil alles h~. My ma 
kannie daar wees nie, sy mat daar wegbly. nou's die baie mense w 
wat gedrink het, weg, nou's ditnet die groot manne envernaamste 
mense wat no sononder hier is, die wat nou vir jou woorde gee en 
vertel hoe moet jy lewe, dis nou die verskrilikste jy moet huil, 
jy voel so seer gat jy amper spyt is hoekom het jy nou getrou. 
en die man, sit nou maar net kop onderstebo, vir almal is dit 
tot die ou mense wat daar sit, voel ook nou seer, want hulle dink 
jy wat diemeisie is weet nou nie watjy nou in beland nie, nou sie 
jy anders huil saam met jou ,kyknou, my dogter wat pregnant is, sy 
weet nie wat sy haar in baeland nie,die grootmense weet, so is di 
ook as jy trou, jy weet nie wat le vir jou voor nie. dit ho miskien 
• n uur of l~unr aan, d aarna is dit nou klaar, dan weer teedrinekery 
en koek eet, dan is die troue nou klaar. Moreoggend kom die mense 
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Dit was net eenkamer huis ,gebou met sinke en planke, my ma thet 
vir my diekitchen dresser gekry, tafel, bed, toe nog stoele, daa 
my man het mooi tu ntjie voor huis gemaak, rnielies, pampoen wortels.· 
in dag kos ~ernaak en weggebring fabriek toe, brood, gebakte vis, 
da:•. kook jy vleis, sornmer da:arsdeur dag vleis gekook, gaan slaghuis 
toe en koop vleis, ander dag kook jy stamprnielies en boontji..es, 
anderdag nunpokos, met dikrnerlk, maar goeoi nie dikmelk in nie, 
hy rnoet by die we:ck ingooi, anders droog dit op. Neen: die melk in 
bottel, in eets wat nie roes nie, altyd ennemelerruner gehad, en 
kos in groat skottel, kan nie net vir jou man kook nie, moet genoeg 
dat alrnal liian saarn eet. ek eet alleen by hu:Es. meis]_,:;; het baie n a 
my toe gekom, roeisie later getroud met kleurlingman. Vi my was 
elkeer om te werk iim fabriek maar my man wil nie he nie, het vic,r 
pond 'n week verdien, daai tyd goed nie so duur nie. vaste werk. 
al is daar nie vis, altyd werk. plek}~i·e klein, vroecl.vDou, au.ma 
_ !-lartha Horings, bnunvrou, man xhosa, cu lMartien l:.orings, misli:ien 
horne, •.lroevrou van al diemcnse daar klinkie!<. toe •gegaan met 
br;.iin nurse, maarin 1-.uis baby ger,ad, voedvrou private, virhaarself 
gewerk, was by my ma toe ek die baby kry, ;in onse geloof moet jy 
na jou ma gaan as jy baby kry, eerste baby S<:untjie sterwex 
Hy lma het hel:!:te v.d. goed '='e~<oop, ens koop mos nou n:Ebaie 
goed nie voor die geboorte nie,, die eerste baba het ek 'n wi·:~ nurse 
gehad, die tweede s-=n ouma Ma.rha :-:rorins;s. sterv;e met kinkhoes · in 
winter op ~'yfmaanc":.2, ck weet nie wat •.·.'as ciaai jaar nie, maar all 
mense met klein&inders l1et afgester.\lll2, 54 , sinkl1uise kou~, kan 
nie s~ was dit swaar in sinkhuise, klam en kO'..lcl. want my ma l:et dan 
al haar babas daar gekry, Gaai jaa~ net 'n ander jaar, alle kind ers 
ste~e, bruin en swart,/begrawe in begraafplaas, hartl:Eer, naam 
Sidwell. 'roe na 2 of 3 maan.de weer pregnant, kry seunjtie, sy 
naam is ombusene, Eng. naam William. by geboorte, naam beteken 
ek is iets te~uggege, busee is iets teiuggekry, een verloor een 
terug, Eng. naam is my ma se van. goed grootc;eword, bly by huis, 
opgepas. toe hy jaar oud was, k.om Kaaptoe. Toe word ans mos daar 
uitgsit. ONs daar was blanke manne wat lokasie toe kom en ons 
s~ die mense moet nou weggaan, daa1 ne so agter koerante nie, ne 
gehoor die mense moet weggaan, moet weggan, twee blanke manne a 
d 
. i·n lokasie en ges~ hulle moet weggaan, en daarn 
hou verga ering 
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toe kom vang hulle die m-::nse verskriklik in dielokasie, die 
vrouens , hulle mo et mos v.eggaan, die mans mcx: t bly en wcrkf 
man kon bly in fabrick maar ek was gelukkig nooit ~e',-an'}, polisie 
het my geken, vrouenS. wat nou vas gewerk het, as werk min is, is 
daar spesiale vrouens wat gehaal word om t~ werk ,aaai is nou nie 
weggeja nie, die wat weggeja is is die wat waq totdat die vis 
nou weer meer is, mcett ~aan na waar hulle vandaan gekom l"L:t, of 
by ander plekke k'aan werksoek, as die vis nie in seisoen is nie, 
nuIJ..e se 
slu t rnense huise to:c:, anders 9aan werk by vnugte 7ulbagh en 
ander plekkc en as hulle terugkom het hulle mie rr.eer hu:5se nie, 
die huise word aan die brand gesteek deur diemunispalitsit, 
die mense was nooit te veel nie, die plek was so groat, toe die 
wet nou sterk word dat die bantoemense moet uitgeroei word uit 
die stede uit, toe "tet .hulle nou ci.i·t vers!cciklik 1:;edoencaar buit 
:cant by LB ::n toe s~ ek no:J v ir rqr. rr:an ek wil m2,a::: ook w,~g;-aan 
want al le mense gaan weg , en ek bnthou, e:=nsla<] het daar 'n poli-
esman gekom vir wie hull:::: se Adonis ,hywas 'n nuwe p. or: r.,::, en 
l:::y het my toe nie geken nie, en hy kovat vir ans, l:y wa~ 'n klerurli. 
hulle kom sommer in die dag as jy wasgoed staan ~n doen 1;-ocr die 
huis en vang jou en vat jou polisiestasie tos, toe se hy waar's 
jou pas , ek s~ ek het nie pas nie, toe se hy jy moet sa.a.."Tc met my 
saan pliesstasie toe, toe sit ek rr.y kind agter die rug en e'.< ·;aa 
saarn, tof.:: ek. b:t"" p. stasie- kom met die ander \: rouens toe is C.aar 
'n pcliesrr.an , .. ,at n·~j;r ken1 to~ vrai1~{ my \vat soeJ..: j~/ f.;.ier_. e~< se \·i··~ 
horn ek is gevani;, toe s~- hy a.g ne.::, gaan huistoe, toe 'Jaan e:-: 
huistoe, toe bly die ander vrouens agter,die vrouesn wat daar gekom 
werk toe. toe gaan ek huis toe, toe's dit nou so aangebly dat die 
mense gevang word, partykeer is dit net dat dieme'."'.Se supper eet 
dan kom die polieswans en l<om vang hulle die vrouens, toe' et ons 
nou lmaar almal weggegaan, my ma ook, die anders het met lorries 
gegaan kaap toe, die anders met die trein, anders wo:a:sester toe, 
anders Tulbagh toe, baie wat ons ge:rnn het het !-!Osselbaai toe gegaan 
my ma is voor my daar weg, Kaap toe. Ek is in 1956, sy 1955, my 
man het daar gebly toe ek na my ma toe kom, en net so kart tydjie 
daarna kom hy agterna, moes sy werk los, want wat kan hy nou d~en 
• 1 eblv -:-et nie 
- ni· e .net die vro uesCl wat nie KOn g -' " 
ek is dan nie aaar 
224 
// 
Appendix II. Eunice N in,tervi,ewed by Elsa Joubert 
,~~~ 
. ~~ 
- l -
Junis, ek kan nie verstaa.n dat jy ·n kerkvrou is nie. Hoe voel jy 
nou oor die Xhosa-geloof, oor die twee? Madam, God die Vader aanvaar 
ons Xhosa's soos ons is. Ons voel al ka.n jy nou ook hoe gelowig 
j.. wees, en jy het nie jou eie geloof gedoen nie, dan het jy die werk half 
gedoen. Kyk ek is n xhosa en my Ma en my Pa, ek weet ook nie of m:/ 
Pa het nie, maar my Ma het my geloof vir my gedoen. Daar was ·n bok 
geslag vir my, en nou as ek dit nie ook vir my kinders doen nie, dan 
is dit mos halwe kinders. Dan het ek die werk half gedoen. En dan 
voel ons ons doen nie sonde nie as ons iets geed doen nie, want 
om ·n bok of n skaap te slag en om bier te maak, ons doen mos nie n vu.il 
werk nie, ons doen n goeie werk, en ons doen dit om baie mense gelukkig 
te ma.ak. Ons voel as baie mense bymekaar kom by jou plek, en goeie 
dinge se en mooi dinge praat, dan voel ons alrnal gelukkig. So voel ons 
God aanvaar ons soos ons is, w2.nt di t is nie sonde~- wat ons gedoen het 
nie. 9ns is Amaxhosa's socs ons nou se, en ons doen ons geloof soos 
Amaxhosa's, en God word gedien deur ons boonop alles. Kyk as jy nou 
vuilwerk doen, tyk as jy nou bedoel om iets vuil te doen bv. 2.s ek nou 
mense nooi en ek wil nou iets aan hom doen - ek gee bv. vir horn gif in 
dc;.n is di t n vuilwerk en God a.anvaar nie vuilwerke nie. JBn het ek mos 
nou sonde gedoen. r.Tas.r as ek nou mense o·'mekaar gemaak het en hulle 
kos gee en bier dan is dit mos nie sonde nie. Ons witmense het so n 
ander idee oor toordokters nou hoe voel die kerk daaroor? Baie mense 
gaan uit die kerk uit as hulle nou wil toordokters word, maar ons as 
Xhoza's gebruik nie die woord toordokters nie. Ons se ama.tyge - dis 
net dokters. Ek weet nie hoekom hulle heeltemal uit die kerk uit gaan 
nie, want ek din..'": nie di t is verkeerd nie. As hy nou die werk klaar 
gedoen het, dan ko:i hy nou terug na die kerk toe . Die dokterwerk self 
is nie sleg nie? .Jie dokterwerk is geed as- hy nie slegte werk daarin 
ho+ ,..,; o 
'.V::>r.-!-. le·> as iv ·n C.okter is k2.n :i:r vuil en goeie werk doen. 
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Dit is soos enige dokter. As h;y jou n ,.injection" wil gee om jou 
· dood te maak, dan gaan .i:r mfi.ar as h;y- j ou wil gesond maak dan word jy 
\ 
gesond. So is dit maar by die Xhosa-dokters ook. Wat ek ook 
g!'E'.ag helderheid oor wil he is dat hulle se so dikwels dat onskuldige 
mense deur hierdie dokters uitgewys word. Se nou daars droogte of 
pc::.rty gaan dood of iemand word siek dan kom hulle en hulle gooi hulle 
dollose en hulle wys onskuldige mense uit. Daar is baie van die mense 
wat ek al van gehoor het, maar ek het dit nog nooit met my eie oe 
gesien het. Kyk ek was n2. ·n dokter toe de.ar in Nranga-East saam 
met my man. Hy het baie in hulle geglo. Ons het baie daaroor 
gestr~1, want ek gaan nou nie vir die nonsens nie. Toe go.an ons na 
die slim man toe, maar die man wa.s nie n Xhosa nie, h~.r was n Mitjano. 
Die man se toe, ek we et nie hoe het hy ge•;verk nie, want h~r het n 
papiertjie gehad en ·n spieeltjie in sy hand en n potlood. Hy se toe 
vir my man hy het iets ingekry in sy land, nie hier in die Kaap nie. 
Hy se toe vir my man dat hy die iets ingekr.f het met kos, en dit 
is n familielid wat dit vir horn gegee het. Dit was toe ek, my m~n, 
my man se broer wat net agter horn is, en ek weet nie meer wie was die 
vierde persoon nie. Ek sit en luister toe so na die nonsens wat die 
man praat, maa.r ek bly toe stil, want die mans wil mos nie he jy moet 
iets se nie. Die man se toe vir my man dat hy horn sal wys dat hy 
die .,poison" uit sy maag uit sal haal. Di t was ·n Vrydag of Saterdag 
wat ons by horn was. Hy se toe vir my man dat hy 11aandag werktoe gaan, 
en as hy Maandagaand van die werk af kom, dan moet hy sy mense roep 
sodat hulle kan sien hoe haal hy die .,poison" uit sy maag uit. 
Toe ons by die huis kom het ek niks gese nie WP..nt dan sal my se ek 
mors nou goeie dinge. Die Maandag toe daag hy nie op Irie. Ons het 
vyf pond by horn gelos. Die Dinsdag toe gaan my manna horn toe. Hy 
se toe dat hy laat van die werk af gekom het, maar hy lieg toe, want 
hy het nie eers ve-:: van ons af gebly nie. 
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Hy kom die volgende s.a.nd toe - sononder - toe moES ons nog 12.mpies aansteek 
sodat dit baie lig kan wees. Ons wou toe nou goed sien. Toe is hierdie 
boetie van my man by ons en hierdie r·.·1:2,iola wat voor my gebl~' het, want 
die mnn het gese ons moet mense roep sodat hulle kan sien wat hy doen. 
Toe is dit nou my man se broer en sy vrou en ek en Livingston. Ek sien 
toe sornmer hoe die ma.n begin bewe en ek sien toe sommer d-?.t hy nie weet 
wat hy kom doen nie. Hy se toe my man moet sy hemp uittrek en voor 
horn ko8 sit op s3r kniee. Hy sn:: hom toe met die ,,bls.de". Dis wat 
ek nou haat. Hy sny toe ·n sny op m;,r man se maag en sit toe so ·n 
haring teen die sny. Hy suig toe Sti::.n die horing. Ek ;·:il toe lag, 
m2.ar ek hou my toe m2.ar in. Hy het gese ek moet ·n glrcspotj ie bring 
om die ,.poison" in te gooi. Hy suig en hy suig en l:op en h.'.t 
'-../.... se: ,.Gm, die poison van jou is darem baie oud en baie sterk, dit wil 
nie uitkom nie." Ek dink toe so by myself c.e.t as ek nou ·n mz.n was 
dan het ek hom nou geskop. Ek en Livingston kyk vir me1raar en :ian 
kyk ons maar weer &.f . Ons wil toe nie pre.at nie, want die Xhosa's 
. .._:_ het ·n woord, a.fotegasy, dit beteken ,jy moet nie prec.t teY".--~,-1 ie:ns.nd 
met medisyne ;•:erk nie. H:r het ·n draa.d.i ie by horn en h;t kran toe iets 
uit die horing uit en hy gooi dit in die piering. ~· s§ toe kom kyk 
net wat kom uit die man uit. Al die mrJ.ns gs.&n toe na'.3.er, m2.c:r el' het 
nie eers ga.an kyk nie. Hy ma2.k toe die ding oop. 
tee, en toe.gaan die man huistoe. H~r se toe h:{ sal ~Neer kom. Toe my 
man se broer-hulle nou weg is toe vra ek vir nom wat dit was. Hy se 
toe nee hy weet nie. Ek wil toe weet hoe hy gevoel het toe die ding 
uitgekom het. Hy se toe nee hy het net gevoel hoe die man suig. Ek 
se toe vir horn dat de.ar niks ui t sy derms sr:=.l ui tkom nie. Ek en hy 
stry toe lekker, w2.nt hy we et ek glo nie aan die mense nie. Ek se 
toe vir horn as d~ar iets uit hom uitgekom het, sou sy der~s stukkend 
geraak het, hy sou ook flou geword het, en hulle sou die wond in die 
hosni taa.l moes toe7;erk. 
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Hy ruik toe }:r;aa.d, V'tant hy dink toe ek spot met horn. Ek se toe 
vir hom dat dc.ai man horn kom ,.rob" het. Wat w~.s dit toe w:::.t hy gese 
het, kom uit jou man uit? Di t het vir my gelyk soos hond- of ka.thare. 
Ek het dit toe goed ondersoek en dit lyk toe om die hare met ghries 
gemeng is sodat dit n bolletjie vorm. Was dit toe in die horing gewees? 
Ja, dit was in die haring. Ek vra toe vir my man ka.n jy dan nie sien 
die man het ·n draad gevat en die ding ui tgekrap nie. Is jy dan so dom? 
Toe verstaan hy. Hy ga.an toe na die man toe en hy se vir horn alles 
wa t ek gese het en hy vra toe s:r RlO_ terug. Daa.i ma.n vr<~ toe vrede 
en toe gee hy die RlO terug. 1!adam v.;eet as hulle se j;y is getoor 
deur jou .,neighbours" dan is dit gewoonlik liegstories. As jy iemand 
haa.t, kan jy nie na die toordokters toe g8.an dat hulle die man toor nie? 
Ek glo gl.?.d nie de.araan nie. Ek het nog nie ,.getr::t" nie, maar as jy 
glo dsn kom dit soos jy dit wil he. Dit is nes ,jy iemand verwens. 
Hoek om mo et :mlle al die kl ere en vere ens. drz? Dit is nou spesiale 
dra.g wat hulle mo et dra. As hulle nou mo et dans dan mo et hulle die 
klere aanb.e. Masr is die dans nie vir die dokter nie, die d:::.ns is 
vir iets anders? Die dans is nou vir die, kyk dit is a.mper SOOS 'n 
kerk. Hulle moet nou b~rmekaar kom. Ek weet nou nie hoe dikwels nie. 
In die lokG.sie is d2'3.r ~mper elke Saterdag n dans vir die dokters. 
Dan dans hulle tot die Sondagoggend toe. 'Ns.t doen :iulle by d.ie dan;a? 
Is daar dan n soort v2.n ·n party? Dit is n party, ek het nie baie kennis 
daarvan nie,' maar hulle dans seker vir die geeste. Hulle se die Xhosa 
mense is baie goed gewaarsku, hulle is b<1ie goed daarin. Ja, baie is 
baie goed, mear baie kan ook lekker lieg. Ek onthou my man was een 
sla.g ook hier na n man in Guguletu. 
·n groot dokter. Hy het ·n mooi k:ar. 
Hulle se toe die Soekino is so 
Hy het toe vir my man ·n bottel 
medisyne gemaak vir sy maag. Hy se toe vir m.y man as hy weer kom moet 
ek saam kom. My man se vriend kom toe da.ar by ons huis en hy vertel 
toe vir horn dat Soekino het gese dat ek die volgende keer moet saam kom. 
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Toe se die man de.t h~r nie vir my moet saa.m neem die Soekino toe nie, 
want daai vrou wat hy nou het is ·n ander man se vrou. Hy ma.ak glo 
so met al die mans wat daar kom. Hy wil net sien hoe hulle vrouens 
lyk en da.n dokter hy die vrou vir homself. r.-ry man is mos n baie 
jaloerse man. H:l het nooi t weer na daai man toe gegaan nie. :!Jaarom ek 
se vir Madc..m da t hulle kan ook baie lieg. 
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Jy wil vir my vertel van Vrydagaand, van Xmas. Vrydagaand het ek 
by die huis gekom toe se my Ma di t is •n bietjie woelig in die lokasie. 
Dit _lyk of die mense wil baklei. Die kinders met die manne van die 
speci~l- quarters. Maak toe nou niks nie. Toe gaan ek nou toe Saterdag 
kerk toe. Ek het toe met my kinders gegaan en toe ons van die kerk 
af kom toe gaan ons na Mantoela se huis toe. Die vriendin van my wie 
se seun nou moet berg toe gaan. Toe ons daar kom, dit was Xmas dag, 
maar daar was baie min mense in die kerk, toe boor ek in die lokasie 
dat die kinders gese bet die mense gaan nie kerk toe gaan nie, maar 
sulke nonsens, madam weet. En toe word die mense nou bang vir kerk 
toe.gaan en die mense het gese die mense moet nie gaan skaap koop nie. 
Kyk dit is toe nou mos Xmas. As jy baie kinders het dan koop jy 
elke Xmas n skaap. En niks Xmas-klere nie, niks skape nie, die mense 
moet vleis in die slaghuis gaan koop en kos. Madam weet, niks trimmings 
nie. Niks parties nie. Die mense noet nou try om te rou vir die 
wat doodgeskiet is. Hulle moet nou nie al die Xmas-party's hou nie. 
Niks skape nie, niks klere, nie n skoen nie, niks wat nuut is nie, net 
kos. Nouja toe hoor ons nou die stories en toe word baie mense bang 
om kerktoe te gaan. Toe gaan ek toe kerktoe met die twee kleinkinders 
van my. ~oe ons in die kerk kom, was daar baie min mense, en ons 
kerk word gewoonlik vol met Kersfees. Die kinders het niks nuwe 
rokke aangehad nie, hulle was bang om nuwe klere te koop. Soos ekself 
het niks nuuts gekoop vir die kinders nie. Dit was nie n lekker kerk 
nie, want die kerk is gewoonlik vol Xmasdag. Toe was dit nou nie so 
lekker nie, want die mense is in angs en ons weet nie wat gaan gebeur 
nie. Ek het toe lekker by Mantoela-hulle se huis geeet en ons sien 
die mense gaan so op en af, en ons voel toe half onrus~ig. Die Xmas 
namiddag, so drie-uur se kant, dit was mos die 25ste, toe sien ek die 
lokasie se mense word so n bietjie woelig. Ons verwag toe iets, en 
die riot-squad is hier op en af. Die kinders en die manne is op en 
af en dis n gewoelery, maar ans weet nou nie watter kant toe gaan die 
ding nou nie. 
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Xmas-namiddag toe sien ons die lokasie se mense kom bymekaar. En 
die manne van die special-quarters kom bymekaar, maar hier naby 
Mantoela se huis was daar nou nie oorlog nie. Toe sien ons die 
mense baklei daar in n ander straat. Maar ons kan nou mos nie daarna 
toe gaan nie. Toe sien ons hoe brand daar 'n gebou. Toe later toe 
brand daar ~ gebou naby Mantoela se huis. Toe slaap jy daar? Ja, 
toe slaap ek daar, want toe is ons nou bang om rond te loop. Die 
Sondag toe hoar ons daar is twee manne van die special-quarters dood. 
En dieselfde Sondag toe sit ans nou maar so, madam weet, ons weet 
nou nie wat gaan aan nie, en oak weet ons nie wat gaan gebeur nie. 
Ek kon toe nie eers na my broer se huis toe gaan nie. En Sondagoggend 
bet ons gevoel dat niemand van ans kan kerktoe gaan nie. Maar toe 
gaan ans nerens nie. toe bly ans net daar by Mantoela se huis. Toe 
kom hierdie James en sy meisie daar na Mantoela se huis toe. Hulle was 
by my huis toe se my Ma ek is by Mantoela se buis. Toe vra hulle 
hoe gaan dit. Ons se toe dit gaan goed, maar ons weet nou net nie 
-· :.- wa t gaan ge beur nie. Toe se hulle: Sussie ons was gisteraand 
net so bang, want hulle was toe daar naby waar gebaklei word. Toe se 
hulle hulle het huistoe gehardloop na James se ma toe. Na Guguletu 
toe. En die Sondagnamiddag toe begin die ding. Toe sien ek die 
lokasie se mense kom bymekaar, een vir een kom bymekaar. Hulle het 
klippe bymekaar gemaak. Net kinders? Nee, kinders en jongmans. 
Dis nou oorlog teen die lokasie se manne, met hulle seuns. En die 
special-quarters se manne met hul jongmanne wat daar bly. Toe sien 
ek n bakkie gaan laai klippe af by die special-quarters. Ek weet 
nie waar het bulle spesiaal gaan klippe haal nie. Stene. Toe kom 
gooi hulle dit daar af en toe sien ek hoe kom hulle bym.ekaar. Hulle 
het wit doekies om die kop, wit lakens om en kieries in die hande. 
En hulle gaan toe tekere daar in die pad en hulle skree vir die manne 
wat hier by ans staan dat hulle daarna toe moet kom. 
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Hulle skree: kom laat ons baklei, en hulle vloek tussen in en die 
ander bier by ons, die antwoord ook. En dan lyk dit of hulle uit..,. 
mekaar is, en dan kom hulle weer bymekaar, maar al die tyd bet die 
riot-squad so tussen bulle deurgery. Eenkeer toe sien ek hoe praat 
die polisie met die manne van die special-quarters, maar ons kon nie 
hoor nie, want ons is tever. Toe sien ek die manne gaan terug in 
hulle huise in. Toe sien ek hulle kom weer bymekaar. Ons is nou 
altyd op die uitkyk, want jy kan sommer voel dat daar nou iets gaan 
gebeur. Ons maak toe maar Mantoela se goed bymekaar, want ek se 
toe vir baar ons het gesien gisteraand hoe dit gebrand het. Jy moet 
nou try om alles bymekaar te kry. My kinders se goedjies wat daar 
was bet ek inn plastic-bag gesit en buitekant gaan sit, sodat as 
die mense miskien kom om die huis te brand, dan is die geed buite. 
Ek en Mantoela bet toe haar meubels uit gedra buite toe, baie mense 
hier in die lokasie bet dit gedoen. Ons was nog so besig om alles 
buite toe te dra, toe kom Mantoela se dogter van die werk af. Sy 
werk in Kenilworth. Toe vra sy wat gaan aan. Toe se ek ons dra die 
goed uit, want dit lyk vir my of daar gaan baklei word. Toe se s.y nee, 
maar die mense is dan nou weg. Toe dra ons toe maar weer die goed in 
die huis in. 
die bakleiery. 
Net toe die dogter van Matoela weggaan, toe begin 
In die straat? Ja in die straat, op die hoek en 
anderkant. Madam weet, special-quarters is so om. En dis die 
lokasie hier' in die middel. En toe begin die groot bakleiery.'I..... Ek 
bet hierdie baba van my after die rug, my seun se dogtertjie. Mantoela 
het n gebreklike kindjie wat nie kan loop nie, dit is haar skoonsuster 
se kind, die kind kan nie loop nie, sy is al sewe jaar oud. Toe 
moet Mantoela hierdie kind op haar rug sit. Sy het ook n ander seuntjie 
van n jaar en 5 maande van n ander vrou wat werk. Daar was toe nog 
n ander kind en toe moes ons nou met al die kinders uithardloop. 
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van die special-quarters is weer terug, madam weet, hulle kom so 
bymekaar, en dan gooi hulle mekaar met klippe en 'n petrolbom, en dan 
is dit 'n geraas en dan gaan hulle weer uitmekaar uit. Dan kom die 
../ lokasie se mense weer terug. Maar hierdie manne wat hier by ons 
se kant gestaan het, het nou gekeer dat hulle nou nie moet inkom en 
die huise kom brand nie. /E,n toe het hulle nou so gebaklei, en toe 
ek weer sien toe is daar nou riot-squad tussen hulle. Toe kry die 
manne kans, hierdie van die special-quarters om in te kom en te kom 
gooi en petrolbomme skiet, want hierdie manne wat hier gestaan bier 
by ons se kant, het toe teruggeveg en toe kon daai manne nie kans 
kry om in te kom nie. Hulle het 'n kans gekry om in te kom toe hulle 
die riot-squad sien. Die riot-squad skiet toe nou die lokasie se 
mense. Hulle los toe die specail-quarters en daarom het Mantoela-
hulle en baie ander mense se huise gebrand. Die polisie het toe 
ingekom, maar 'n mens mag dit nou nie se nie, want jy gaan gevang word, 
en dan moet jy die polisie point, maar hoe kan ~r. hulle point. 
:.;,] 7' 1.. 
Toe het ek en Mantoela uitgehardloop na 'n ander huis toe. Ons het 
daar in die huis ingegaan en vir die kinders gese hulle moet in die 
kombuis ingaan en onder die tafel staan, want die klippe kom nou van 
voor en agter af. En toe brand Mantoela-hulle se blok al klaar, want 
hulle het 'n petrolbom op die huis gegooi. l Wat word toe van haar 
meubels? ~oe haar dogter gekom het, het sy Mandoela se eetkamer 
meubels op haar pa se van gelaai. En Mandoela se groot gramradio 
en goedjies wat sy nog kon gevat het, het sy vir haar pa gese moet 
hy by haar werk gaan sit. Toe gaan Mandoela se man saam 
en toe daarna toe is dit net waar die groot balkeiery toe 
met die dogter 
begin) 
Maar al haar kamerkaste en klere het uitgebrand, en die kamer se 
dak is heeltemal totniet. En toe staan ek en Mantoela in die vrou 
se huis. Die vrou is in die kamer met haar man en Mantoela staan 
toe so skuins voor die venster en toe kom daar 'n yslike klip by die 
venster in. Amper het sy toe die klip in haar gesig gekry. 
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En ans staan nag so, toe kom die klippe deur die kombuisvenster. 
Hierdie kinders van ons was in die kombuis. Toe gooi daai manne 
die kombuisvenster flenters. Toe roep ek die kinders en se hulle 
moet na ans toe kom. Ons het toe maar gedink wat moet gebeur, moet 
nou maar gebeur. Ons weet toe nie waarnatoe nie, want die strate 
is vol van die manne met die wit goeters, en die riot-squad is 
tussen bulle. As die manne van die lokasie probeer om te kom, 
madam weet, as bulle 'n buis sien brand, dan wil hulle kom om die vuur 
te blus, maar dan word hulle geskiet. En ek staan so in die vrou 
se voorhuis en bulle kap toe die deur langsaan oop, maar ek weet 
nie of hulle die deur oopgekry bet nie, want ons is toe in die buis, 
maar toe gaan hulle soos mal mense aan. Hulle bet gespring, hulle 
het alles gedoen en hulle het petrolbomme gegooi. Klippe is gegooi, 
kieries en enige skerpding wat jy op die aarde kan kry ~et hulle in 
bulle hande. Maar die lokasie se manne het ook skerpgoed en petrol-
bomme gehad. Maar hulle kan toe nou nie men to men fight nie, want 
die polisie is toe tussen die special-quarters. En as hulle 'n man 
sien wat so bont aan het soos ek e-n---mad-am... dan skiet hulle horn. Hulle 
bet die manne gemerk met die wit doeke. Hulle skiet hulle nie. 
Toe bet dit nou so aangegaan tot ek later gesien bet dat die polisievan 
weer inkom tussen die manne. Toe roep die polisie die manne bymekaar. 
Toe het die lokasie se manne gou hulle verstand gebruik en TI witlap 
gevat en opgesteek, want toe se hulle ans kan nou nie meer baklei 
nie, want die huise brand en die kinders word vermoor. Die vrouens 
word geslaan en ons kon nie teen die manne veg nie, want die polisie 
help hulle. Toe steek hulle TI wit lap op. Ek het gesien hoe een 
van die riot-squad op die van se neus sit met sy geweer in sy hand. 
Toe sien ek hoe roep bulle die manne bymekaar en toe roep bulle die 
manne van die special-quarters bymekaar en toe se hulle who! who! 
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Vertel m~.r nou wat j;y ka:i onthoLl van die riots wat laas in 11 June" ~egin 
bet? Ja, dit bet mos in June" begin in Soweto, maar eers later hier 
II 
ir. die Kaap. Dit bet in J'-llie begin hier in die Kaap, maar ek het nou 
nie sulke goeie kennis daarvan nie. Ek het maar net gehoor wanneer 
ek by die lokasie kom dat die mense se daar was kinders geskiet en huise 
gebrand. Junis is jou Ma se stiefkinders nog op skool? Herbert? 
Ja. Se vir my wat bet jy gehoor as jy by die loka.sie kom van hierdie 
dinge? Ek bet maar net geboor hoe hulle die bar afgebrand het en 'n 
saal en die poskantoor was afgebrand in Nyanga-East. Ek bet ook geboor 
hoe my Ma vertel het hoe drank was die kin1ers die dag toe ~ie bar afgebre~ 
het. Dit was '-':an:-1etj ies wyn en brandewyn w.'3.t sommerso op die strate. 
Gebree~te bottels. l'Ty Na se die kind.ertjies ven groot tot klein was 
sommer baie drcn~. My T'Ia se di t het soos ·n bioskoop gelyk. Elke mens 
het :,randewyn er: wyn gehad. En toe daarna toe kom die polisie en die 
skietery. Ek weet nou nie hoe laat bulle die bar gebrand het nie, want 
ek was toe nie ~aar nie. Ek dink dit was die eerste dag. Toe kom 
die polisie mos en toe kom skiet hulle. En as jy nou in die naweei<: 
'cy die huis ko!!l? Ons moelikherl was as ons naweke huistoe gaan dan weet 
ons nie of die cus in Nyanga in gaan nie. Dan moet ons nou by die 
St. Josephs Home afklim, daar langs die pad. Partykeer kry ons karre 
wat in die lokasie in gaan en -partykeer gaan ons met die voet .. huistoe • 
.Di t was 'n stywe end. Toe eendag toe ons weer hiervandaan gaan -
van die werk a.t - toe moes die bus nou deur Guguletu ry, toe kon die 
bus nou nie soos gewoonlik Nyanga-East toe gaan nie. Toe klim daar 
seuntjies in die bus. Eulle was so t1issen 1:7 en lll jaar. Toe se 
die udriver" vac: die bus ons moet afkli'.11, want die seuntjies bet nou 
die bus gestop en rn.:.lle se die bus moet nie verder gaan nie. Toe gaan 
ons maar weer met die voet Nyanga-East toe. 
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So het dit nou maar gebly. Elke naweek as ans daar kom dan hoor 
ons daar is mense geskiet en mense gevang. Eendag toe ek by die 
huis kom toe hoor ek Herbert is gevang - Toto is sy Xhosa naam, 
want hy het saam 11 gemarch 11 bier in die stad. Toe se hulle hy is 
'n leier, want wat soek hy tussen die skoolkinders. Maar toe se 
hy hy het stad toe gekom en toe kom die kinders ook. Toe 11march11 
hy saam met hulle. Hulle bet hom bier in die stad gevang. Toe 
las hulle born en toe gaan hy huistoe. Toe word hy weer gevang. 
Ek weet nie wat gebeur bet nie. Toe las hulle hom weer. Toe 
brand die skoolkinders glo n huis daar in Nyanga-East. Dit was 
omtrent so twee maande gelede. Toe gaan die man saam met my Na 
en my stiefpa na een kerk toe, maar hulle het lankal 'n nclash" 
gehad in die kerk, madam weet. Toe sy huis brand, toe se hy 
my broer moes seker saam met die kinders gewees het wat die huis 
aan die brand gesteek het. Toto was drie dae daar en toe gaan vra 
die man by my l"la-hulle omverskoning. Toe se hy dit is nie hy wat 
so gese het nie maar dit is die ander mense. Hulle se dit is seker 
Toto omdat hulle in die kerk n 11 clasb 11 gebad het. Toe ek nou vir 
Toto vra, toe sy hy: 11 nee Sussie ek het 'n 11 gi rl-friend" wat by daai 
manse huis bly." Dit.is nou_nie die manse dogter nie, maar sy 
broer se dogter. Hulle is blykbaar nou jaloers omdat Toto met baar 
uitgaan. Wat het jy vir ~ vertel van die kinders wat SQ teen die 
mense is wat drink? Ja, dit is mos nou juis daarom dat die groat 
/ baklei nou laaste gekom het in die lokasie. Die kinders het gese 
die mense meet ophou drank verkoop in die lokasie. Daai tyd het 
die mense jou gestop en hulle ruik drank dan gee hulle jou n goeie 
pak slae met stokkies. As die oumanne op die strate kom en hulle 
het gedrink dan moet hulle weghardloop vir die kinders, want hulle wil 
weet waar jy die drank gekry het. liulle wil ook weet wie dit'verkoop 
het. Nou is die mense mos bang om te se ons het dit by so-en-so se 
huis gekoop, want hulle is bang daarcfu mense kom in die moeilikheid. 
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Dan kry die grootmense nou 'n pak slae. Die kinders bet dan hoender-
vere by hulle en dan steek hulle die vere in die man se keel in om 
horn te laat opbring. Dan se die kinders jy meet nie weer wyn drink 
nie. Dan stap die man nou huistoe. My oudste broer het lekker 
drank huistoe gekom en toe kry hulle ook vir horn. Toe kom die 
skoolkinders agter hom aan en toe vra hulle:,,Boetie waar bet jy wyn 
gekry?" Toe se hy vir hulle al het hy wyn waar oak al gekry, dit 
is nie hulle besigheid nie. Toe druk hulle ook die veer in sy keel 
af, maar toe los hulle ham maar weer. Hulle bet ham toe 'n ,.warning" 
gegee en gese by mag nie weer drink nie. En toe kom by weer eendag 
drank buistoe. Die kinders loop al agter jou aan, madam weet, jy 
weet nie hulle ,.watch" jou nie. Party speel met die bal in die straat. 
maar al die tyd kyk hulle vir jou wat daar loop met wyn. Of socs 'n 
vrou wat 'n papiersak by haar gehad bet, bet; hulle gevra: 11 Antie maak 
oop die ,,bag" ans wil sien wat daar in is." As jy wyn by jou bet 
dan breek hulle d.it daar op die straat. Nou toe loop hulle agter 
my broer aan - by bet nie geweet bulle 11 watch 11 vir tom nie - toe kom 
,,.x L:.iC. 
gee tulle hom bier by die huis 'n goeie pak slae. Daarna bet hy nie 
weer so baie gedrink nie. En van die drank. ek onthou toe ek die 
Saterdag in die lokasie kom, toe sien ek net geb~eekte bottels. Die 
kinders het toe die mense gaan voorle by die busterminusse en by die 
.j.. • 
s vasie. Hulle het die mense toe mos ,.warnings" gegee, maar dan bring 
die vrouens die drank in hulle 11 sbopping-bags 11 en die mans in bulle 
briewetas. Elke man en vrou wat by die trein afgeklim het, het 
hulle gestop. Een het my gestop op Claremont-stasie. Ek het my 
Checkers-bag by my gehad. Toe se hy ek moet my 11bag 11 • oopmaak, maar 
ek se toe vir horn dat ek nie my sak vir hom sal oopmaak nie. Hy was 
nie een van van die skoolkinders nie. Ek se toe vir hom hy is n OU 
man en ek laat my nie deur hom deursoek nie. Sy maats keer horn toe, 
want hy was dronk. 
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Ek vra toe vir horn waar hy wyn gekry het. Toe sien ek hoe vat hulle 
n ander meisie se wyn. Sy het n bottel whisky gehad. Hulle gooi 
die whisky toe daar op die straat stukkend. Die skollies het toe 
gejoin saam met die skoolkinders. Hulle vat toe kanse. Hulle vat 
dan die wyn by die mense af en dan drink hulle dit self. Maar ek het 
gese jy sal nie my bek oopmaak nie, want jy is drank en ek dra mos nie 
wyn op my nie. As dit n skoolkind was sou ek dit gegee het. Toe het 
die kinders nou so aangegaan met die wyn. en later het hulle die mense 
se venster in die lokasie stukkend gegooi. Die mense wie se venster 
stukkend gegooi is,dit is hulle wat gese he+ hulle sal die kinders wys 
dat hulle nie die wyn sal los nie. Toe se die kinders hulle sal vir 
hulle wys. As hulle wyn in die huis kry. dan breek bulle dit bier in 
die huis. · As jy niks gese bet nie. dan kyk hulle net of daar iets is, 
--- as hulle dan niks kry nie, dan los hulle die huis/ /\ Di t is toe nou 
hoe die groat moeilikheid gekom het, want die manne van die "special-
\; 
quarters" het gese hulle sal nie die wyn los nie. Hulle sal nie vir 
bulle laat ,,rule" deur amma tali mokwe nie, di t is nou 'n vloekwoord. 
As hulle so se dan meen hulle die lokasie kinders is moer kinders. 
Toe se die kinders julle is van die Transkei en die Ciskei en ons 
kin~ers probeer om ons mense reg te help. Die kinders het toe in 
die 11 special-quarters 11 ingegaan en wyn uitgedra, en stukkend gegooi. 
En toe daarna- toe kom die groat moeilikheid die 28ste Desember. En toe 
hoe het jy dit belewe? Toe ek die Vrydagaand in die lokasie kom toe 
se die mense dit is so n bietjie woelerig in die lokasie. My Ma se 
toe dat dit lyk n bietjie woelerig, maar daar het nog niks gebeur nie. 
Die kinders se toe die manne moet ophou drank verkoop, maar hulle wou 
toe nie. Want hulle is nie van die Kaap nie en hulle gaan die Ka.apse 
skollies wys, Madam weet, sulke praatjies. Ek weet toe nie wat het 
gebeur nie, maar Xmas-dag het ek kerktoe gegaan. 
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